In this edition, Bill explores how intellectual curiosity drives success in cybersecurity, shares insights on the IAB ToyMaker’s tactics, and covers the top security headlines you need to know.

Thursday, April 24, 2025 14:00

Welcome to this week’s edition of the Threat Source newsletter. 

"Be curious, not judgmental," Ted Lasso says, misattributing Walt Whitman. We forgive Ted because... well, he's Ted Lasso. 

If you’ve not watched the first season of Ted Lasso, there is a defining moment where Ted confronts a nefarious bully. While putting him in his place with kindness and skill, Ted refers to this quote. It’s a defining moment not only for Ted but for the secondary and tertiary characters in the scene. One of the questions that I'm asked most when public speaking is “How do I get into Talos?” For people considering a new career, it’s “How do I get into cybersecurity?” To all those questions, my answer is "Be curious, not judgmental." 

I think there is no greater skill necessary in security than intellectual curiosity. If you have that, you can learn the rest. The hiring process to get in the door at Talos is extremely challenging and the candidates are incredible. That's why when I interview candidates for various roles in Talos I rarely, if ever, fixate on a niche skillset, instead focusing on the prospective employee’s intellectual curiosity. I ask weird questions that don’t seem related to the specific job role, not in an effort to throw them off but simply because I am curious and hope that they are as well.  

_Do you like to read? Do you ever read books outside of your normal wheelhouse? What are some favorite fiction and non-fiction books? Do you have a favorite craft or hobby? How many different Linux distributions have you installed? What are your 5 favorite board games? Do you play video games, and if so, what are a few favorites from each platform and decade?_   

These kinds of questions help me identify what kind of innate curiosity that the prospective candidate possesses and from their answers we will invariably fall down a rabbit hole while my co-workers shake their heads at me in disdain.  

Beyond that, I always listen for my favorite answer: “I don’t know, but...” There’s no better answer to a very difficult question than “I don’t know, but I’d probably try X,” or “I don’t know, but I’d love to learn...” 

Barbecue sauce.

**The one big thing **

Cisco Talos has released a blog post on the initial access broker (IAB) we call “ToyMaker” — a financially-motivated threat actor. They deploy their custom-made backdoor we call “LAGTOY” and extract credentials from the victim enterprise. LAGTOY can be used to create reverse shells and execute commands on infected endpoints. 

**Why do I care? **

A compromise by LAGTOY may result in access handover to a secondary threat actor. Specifically, we’ve observed ToyMaker hand over access to Cactus, a double extortion gang who employed their own tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) to carry out malicious actions across the victim’s network. Our blog details a timeline with turnaround time from ToyMaker to Cactus. 

**So now what?**

Cisco Talos has released information to help ensure protection including techniques and related IOCs. Check out the blog post for full details.

**Top security headlines of the week **

**Apple says zero-day bugs exploited against ‘specific targeted individuals’ using iOS.** Apple has released new software updates across its product line to fix two security vulnerabilities, which the company said may have been actively used to hack customers running its mobile software, iOS. (TechCrunch)

**Microsoft purges millions of cloud tenants in the wake of Storm-0558.** In an effort to thwart state-sponsored activity stemming from preventable security issues, Microsoft is making significant efforts to purge inactive Azure cloud tenants and take comprehensive inventory of cloud and network assets. (DarkReading) 

**Researchers warn of critical flaw found in Erlang OTP SSH.** The vulnerability could allow unauthenticated attackers to gain full access to a device. Many of these devices are widely used in IoT and telecom platforms. (cybersecuritydrive) 

**CISA flags actively exploited vulnerability in SonicWall SMA devices.** The U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) added a security flaw impacting SonicWall Secure Mobile Access 100 Series gateways to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog, based on evidence of active exploitation. (The Hacker News)

**Can’t get enough Talos? **

*   Talos Takes: Year in Review Special: Part 3 
*   TL,DR: Attacks on identity, and Multi Factor Authentication 
*   Unmasking the new XorDDoS controller and infrastructure

**Upcoming events where you can find Talos **

*   RSA (Apr. 28 – May 1) San Francisco, CA 
*   PIVOTcon (May 7 – 9) Malaga, Spain 
*   CTA TIPS 2025 (May 14 – 15)  Arlington, VA 
*   Cisco Connect UK & Ireland (May 20) London, UK 
*   BotConf (May 20 – 23) Angers, France 
*   Cisco Live U.S. (June 8 – 12) San Diego, CA

**Most prevalent malware files from Talos telemetry over the past week  **

**SHA256: 2462569cf24a5a1e313390fa3c52ed05c7f36ef759c4c8f5194348deca022277**    
MD5: 42c016ce22ab7360fb7bc7def3a17b04    
VirusTotal: https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/2462569cf24a5a1e313390fa3c52ed05c7f36ef759c4c8f5194348deca022277    
Typical Filename: Rainmeter-4.5.22.exe     
Detection Name: Artemis!Trojan  

**SHA 256:7b3ec2365a64d9a9b2452c22e82e6d6ce2bb6dbc06c6720951c9570a5cd46fe5**      
MD5: ff1b6bb151cf9f671c929a4cbdb64d86      
VirusTotal : https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/7b3ec2365a64d9a9b2452c22e82e6d6ce2bb6dbc06c6720951c9570a5cd46fe5    
Typical Filename: endpoint.query        
Detection Name: W32.File.MalParent    

**SHA256: 9f1f11a708d393e0a4109ae189bc64f1f3e312653dcf317a2bd406f18ffcc507**    
MD5: 2915b3f8b703eb744fc54c81f4a9c67f      
VirusTotal: https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/9f1f11a708d393e0a4109ae189bc64f1f3e312653dcf317a2bd406f18ffcc507      
Typical Filename: VID001.exe      
Detection Name: Win.Worm.Bitmin-9847045-0  

**SHA 256: a31f222fc283227f5e7988d1ad9c0aecd66d58bb7b4d8518ae23e110308dbf91**      
MD5: 7bdbd180c081fa63ca94f9c22c457376      
VirusTotal: https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/a31f222fc283227f5e7988d1ad9c0aecd66d58bb7b4d8518ae23e110308dbf91     
Typical Filename: IMG001.exe     
Detection Name: Win.Trojan.Miner-9835871-0

Lessons from Ted Lasso for cybersecurity success

Cisco Talos discovered a sophisticated attack on critical infrastructure by ToyMaker and Cactus, using the LAGTOY backdoor to orchestrate a relentless double extortion scheme.

Introducing ToyMaker, an Initial Access Broker working in cahoots with double extortion gangs

For the third topic for Talos' 2024 Year in Review, we tell the story of how identity has become the pivot point for adversarial campaigns.

Tuesday, April 22, 2025 06:03

For our third focussed topic for Talos' 2024 Year in Review, we tell the story of how identity has become the pivot point for adversarial campaigns.

The main themes of this story are credential abuse, Active Directory exploits, and MFA workarounds. Valid account details was the #1 way attackers got in, and nearly half of identity attacks involved poking at AD. We also look at common MFA missteps (like no enrollment or misconfigured policies) and break down how attackers are bypassing protections with techniques like push fatigue and password spraying.

Take a look at this short but data-rich overview of identity attacks. For defenders, it may be able to help you to identify gaps in MFA implementations, understand the operational tradecraft attackers are using post-authentication, and how to align your defenses with what’s being seen in the wild.

For a 60 second overview, have a watch of this video:

For the full analysis, download Talos' 2024 Year in Review today.

Year in Review: Attacks on identity and MFA

In this week’s newsletter, Thorsten muses on how search engines and AI quietly gather your data while trying to influence your buying choices. Explore privacy-friendly alternatives and get the scoop on why it's important to question the platforms you interact with online.

Thursday, April 17, 2025 14:01

Welcome to this week’s edition of the Threat Source newsletter. 

As we navigate our daily routines, certain tasks become second nature to us, especially if they are integral to our professions. However, what feels instinctive to one person might be foreign to another. This disparity is akin to a skilled musician effortlessly playing a complex melody, while someone without musical training might appreciate the beauty of the music in a different way. Both may enjoy music, but they experience it from different perspectives. 

Lately, I've found myself thinking about these differences in the context of online interactions, particularly with search engines. I've become increasingly frustrated with how they try to influence my buying behavior or try to “enhance” search results with AI. It's often unsuccessful, as many of you have experienced. I once looked up something for my father-in-law and got swamped for weeks after with advertisements absolutely irrelevant to me. 

It's easy to overlook that when using a search engine, the exchange of knowledge is not one-sided. It's not only users who gain knowledge from indexed content, but search engines also acquire detailed insights into user behavior and preferences. You may unknowingly share sensitive information that could be stored for extended periods or shared with third parties for advertising or other purposes. I tried to get around this by shifting to privacy-focused search engines but wasn’t happy with the experience, either because of smaller or different indexes, or I was missing results in my native language. 

Luckily, I came across an open-source project called SearXNG, a “free internet metasearch engine which aggregates results from up to 229 search services. Users are neither tracked nor profiled.” 

I like it for three reasons: 

1.  You can try one of the public instances and check if you like it before you go all-in.
2.  You can self-host it on bare metal, in Docker or LXC, giving you even more control over your data. 
3.  With Opensearch it seamlessly integrates with your existing browser. 

It took me a couple of days to get used to it, but I do really like it now. It’s not perfect, but it is a real timesaver. As a bonus, the search syntax for advanced use is easy to memorize: 

*   “:en”, “:de” or “:fr” to search in a given language 
*   “!social\_media” or “!news” to search just a given category 

The same principle applies to the increasing number of AI and large language models (LLMs) that process your queries — they also gather information about you. There are initiatives like Perplexica on GitHub that aim to bridge the gap for AI-assisted searches, although I haven't explored them in detail. Additionally, if your interactions extend beyond simple searches to more profound inquiries, such as asking an LLM about the meaning of life, it's wise to first assess the trustworthiness of the engine or the company behind it. Care what you share.

**The one big thing **

We are continuing our discussion of Talos' 2024 Year in Review report, looking at each section in detail. This week, let’s examine ransomware.

**Why do I care? **

Ransomware actors overwhelmingly leveraged valid accounts for initial access in 2024, with this tactic appearing in almost 70% of related cases.  

Ransomware actors exploited public-facing applications nearly 20% of the time. The Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog for 2024 lists 28 out of 186 Vulnerabilities as “Known to be used in Ransomware Campaigns” with CVE ID’s all the way from 2012-2024 (except for 2015).

**So now what? **

These are major risks which can be mitigated by applying basic cyber hygiene principles. Please update and patch your software, and protect your credentials. Tune in next week to learn about multi-factor authentication (MFA) and identity threats, and why you need to do more than just enable MFA.

**Top security headlines of the week **

*   **OpenAI cuts safety tests in “reckless” AI push.** According to the article, testing has gone down from six months to just days. We all know that even with six months of testing any model, it’ll never be quite perfect. (MSN) Further compounding this: 
*   **AI-hallucinated code dependencies become new supply chain risk.** “Slopsquatting” (as a spin on typosquatting) has become a thing. Threat actors can check with one or more AI models what packages they hallucinate and upload their malicious ones to PyPI or npm. (BleepingComputer)
*   **Windows Recall seems to be back again.** More privacy-related news. If I recall (pun intended) correctly, in May last year Microsoft introduced Recall — a feature which constantly takes screenshots, indexes them, and makes them searchable for you. After huge backslashes in the community, and the creation of tools like TotalRecall, Microsoft paused the launch last June. (BleepingComputer)
*   **The 25-year-old CVE program seemed to be at risk.** MITRE warned on April 15 that its contract to maintain the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) program expired on April 16. This was big. Just in Q1 about 11,781 vulnerabilities were added (with 415 rejected) to the Database. Stopping this would have caused a lot of trouble. (Krebs on Security) However, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) announced that it had exercised an option to extend MITRE’s contract—reportedly for another 11 months, according to multiple sources.

**Can’t get enough Talos? **

*   **Unmasking the new XorDDoS controller and infrastructure.** Cisco Talos observed the ongoing global spread of the XorDDoS malware, predominantly targeting the United States, with evidence suggesting Chinese-speaking operators are using sophisticated tools to orchestrate widespread attacks. 
*   **Talos Takes: Year in Review Special (Pt. 2).** Azim Khodjibaev and Lexi DiScola join Hazel to discuss some of the most prolific ransomware groups (and why LockBit may end this year very differently to how they ended 2024).

**Upcoming events where you can find Talos **

*   RSA (April 28 – May 1) San Francisco, CA    
*   PIVOTcon (May 7 – 9) Malaga, Spain    
*   CTA TIPS 2025 (May 14 – 15) Arlington, VA    
*   Cisco Connect UK & Ireland (May 20) London, UK  
*   Cisco Live U.S. (June 8 – 12) San Diego, CA 

**Most prevalent malware files from Talos telemetry over the past week  **

**SHA256: 9f1f11a708d393e0a4109ae189bc64f1f3e312653dcf317a2bd406f18ffcc507**   
MD5: 2915b3f8b703eb744fc54c81f4a9c67f     
VirusTotal: https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/9f1f11a708d393e0a4109ae189bc64f1f3e312653dcf317a2bd406f18ffcc507     
Typical Filename: VID001.exe     
Detection Name: Win.Worm.Bitmin-9847045-0 

**SHA256: 2e964c017df8b7d56600a5d68018f9f810a1c7dd3da800b5b5dfe85e9ce6b385**   
MD5: 01b521c78f5bbdaba0cc221bc893e2b8   
VirusTotal: https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/2e964c017df8b7d56600a5d68018f9f810a1c7dd3da800b5b5dfe85e9ce6b385   
Typical Filename: toyboy.exe     
Detection Name: Gen:Variant.Tedy.758566 

**SHA256: 2462569cf24a5a1e313390fa3c52ed05c7f36ef759c4c8f5194348deca022277**   
MD5: 42c016ce22ab7360fb7bc7def3a17b04   
VirusTotal: https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/2462569cf24a5a1e313390fa3c52ed05c7f36ef759c4c8f5194348deca022277   
Typical Filename: Rainmeter-4.5.22.exe    
Detection Name: Artemis!Trojan 

**SHA 256: a31f222fc283227f5e7988d1ad9c0aecd66d58bb7b4d8518ae23e110308dbf91**     
MD5: 7bdbd180c081fa63ca94f9c22c457376     
VirusTotal: https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/a31f222fc283227f5e7988d1ad9c0aecd66d58bb7b4d8518ae23e110308dbf91    
Typical Filename: IMG001.exe    
Detection Name: Win.Trojan.Miner-9835871-0

Care what you share

Cisco Talos observed the ongoing global spread of the XorDDoS malware, predominantly targeting the United States, with evidence suggesting Chinese-speaking operators are using sophisticated tools to orchestrate widespread attacks.

Thursday, April 17, 2025 06:00

*   Cisco Talos observed an existing distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) malware known as XorDDoS, continuing to spread globally between November 2023 and February 2025. 
*   A significant finding shows that over 70 percent of attacks using XorDDoS targeted the United States from Nov. 2023 to Feb. 2025. 
*   The language settings of the muti-layer controller, XorDDoS builder and controller binding tool strongly suggest that the operators are Chinese-speaking individuals. 
*   Talos discovered the latest version of the XorDDoS controller, called the “VIP version,” and its corresponding central controller were used to build the DDoS bot network for more sophisticated and widespread attacks. 
*   Talos' analysis exposes the network connection between central controller, sub-controller and XorDDoS malware in order to highlight the XorDDoS trojan network pattern. This may help victims identify when they are targeted by these trojans.

**Linux XorDDoS trojan trend and victimology  **

The XorDDoS trojan is a well-known DDoS malware that targets Linux machines, turning them into "zombie bots" that carry out attacks. First identified in 2014, its sub-controller was uncovered in 2015. Based on the simplified Chinese user interface and instructions of the XorDDoS controllers and builder, Talos assess with high confidence that the operators are Chinese-speaking individuals. 

From 2020 to 2023, the XorDDoS trojan has increased significantly in prevalence. This trend is not only due to the widespread global distribution of the XorDDoS trojan but also an uptick in malicious DNS requests linked to its command-and-control (C2) infrastructure. In addition to targeting commonly exposed Linux machines, the trojan has expanded its reach to Docker servers, converting infected hosts into bots. It employs a strategy of Secure Shell (SSH) brute-force attacks to gain remote access to target devices. Once it obtains valid SSH credentials, the attacker leverages root privileges to execute a script that downloads and installs XorDDoS on the compromised device. 

Even though numerous security vendors have already provided solutions and detection methods to capture them, Talos continues to observe attempts to deliver XorDDoS malware.

__Figure 1. Cisco Secure Firewall’s monthly malware connection detection statistics.__

Between November 2023 and February 2025, Talos observed that the XorDDoS trojan continued to have a global impact, with nearly 50 percent of its successfully compromised victims located in the United States. Additionally, we noted that the compromised systems attempted to target and attack several countries, including Spain, the United States, Taiwan, Canada, Japan, Brazil, Paraguay, Argentina, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Italy, Ukraine, Germany, Thailand, China, India, Israel, Venezuela, Switzerland, Singapore, Finland, Australia, Saudi Arabia, France, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates and South Korea.

__Figure 2. Percentage of XorDDoS successfully-compromised machines across all regions.__

Talos also used our Cisco Secure Network/Cloud Analysis to observe actors using those compromised machines to launch DDoS attack and the attacks are globalized. Notably, we found that the United States accounted for over 70 percent of attempted attacks employing XorDDoS.

__Figure 3. Percentage of XorDDoS attempted targets across all regions.__

**Infection chain  **

XorDDoS has long relied on SSH brute-force attacks to spread. It deploys a malicious shell script that attempts numerous root credential combinations across thousands of servers until it successfully accesses a target Linux device. Once inside the machine, XorDDoS implements persistence mechanisms to ensure it launches automatically at system startup, therefore evading detection and termination by security products. To maintain persistence, the malware installs an init script and a cron job script. These scripts are embedded within the malware and perform actions consistent with those outlined in previous reports.

__Figure 4. Inint script and cron script embedded in trojan.__

The latest version of XorDDoS malware continues to use the same decryption function and the XOR key "BB2FA36AAA9541F0" to decrypt its embedded configuration. Once the URLs or IPs are decrypted, they are added to a remote list. This list is then used to establish communication and retrieve commands from the C2 server. Talos used CyberChef to successfully decrypt one of the examples.

__Figure 5. Talos CyberChef decryption.__

**XorDDoS new sub-controller and central controller **

Although the sub-controller for XorDDoS was exposed in 2015, attacks have persisted over the last decade. The panel from 2015 was for version 1.4, the oldest version, which we believe is no longer in use by threat actors. In 2024, Talos discovered a new “VIP” version of the XorDDoS sub-controller, which can control the "VIP version” of the XorDDoS trojan, the first instance of which we traced back to 2017. With the newest version of the XorDDoS sub-controller and trojan builder, Talos believes that this collection is a product suite developed for sale.

Figure 6 shows translated screenshots of the XorDDoS trojan sub-controller and builder. The builder also contains new feature descriptions, which strengthens Talos’ assessment that this is a product meant to be sold. The VIP version of the XorDDoS trojan builder includes new feature descriptions. When translated, the description in Figure 7 reads, "Stable Anti-Kick, 100% Packet Sending, Fixes for Over Ten Thousand Online Without Lag. Supports Domain Online, IP Online, with New Packet Sending Code and Wall-Penetration Optimization. Can Send 1024 Packets with Resource Utilization Optimization."

__Figure 6. VIP version sub-controller.__

__Figure 7. Feature description in the VIP version of the XorDDoS trojan builder.__

Talos observed a new version of the sub-controller, which we call the "central controller." Specifically created for the XorDDoS trojan, the central controller enables threat actors to manage multiple XorDDoS controllers simultaneously. This updated central controller enhances cybercriminals’ ability to coordinate and execute attacks more efficiently, indicating an evolution in their tactics and capabilities.

__Figure 8. Example view of central controller controlling each sub-controller__.

The central controller can generate a controller binder that will inject a DLL file to the XorDDoS controller to bind network connection and command operation to the sub-controller, allowing the central controller to fully remote control the sub-controllers.

__Figure 9. Generator Setting__

The controller binder will establish a connection with the central controller. When running the controller binder on the host, the actor can enter the controller's process name, allowing them to inject into the process and take control. This straightforward strategy allows the actor to send the DDoS commands to multiple controllers simultaneously. There are two notable facts Talos observed from this central controller. First, when the actor opens the central controller, there is a feature description in its mission list column that, when translated, includes the following:

*    "Check the SYN packet length to make it a large packet, otherwise it will be a small packet. 
*   A round-robin attack is a task performed by all online hosts.
*   Select the host and click the test mode, which means a single host sends a packet.
*   Multiple measurement modes cannot be selected, only one at a time!
*   The round-robin attack needs to be stopped manually.
*   Supports 1024 packages but requires a corresponding sub-controller.
*   The sub-controller of version 1.4 and 1.8 on the underground market cannot use the central controller to send 1024 packages."

Second, the controller's creator left their Tencent QQ instant message contact number and nickname on the central controller, while also mentioning other sub-controller versions available on the underground market. This further supports Talos’ assessment that these tools are for sale.

__Figure 10. Central controller and controller binder.__

**Advanced XorDDoS traffic analysis **

Talos’ detailed analysis of these new tools suggests cybercriminals’ continued investment in the development and deployment of the XorDDoS trojan, allowing for more sophisticated and widespread attacks. The entire control flow of these operations demonstrates the adaptability and resilience of these threat actors, emphasizing the ongoing challenge in combating this form of cybercrime. Talos completed a traffic analysis in our sandbox environment, first to analyze how the XorDDoS trojan is connected to the sub-controller, and then to understand how the central controller manages the sub-controller.

__Figure 11. XorDDoS control flow diagram.__

The connection between the sub-controller and DDoS trojan is the orange line in Figure 11. When the malware is successfully installed in the target system, it will attempt to send encrypted data, including "phone home," which consists of the CRC Header, uname string release, uname string machine, magic string and hardcoded version string. Talos used CyberChef to provide a decryptor function for this data.

__Figure 12. Example of decrypted phone home data.__

We noticed that the latest VIP version's "phone home" CRC header remains unchanged from what Unit 42 previously detailed in a blog post. Since the blog post has already covered the encryption of the XorDDoS trojan's phone home data, we will focus here on the behavior of the controller's responses and any modifications in the CRC header.

Once the XorDDoS trojan successfully establishes a connection, the CRC header changes to "5343f096000000000200000000000000000000000000000000000000", as shown in Figure 13. This functions similarly to basic client-server authentication for establishing a connection. When the controller issues a command to the XorDDoS trojan, it uses the same CRC header to attach the encrypted command, sending it to the trojan. This process, illustrated in Figure 14, helps the XorDDoS trojan verify that the commands are authorized and safe to execute.

__Figure 13. The CRC header changes after successfully establishing a connection.__

__Figure 14. Network flow of sub-controller sending the command to XorDDoS trojan.__

Next, Talos explored the connection between the central controller and the sub-controller, represented by the purple line in Figure 11. The central controller can create a controller binder to inject the sub-controller, thereby gaining full access to it. Once the controller binder successfully takes control of the sub-controller, it sends the sub-controller's machine information back to the central controller as a "phone home" beacon. This phone home data uses plaintext to send information, which includes the message number, packet size, IP address, hostname and connection port.

__Figure 15. Network flow of the phone home connection.__

Talos used the central controller to establish a connection with the sub-controller to monitor network traffic. During this process, we observed that the MSG number in the packets increases with each command sent to either the client controller or back to the central controller. As shown in Figure 16, Talos used the central controller to issue commands to start a SYN DDoS attack, stop the attack, and target specific IPs or domains. For every command sent, the MSG number increments. Similarly, each received packet also sees an increase in its MSG number. However, it's important to note that the MSG numbers for sent packets and received packets are not directly related to each other.

__Figure 16. Network flow of central controller sending the command to sub-controller.__

**Coverage**

Cisco Secure Endpoint (formerly AMP for Endpoints) is ideally suited to prevent the execution of the malware detailed in this post. Try Secure Endpoint for free here.

Cisco Secure Web Appliance web scanning prevents access to malicious websites and detects malware used in these attacks.

Cisco Secure Email (formerly Cisco Email Security) can block malicious emails sent by threat actors as part of their campaign. You can try Secure Email for free here.

Cisco Secure Firewall (formerly Next-Generation Firewall and Firepower NGFW) appliances such as Threat Defense Virtual, Adaptive Security Appliance and Meraki MX can detect malicious activity associated with this threat.

Cisco Secure Malware Analytics (Threat Grid) identifies malicious binaries and builds protection into all Cisco Secure products.

Umbrella, Cisco's secure internet gateway (SIG), blocks users from connecting to malicious domains, IPs and URLs, whether users are on or off the corporate network. Sign up for a free trial of Umbrella here.

Cisco Secure Web Appliance (formerly Web Security Appliance) automatically blocks potentially dangerous sites and tests suspicious sites before users access them. Additional protections with context to your specific environment and threat data are available from the Firewall Management Center.

Cisco Duo provides multi-factor authentication for users to ensure only those authorized are accessing your network.

Open-source Snort Subscriber Rule Set customers can stay up to date by downloading the latest rule pack available for purchase on Snort.org. Snort SIDs for this threat are 64669, 64668 and 64667.

ClamAV detections are also available for this threat: Unix.Dropper.Xorddos::in07.talos

**Indicators of Compromise**

IOCs for this threat can be found in our GitHub repository here.

Unmasking the new XorDDoS controller and infrastructure

Cisco Talos’ Vulnerability Discovery & Research team recently disclosed three vulnerabilities found in Eclipse ThreadX and four vulnerabilities in STMicroelectronics.   
The vulnerabilities mentioned in this blog post have been patched by their respective vendors, all in adherence to Cisco’s third-party vulnerability disclosure policy.

Wednesday, April 16, 2025 08:00

Cisco Talos’ Vulnerability Discovery & Research team recently disclosed three vulnerabilities found in Eclipse ThreadX and four vulnerabilities in STMicroelectronics.   

The vulnerabilities mentioned in this blog post have been patched by their respective vendors, all in adherence to Cisco’s third-party vulnerability disclosure policy.     

For Snort coverage that can detect the exploitation of these vulnerabilities, download the latest rule sets from Snort.org, and our latest Vulnerability Advisories are always posted on Talos Intelligence’s website.      

**Eclipse vulnerabilities **

_Discovered by Kelly Patterson of Cisco Talos._    

Eclipse ThreadX is an embedded development suite including an operating system that provides performance for resource-constrained devices. 

TALOS-2024-2098 (CVE-2025-0726, CVE-2025-2260) A denial of service vulnerability exists in the NetX HTTP server functionality of Eclipse ThreadX NetX Duo git commit 6c8e9d1. A specially crafted network packet can lead to denial of service. An attacker can send a malicious packet to trigger this vulnerability. 

Two integer underflow vulnerabilities exist in the HTTP server PUT request functionality of Eclipse ThreadX NetX Duo git commit 6c8e9d1, TALOS-2024-2104 (CVE-2025-0727, CVE-2025-2259) and TALOS-2024-2105 (CVE-2025-0728, CVE-2025-2258). Specially crafted network request packets can lead to denial of service. An attacker can send malicious packets to trigger these vulnerabilities. 

**STMicroelectronics vulnerabilities **

_Discovered by Kelly Patterson of Cisco Talos._    

STMicroelectronics is a European multinational semiconductor contract manufacturing and design company. 

TALOS-2024-2096 (CVE-2024-45064) is a buffer overflow vulnerability in the FileX Internal RAM interface functionality of STMicroelectronics X-CUBE-AZRTOS-WL 2.0.0. A specially crafted set of network packets can lead to code execution. An attacker can send a sequence of requests to trigger this vulnerability. 

TALOS-2024-2097 (CVE-2024-50384-CVE-2024-50385) is a denial-of-service vulnerability in the NetX Component HTTP server functionality. A specially crafted network packet can lead to denial of service. An attacker can send a malicious packet to trigger this vulnerability. 

Two integer underflow vulnerabilities exist in the HTTP server PUT request functionality. For TALOS-2024-2102 (CVE-2024-50594-CVE-2024-50595), a specially crafted series of network requests can lead to denial of service. An attacker can send a sequence of malicious packets to trigger this vulnerability. For TALOS-2024-2103 (CVE-2024-50596-CVE-2024-50597), a specially crafted network packet can lead to denial of service. An attacker can send a malicious packet to trigger this vulnerability.

Eclipse and STMicroelectronics vulnerabilities

This week, our Year in Review spotlight is on ransomware—where low-profile tactics led to high-impact consequences. Download our 2 page ransomware summary, or watch our 55 second video.

Tuesday, April 15, 2025 05:50

This week, our _Year in Review_ spotlight is on **ransomware**—where low-profile tactics led to high-impact consequences.

Ransomware operators often prioritized stealth over complexity for initial access. They also focused on slipping past defenses with minimal noise—uninstalling security tools, creating new firewall rules for remote access, and using common, freely available tools.

The ransomware-as-a-service landscape also paints an interesting picture. A new player quickly rose through the ranks, becoming the second most prolific operator by targeting large payouts.

Something that hasn't really changed over the years is the sectors that ransomware actors target most heavily - favouring industries that typically have lower security budgets, irregular monitoring, but highly sensitive data.

We’ve pulled together the most significant insights in a **quick, 2-page PDF**:

If you only have 55 seconds? Watch this video:

For the full analysis, download Talos' 2024 Year in Review.

Year in Review: The biggest trends in ransomware

Martin delves into how threat actors exploit chaos, offering insights from Talos' 2024 Year in Review on how to fortify defenses against evolving email lures and frequently targeted vulnerabilities, even amidst economic disruption.

Thursday, April 10, 2025 14:02

Welcome to this week’s edition of the Threat Source newsletter. 

If there’s one thing that threat actors love, it’s chaos. Headlines in the news that provoke an emotional response make excellent phishing lures because the intense feelings invoked by a provocative subject line cause our critical thinking faculties to be bypassed. Without cautious reflection, we’re likely to engage with bait, fall for the lure and “click the link” rather than pausing to ask ourselves what the headline’s writer is trying to achieve. 

Economic disruption also works in the bad guys’ favor. In budgetary crises, investments in cyber defenses may be postponed or the hiring of sorely needed additional team members delayed. Alternatively, an end-of-life device that is still functional despite obsolescence and many unpatched vulnerabilities may get an additional year of operation before replacement. 

In such a climate, security teams are often asked to do more with less. However, security can be improved simply by getting the basics right and addressing gaps that don’t require investment. Patching might be time-consuming, but it doesn’t require extra budget. Prioritize removing the most exploited vulnerabilities as listed in our 2024 Year in Review report. Next, review your MFA implementation, ensuring that it is deployed everywhere throughout the organization and that it can’t be bypassed. 

When times are tough, focus on getting the basics right and fixing what can be fixed without needing costly investment. Each vulnerability fixed, each weakness remediated helps move the security posture forwards and makes your organization a tougher target for the bad guys who in turn are more likely to seek easier quarry.

**The one big thing **

We are continuing our discussion of Talos' 2024 Year in Review report, looking at each section in detail. This week, let’s examine the evolution of email lures and the nature of the most frequently targeted vulnerabilities.

**Why do I care? **

In a world of limited resources, effective defense requires identifying areas that are more likely to be targeted by threat actors and prioritizing shoring up these areas. Not all vulnerabilities or systems are exploited equally, and remediating the most frequently exploited vulnerabilities maximizes security effectiveness. 

**So now what? **

Educate users on the types of social engineering that threat actors are currently using in email lures. Social engineering is not static but constantly changing to try and outwit unwary targets. 

Exploitation of the Shellshock series of vulnerabilities should not be continuing for over 10 years since disclosure. Aggressively identify systems within your IT estate that are vulnerable to this attack and urgently patch them.

**Top security headlines of the week **

**Hackers strike Australia's largest pension funds.** A series of coordinated attacks has reportedly led to criminals compromising in excess of 20,000 pension accounts and stealing funds. (Reuters) 

**Ireland Plans 300-Strong Military Cyber Command**. The Irish armed forces are creating a Joint Cyber Defence Command to support defensive and offensive cyber operations. (Irish Times) 

**Baltimore City Falls Victim to Vendor Fraud.** Two payments totaling $1.5 million were reportedly paid to a fraudulent bank account that had been swapped for a contractor’s genuine account. (CBS News) 

**CISA Warns of Vulnerabilities in ICS Software**. The US Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Agency released advisories relating to five series vulnerabilities in Industrial Control Systems software. (CISA)

**Can’t get enough Talos?**

*   **Unraveling the U.S. toll road smishing scams.** Talos has observed a widespread and ongoing smishing campaign since October 2024 that targets toll road users in the U.S. Read the blog here.
*   **Beers with Talos: 2024 Year in Review.** Joe, Hazel, Bill and Dave break down 2024 Year in Review and discuss how and why cybercriminals are learning on attacks based in stealth and simplicity. Listen here.
*   **The TTP Ep 10 (Part 1).** Peeling back the layers of the threats that dominated 2024. Watch now.
*   **The TTP Ep 10 (Part 2).** Ransomware groups, and why we're seeing more identity attacks. Watch now.

**Upcoming events where you can find Talos **

*   RSA (April 28 – May 1) San Francisco, CA   
*   PIVOTcon (May 7 – 9) Malaga, Spain   
*   CTA TIPS 2025 (May 14 – 15) Arlington, VA   
*   Cisco Connect UK & Ireland (May 20) London, UK 
*   Cisco Live U.S. (June 8 – 12) San Diego, CA

**Most prevalent malware files from Talos telemetry over the past week **

**SHA 256: 9f1f11a708d393e0a4109ae189bc64f1f3e312653dcf317a2bd406f18ffcc507**     
MD5: 2915b3f8b703eb744fc54c81f4a9c67f     
VirusTotal: https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/9f1f11a708d393e0a4109ae189bc64f1f3e312653dcf317a2bd406f18ffcc507/details   
Typical Filename: VID001.exe     
Detection Name: Simple\_Custom\_Detection

**SHA 256: a31f222fc283227f5e7988d1ad9c0aecd66d58bb7b4d8518ae23e110308dbf91**    
MD5: 7bdbd180c081fa63ca94f9c22c457376    
VirusTotal: https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/a31f222fc283227f5e7988d1ad9c0aecd66d58bb7b4d8518ae23e110308dbf91/details   
Typical Filename: IMG001.exe   
Detection Name: Simple\_Custom\_Detection  

**SHA 256: 47ecaab5cd6b26fe18d9759a9392bce81ba379817c53a3a468fe9060a076f8ca**      
MD5: 71fea034b422e4a17ebb06022532fdde      
VirusTotal: https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/47ecaab5cd6b26fe18d9759a9392bce81ba379817c53a3a468fe9060a076f8ca/details   
Typical Filename: VID001.exe     
Detection Name: Coinminer:MBT.26mw.in14.Talos   

**SHA 256: 7bf7550ae929d6fea87140ab70e6444250581c87a990e74c1cd7f0df5661575b**   
MD5: f5e908f1fac5f98ec63e3ec355ef6279   
VirusTotal: https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/7bf7550ae929d6fea87140ab70e6444250581c87a990e74c1cd7f0df5661575b/details   
Typical Filename: IMG001.exe   
Detection Name: Win.Dropper.Coinminer::tpd

Threat actors thrive in chaos

Cisco Talos has observed a widespread and ongoing financial theft SMS phishing (smishing) campaign since October 2024 that targets toll road users in the United States of America.

Thursday, April 10, 2025 10:30

*   Cisco Talos has observed a widespread and ongoing financial theft SMS phishing (smishing) campaign since October 2024 that targets toll road users in the United States of America.  
*   We observed that the campaign targets people across several states in the U.S. according to the domain names used in the smishing messages. 
*   Talos assesses with moderate confidence that the toll road smishing attacks are being carried out by multiple financially motivated threat actors using the smishing kit developed by “Wang Duo Yu”, according to the intelligence obtained by Talos. 

**Toll road smishing attacks **

Since the middle of Oct. 2024, Talos has seen ongoing smishing attacks impersonating U.S toll road automatic payment services (such as E-ZPass) with the intent of financial theft. The actors have so far sent SMS messages to individuals in about eight states in the U.S., including Washington, Florida, Pennsylvania, Virginia, Texas, Ohio, Illinois and Kansas. Talos identified these states via spoofed domains containing the states’ two-letter abbreviations that we observed in the SMS messages. 

The actors send an SMS notification for an outstanding bill claiming that the potential victim owes a small amount of money, under $5 USD. They warn of potential late fees, prompting victims to visit a spoofed domain for the payment.  

Sample phishing SMS messages. 

When the victim visits the domain, they are prompted to solve a fake image-based CAPTCHA, after which it redirects the victims to a fake webpage with the legitimate toll service's logo. This webpage prompts the victims to enter their name and ZIP code to view their fake bill. The fake bill displays the victim's name with a message showing that they owe approximately $4 and warning of a $35 late payment fee. 

After the victim views their fake bill, they click the “Proceed Now” button which redirects them to another fake webpage. This site prompts the victim to enter their name, address, phone number and credit card information, which the threat actor eventually steals. Due to the limited visibility of the threat actor phishing infrastructure, Talos is unsure if there are any further payloads delivered to the victims' devices. 

In April 2024, FBI’s Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3) warned about a similar toll road smishing campaign where the threat actor used the same brand impersonation technique but with a slight difference in the SMS message language, monetary values and formatting. 

Targeting toll road users in multiple states indicates the likelihood of the threat actor leveraging user information publicly leaked from large databases. For example, the threat actor behind the 2024 National Public Data leak released billions of records publicly which were then shared on private Telegram channels for further abuse. However, Talos currently does not have any evidence to suggest that the toll road smishing campaign is fueled by the National Public Data leaks.  

**Phishing infrastructure **

Talos observed that the actors have used several typosquatted domains in the SMS phishing messages to convince the potential victims to visit them. These typosquatted phishing domains were created during Oct. and Nov. 2024 and were observed resolving to one of the following IP addresses: 45\[.\]152\[.\]115\[.\]161 and 82\[.\]147\[.\]88\[.\]22.  

As of March 2025, Talos is still seeing new domains registered by the threat actors for the toll road scams, implying that the campaign is ongoing. During our research period, these newly registered domains resolved to the IP address 43\[.\]156\[.\]47\[.\]209. 

**Smishing kits likely used in the U.S. toll road scams **

Talos assesses with moderate confidence that multiple threat actors are operating the toll road smishing campaign by leveraging a smishing kit developed by the actor known as “Wang Duo Yu", according to the intelligence obtained by Talos. 

We have observed similar smishing kits being used by the organized cybercrime group known as the "Smishing Triad." This group has conducted large-scale smishing attacks targeting mail services in multiple countries, including the United States Postal Service (USPS), as well as the financial and commercial sectors previously reported by Resecurity. 

Talos discovered references to specific phishing kits that are targeting toll systems in the DY Tongbu Telegram channel on "老王同步源码开发教学" translated to "Lao Wang Synchronized Source Code Development Tutorial."  

Public Lao Wang Synchronized Source Code Development Tutorial Telegram channel.

The Telegram channel shared details about a phishing module that allegedly spoofs the Massachusetts MassDOT's EZDriveMA toll system, as well as a phishing module that targets customers of the North Texas Toll Authority. At the time of publication, the Telegram channel had more than 4,400 subscribers. 

Further investigation has revealed that the developer, 王多余 (translated to Wang Duo Yu), has developed a similar smishing kit and operates the Lao Wang Synchronized Source Code Development Tutorial Telegram channel from two separate accounts. The pictures shown below display screenshots of the two telegram accounts related to Wang Duo Yu. 

Two telegram accounts related to Wang Duo Yu. 

Additionally, we noticed that the developer has created a YouTube channel where they upload tutorial videos. These videos cover topics such as "How to Build a PMTA Mail Server," "Setting Up an Automatic EPUSD Payment and Vending System," "Creating a Pagoda Panel Website (宝塔面板)," "Building the Simplest and Safest Node Using Native Tools," and "Using the X-UI Panel to Set Up a VMess+WS+TLS+Web or VLess+WS+TLS+Web Node."  Each video guides users on building basic web services or mail servers. 

Wang Duo Yu’s YouTube channel. 

There are also some private video links that cannot be found elsewhere. Talos found one such video on a Chinese forum. To access the post with the video link, users need special permissions in that forum. 

Wang Duo Yu’s YouTube channel with private video. 

We also observed Wang Duo Yu promoting their smishing kits business and tutorials on other Telegram channels, also offering personal lessons that include full-stack development, mail server setup and Telegram bot development. The threat actor offers a two-hour lesson each day and provides one-on-one instruction via remote desktop, charging ¥5888 (converting to approx. US $806 at time of publication) per class. 

Wang Duo Yu marketing the kits in telegram channels. 

One of the Telegram channels shown in the above picture is called, “向前论坛,” translating to " Xiangqian Forum,” of which Wang Duo Yu is a moderator. Wang Duo Yu posted articles in this forum to increase subscribers, promoted their own teaching courses, and provided links and discount codes for purchasing VPS and domains. 

Wang Duo Yu selling the VPS and cloud services through his website. 

We also found an additional website selling the VPS and cloud services, confirmed to be owned by Wang Duo Yu.  The “wangduoyu\[.\]vip” website was active from 2022 to 2023. 

Wang Duo Yu’s shop website. 

Wang Duo Yu’s shop DNS resolved IPs and active periods of time. 

We observed that Wang Duo Yu offers the toll smishing kit source code for sale and provides services to assist in setting up the whole system. In a forum post, they stated that anyone interested can reach out to their personal Telegram account "@wangduofish". The post also includes hidden content only visible to users with VIP access. 

Wang Duo Yu’s post includes hidden content only visible with VIP access. 

Wang Duo Yu has crafted and designed specific smishing kits and has been selling access to these kits on their Telegram channels. The kits are available with different infrastructure options, priced at US $50 each for a full-feature development, $30 each for proxy development (when the customer has a personal domain and server), $20 each for version updates, and $20 for all other miscellaneous support. The threat actor also offers updated releases for multiple source code versions. The offers on the Telegram channel revealed that the smishing kits and source code primarily target large public-facing entities with a large end-userbase, such as toll road operators, banks and postal services. 

**Coverage**

Cisco Secure Endpoint (formerly AMP for Endpoints) is ideally suited to prevent the execution of the malware detailed in this post. Try Secure Endpoint for free here. 

Cisco Secure Email (formerly Cisco Email Security) can block malicious emails sent by threat actors as part of their campaign. You can try Secure Email for free here. 

Cisco Secure Firewall (formerly Next-Generation Firewall and Firepower NGFW) appliances such as Threat Defense Virtual, Adaptive Security Appliance and Meraki MX can detect malicious activity associated with this threat. 

Cisco Secure Network/Cloud Analytics (Stealthwatch/Stealthwatch Cloud) analyzes network traffic automatically and alerts users of potentially unwanted activity on every connected device. 

Cisco Secure Malware Analytics (Threat Grid) identifies malicious binaries and builds protection into all Cisco Secure products. 

Cisco Secure Access is a modern cloud-delivered Security Service Edge (SSE) built on Zero Trust principles.  Secure Access provides seamless transparent and secure access to the internet, cloud services or private application no matter where your users work. Please contact your Cisco account representative or authorized partner if you are interested in a free trial of Cisco Secure Access. 

Umbrella, Cisco’s secure internet gateway (SIG), blocks users from connecting to malicious domains, IPs and URLs, whether users are on or off the corporate network.  

Cisco Secure Web Appliance (formerly Web Security Appliance) automatically blocks potentially dangerous sites and tests suspicious sites before users access them.  Additional protections with context to your specific environment and threat data are available from the Firewall Management Center. 

Cisco Duo provides multi-factor authentication for users to ensure only those authorized are accessing your network. 

**Indicators of Compromise  **

IOCs for this threat can be found in our GitHub repository here.

Unraveling the U.S. toll road smishing scams

Microsoft has released its monthly security update for April of 2025 which includes 126 vulnerabilities affecting a range of products, including 11 that Microsoft has marked as “critical”.

Tuesday, April 8, 2025 14:53

Microsoft has released its monthly security update for April of 2025 which includes 126 vulnerabilities affecting a range of products, including 11 that Microsoft marked as “critical”. 

In this month's release, none of the included vulnerabilities have been observed by Microsoft to be exploited in the wild. The eleven "critical” entries are all remote code execution (RCE) vulnerabilities, four of which have been marked as "Exploitation more likely". 

Two of the “critical” vulnerabilities listed affect components of the Windows Remote Desktop Services. 

CVE-2025-27480 and CVE-2025-27482 are RCE vulnerabilities in components of the Remote Desktop Gateway Service. Both vulnerabilities were given a CVSS 3.1 score of 8.1. To successfully exploit these an attacker could connect to a system with the Remote Desktop Gateway role and trigger a race condition to create a use-after-free scenario, potentially allowing arbitrary code to be executed. Microsoft has assessed that the attack complexity is “high”, and exploitation is “More likely”.

CVE-2025-26663 is an RCE vulnerability in the Windows Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) and has been given a CVSS 3.1 score of 8.1. This could be exploited by an attacker by sending a specially crafted LDAP call to trigger a use-after-free vulnerability, allowing arbitrary code to be executed in the context of the LDAP service. An attacker could initiate this by sending a victim an email or message containing a malicious link. Microsoft has assessed that exploitation is “more likely” and that the attack complexity is “high”.

CVE-2025-26670 is a RCE vulnerability in the Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) Client and has been given a CVSS 3.1 base score of 8.1. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending sequential specially crafted LDAP requests to a vulnerable LDAP server. Successful exploitation would require an attacker to win a race condition, which could result in a use-after-free that would allow for arbitrary code execution. Microsoft states that exploitation of this vulnerability is “More likely” and that the attack complexity is “high”.

CVE-2025-26686 is an RCE vulnerability in Windows TCP/IP and has been given a CVSS 3.1 base score of 7.5. Due to improperly locked memory in Windows TCP/IP, this vulnerability could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code over a network. To exploit this an attacker must wait for a user to initiate a connection and send a DHCPv6, to which the attacker would reply with a DHCPv6 response containing a fake IPv6 address. Successful exploitation requires the attacker to win a race condition and make several preparations in the target environment beforehand. Due to this complexity Microsoft has determined that exploitation is "Less likely".

CVE-2025-27491 is an RCE vulnerability in Windows Hyper-V and has a CVSS 3.1 base score of 7.1. An attacker with guest privileges on a network could exploit this by convincing a victim to click a link to a malicious site.  Microsoft has determined that exploitation of this vulnerability is “Less likely” and that the attack complexity is “high”.

CVE-2025-29791 is an RCE vulnerability in Microsoft Excel and has a CVSS 3.1 base score of 7.8. An attacker could exploit this by sending a specially crafted document to a victim that triggers a type confusion when opened. Once triggered, the type confusion could lead to arbitrary code execution. Microsoft has assessed that exploitation of this vulnerability is "Less likely".

CVE-2025-27752 is another RCE vulnerability in Microsoft Excel and has a CVSS 3.1 score of 7.8. This is a heap overflow vulnerability and can be exploited by an attacker to locally execute arbitrary code. It has been assessed that exploitation of this vulnerability is considered "Less likely".

CVE-2025-27745, CVE-2025-27748 and CVE-2025-27749 are RCE vulnerabilities in Microsoft Office and all have a CVSS 3.1 base score of 7.8. These could be exploited by an attacker by triggering a use-after-free scenario, allowing for the execution of arbitrary code. Microsoft has determined that exploitation for each is considered "Less likely".

Talos would also like to highlight the following "important" vulnerabilities as Microsoft has determined that exploitation is "More likely":

*   CVE-2025-27472 - Windows Mark of the Web Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability  
    
*   CVE-2025-27727 - Windows Installer Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability  
    
*   CVE-2025-29792 - Microsoft Office Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability  
    
*   CVE-2025-29793 - Microsoft SharePoint Remote Code Execution Vulnerability  
    
*   CVE-2025-29794 - Microsoft SharePoint Remote Code Execution Vulnerability  
    
*   CVE-2025-29809 - Windows Kerberos Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability  
    
*   CVE-2025-29812 - DirectX Graphics Kernel Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability  
    
*   CVE-2025-29822 - Microsoft OneNote Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability 

A complete list of all the other vulnerabilities Microsoft disclosed this month is available on its update page. 

In response to these vulnerability disclosures, Talos is releasing a new Snort rule set that detects attempts to exploit some of them. Please note that additional rules may be released at a future date and current rules are subject to change pending additional information. Cisco Security Firewall customers should use the latest update to their ruleset by updating their SRU. Open-source Snort Subscriber Rule Set customers can stay up to date by downloading the latest rule pack available for purchase on Snort.org.

The rules included in this release that protect against the exploitation of many of these vulnerabilities are 58316, 58317, 64432, 64746 - 64757, 64760 - 64762. There are also these Snort 3 rules: 301176 - 301179.