#git

Guide to scale ready code security with event driven scans unified data and API first design for large teams seeking strong growth aligned control.

We’ve seen a new wave of attacks exploiting legitimate Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) tools to remotely control victims’ systems.

### Impact Javascript code can be injected by malicious editors for a stored XSS attack if the standard Content Security Policy is disabled. ### Workaround If the standard CSP rules are active (default in production mode), an exploit isn't possible. ### Credits Lwin Min Oo <lwinminoo2244@gmail.com>

Your antivirus scans files. But what about attacks that never create files? Here's how we catch the threats hiding on your family's computers.

Remember when phishing emails were easy to spot? Bad grammar, weird formatting, and requests from a "Prince" in a distant country? Those days are over. Today, a 16-year-old with zero coding skills and a $200 allowance can launch a campaign that rivals state-sponsored hackers. They don't need to be smart; they just need to subscribe to the right AI tool. We are witnessing the industrialization of

Koi Security exposes ShadyPanda, a group that used trusted Chrome/Edge extensions to infect 4.3 million users over 7 years for deep surveillance and corporate espionage.

FeehiCMS version 2.1.1 has a Remote Code Execution via Unrestricted File Upload in Ad Management. FeehiCMS version 2.1.1 allows authenticated remote attackers to upload files that the server later executes (or stores in an executable location) without sufficient validation, sanitization, or execution restrictions. An authenticated remote attacker can upload a crafted PHP file and cause the application or web server to execute it, resulting in remote code execution (RCE).

SQL injection vulnerability in long2ice assyncmy thru 0.2.10 allows attackers to execute arbitrary SQL commands via crafted dict keys.

### Impact In Apptainer versions less than 1.4.5, a container can disable two of the forms of the little used `--security` option, in particular the forms `--security=apparmor:<profile>` and `--security=selinux:<label>` which otherwise put restrictions on operations that containers can do. The `--security` option has always been mentioned in Apptainer documentation as being a feature for the root user, although these forms do also work for unprivileged users on systems where the corresponding feature is enabled. Apparmor is enabled by default on Debian-based distributions and SElinux is enabled by default on RHEL-based distributions, but on SUSE it depends on the distribution version. In addition, a bug in the detection of selinux support in Apptainer's suid mode means that `--security selinux:<label>` flags may not be applied, even in the absence of an attack. In that case a warning message is emitted indicating that selinux is unavailable, but the warning may be may be overlooked...

### Impact _**Native Mode (default)**_ Singularity's default native runtime allows users to apply restrictions to container processes using the apparmor or selinux Linux Security Modules (LSMs), via the `--security selinux:<label>` or `--security apparmor:<profile>` flags. LSM labels are written to process or thread `attrs/exec` under `/proc`. If a user relies on LSM restrictions to prevent malicious operations then, under certain circumstances, an attacker can redirect the LSM label write operation so that it is ineffective. This requires: * The attacker to cause the user to run a malicious container image that redirects the mount of `/proc` to the destination of a shared mount, either known to be configured on the target system, or that will be specified by the user when running the container. * Control of the content of the shared mount, for example through another malicious container which also binds it, or as a user with relevant permissions on the host system it is bound from...