#docker

The recently discovered sophisticated Linux malware framework known as VoidLink is assessed to have been developed by a single person with assistance from an artificial intelligence (AI) model. That's according to new findings from Check Point Research, which identified operational security blunders by malware's author that provided clues to its developmental origins. The latest insight makes

### Summary Markdown feature allows unrestricted server side html-rendering which allows arbitary file read (LFD) and fully SSRF access We in @0xL4ugh ( @abdoghazy2015, @xtromera, @A-z4ki, @ZeyadZonkorany and @KarimTantawey) During playing Null CTF 2025 that helps us solved a challenge with unintended way : ) Please note that we used the latest Version and deployed it via this dockerfile : Dockerfile: ``` FROM b3log/siyuan ENV TZ=America/New_York \ PUID=1000 \ PGID=1000 \ SIYUAN_ACCESS_AUTH_CODE=SuperSecretPassword RUN mkdir -p /siyuan/workspace COPY ./startup.sh /opt/siyuan/startup.sh RUN chmod +x /opt/siyuan/startup.sh EXPOSE 6806 ENTRYPOINT ["sh", "-c", "/opt/siyuan/startup.sh"] ``` startup.sh ```sh #!/bin/sh set -e echo "nullctf{secret}" > "/flag_random.txt" exec ./entrypoint.sh ``` docker-compose.yaml: ```yaml services: main: build: . ports: - 6806:6806 restart: unless-stopped environment: - TZ=America/New_York - PUID...

### Summary The SiYuan Note application (v3.5.3) contains a logic vulnerability in the /api/file/globalCopyFiles endpoint. The function allows authenticated users to copy files from any location on the server's filesystem into the application's workspace without proper path validation ### Details The vulnerability exists in the api/file.go source code. The function globalCopyFiles accepts a list of source paths (srcs) from the JSON request body. While the code checks if the source file exists using filelock.IsExist(src), it fails to validate whether the source path resides within the authorized workspace directory. ``` func globalCopyFiles(c *gin.Context) { // ... srcsArg := arg["srcs"].([]interface{}) for _, src := range srcs { if !filelock.IsExist(src) { ... } if err := filelock.Copy(src, dest); err != nil { ... } } } ``` ### PoC The following steps demonstrate how to exfiltrate the /etc/passwd file. 1. The attacker sends a request...

### Summary The [commit](https://github.com/esm-dev/esm.sh/commit/9d77b88c320733ff6689d938d85d246a3af9af16) does not actually fix the path traversal bug. `path.Clean` basically normalizes a path but does not prevent absolute paths in a malicious tar file. ### PoC This test file can demonstrate the basic idea pretty easily: ```go package server import ( "archive/tar" "bytes" "compress/gzip" "testing" ) // TestExtractPackageTarball_PathTraversal tests the extractPackageTarball function // with a malicious tarball containing a path traversal attempt func TestExtractPackageTarball_PathTraversal(t *testing.T) { // Create a temporary directory for testing installDir := "./testdata/good" // Create a malicious tarball with path traversal var buf bytes.Buffer gw := gzip.NewWriter(&buf) tw := tar.NewWriter(gw) // Add a normal file content := []byte("export const foo = 'bar';") header := &tar.Header{ Name: "package/index.js", Mode: 0644, Size: int64(len(cont...

# Kimai 2.45.0 - Authenticated Server-Side Template Injection (SSTI) ## Vulnerability Summary | Field | Value | |-------|-------| | **Title** | Authenticated SSTI via Permissive Export Template Sandbox || **Attack Vector** | Network | | **Attack Complexity** | Low | | **Privileges Required** | High (Admin with export permissions and server access) | | **User Interaction** | None | | **Impact** | Confidentiality: HIGH (Credential/Secret Extraction) | | **Affected Versions** | Kimai 2.45.0 (likely earlier versions) | | **Tested On** | Docker: kimai/kimai2:apache-2.45.0 | | **Discovery Date** | 2026-01-05 | --- **Why Scope is "Changed":** The extracted `APP_SECRET` can be used to forge Symfony login links for ANY user account, expanding the attack beyond the initially compromised admin context. --- ## Vulnerability Description Kimai's export functionality uses a Twig sandbox with an overly permissive security policy (`DefaultPolicy`) that allows arbitrary method calls on objects av...

A critical remote code execution vulnerability exists in the Crawl4AI Docker API deployment. The `/crawl` endpoint accepts a `hooks` parameter containing Python code that is executed using `exec()`. The `__import__` builtin was included in the allowed builtins, allowing attackers to import arbitrary modules and execute system commands. **Attack Vector:** ```json POST /crawl { "urls": ["https://example.com"], "hooks": { "code": { "on_page_context_created": "async def hook(page, context, **kwargs):\n __import__('os').system('malicious_command')\n return page" } } } ``` ### Impact An unauthenticated attacker can: - Execute arbitrary system commands - Read/write files on the server - Exfiltrate sensitive data (environment variables, API keys) - Pivot to internal network services - Completely compromise the server ### Mitigation 1. **Upgrade to v0.8.0** (recommended) 2. If unable to upgrade immediately: - Disable the Docker API - Block `/crawl` endpoint ...

A local file inclusion vulnerability exists in the Crawl4AI Docker API. The /execute_js, /screenshot, /pdf, and /html endpoints accept file:// URLs, allowing attackers to read arbitrary files from the server filesystem. Attack Vector: ```json POST /execute_js { "url": "file:///etc/passwd", "scripts": ["document.body.innerText"] } ``` Impact An unauthenticated attacker can: - Read sensitive files (/etc/passwd, /etc/shadow, application configs) - Access environment variables via /proc/self/environ - Discover internal application structure - Potentially read credentials and API keys Workarounds 1. Disable the Docker API 2. Add authentication to the API 3. Use network-level filtering

## Summary Arcane’s updater service supported lifecycle labels `com.getarcaneapp.arcane.lifecycle.pre-update` and `com.getarcaneapp.arcane.lifecycle.post-update` that allowed defining a command to run before or after a container update. The label value is passed directly to /bin/sh -c without sanitization or validation. Because any authenticated user (not limited to administrators) can create projects through the API, an attacker can create a project that specifies one of these lifecycle labels with a malicious command. When an administrator later triggers a container update (either manually or via scheduled update checks), Arcane reads the lifecycle label and executes its value as a shell command inside the container. If the container is configured with host volume mounts in its Compose definition, the executed command may be able to read from or write to the host filesystem through the mounted paths. This can enable data theft and, in some configurations, escalation to full host c...

Researchers have discovered VoidLink, a sophisticated new Linux malware framework designed to infiltrate AWS, Google Cloud, and Azure. Learn how this Chinese-affiliated toolkit uses adaptive stealth to stay hidden.

## Summary GuardDog's `safe_extract()` function does not validate decompressed file sizes when extracting ZIP archives (wheels, eggs), allowing attackers to cause denial of service through zip bombs. A malicious package can consume gigabytes of disk space from a few megabytes of compressed data. ## Vulnerability Details **Affected Component:** `guarddog/utils/archives.py` - `safe_extract()` function **Vulnerability Type:** CWE-409 - Improper Handling of Highly Compressed Data (Zip Bomb) **Severity:** HIGH (CVSS ~8) **Attack Vector:** Network (malicious package uploaded to PyPI/npm) or local ### Root Cause The `safe_extract()` function handles TAR files securely using the `tarsafe` library, but ZIP file extraction has no size validation: ```python elif zipfile.is_zipfile(source_archive): with zipfile.ZipFile(source_archive, "r") as zip: for file in zip.namelist(): zip.extract(file, path=os.path.join(target_directory, file)) ``` **Missing protections:*...