#auth

Explore how cybercrime markets turn stolen data into laundered funds using dollar‑pegged assets, mixers and exchanges-and why tracking BTC USDT price and stablecoin flows now matters for security, fraud and AML teams.

The Computer Emergency Response Team of Ukraine (CERT-UA) has disclosed details of new cyber attacks targeting its defense forces with malware known as PLUGGYAPE between October and December 2025. The activity has been attributed with medium confidence to a Russian hacking group tracked as Void Blizzard (aka Laundry Bear or UAC-0190). The threat actor is believed to be active since at least

**Impact** An attacker can cause high CPU usage by sending a specially crafted p2p message. More details to be released later. **Credit** This issue was reported to the Ethereum Foundation Bug Bounty Program by @Yenya030

**Impact** A vulnerable node can be forced to shutdown/crash using a specially crafted message. More details to be released later. **Credit** This issue was reported to the Ethereum Foundation Bug Bounty Program by DELENE TCHIO ROMUALD.

## Summary A **path traversal vulnerability** exists in GuardDog's `safe_extract()` function that allows malicious PyPI packages to write arbitrary files outside the intended extraction directory, leading to **Arbitrary File Overwrite** and **Remote Code Execution** on systems running GuardDog. **CWE:** CWE-22 (Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory) ## Details ### Vulnerable Code **File:** `guarddog/utils/archives.py` ```python elif zipfile.is_zipfile(source_archive): with zipfile.ZipFile(source_archive, "r") as zip: for file in zip.namelist(): # Note: zip.extract cleans up any malicious file name # such as directory traversal attempts This is not the # case of zipfile.extractall zip.extract(file, path=os.path.join(target_directory, file)) # ❌ VULNERABLE ``` ### Root Cause The comment about `zip.extract()` fooled me at first :) then I noticed the `os.path.join()` call. The vulnerability stems fr...

## Summary A flaw in Hono’s JWK/JWKS JWT verification middleware allowed the algorithm specified in the JWT header to influence signature verification when the selected JWK did not explicitly define an algorithm. This could enable JWT algorithm confusion and, in certain configurations, allow forged tokens to be accepted. ## Details When verifying JWTs using JWKs or a JWKS endpoint, the middleware selected the verification algorithm based on the JWK’s `alg` field if present. If the JWK did not specify an algorithm, the middleware fell back to using the `alg` value provided in the unverified JWT header. Because the `alg` field in a JWK is optional and commonly omitted in real-world JWKS configurations, this behavior could allow an attacker to influence which algorithm is used for verification. In some environments, this may result in authentication or authorization bypass through crafted JWTs. The practical impact depends on application configuration, including which algorithms are ...

## Summary A flaw in Hono’s JWK/JWKS JWT verification middleware allowed the JWT header’s `alg` value to influence signature verification when the selected JWK did not explicitly specify an algorithm. This could enable **JWT algorithm confusion** and, in certain configurations, allow forged tokens to be accepted. ## Details When verifying JWTs using JWKs or a JWKS endpoint, the middleware selected the verification algorithm based on the JWK’s `alg` field if present, but otherwise fell back to the `alg` value provided in the unverified JWT header. Because the `alg` field in a JWK is optional and often omitted in real-world JWKS configurations, this behavior could allow an attacker to control the algorithm used for verification. In some environments, this may lead to authentication or authorization bypass through crafted tokens. The practical impact depends on application configuration, including which algorithms are accepted and how JWTs are used for authorization decisions. ## Im...

Deserialization of untrusted data in Azure Core shared client library for Python allows an authorized attacker to execute code over a network.

### Problem Backend users who had access to the recycler module could delete arbitrary data from any database table defined in the TCA - regardless of whether they had permission to that particular table. This allowed attackers to purge and destroy critical site data, effectively rendering the website unavailable. ### Solution Update to TYPO3 versions 10.4.55 ELTS, 11.5.49 ELTS, 12.4.41 LTS, 13.4.23 LTS, 14.0.2 that fix the problem described. ### Credits Thanks to Sven Jürgens and Daniel Windloff for reporting this issue, and to TYPO3 security team member Elias Häußler for fixing it. ### References * [TYPO3-CORE-SA-2026-003](https://typo3.org/security/advisory/typo3-core-sa-2026-003)

### Problem Backend users with access to the redirects module and write permission on the `sys_redirect` table were able to read, create, and modify any redirect record - without restriction to the user’s own file‑mounts or web‑mounts. This allowed attackers to insert or alter redirects pointing to arbitrary URLs - facilitating phishing or other malicious redirect attacks. ### Solution Update to TYPO3 versions 10.4.55 ELTS, 11.5.49 ELTS, 12.4.41 LTS, 13.4.23 LTS, 14.0.2 that fix the problem described. ### Credits Thanks to Georg Dümmler for reporting this issue, and to TYPO3 security team member Elias Häußler for fixing it. ### References * [TYPO3-CORE-SA-2026-002](https://typo3.org/security/advisory/typo3-core-sa-2026-002)