ghsa

### Impact ZITADEL uses a cookie to identify the user agent (browser) and its user sessions. Although the cookie was handled according to best practices, it was accessible on subdomains of the ZITADEL instance. An attacker could take advantage of this and provide a malicious link hosted on the subdomain to the user to gain access to the victim’s account in certain scenarios. A possible victim would need to login through the malicious link for this exploit to work. If the possible victim already had the cookie present, the attack would not succeed. The attack would further only be possible if there was an initial vulnerability on the subdomain. This could either be the attacker being able to control DNS or a XSS vulnerability in an application hosted on a subdomain. ### Patches 2.x versions are fixed on >= [2.46.0](https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel/releases/tag/v2.46.0) 2.45.x versions are fixed on >= [2.45.1](https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel/releases/tag/v2.45.1) 2.44.x versio...

1Panel is vulnerable to command injection. This vulnerability has been classified as critical, has been found in 1Panel up to 1.10.1-lts. Affected by this issue is the function baseApi.UpdateDeviceSwap of the file /api/v1/toolbox/device/update/swap. The manipulation of the argument Path with the input 123123123\nopen -a Calculator leads to command injection. The attack may be launched remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. It is recommended to apply a patch to fix this issue. The identifier of this vulnerability is VDB-256304.

### Impact Since version 61.0, there's a vulnerability which allows attaching content of arbitrary files and URLs to a generated PDF document, even if `url_fetcher` is configured to prevent access to files and URLs. ### Patches Fixed by 734ee8e that’s included in 61.2 ### Workarounds - Check that no PDF attachment is defined in source HTML. - Launch WeasyPrint in a sandbox that prevents access to the filesystem and the network.

- Issues: - SCS_14 is allowed on encrypted connection (osdp_phy.c) - No validation for RMAC_I is only in response to osdp_SCRYPT (osdp_cp.c) - Couldn't find anything specific in the OSDP specifications indicating it is forbidden, I'm gussing it shouldn't be allowed according from the secure connection initialization flow (let me know if you think there is spec-rela ted change that should be done) - Attack: - Once RMAC_I message can be sent during a session, attacker with MITM access to the communication may intercept the original RMAC_I reply and save it. - While the session continues, the attacker will record all of the replies and save them, till capturing the message to be replied (can be detected by ID, length or time based on inspection of visual activity next to the reade r) - Once attacker captures a session with the message to be replayed, he stops reseting the connection and waits for signal to perform the replay to of the PD to CP message (ex: by signaling remotly...

### Issue: At ospd_common.c, on the osdp_reply_name function, any reply id between REPLY_ACK and REPLY_XRD is valid, but names array do not declare all of the range. On a case of an undefined reply id within the range, name will be null (`name = names[reply_id - REPLY_ACK];`). Null name will casue a crash on next line: `if (name[0] == '\0')` as null[0] is invalid. ### Attack: As this logic is not limited to a secure connection, attacker may trigger this vulnerability without any prior knowledge. ### Impact Denial of Service ### Patch The issue has been patched in 24409e98a260176765956ec766a04cb35984fab1

Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability in the Django MarkdownX project, affecting version 4.0.2. An attacker could store a specially crafted JavaScript payload in the upload functionality due to lack of proper sanitisation of JavaScript elements.

### Summary This vulnerability allows an attacker with a trusted public key to cause a Denial-of-Service (DoS) condition by crafting a malicious JSON Web Encryption (JWE) token with an exceptionally high compression ratio. When this token is processed by the recipient, it results in significant memory allocation and processing time during decompression. ### Details **The attacker needs to obtain a valid public key to compress the payload**. It needs to be valid so that the recipient can use to successfully decompress the payload. Furthermore in context JWT processing in the v2 versions, the recipient must explicitly allow JWE handling . The attacker then crafts a message with high compression ratio, e.g. a payload with very high frequency of repeating patterns that can decompress to a much larger size. If the payload is large enough, recipient who is decompressing the data will have to allocate a large amount of memory, which then can lead to a denial of service. The original repo...

### Impact An attacker could send a JWE containing compressed data that used large amounts of memory and CPU when decompressed by Decrypt or DecryptMulti. Those functions now return an error if the decompressed data would exceed 250kB or 10x the compressed size (whichever is larger). Thanks to Enze Wang@Alioth and Jianjun Chen@Zhongguancun Lab (@zer0yu and @chenjj) for reporting. ### Patches The problem is fixed in v4.0.1, v3.0.3, v2.6.3

pgAdmin 4 uses a file-based session management approach. The session files are saved on disk as pickle objects. When a user performs a request, the value of the session cookie 'pga4_session' is used to retrieve the file, then its content is deserialised, and finally its signature verified. The cookie value is split in 2 parts at the first '!' character. The first part is the session ID (sid), while the second is the session digest. The vulnerability lies in versions of pgAdmin prior to 8.4 where a method loads session files by concatenating the sessions folder - located inside the pgAdmin 4 DATA_DIR - with the session ID. Precisely, the two values are concatenated using the ['os.path.join'] function. It does not set a trusted base-path which should not be escaped

A user with the permissions to create a data source can use Grafana API to create a data source with UID set to *. Doing this will grant the user access to read, query, edit and delete all data sources within the organization.