#auth

The Security Labs team at Snyk is reporting a security issue affecting Authlib, which was identified during a recent research project. A vulnerability has been identified that can result in a 1-click Account Takeover in applications that use the Authlib library. (5.7 CVSS v3: AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N) **Description** Cache-backed state/request-token storage is not tied to the initiating user session, so CSRF is possible for any attacker that has a valid state (easily obtainable via an attacker-initiated authentication flow). When a cache is supplied to the OAuth client registry, `FrameworkIntegration.set_state_data` writes the entire state blob under `_state_{app}_{state},` and `get_state_data` ignores the caller’s session altogether. \[1\]\[2\] ```py def _get_cache_data(self, key): value = self.cache.get(key) if not value: return None try: return json.loads(value) except (TypeError, ValueError): ret...

## **Summary** This notification is related to the use of specific values for the region input field when calling AWS services. An actor with access to the environment in which the SDK is used could set the region input field to an invalid value. A defense-in-depth enhancement has been implemented in the AWS SDK for Rust. This enhancement validates that a region used to construct an endpoint URL is a valid host label. The change was released on November 6, 2025. This advisory is informational to help customers understand their responsibilities regarding configuration security. ## **Impact** Customer applications could be configured to improperly route AWS API calls to non-existent or non-AWS hosts. While the SDK was functioning safely within the requirements of the shared responsibility model, additional safeguards have been added to support secure customer implementations. **Impacted versions**: All versions prior to [November 6, 2025 release](https://github.com/awslabs/aws-sdk-rus...

### Impact A vulnerability in Ghost's `/ghost/api/admin/members/events` endpoint allows users with authentication credentials for the Admin API to execute arbitrary SQL. ### Vulnerable versions This vulnerability is present in Ghost v5.90.0 to v5.130.5 to and Ghost v6.0.0 to v6.10.3. ### Patches v5.130.6 and v6.11.0 contain a fix for this issue. ### References Ghost thanks Sho Odagiri of GMO Cybersecurity by Ierae, Inc. for discovering and disclosing this vulnerability responsibly. ### For more information If there are any questions or comments about this advisory, email Ghost at [security@ghost.org](mailto:security@ghost.org).

### Impact A vulnerability in Ghost’s media inliner mechanism allows staff users in possession of a valid authentication token for the Ghost Admin API to exfiltrate data from internal systems via SSRF. ### Vulnerable versions This vulnerability is present in Ghost v5.38.0 to v5.130.5 to and Ghost v6.0.0 to v6.10.3. ### Patches v5.130.6 and v6.11.0 contain a fix for this issue. ### References Ghost thanks Sho Odagiri of GMO Cybersecurity by Ierae, Inc. for discovering and disclosing this vulnerability responsibly. ### For more information If there are any questions or comments about this advisory, email Ghost at [security@ghost.org](mailto:security@ghost.org).

### Impact A vulnerability in Ghost's handling of Staff Token authentication allowed certain endpoints to be accessed that were only intended to be accessible via Staff Session authentication. External systems that have been authenticated via Staff Tokens for Admin/Owner-role users would have had access to these endpoints. ### Vulnerable versions This vulnerability is present in Ghost v5.121.0 to v5.130.5 to and Ghost v6.0.0 to v6.10.3. ### Patches v5.130.6 and v6.11.0 contain a fix for this issue. ### References Ghost thanks Sho Odagiri of GMO Cybersecurity by Ierae, Inc. for discovering and disclosing this vulnerability responsibly. ### For more information If there are any questions or comments about this advisory, email Ghost at [security@ghost.org](mailto:security@ghost.org).

### Summary An Unauthenticated Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) vulnerability was identified that allows an unauthenticated attacker to access guest address information without supplying valid credentials or session cookies. ### Details During testing, it was observed that all guest users can make an unauthenticated request to retrieve address data belonging to other guest users by manipulating object identifiers. The attacker would need to know the storefront URL structure to perform this attack (which can be learnt after creating a registered user account). Affected Component(s) * Address Edit endpoint: `/addresses/{addressId}/edit` Root Cause - Faulty authorization check in CanCanCan Ability class: ```diff - can :manage, ::Spree::Address, user_id: user.id + can :manage, ::Spree::Address, user_id: user.id if user.persisted? ``` the `user` object in `Spree::Ability` class for guest users is a `Spree.user_class.new` object. Addresses endpoint to access it is part of the `...

### Summary An Authenticated Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) vulnerability was identified that allows an authenticated user to retrieve other users’ address information by modifying an existing order. By editing an order they legitimately own and manipulating address identifiers in the request, the backend server accepts and processes references to addresses belonging to other users, subsequently associating those addresses with the attacker’s order and returning them in the response. ### Details Affected Component(s) - Authenticated user order management - Address association logic - Order update endpoint(s) Affected Endpoint(s): - `/api/v2/storefront/checkout` The application fails to enforce proper object-level authorization when updating an existing order. While the user is authenticated and authorized to modify their own order, the backend does not verify that the supplied address identifiers belong to the same authenticated user. ### PoC Preconditions - Valid authentic...

### Summary Since 2017, the default webpack plugins have passed the entire `process.env` to `EnvironmentPlugin`. This pattern exposed ALL build environment variables to client-side JavaScript bundles whenever application code (or any dependency) referenced `process.env.VARIABLE_NAME`. This is not a regression - the vulnerable code has existed since the original Webpacker implementation. No recent code change in Shakapacker triggered this issue. ### Impact Any environment variable in the build environment that is referenced in client-side code (including third-party dependencies) is embedded directly into the JavaScript bundle. This includes: - `DATABASE_URL` - Database credentials - `AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY` - AWS credentials - `RAILS_MASTER_KEY` - Rails encrypted credentials key - `STRIPE_SECRET_KEY`, `TWILIO_AUTH_TOKEN` - Third-party API keys - Any other secrets present in the build environment **Severity**: Critical - secrets are exposed in publicly accessible JavaScript files...

Researchers at Acronis have discovered a new campaign called Boto Cor-de-Rosa, where the Astaroth banking malware spreads like a worm through WhatsApp Web to steal contact lists and banking credentials.

## LFS Lock Force-Delete Authorization Bypass ### Summary An authorization bypass in the LFS lock deletion endpoint allows any authenticated user with repository write access to delete locks owned by other users by setting the `force` flag. The vulnerable code path processes force deletions before retrieving user context, bypassing ownership validation entirely. ### Severity - **CWE-863:** Incorrect Authorization - **CVSS 3.1:** 5.4 (Medium) — `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L` ### Affected Code **File:** `pkg/web/git_lfs.go` **Function:** `serviceLfsLocksDelete` (lines 831–945) **Endpoint:** `POST /<repo>.git/info/lfs/locks/:lockID/unlock` The control flow processes `req.Force` at line 905 before retrieving user context at line 919: ```go // Line 905-916: Force delete executes immediately without authorization if req.Force { if err := datastore.DeleteLFSLock(ctx, dbx, repo.ID(), lockID); err != nil { // ... } renderJSON(w, http.StatusOK, l) ...