ghsa

#Fickling's assessment `ctypes`, `importlib`, `runpy`, `code` and `multiprocessing` were added the list of unsafe imports (https://github.com/trailofbits/fickling/commit/9a2b3f89bd0598b528d62c10a64c1986fcb09f66, https://github.com/trailofbits/fickling/commit/eb299b453342f1931c787bcb3bc33f3a03a173f9, https://github.com/trailofbits/fickling/commit/29d5545e74b07766892c1f0461b801afccee4f91, https://github.com/trailofbits/fickling/commit/b793563e60a5e039c5837b09d7f4f6b92e6040d1, https://github.com/trailofbits/fickling/commit/b793563e60a5e039c5837b09d7f4f6b92e6040d1). # Original report ## Summary The `unsafe_imports()` method in Fickling's static analyzer fails to flag several high-risk Python modules that can be used for arbitrary code execution. Malicious pickles importing these modules will not be detected as unsafe, allowing attackers to bypass Fickling's primary static safety checks. ## Details In `fickling/fickle.py` lines 866-884, the `unsafe_imports()` method checks imported m...

# Fickling's assessment `pydoc` and `ctypes` were added to the list of unsafe imports (https://github.com/trailofbits/fickling/commit/b793563e60a5e039c5837b09d7f4f6b92e6040d1). # Original report ### Summary Both ctypes and pydoc modules arent explictly blocked. Even other existing pickle scanning tools (like picklescan) do not block pydoc.locate. Chaining these two together can achieve RCE while the scanner still reports the file as LIKELY_SAFE ### Details Import: GLOBAL pydoc locate (Allowed). Resolution: Call locate('ctypes.windll.kernel32.WinExec'). Execution: Call the result with (b'calc.exe', 1). To bypass the unused variable check an exception object is used, on the assumption that Exception would not be blocked in the future as it is a benign builtin ### PoC ```python import os GLOBAL = b'c' STRING = b'S' BININT = b'K' TUPLE1 = b'\x85' TUPLE2 = b'\x86' EMPTY_TUPLE = b')' REDUCE = b'R' PUT = b'p' GET = b'g' POP = b'0' E...

# Fickling's assessment `cProfile` was added to the list of unsafe imports (https://github.com/trailofbits/fickling/commit/dc8ae12966edee27a78fe05c5745171a2b138d43). # Original report ## Description ### Summary Fickling versions up to and including 0.1.6 do not treat Python's `cProfile` module as unsafe. Because of this, a malicious pickle that uses `cProfile.run()` is classified as SUSPICIOUS instead of OVERTLY_MALICIOUS. If a user relies on Fickling's output to decide whether a pickle is safe to deserialize, this misclassification can lead them to execute attacker-controlled code on their system. This affects any workflow or product that uses Fickling as a security gate for pickle deserialization. ### Details The `cProfile` module is missing from fickling's block list of unsafe module imports in `fickling/analysis.py`. This is the same root cause as CVE-2025-67748 (pty) and CVE-2025-67747 (marshal/types). Incriminated source code: - File: `fickling/analysis.py` - Class: `U...

# Fickling's assessment `runpy` was added to the list of unsafe imports (https://github.com/trailofbits/fickling/commit/9a2b3f89bd0598b528d62c10a64c1986fcb09f66). # Original report ### Summary Fickling versions up to and including 0.1.6 do not treat Python’s runpy module as unsafe. Because of this, a malicious pickle that uses runpy.run_path() or runpy.run_module() is classified as SUSPICIOUS instead of OVERTLY_MALICIOUS. If a user relies on Fickling’s output to decide whether a pickle is safe to deserialize, this misclassification can lead them to execute attacker-controlled code on their system. This affects any workflow or product that uses Fickling as a security gate for pickle deserialization. ### Details The `runpy` module is missing from fickling's block list of unsafe module imports in `fickling/analysis.py`. This is the same root cause as CVE-2025-67748 (pty) and CVE-2025-67747 (marshal/types). Incriminated source code: - File: `fickling/analysis.py` - Class: `UnsafeIm...

A cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerabilities was identified in October CMS backend configuration forms: - **Branding and Appearances Styles** A user with the `Customize Backend Styles` permission could inject malicious HTML/JS into the stylesheet input at *Settings → Branding & Appearance → Styles*. A specially crafted input could break out of the intended `<style>` context, allowing arbitrary script execution across backend pages for all users. --- ### Impact - Persistent XSS across the backend interface. - Exploitable by lower-privileged accounts with the above permissions. - Potential consequences include privilege escalation, session hijacking, and execution of unauthorized actions in victim sessions. --- ### Patches The vulnerability has been patched in **v4.0.12** and **v3.7.13**. Stylesheet inputs are now sanitized to prevent injection of arbitrary HTML/JS. All users are strongly encouraged to upgrade to the latest patched version. --- ### Workaround...

The function `mnl::cb_run` is marked as safe but exhibits unsound behavior when processing malformed Netlink message buffers. Passing a crafted byte slice to `mnl::cb_run` can trigger memory violations. The function does not sufficiently validate the input buffer structure before processing, leading to out-of-bounds reads. This vulnerability allows an attacker to cause a Denial of Service (segmentation fault) or potentially read unmapped memory by providing a malformed Netlink message.

### Impact An attacker who exploits this vulnerability can craft a PDF which leads to possibly long runtimes for invalid `startxref` entries. When rebuilding the cross-reference table, PDF files with lots of whitespace characters become problematic. Only the non-strict reading mode is affected. ### Patches This has been fixed in [pypdf==6.6.0](https://github.com/py-pdf/pypdf/releases/tag/6.6.0). ### Workarounds ```python from pypdf import PdfReader, PdfWriter # Instead of reader = PdfReader("file.pdf") # use the strict mode: reader = PdfReader("file.pdf", strict=True) # Instead of writer = PdfWriter(clone_from="file.pdf") # use an explicit strict reader: writer = PdfWriter(clone_from=PdfReader("file.pdf", strict=True)) ``` ### Resources This issue has been fixed in #3594.

### Impact An attacker who exploits this vulnerability can craft a PDF which leads to possibly long runtimes for actually invalid files. This can be achieved by omitting the `/Root` entry in the trailer, while using a rather large `/Size` value. Only the non-strict reading mode is affected. ### Patches This has been fixed in [pypdf==6.6.0](https://github.com/py-pdf/pypdf/releases/tag/6.6.0). ### Workarounds ```python from pypdf import PdfReader, PdfWriter # Instead of reader = PdfReader("file.pdf") # use the strict mode: reader = PdfReader("file.pdf", strict=True) # Instead of writer = PdfWriter(clone_from="file.pdf") # use an explicit strict reader: writer = PdfWriter(clone_from=PdfReader("file.pdf", strict=True)) ``` ### Resources This issue has been fixed in #3594.

### Summary An authentication bypass vulnerability allows any unauthenticated attacker to forge arbitrary JWT tokens by setting "alg": "none" in the token header. The library's verification functions immediately return `true` for such tokens without performing any cryptographic verification, enabling complete impersonation of any user and privilege escalation. ### Details The vulnerability exists in Sources/JSONWebSignature/JWS+Verify.swift at lines 34-37: ``` public func verify<Key>(key: Key?) throws -> Bool { guard SigningAlgorithm.none != protectedHeader.algorithm else { return true // <-- Vulnerability: returns true without verification } ``` When the JWT header contains "alg": "none", the verify() method returns true immediately without: 1. Checking if the signature is empty or present 2. Validating the token against any key 3. Requiring explicit opt-in from the caller The SigningAlgorithm enum in Sources/JSONWebAlgorithms/Signatures/Signi...

### Vulnerability **Description** --- **Vulnerability Overview** This issue is a command injection vulnerability (CWE-78) that allows authenticated users to inject stdio_config.command/args into MCP stdio settings, causing the server to execute subprocesses using these injected values. The root causes are as follows: - **Missing Security Filtering**: When transport_type=stdio, there is no validation on stdio_config.command/args, such as allowlisting, enforcing fixed paths/binaries, or blocking dangerous options. - **Functional Flaw (Trust Boundary Violation)**: The command/args stored as "service configuration data" are directly used in the /test execution flow and connected to execution sinks without validation. - **Lack of Authorization Control**: This functionality effectively allows "process execution on the server" (an administrative operation), yet no administrator-only permission checks are implemented in the code (accessible with Bearer authentication only). **Vulnerable...