#git

A Minnesota cybersecurity and computer forensics expert whose testimony has featured in thousands of courtroom trials over the past 30 years is facing questions about his credentials and an inquiry from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Legal experts say the inquiry could be grounds to reopen a number of adjudicated cases in which the expert's testimony may have been pivotal.

### Summary gitoxide uses SHA-1 hash implementations without any collision detection, leaving it vulnerable to hash collision attacks. ### Details gitoxide uses the `sha1_smol` or `sha1` crate, both of which implement standard SHA-1 without any mitigations for collision attacks. This means that two distinct Git objects with colliding SHA-1 hashes would break the Git object model and integrity checks when used with gitoxide. The SHA-1 function is considered cryptographically insecure. However, in the wake of the SHAttered attacks, this issue was mitigated in Git 2.13.0 in 2017 by using the [sha1collisiondetection](https://github.com/crmarcstevens/sha1collisiondetection) algorithm by default and producing an error when known SHA-1 collisions are detected. Git is in the process of migrating to using SHA-256 for object hashes, but this has not been rolled out widely yet and gitoxide does not support SHA-256 object hashes. ### PoC The following program demonstrates the problem, using the...

### Summary A Remote Code Execution (RCE) vulnerability caused by insecure deserialization has been identified in the latest version(v1.4.2) of BentoML. It allows any unauthenticated user to execute arbitrary code on the server. ### Details It exists an unsafe code segment in `serde.py`: ```Python def deserialize_value(self, payload: Payload) -> t.Any: if "buffer-lengths" not in payload.metadata: return pickle.loads(b"".join(payload.data)) ``` Through data flow analysis, it is confirmed that the `payload `content is sourced from an HTTP request, which can be fully manipulated by the attack. Due to the lack of validation in the code, maliciously crafted serialized data can execute harmful actions during deserialization. ### PoC Environment: - Server host: - IP: 10.98.36.123 - OS: Ubuntu - Attack host: - IP: 10.98.36.121 - OS: Ubuntu 1. Follow the instructions on the BentoML official README(https://github.com/bentoml/BentoML) to set up the environment. 1.1 I...

Crypto software wallets are invincible in the micro range. If you own multiple crypto assets, you need safe and reliable wallets, too.

### Impact This is a high priority vulnerability and users must upgrade ASAP. The signature component of the authorization may be invalid, which would mean that as a client you can use any arbitrary secret to upload objects given the user already has prior WRITE permissions on the bucket, Prior knowledge of access-key, and bucket name this user might have access to - and an access-key with a WRITE permissions is necessary. However with relevant information in place, uploading random objects to buckets is trivial and easy via `curl` ### Patches Yes https://github.com/minio/minio/pull/21103 ### Workarounds Reject requests with `x-amz-content-sha256: STREAMING-UNSIGNED-PAYLOAD-TRAILER` for now at LB layer, ask application users to use `STREAMING-AWS4-HMAC-SHA256-PAYLOAD-TRAILER`

### Impact If the JIRA macro is installed, any logged in XWiki user could edit his/her user profile wiki page and use that JIRA macro, specifying a fake JIRA URL that returns an XML specifying a DOCTYPE pointing to a local file on the XWiki server host and displaying that file's content in one of the returned JIRA fields (such as the summary or description for example). For example: ``` <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> <!DOCTYPE foo [ <!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "file:///etc/passwd"> ]> <rss version="0.92"> ... <item> <title>&xxe;</title> <link>https://jira.xwiki.org/browse/XE-307</link> <project id="10222" key="XE">{RETIRED} XWiki Enterprise</project> <description>&xxe;</description> <environment/> ... ``` ### Patches The vulnerability has been patched in the JIRA Extension v8.6.5. ### Workarounds No easy workaround except to upgrade (which is easy using the XWiki Extension Manager). ### References * https://github.com/xwiki-contrib/jira/commit/98a...

### Summary The contents of arbitrary files can be returned to the browser. ### Impact Only apps explicitly exposing the Vite dev server to the network (using --host or [server.host config option](https://vitejs.dev/config/server-options.html#server-host)) are affected.. ### Details #### `.svg` Requests ending with `.svg` are loaded at this line. https://github.com/vitejs/vite/blob/037f801075ec35bb6e52145d659f71a23813c48f/packages/vite/src/node/plugins/asset.ts#L285-L290 By adding `?.svg` with `?.wasm?init` or with `sec-fetch-dest: script` header, the restriction was able to bypass. This bypass is only possible if the file is smaller than [`build.assetsInlineLimit`](https://vite.dev/config/build-options.html#build-assetsinlinelimit) (default: 4kB) and when using Vite 6.0+. #### relative paths The check was applied before the id normalization. This allowed requests to bypass with relative paths (e.g. `../../`). ### PoC ```bash npm create vite@latest cd vite-project/ npm insta...

### Original message: I found an issue with security grants on on properties in the GraphQL ItemNormalizer: If you use something like `#[ApiProperty(security: 'is_granted("PROPERTY_READ", [object, property])')]` on a member of an entity, the grant gets cached and is only evaluated once, even if the `object` in question is a different one. There is the `ApiPlatform\GraphQl\Serializer\ItemNormalizer::isCacheKeySafe()` method that seems to be intended to prevent this: https://github.com/api-platform/core/blob/88f5ac50d20d6510686a7552310cc567fcca45bf/src/GraphQl/Serializer/ItemNormalizer.php#L160-L164 and in its usage on line 90 it does indeed not create a cache key, but the `parent::normalize()` that is called afterwards still creates the cache key and causes the issue. ### Impact It grants access to properties that it should not. ### Workarounds Override the ItemNormalizer. Patched at: https://github.com/api-platform/core/commit/7af65aad13037d7649348ee3dcd88e084ef771f8

## Summary Due to a weak Content Security Policy on the `/proxy/*` route, an attacker can bypass the CSP of the media proxy and execute cross-site scripting when opening external images in a new tab/window. ## Impact A malicious feed added to Miniflux can execute arbitrary JavaScript in the user's browser when opening external resources, such as proxified images, in a new tab or window. ## Mitigation The CSP for the media proxy has been changed from `default-src 'self'` to `default-src 'none'; form-action 'none'; sandbox;`. Upgrade to Miniflux >= 2.2.7 ## Credit [RyotaK](https://ryotak.net) (GMO Flatt Security Inc.) with [takumi-san.ai](https://takumi-san.ai)

### Summary Using the Relay special `node` type you can bypass the configured security on an operation. ### Details Here is an example of how to apply security configurations for the GraphQL operations: ```php #[ApiResource( security: "is_granted('ROLE_USER')", operations: [ /* ... */ ], graphQlOperations: [ new Query(security: "is_granted('ROLE_USER')"), //... ], )] class Book { /* ... */ } ``` This indeed checks `is_granted('ROLE_USER')` as expected for a GraphQL query like the following: ```php ‌query { book(id: "/books/1") { title } } ``` But the security check can be bypassed by using the `node` field (that is available by default) on the root query type like that: ```php ‌query { node(id: "/books/1") { ... on Book { title } } } ``` This does not execute any security checks and can therefore be used to access any entity without restrictions by everyone that has access to the API. ### Impa...