#git

### Impact This vulnerability affects applications that: * Use the ImageMagick handler for image processing (`imagick` as the image library) * **AND** either: * Allow file uploads with user-controlled filenames and process uploaded images using the `resize()` method * **OR** use the `text()` method with user-controlled text content or options An attacker can: * Upload a file with a malicious filename containing shell metacharacters that get executed when the image is processed * **OR** provide malicious text content or options that get executed when adding text to images ### Patches Upgrade to v4.6.2 or later. ### Workarounds * **Switch to the GD image handler** (`gd`, the default handler), which is not affected by either vulnerability * **For file upload scenarios**: Instead of using user-provided filenames, generate random names to eliminate the attack vector with `getRandomName()` when using the `move()` method, or use the `store()` method, which automatically generates safe ...

Some risks don’t breach the perimeter—they arrive through signed software, clean resumes, or sanctioned vendors still hiding in plain sight. This week, the clearest threats weren’t the loudest—they were the most legitimate-looking. In an environment where identity, trust, and tooling are all interlinked, the strongest attack path is often the one that looks like it belongs. Security teams are

Sublime Security reveals a cunning romance/adult-themed scam targeting German speakers, leveraging Keitaro TDS to deliver an AutoIT-based malware loader. Learn how this sophisticated campaign operates, its deceptive tactics, and the hidden payload.

A list of topics we covered in the week of July 21 to July 27 of 2025

### Duplicate Advisory This advisory has been withdrawn because it is a duplicate of GHSA-25mx-8f3v-8wh7. This link is maintained to preserve external references. ### Original Description The sequoia-openpgp crate before 1.16.0 for Rust allows out-of-bounds array access and a panic.

A sandbox escape vulnerability was identified in huggingface/smolagents version 1.14.0, allowing attackers to bypass the restricted execution environment and achieve remote code execution (RCE). The vulnerability stems from the local_python_executor.py module, which inadequately restricts Python code execution despite employing static and dynamic checks. Attackers can exploit whitelisted modules and functions to execute arbitrary code, compromising the host system. This flaw undermines the core security boundary intended to isolate untrusted code, posing risks such as unauthorized code execution, data leakage, and potential integration-level compromise. The issue is resolved in version 1.17.0.

Cybersecurity researchers at CloudSEK’s STRIKE team used facial recognition and GPS data to expose a massive, over $2…

### Description Opencast prior to versions 17.6 would incorrectly send the hashed global system account credentials (ie: `org.opencastproject.security.digest.user` and `org.opencastproject.security.digest.pass`) when attempting to fetch mediapackage elements included in a mediapackage XML file. A [previous CVE](https://github.com/opencast/opencast/security/advisories/GHSA-hcxx-mp6g-6gr9) prevented many cases where the credentials were inappropriately sent, but not all. The remainder are addressed with this patch. ### Impact Anyone with ingest permissions could cause Opencast to send its hashed global system account credentials to a url of their choosing. ### Patches This issue is fixed in Opencast 17.6 If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: - Open an issue in our [issue tracker](https://github.com/opencast/opencast/issues) - Email us at security@opencast.org

### Summary The HAX CMS API endpoints do not perform authorization checks when interacting with a resource. Both the JS and PHP versions of the CMS do not verify that a user has permission to interact with a resource before performing a given operation. ### Details The API endpoints within the HAX CMS application check if a user is authenticated, but don't check for authorization before performing an operation. #### Affected Resources - [Operations.php: 760](https://github.com/haxtheweb/haxcms-php/blob/b158d8ba1f9602af92ab084fd03b418f953079fd/system/backend/php/lib/Operations.php#L760) `createNode()` - [Operations.php: 868](https://github.com/haxtheweb/haxcms-php/blob/b158d8ba1f9602af92ab084fd03b418f953079fd/system/backend/php/lib/Operations.php#L868) `saveNode()` - [Operations.php: 1171](https://github.com/haxtheweb/haxcms-php/blob/b158d8ba1f9602af92ab084fd03b418f953079fd/system/backend/php/lib/Operations.php#L1171) `deleteNode()` - [Operations.php: 1789](https://github.com/haxth...

#### **Overview** A critical vulnerability has been identified in the `tj-actions/branch-names` GitHub Action workflow which allows arbitrary command execution in downstream workflows. This issue arises due to inconsistent input sanitization and unescaped output, enabling malicious actors to exploit specially crafted branch names or tags. While internal sanitization mechanisms have been implemented, the action outputs remain vulnerable, exposing consuming workflows to significant security risks. #### **Technical Details** The vulnerability stems from the unsafe use of the `eval printf "%s"` pattern within the action's codebase. Although initial sanitization using `printf "%q"` properly escapes untrusted input, subsequent unescaping via `eval printf "%s"` reintroduces command injection risks. This unsafe pattern is demonstrated in the following code snippet: ```bash echo "base_ref_branch=$(eval printf "%s" "$BASE_REF")" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT" echo "head_ref_branch=$(eval printf "%s" "$...