#auth

**How could an attacker exploit this vulnerability?** An unauthenticated attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could gain code execution through a specially crafted set of LDAP calls to execute arbitrary code within the context of the LDAP service.

**According to the CVSS metric, user interaction is required (UI:R) and privileges required are none (PR:N). What does that mean for this vulnerability?** An unauthorized attacker must wait for a user to initiate a connection.

**How could an attacker exploit the vulnerability?** An unauthenticated attacker could exploit the vulnerability by connecting to a Remote Desktop server and then sending a malicious http request to the server.

**According to the CVSS metric, the attack complexity is high (AC:H). What does that mean for this vulnerability?** Successful exploitation of this vulnerability requires an attacker to win a race condition.

**How would an attacker exploit this vulnerability?** This vulnerability would require an authenticated attacker on a guest VM to send specially crafted file operation requests on the VM to hardware resources on the VM which could result in remote code execution on the host server.

**How could an attacker exploit this vulnerability?** An authenticated attacker could exploit the vulnerability by triggering remote code execution (RCE) on the server via a Remote Desktop connection. Alternatively, an authenticated attacker could trigger guest-to-host RCE via a malicious program by connecting to the host using MMC.

Versions of the package luigi before 3.6.0 are vulnerable to Arbitrary File Write via Archive Extraction (Zip Slip) due to improper destination file path validation in the _extract_packages_archive function.

Summary Cybersecurity researchers have identified a large-scale hacking operation linked to notorious ShinyHunters and Nemesis hacking groups. In…

It’s easy to tick the checkboxes on a compliance checklist with the mindset that your system is protected and not exposed to risk. If it is this simple, why do we continue to invest billions of dollars in developing security controls and software development lifecycle (SDL) practices that help harden software and minimize risk? What is the value in configuring services, tuning firewalls, and enforcing access policies only to accept a risk rating for a vulnerability directly mapped to a base score that seemingly ignores all the work done?This contradictory model of focusing on security featur

### Summary If a `server.ca` file is present in `LXD_DIR` at LXD start up, LXD is in "PKI mode". In this mode, only TLS clients that have a CA-signed certificate should be able to authenticate with LXD. We have discovered that if a client that sends a non-CA signed certificate during the TLS handshake, that client is able to authenticate with LXD if their certificate is present in the trust store. - The LXD Go client (and by extension `lxc`) does not send non-CA signed certificates during the handshake. - A manual client (e.g. `cURL`) might send a non-CA signed certificate during the handshake. #### Versions affected LXD 4.0 and above. ### Details When PKI mode was added to LXD it was intended that all client and server certificates *must* be signed by the certificate authority (see https://github.com/canonical/lxd/pull/2070/commits/84d917bdcca6fe1e3191ce47f1597c7d094e1909). In PKI mode, the TLS listener configuration is altered to add the CA certificate but the `ClientAut...