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### Impact Wrong usage of the PHP `array_search()` allows bypass of validation. ### Patches The problem has been patched in versions: - v4.4.1 for PrestaShop 1.7 (build number: 7.4.4.1) - v4.4.1 for PrestaShop 8 (build number: 8.4.4.1) - v5.0.5 for PrestaShop 1.7 (build number: 7.5.0.5) - v5.0.5 for PrestaShop 8 (build number: 8.5.0.5) - v5.0.5 for PrestaShop 9 (build number: 9.5.0.5) Read the [Versioning policy](https://github.com/PrestaShopCorp/ps_checkout/wiki/Versioning) to learn more about the build number. ### Credits [Léo CUNÉAZ](https://github.com/inem0o) reported this issue.

# Impact Missing validation on input vulnerable to directory traversal. # Patches The problem has been patched in versions: v4.4.1 for PrestaShop 1.7 (build number: 7.4.4.1) v4.4.1 for PrestaShop 8 (build number: 8.4.4.1) v5.0.5 for PrestaShop 1.7 (build number: 7.5.0.5) v5.0.5 for PrestaShop 8 (build number: 8.5.0.5) v5.0.5 for PrestaShop 9 (build number: 9.5.0.5) Read the [Versioning policy](https://github.com/PrestaShopCorp/ps_checkout/wiki/Versioning) to learn more about the build number. # Credits [Léo CUNÉAZ](https://github.com/inem0o) for reportied this issue.

# Impact Missing validation on Express Checkout feature allows silent log-in. # Patches The problem has been patched in versions - v4.4.1 for PrestaShop 1.7 (build number: 7.4.4.1) - v4.4.1 for PrestaShop 8 (build number: 8.4.4.1) - v5.0.5 for PrestaShop 1.7 (build number: 7.5.0.5) - v5.0.5 for PrestaShop 8 (build number: 8.5.0.5) - v5.0.5 for PrestaShop 9 (build number: 9.5.0.5) Read the [Versioning policy](https://github.com/PrestaShopCorp/ps_checkout/wiki/Versioning) to learn more about the build number. # Credits [Léo CUNÉAZ](https://github.com/inem0o) reported this issue.

### Summary A CORS misconfiguration vulnerability exists in default installations of Strapi where attacker-controlled origins are improperly reflected in API responses. ### Technical Details By default, Strapi reflects the value of the Origin header back in the Access-Control-Allow-Origin response header without proper validation or whitelisting. Example: `Origin: http://localhost:8888` `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: http://localhost:8888` `Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true` This allows an attacker-controlled site (on a different port, like 8888) to send credentialed requests to the Strapi backend on 1337. ### Suggested Fix 1. Explicitly whitelist trusted origins 2. Avoid reflecting dynamic origins

## Summary Strapi's password hashing implementation using bcryptjs lacks maximum password length validation. Since bcryptjs truncates passwords exceeding 72 bytes, this creates potential vulnerabilities such as authentication bypass and performance degradation. ## POC Create an admin user with a password exceeding 72 characters like 85, Log in using only the first 72 characters of the password. Authentication is successful, confirming the issue. Proposed Solution Based on discussions: Add a maximum password length validation (72 characters) during password creation and updates for both Admin and U&P users. Truncate passwords exceeding 72 bytes on the server before passing them to bcryptjs during login. Optionally, issue a warning to users with passwords longer than 72 bytes during login, informing them of truncation. ## Impact This issue affects all Strapi installations using bcryptjs for password hashing. Until resolved, it can lead to: Authentication Bypass: Users may unknowing...

A security vulnerability has been detected in Shazwazza Smidge up to 4.5.1. The impacted element is an unknown function of the component Bundle Handler. The manipulation of the argument Version leads to path traversal. Remote exploitation of the attack is possible. Upgrading to version 4.6.0 is sufficient to resolve this issue. It is recommended to upgrade the affected component.

### Summary It's possible to access any private fields by filtering through the lookup parameters ### Details Using the new lookup operator provided by the document service in Strapi 5, it is not properly sanitizing this query operator for private fields. ### PoC 1. Create a strapi app. 2. Create a content-type 3. In the content-type you make a new entry 4. Go back to the list view 4. Add `&lookup[updatedBy][password][$startsWith]=$2` to the end of your url (All passwords start with $2) see that all entries are still there 6. Add `&lookup[updatedBy][password][$startsWith]=$3` see the entry disappear proving that the search above works ### Impact An attacker can perform filtering attacks on everything related to the object, including admin passwords and reset-tokens. This means that they can gain full access to the strapi instance.

### Summary In Bagisto v2.3.7, the TinyMCE image upload functionality allows an attacker with sufficient privileges (e.g. admin) to upload a crafted HTML file containing embedded JavaScript. When viewed, the malicious code executes in the context of the admin/user’s browser. ### Details The application blocks the uploading of HTML files; however, if the backend detected that the content of the .png file is HTML or JavaScript, the file extension will be automatically converted from .png to .html. When the HTML is viewed, it will execute the JavaScript code. ### PoC Created a html file, renamed the extension to .png, and uploaded the file. It was converted to HTML file in the backend. When opened in another tab, the JavaScript code will execute. <img width="1605" height="702" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/bd9406aa-2380-464f-ac21-32d483639969" /> <img width="1358" height="314" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/e5a64a5a-39fb-4fdb-ad...

### Summary LibreNMS <= 25.8.0 contains a **Stored Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)** vulnerability in the Alert Transports management functionality. When an administrator creates a new Alert Transport, the value of the `Transport name` field is stored and later rendered in the **Transports** column of the **Alert Rules** page without proper input validation or output encoding. This leads to arbitrary JavaScript execution in the admin’s browser. ### Details * **Injection point:** `Transport name` field in `/alert-transports`. * **Execution point:** **Transports** column in `/alert-rules`. * **Scope:** Only administrators can create Alert Transports, and only administrators can view the affected Alert Rules page. Therefore, both exploitation and impact are limited to admin users. ### Steps to reproduce 1. Log in with an administrator account. 2. Navigate to: ``` http://localhost:8000/alert-transports ``` 3. Click **Create alert transport** and provide the following values: ...

The following versions of Spring Cloud Gateway Server Webflux may be vulnerable to the ability to expose environment variables and system properties to attackers. An application should be considered vulnerable when all the following are true: * The application is using Spring Cloud Gateway Server Webflux (Spring Cloud Gateway Server WebMVC is not vulnerable). * An admin or untrusted third party using Spring Expression Language (SpEL) to access environment variables or system properties via routes. * An untrusted third party could create a route that uses SpEL to access environment variables or system properties if: * The Spring Cloud Gateway Server Webflux actuator web endpoint is enabled via management.endpoints.web.exposure.include=gateway and management.endpoint.gateway.enabled=trueor management.endpoint.gateway.access=unrestricte. * The actuator endpoints are available to attackers. * The actuator endpoints are unsecured.