ghsa

### Summary jinjava’s current sandbox restrictions prevent direct access to dangerous methods such as `getClass()`, and block instantiation of Class objects. However, these protections can be bypassed. By using mapper.getTypeFactory().constructFromCanonical(), it is possible to instruct the underlying ObjectMapper to deserialize attacker-controlled input into arbitrary classes. This enables the creation of semi-arbitrary class instances without directly invoking restricted methods or class literals. As a result, an attacker can escape the sandbox and instantiate classes such as java.net.URL, opening up the ability to access local files and URLs(e.g., file:///etc/passwd). With further chaining, this primitive can potentially lead to remote code execution (RCE). ### Details jinjava templates expose a built-in variable `____int3rpr3t3r____`, which provides direct access to the jinjavaInterpreter instance. This variable was previously abused (see [Add interpreter to blacklist](https:/...

### Impact DragonFly2 uses the os.MkdirAll function to create certain directory paths with specific access permissions. This function does not perform any permission checks when a given directory path already exists. This allows a local attacker to create a directory to be used later by DragonFly2 with broad permissions before DragonFly2 does so, potentially allowing the attacker to tamper with the files. Eve has unprivileged access to the machine where Alice uses DragonFly2. Eve watches the commands executed by Alice and introduces new directories/paths with 0777 permissions before DragonFly2 does so. Eve can then delete and forge files in that directory to change the results of further commands executed by Alice. ### Patches - Dragonfy v2.1.0 and above. ### Workarounds There are no effective workarounds, beyond upgrading. ### References A third party security audit was performed by Trail of Bits, you can see the [full report](https://github.com/dragonflyoss/dragonfly/blob/mai...

### Impact The processPieceFromSource method (figure 4.1) is part of a task processing mechanism. The method writes pieces of data to storage, updating a Task structure along the way. The method does not update the structure’s usedTraffic field, because an uninitialized variable n is used as a guard to the AddTraffic method call, instead of the result.Size variable. ```golang var n int64 result.Size, err = pt.GetStorage().WritePiece([skipped]) result.FinishTime = time.Now().UnixNano() if n > 0 { pt.AddTraffic(uint64(n)) } ``` A task is processed by a peer. The usedTraffic metadata is not updated during the processing. Rate limiting is incorrectly applied, leading to a denial-of-service condition for the peer. ### Patches - Dragonfy v2.1.0 and above. ### Workarounds There are no effective workarounds, beyond upgrading. ### References A third party security audit was performed by Trail of Bits, you can see the [full report](https://github.com/dragonflyoss/dragonfly/blob/ma...

### Impact The Manager disables TLS certificate verification in two HTTP clients (figures 3.1 and 3.2). The clients are not configurable, so users have no way to re-enable the verification. ```golang func getAuthToken(ctx context.Context, header http.Header) (string, error) { [skipped] client := &http.Client{ Timeout: defaultHTTPRequesttimeout, Transport: &http.Transport{ TLSClientConfig: &tls.Config{InsecureSkipVerify: true}, }, } [skipped] } ``` A Manager processes dozens of preheat jobs. An adversary performs a network-level Man-in-the-Middle attack, providing invalid data to the Manager. The Manager preheats with the wrong data, which later causes a denial of service and file integrity problems. ### Patches - Dragonfy v2.1.0 and above. ### Workarounds There are no effective workarounds, beyond upgrading. ### References A third party security audit was performed by Trail of Bits, you can see the [full report]...

### Impact There are multiple server-side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerabilities in the DragonFly2 system. The vulnerabilities enable users to force DragonFly2’s components to make requests to internal services, which otherwise are not accessible to the users. One SSRF attack vector is exposed by the Manager’s API. The API allows users to create jobs. When creating a Preheat type of a job, users provide a URL that the Manager connects to (see figures 2.1–2.3). The URL is weakly validated, and so users can trick the Manager into sending HTTP requests to services that are in the Manager’s local network. ```golang func (p *preheat) CreatePreheat(ctx context.Context, schedulers []models.Scheduler, json types.PreheatArgs) (*internaljob.GroupJobState, error) { [skipped] url := json.URL [skipped] // Generate download files var files []internaljob.PreheatRequest switch PreheatType(json.Type) { case PreheatImageType: // Parse image manifest url s...

### Impact The /api/v1/jobs and /preheats endpoints in Manager web UI are accessible without authentication. Any user with network access to the Manager can create, delete, and modify jobs, and create preheat jobs. An unauthenticated adversary with network access to a Manager web UI uses /api/v1/jobs endpoint to create hundreds of useless jobs. The Manager is in a denial-of-service state, and stops accepting requests from valid administrators. ### Patches - Dragonfy v2.1.0 and above. ### Workarounds There are no effective workarounds, beyond upgrading. ### References A third party security audit was performed by Trail of Bits, you can see the [full report](https://github.com/dragonflyoss/dragonfly/blob/main/docs/security/dragonfly-comprehensive-report-2023.pdf). If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, please email us at [dragonfly-maintainers@googlegroups.com](mailto:dragonfly-maintainers@googlegroups.com).

## Summary A path-traversal flaw in the handling of the `X-Zone-Id` HTTP header allows an attacker to cause the application to write files outside the intended storage location. The header value is used to build a filesystem path but is not properly canonicalized or restricted to the application’s storage base directory. As a result, supplying `../` sequences in `X-Zone-Id` causes files to be written to arbitrary directories (example observed: `~/.esmd/modules/transform/<id>/` instead of `~/.esmd/storage/modules/transform`). **Severity:** Medium **Component / Endpoint:** `POST /transform` — handling of `X-Zone-Id` header The vulnerable code is in https://github.com/esm-dev/esm.sh/blob/main/server/router.go#L116 and https://github.com/esm-dev/esm.sh/blob/main/server/router.go#L411 **Impact:** Arbitrary file creation / overwrite outside intended storage directory (file write to attacker-controlled path). Possible remote code execution, persistence, tampering with application file...

## Summary A Local File Inclusion (LFI) issue was identified in the esm.sh service URL handling. An attacker could craft a request that causes the server to read and return files from the host filesystem (or other unintended file sources). **Severity:** High — LFI can expose secrets, configuration files, credentials, or enable further compromise. **Impact:** reading configuration files, private keys, environment files, or other sensitive files; disclosure of secrets or credentials; information leakage that could enable further attacks. Vulnerable code snippet is in this file: https://github.com/esm-dev/esm.sh/blob/c62f191d32639314ff0525d1c3c0e19ea2b16143/server/router.go#L1168 --- ## Proof of Concept 1. Using this default config file that I copy from the repo, the server is running at `http://localhost:9999` with this command `go run server/esmd/main.go --config=config.json` ```json { "port": 9999, "npmRegistry": "https://registry.npmjs.org/", "npmToken": "******" } ```...

### Impact The REXML gems from 3.3.3 to 3.4.1 have a DoS vulnerability when parsing XML containing multiple XML declarations. If you need to parse untrusted XMLs, you may be impacted to these vulnerabilities. ### Patches REXML gems 3.4.2 or later include the patches to fix these vulnerabilities. ### Workarounds Don't parse untrusted XMLs. ### References * https://www.ruby-lang.org/en/news/2025/09/18/dos-rexml-cve-2025-58767/ : An announcement on www.ruby-lang.org

In Jenkins 2.527 and earlier, LTS 2.516.2 and earlier, the log formatter that prepares log messages for console output (including `jenkins.log` and equivalent) does not restrict or transform the characters that can be inserted from user-specified content in log messages. This allows attackers able to control log message contents to insert line break characters, followed by forged log messages that may mislead administrators reviewing log output. Jenkins 2.528, LTS 2.516.3 adds an indicator at the beginning of a line that was inserted as part of log message content: `[CR]`, `[LF]`, or `[CRLF]` (representing the kind of line break), followed by `>` .