ghsa

### Summary Hoverfly’s admin WebSocket endpoint /api/v2/ws/logs is not protected by the same authentication middleware that guards the REST admin API. Consequently, an unauthenticated remote attacker can: - Stream real-time application logs (information disclosure). - Gain insight into internal file paths, request/response bodies, and other potentially sensitive data emitted in logs. ### PoC 1. Start Hoverfly with authentication enabled: ``` ./hoverfly -auth ``` 2. Confirm REST API requires credentials: ``` curl -i http://localhost:8888/api/v2/hoverfly/version ``` 3. Connect to the WebSocket endpoint without credentials: ``` wscat -c ws://localhost:8888/api/v2/ws/logs # Connected (press CTRL+C to quit) # … logs stream immediately … (You would need to send a message to start receiving stream) ``` ``` wscat -c ws://localhost:8888/api/v2/ws/logs Connected (press CTRL+C to quit) > hi! < {"logs":[{"level":"info","msg":"Log level set to verbose","time":"2025-07-20T17:07:00+05:30"},{...

### Impact Due to a special entry being appended to `sys.path` during the bootstrap process of a PyInstaller-frozen application, and due to the bootstrap script attempting to load an optional module for bytecode decryption while this entry is still present in `sys.path`, an application built with PyInstaller < 6.0.0 may be tricked by an unprivileged attacker into executing arbitrary python code when **all** of the following conditions are met: 1. Application is built with PyInstaller < 6.0.0; both onedir and onefile mode are affected. 2. Optional bytecode encryption code feature was **not** enabled during the application build. 3. The attacker can create files/directories in the same directory where the executable is located. 4. The filesystem supports creation of files/directories that contain `?` in their name (i.e., non-Windows systems). 5. The attacker is able to determine the offset at which the PYZ archive is embedded in the executable. The attacker can create a directory (or ...

At startup, Claude Code executed a command templated in with `git config user.email`. A maliciously configured user email in git could be used to trigger arbitrary code execution before a user accepted the workspace trust dialog. Users on standard Claude Code auto-update will have received this fix automatically. Users performing manual updates are advised to update to the latest version. Thank you to the NVIDIA AI Red Team for reporting this issue!

### Impact There is a Cross-Site-Scripting vulnerability when rendering LaTeX math code in contribution or abstract descriptions. ### Patches You should to update to [Indico 3.3.8](https://github.com/indico/indico/releases/tag/v3.3.8) as soon as possible. See [the docs](https://docs.getindico.io/en/stable/installation/upgrade/) for instructions on how to update. ### Workarounds Only let trustworthy users create content on Indico. Note that a conference doing a Call for Abstracts actively invites external speakers (who the organizers may not know and thus cannot fully trust) to submit content, hence the need to update to a a fixed version ASAP in particular when using such workflows. ### For more information If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: - Open a thread in [our forum](https://talk.getindico.io/) - Email us privately at [indico-team@cern.ch](mailto:indico-team@cern.ch)

### Impact A legacy API to retrieve user details could be misused to retrieve profile details of other users without having admin permissions due to a broken access check. ### Patches You should to update to [Indico 3.3.8](https://github.com/indico/indico/releases/tag/v3.3.8) as soon as possible. See [the docs](https://docs.getindico.io/en/stable/installation/upgrade/) for instructions on how to update. ### Workarounds It is possible to restrict access to the affected API (e.g. in the webserver config) which is most likely unused anyway and thus will not break anything. ### For more information If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: - Open a thread in [our forum](https://talk.getindico.io/) - Email us privately at [indico-team@cern.ch](mailto:indico-team@cern.ch)

### Summary Picklescan can be bypassed, allowing the detection of malicious pickle files to fail, when a standard pickle file is given a PyTorch-related file extension (e.g., .bin). This occurs because the scanner prioritizes PyTorch file extension checks and errors out when parsing a standard pickle file with such an extension instead of falling back to standard pickle analysis. This vulnerability allows attackers to disguise malicious pickle payloads within files that would otherwise be scanned for pickle-based threats. ### Details The vulnerability stems from the logic in the scan_bytes function within picklescan/scanner.py, specifically around line 463:[ https://github.com/mmaitre314/picklescan/blob/75e60f2c02f3f1a029362e6f334e1921392dcf60/src/picklescan/scanner.py#L463](https://github.com/mmaitre314/picklescan/blob/75e60f2c02f3f1a029362e6f334e1921392dcf60/src/picklescan/scanner.py#L463) The code first checks if the file extension (file_ext) is in the pytorch_file_extension list. I...

### Summary Picklescan's ability to scan ZIP archives for malicious pickle files is compromised when the archive contains a file with a bad Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC). Instead of attempting to scan the files within the archive, whatever the CRC is, Picklescan fails in error and returns no results. This allows attackers to potentially hide malicious pickle payloads within ZIP archives that PyTorch might still be able to load (as PyTorch often disables CRC checks). ### Details Picklescan likely utilizes Python's built-in zipfile module to handle ZIP archives. When zipfile encounters a file within an archive that has a mismatch between the declared CRC and the calculated CRC, it can raise an exception (e.g., BadZipFile or a related error). It appears that Picklescan does not try to scan the files whatever the CRC is. This behavior contrasts with PyTorch's model loading capabilities, which in many cases might bypass CRC checks for ZIP archives - whatever the configuration is. This dis...

### Summary It has been discovered that the middleware functionality in Hoverfly is vulnerable to command injection through its `/api/v2/hoverfly/middleware` endpoint due to insufficient validation and sanitization in user input. ### Details The vulnerability exists in the middleware management API endpoint `/api/v2/hoverfly/middleware`. This issue is born due to combination of three code level flaws: 1. Insufficient Input Validation in [middleware.go line 94-96](https://github.com/SpectoLabs/hoverfly/blob/master/core/middleware/middleware.go#L93): ``` func (this *Middleware) SetBinary(binary string) error { this.Binary = binary // No validation of binary parameter here return nil } ``` 2. Unsafe Command Execution in [local_middleware.go line 14-19](https://github.com/SpectoLabs/hoverfly/blob/master/core/middleware/local_middleware.go#L13): ``` var middlewareCommand *exec.Cmd if this.Script == nil { middlewareCommand = exec.Command(this.Binary) // User-controlled b...

A Cross Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability exists in Decap CMS thru 3.8.3. Input fields such as body, tags, title, and description are not properly sanitized before being rendered in the content preview pane. This enables an attacker to inject arbitrary JavaScript which executes whenever a user views the preview panel. The vulnerability affects multiple input vectors and does not require user interaction beyond viewing the affected content.

Stored cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in Liferay Portal 7.4.3.45 through 7.4.3.128, and Liferay DXP 2024 Q2.0 through 2024.Q2.9, 2024.Q1.1 through 2024.Q1.12, and 7.4 update 45 through update 92 allows remote attackers to execute an arbitrary web script or HTML in the My Workflow Tasks page.