#git

The US indicated they will sign the Pall Mall Pact, an international treaty to regulate commercial spyware and surveillance tools.

SurrealDB offers http functions that can access external network endpoints. A typical, albeit [not recommended ](https://surrealdb.com/docs/surrealdb/reference-guide/security-best-practices#example-deny-all-capabilities-with-some-exceptions) configuration would be to start SurrealDB with all network connections allowed with the exception of a deny list. For example, `surreal start --allow-net --deny-net 10.0.0.0/8` will allow all network connections except to the 10.0.0.0/8 block. An authenticated user of SurrealDB can use redirects to bypass this restriction. For example by hosting a server on the public internet which redirects to the IP addresses blocked by the administrator of the SurrealDB server via HTTP 301 or 307 response codes. When sending SurrealDB statements containing the `http::*` functions to the attacker controlled host, the SurrealDB server will follow the redirects to the blocked IP address. Because the statements also return the responses to the attacker, this iss...

SurrealDB allows authenticated users with `OWNER` or `EDITOR` permissions at the root, database or namespace levels to define their own database functions using the `DEFINE FUNCTION` statement A custom database function comprises a name together with a function body. In the function body, the user programs the functionality of the function in terms of SurrealQL. The language includes a `FOR` keyword, used to implement for-loops. Whilst the parser and interpreter constrain the number of iterations for a single for-loop, nesting several for-loops with a large number of iterations is possible. Thus, an attacker could define a function that comprises several nested for-loops with an iteration count of 1.000.000 each. Executing the function will consume all the CPU time of the server, timeouts configured will not break the CPU consumption, and the function execution monopolizes all CPU time of the SurrealDB server, effectively preventing the server from executing functions, queries, com...

Through enabling the scripting capability. SurrealDB allows for advanced functions with complicated logic, by allowing embedded functions to be written in JavaScript. These functions are bounded for memory and stack size, but not in time. An attacker could launch a number of long running functions that could potentially facilitate a Denial Of Service attack. This vulnerability can only affect SurrealDB servers explicitly enabling the scripting capability with `--allow-scripting` or `--allow-all` and equivalent environment variables `SURREAL_CAPS_ALLOW_SCRIPT=true` and `SURREAL_CAPS_ALLOW_ALL=true`. This issue was discovered and patched during an code audit and penetration test of SurrealDB by cure53, the severity defined within cure53's preliminary finding is Low, matched by our CVSS v4 assessment. ### Impact An attacker can use the scripting capabilities of SurrealDB to run a series of long running functions to facilitate a Denial Of Service attack. ### Patches A default timeout ...

An authenticated user can craft a query using the `string::replace` function that uses a Regex to perform a string replacement. As there is a failure to restrict the resulting string length, this enables an attacker to send a `string::replace` function to the SurrealDB server exhausting all the memory of the server due to string allocations. This eventually results in a Denial-of-Service situation for the SurrealDB server. This issue was discovered and patched during an code audit and penetration test of SurrealDB by cure53. Using CVSSv4 definitions, the severity is High. ### Impact An authenticated user can crash the SurrealDB instance through memory exhaustion ### Patches A patch has been created that enforces a limit on string length `SURREAL_GENERATION_ALLOCATION_LIMIT` - Versions 2.0.5, 2.1.5, 2.2.2, and later are not affected by this issue ### Workarounds Affected users who are unable to update may want to limit the ability of untrusted clients to run the `string::replace`...

### Impact Affected versions of yiisoft/yii are vulnerable to Reflected XSS in specific scenarios where the fallback error renderer is used. ### Patches Upgrade yiisoft/yii to version 1.1.31 or higher. ### References - [Git commit](https://github.com/yiisoft/yii/commit/d386d737861c9014269b7ed8c36c65eadb387368) If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, [contact us through security form](https://www.yiiframework.com/security).

Some misconfigured AI chatbots are pushing people’s chats to the open web—revealing sexual prompts and conversations that include descriptions of child sexual abuse.

An authenticated system user at the root, namespace, or database levels can use the `DEFINE ANALYZER` statement to point to arbitrary file locations on the file system, and should the file be tab separated with two columns, the analyzer can be leveraged to exfiltrate the content. This issue was discovered and patched during an code audit and penetration test of SurrealDB by cure53, the severity defined within cure53's preliminary finding is Low, matched by our CVSS v4 assessment. ### Impact Limited to unauthorised access to 2 column TSV files on the file system ### Patches A patch has been created that introduces a new environment variable, `SURREAL_FILE_ALLOWLIST` , which contains a list of allowed file paths. When a mapping file is processed, the mapper checks if the file’s path is within one of the allowed paths. - Versions 2.1.5, 2.2.2 and later are not affected by this issue. ### Workarounds Users unable to update may want to limit those with root, namespace, or database leve...

A vulnerability was found where an attacker can crash the database via crafting a HTTP query that returns a null byte. The problem relies on an uncaught exception in the `net` module, where the result of the query will be converted to JSON before showing as the HTTP response to the user in the **/sql** endpoint. ### Impact This vulnerability allows any authenticated user to crash a SurrealDB instance by sending a crafted query with a null byte to the /sql endpoint. Where SurrealDB is used as an application backend, it is possible that an application user can crash the SurrealDB instance and thus the supported application through crafted inputs that exploit this attack vector. ### Patches A patch has been introduced that ensures the error is caught and converted as an error. - Versions 2.2.2, 2.1.5 and 2.0.5 and later are not affected by this isssue ### Workarounds Affected users who are unable to update may want to limit the ability of untrusted clients to run arbitrary queries ...

ReversingLabs reveals a malicious npm package targeting Atomic and Exodus wallets, silently hijacking crypto transfers via software patching.