ghsa

### Summary A cache poisoning issue in **Next.js App Router >=15.3.0 and < 15.3.3** may have allowed RSC payloads to be cached and served in place of HTML, under specific conditions involving middleware and redirects. This issue has been fixed in **Next.js 15.3.3**. Users on affected versions should **upgrade immediately** and **redeploy** to ensure proper caching behavior. More details: [CVE-2025-49005](https://vercel.com/changelog/cve-2025-49005)

### Summary Page descriptions are inserted into raw HTML without proper sanitization by the Citizen skin when using the old search bar. ### Details The descriptions, which are unsanitized, are inserted as raw HTML: https://github.com/StarCitizenTools/mediawiki-skins-Citizen/blob/d4dfc3697a82948b3b9c4d44e9a273c79bc86b87/resources/skins.citizen.search/templates/TypeaheadListItem.mustache#L18 ### PoC All of the reproduction methods require the command palette to be disabled via `$wgCitizenEnableCommandPalette = false;`. Additionally, the action API must be used as the Search Gateway via `$wgCitizenSearchGateway = 'mwActionApi';`. #### TextExtracts as the description source * Enable the TextExtracts extension * Add `$wgCitizenSearchDescriptionSource = 'textextracts';` to your LocalSettings.php * Create a page called `CitizenXSSTextExtracts` and insert `<img src="" onerror="alert('citizen search xss')">` into it * Open the search modal and search for `CitizenXSSTextExtracts` ![ima...

## Summary An authorization vulnerability was discovered in the `/rest/executions/:id/stop` endpoint of n8n. An authenticated user can stop workflow executions that they do not own or that have not been shared with them, leading to potential business disruption. ### Impact This is an **improper authorization** vulnerability. While most API methods enforce user-scoped access to workflow execution IDs, the `/stop` endpoint fails to do so. An attacker can guess or enumerate execution IDs (which are sequential and partially exposed via verbose error messages) and terminate active workflows initiated by other users. **Who is impacted:** - Environments where multiple users with varying trust levels share access to the same n8n instance. - All users running long-running or time-sensitive workflows (e.g., using the `wait` node). An attacker with authenticated access can exploit this flaw to: - Disrupt other users’ workflow executions. - Cause denial of service for business-critical automa...

A vulnerability was identified in tarteaucitron.js where document.currentScript was accessed without verifying that it referenced an actual `<script>` element. If an attacker injected an HTML element such as: ``` <img name="currentScript" src="https://malicious.example.com"> ``` it could clobber the document.currentScript property. This causes the script to resolve incorrectly to an <img> element instead of the <script> tag, leading to unexpected behavior or failure to load the script path correctly. This issue arises because in some browser environments, named DOM elements (e.g., name="currentScript") become properties on the global document object. ## Impact An attacker with control over the HTML could exploit this to change the CDN domain of tarteaucitron. ## Fix https://github.com/AmauriC/tarteaucitron.js/commit/230a3b69d363837acfa895823d841e0608826ba3 The issue was resolved by verifying that document.currentScript is an instance of HTMLScriptElement. If not, the script now fa...

### Summary eKuiper /config/uploads API supports accessing remote web URLs and saving files in the local upload directory, but there are no security restrictions, resulting in arbitrary file writing through ../. If run with root privileges, RCE can be achieved by writing crontab files or ssh keys. ### Details ```go func fileUploadHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { switch r.Method { // Upload or overwrite a file case http.MethodPost: switch r.Header.Get("Content-Type") { case "application/json": fc := &fileContent{} defer r.Body.Close() err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(fc) if err != nil { handleError(w, err, "Invalid body: Error decoding file json", logger) return } err = fc.Validate() if err != nil { handleError(w, err, "Invalid body: missing necessary field", logger) return } filePath := filepath.Join(uploadDir, fc.Name) err = upload(fc) ``` - The fc.Name parameter do not safely filtered. ### PoC ``` POST /co...

### Summary Path traversal is also known as directory traversal. These vulnerabilities enable an attacker to read arbitrary files on the server that is running an application. In this case, an attacker might be able to write to arbitrary files on the server, allowing them to modify application data or behavior, and ultimately take full control of the server. ### Details The file handler function trusts the filename provided by the user. This includes the cases when the user uses a path instead of the filename. This makes possible to write arbitrary files to the system and **replace** the files owned by _kuiper_ user on the filesystem. The vulnerable function is `fileUploadHandler` which is shown below: https://github.com/lf-edge/ekuiper/blob/1e6b6b6601445eb05316532f5fbef7f0a863ecfe/internal/server/rest.go#L329-L359 Exploitation of this vulnerability allows an attacker to rewrite the files owned by ekuiper including the main kuiper binaries as they are owned by _kuiper_ user: ![kuip...

## Summary Denial of Service vulnerability in `/rest/binary-data` endpoint when processing empty filesystem URIs (`filesystem://` or `filesystem-v2://`). ### Impact This is a Denial of Service (DoS) vulnerability that allows authenticated attackers to cause service unavailability through malformed filesystem URI requests. The vulnerability affects: - The `/rest/binary-data` endpoint - n8n.cloud instances (confirmed HTTP/2 524 timeout responses) Attackers can exploit this by sending GET requests with empty filesystem URIs (`filesystem://` or `filesystem-v2://`) to the `/rest/binary-data` endpoint, causing resource exhaustion and service disruption. ### Patches The issue has been patched in [1.99.0](https://github.com/n8n-io/n8n/releases/tag/n8n%401.99.0). All users should upgrade to this version or later. The fix introduces strict checking of URI patterns. Patch commit: https://github.com/n8n-io/n8n/pull/16229

An authenticated virtual machine escape vulnerability exists in HashiCorp Vagrant versions 2.4.6 and below when using the default synced folder configuration. By design, Vagrant automatically mounts the host system’s project directory into the guest VM under /vagrant (or C:\vagrant on Windows). This includes the Vagrantfile configuration file, which is a Ruby script evaluated by the host every time a vagrant command is executed in the project directory. If a low-privileged attacker obtains shell access to the guest VM, they can append arbitrary Ruby code to the mounted Vagrantfile. When a user on the host later runs any vagrant command, the injected code is executed on the host with that user’s privileges. While this shared-folder behavior is well-documented by Vagrant, the security implications of Vagrantfile execution from guest-writable storage are not explicitly addressed. This effectively enables guest-to-host code execution in multi-tenant or adversarial VM scenarios.

An authenticated local file inclusion vulnerability exists in Microweber CMS versions < 1.2.11 through misuse of the backup management API. Authenticated users can abuse the /api/BackupV2/upload and /api/BackupV2/download endpoints to read arbitrary files from the underlying filesystem. By specifying an absolute file path in the src parameter of the upload request, the server may relocate or delete the target file depending on the web service user’s privileges. The corresponding download endpoint can then be used to retrieve the file contents, effectively enabling local file disclosure. This behavior stems from insufficient validation of user-supplied paths and inadequate restrictions on file access and backup logic.

### Impact Prior to `ethereum` crate v0.18.0, signature malleability (according to EIP-2) was only checked for "legacy" transactions, but not for EIP-2930, EIP-1559 and EIP-7702 transactions. This is a specification deviation and therefore a high severity advisory if the `ethereum` crate is used for Ethereum mainnet. Note that signature malleability itself is not a security issue, and therefore if the `ethereum` crate is used on a single-implementation blockchain, it's a low/informational severity advisory. ### Patches The issue is fixed in `ethereum` v0.18.0 ### Workarounds You can also manually check transaction malleability outside of the crate. But it's recommended to simply upgrade the version. ### References See PR: https://github.com/rust-ethereum/ethereum/pull/67