#git

## Summary GuardDog's `safe_extract()` function does not validate decompressed file sizes when extracting ZIP archives (wheels, eggs), allowing attackers to cause denial of service through zip bombs. A malicious package can consume gigabytes of disk space from a few megabytes of compressed data. ## Vulnerability Details **Affected Component:** `guarddog/utils/archives.py` - `safe_extract()` function **Vulnerability Type:** CWE-409 - Improper Handling of Highly Compressed Data (Zip Bomb) **Severity:** HIGH (CVSS ~8) **Attack Vector:** Network (malicious package uploaded to PyPI/npm) or local ### Root Cause The `safe_extract()` function handles TAR files securely using the `tarsafe` library, but ZIP file extraction has no size validation: ```python elif zipfile.is_zipfile(source_archive): with zipfile.ZipFile(source_archive, "r") as zip: for file in zip.namelist(): zip.extract(file, path=os.path.join(target_directory, file)) ``` **Missing protections:*...

### Problem Local platform users who can write to TYPO3’s mail‑file spool directory can craft a file that the system will automatically deserialize without any class restrictions. This flaw allows an attacker to inject and execute arbitrary PHP code in the public scope of the web server. The vulnerability is triggered when TYPO3 is configured with `$GLOBALS['TYPO3_CONF_VARS']['MAIL']['transport_spool_type'] = 'file';` and a scheduler task or cron job runs the command `mailer:spool:send`. The spool‑send operation performs the insecure deserialization that is at the core of this issue. ### Solution Update to TYPO3 versions 10.4.55 ELTS, 11.5.49 ELTS, 12.4.41 LTS, 13.4.23 LTS, 14.0.2 that fix the problem described. ### Credits Thanks to Vitaly Simonovich for reporting this issue, and to TYPO3 security team members Elias Häußler and Oliver Hader for fixing it. ### References * [TYPO3-CORE-SA-2026-004](https://typo3.org/security/advisory/typo3-core-sa-2026-004)

### Summary A TOCTOU race condition vulnerability allows a user to exceed the set number of active tunnels in their subscription plan. ### Details Affected conponent: `apps/web/src/routes/api/tunnel/register.ts` - `/tunnel/register` endpoint code-: ```ts // Check if tunnel already exists in database const [existingTunnel] = await db .select() .from(tunnels) .where(eq(tunnels.url, tunnelUrl)); const isReconnection = !!existingTunnel; console.log( `[TUNNEL LIMIT CHECK] Org: ${organizationId}, Tunnel: ${tunnelId}`, ); console.log( `[TUNNEL LIMIT CHECK] Is Reconnection: ${isReconnection}`, ); console.log( `[TUNNEL LIMIT CHECK] Plan: ${currentPlan}, Limit: ${tunnelLimit}`, ); // Check limits only for NEW tunnels (not reconnections) if (!isReconnection) { // Count active tunnels from Redis SET ...

### Summary This vulnerability allows a user i.e a free plan user to get more than the desired subdomains due to lack of db transaction lock mechanisms in `https://github.com/akinloluwami/outray/blob/main/apps/web/src/routes/api/%24orgSlug/subdomains/index.ts` ### Details - The affected code-: ```ts //Race condition const [subscription] = await db .select() .from(subscriptions) .where(eq(subscriptions.organizationId, organization.id)); const currentPlan = subscription?.plan || "free"; const planLimits = getPlanLimits(currentPlan as any); const subdomainLimit = planLimits.maxSubdomains; const existingSubdomains = await db .select() .from(subdomains) .where(eq(subdomains.organizationId, organization.id)); if (existingSubdomains.length >= subdomainLimit) { return json( { error: `Subdomain limit reached. The ${currentPlan} plan allows ${subdom...

### Summary There is a Zip Slip path traversal vulnerability in the jaraco.context package affecting setuptools as well, in `jaraco.context.tarball()` function. The vulnerability may allow attackers to extract files outside the intended extraction directory when malicious tar archives are processed. The strip_first_component filter splits the path on the first `/` and extracts the second component, while allowing `../` sequences. Paths like `dummy_dir/../../etc/passwd` become `../../etc/passwd`. Note that this suffers from a nested tarball attack as well with multi-level tar files such as `dummy_dir/inner.tar.gz`, where the inner.tar.gz includes a traversal `dummy_dir/../../config/.env` that also gets translated to `../../config/.env`. The code can be found: - https://github.com/jaraco/jaraco.context/blob/main/jaraco/context/__init__.py#L74-L91 - https://github.com/pypa/setuptools/blob/main/setuptools/_vendor/jaraco/context.py#L55-L76 (inherited) This report was also sent to setuptoo...

Deserialization of untrusted data in Azure Core shared client library for Python allows an authorized attacker to execute code over a network.

## Summary A potential Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) vulnerability was identified in tarteaucitron.js in the handling of the `issuu_id` parameter. ## Details The issue was caused by the use of insufficiently constrained regular expressions applied to attacker-controlled input: if (issuu_id.match(/\d+\/\d+/)) { issuu_embed = '#' + issuu_id; } else if (issuu_id.match(/d=(.*)&u=(.*)/)) { issuu_embed = '?' + issuu_id; } These expressions are not anchored and rely on greedy patterns (`.*`). When evaluated against specially crafted input, they may cause excessive backtracking, leading to high CPU consumption and potential denial of service. ## Impact An attacker able to control the `issuu_id` parameter could exploit this vulnerability to degrade performance or cause temporary service unavailability through CPU exhaustion. No confidentiality or integrity impact was identified. ## Fix https://github.com/AmauriC/tarteaucitron.js/commit/f0bbda...

*Previously reported via email to support@sst.dev on 2025-11-17 per the security policy in [opencode-sdk-js/SECURITY.md](https://github.com/sst/opencode-sdk-js/blob/main/SECURITY.md). No response received.* ### Summary OpenCode automatically starts an unauthenticated HTTP server that allows any local process—or any website via permissive CORS—to execute arbitrary shell commands with the user's privileges. ### Details When OpenCode starts, it spawns an HTTP server (default port 4096+) with no authentication. Critical endpoints exposed: - `POST /session/:id/shell` - Execute shell commands (`server.ts:1401`) - `POST /pty` - Create interactive terminal sessions (`server.ts:267`) - `GET /file/content?path=` - Read arbitrary files (`server.ts:1868`) The server is started automatically in `cli/cmd/tui/worker.ts:36` via `Server.listen()`. No authentication middleware exists in `server/server.ts`. The server uses permissive CORS (`.use(cors())` with default `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: ...

Thanks, @thunze for reporting this! `hermes` subcommands take arbitrary options under the `-O` argument. These have been logged in raw form since https://github.com/softwarepub/hermes/commit/7f64f102e916c76dc44404b77ab2a80f5a4e59b1 in: https://github.com/softwarepub/hermes/blob/3a92f42b2b976fdbc2c49a621de6d665364a7cee/src/hermes/commands/cli.py#L66 If users provide sensitive data such as API tokens (e.g., via `hermes deposit -O invenio_rdm.auth_token SECRET`), these are written to the log file in plain text, making them available to whoever can access the log file. ### Impact As currently, `hermes.log` is not yet uploaded automatically as an artifact in CI, this vuln impacts: - local users working on shared access computers, where logs may be written to a commonly accessible file system - CI users whose CI logs are accessible to others, e.g., through group or organization rights Potentially, if the changes merged from https://github.com/softwarepub/ci-templates/pull/13 are merged...

### Summary The user-provided string `repository` in the `helmv3` manager is appended to the `helm registry login` command without proper sanitization. ### Details Adversaries can provide a maliciously crafted `Chart.yaml` in conjunctions with a tweaked Renovate configuration file to trick Renovate to execute arbitrary code. The value for both uses of the `repository` variable in [lib/modules/manager/helmv3/common.ts](https://github.com/renovatebot/renovate/blob/b69416ce1745f67c9fc1d149738e2f52feb4f732/lib/modules/manager/helmv3/common.ts) are not being escaped using the `quote` function from the `shlex` package. This lack of proper sanitization has been present in the product since version 31.51.0 (https://github.com/renovatebot/renovate/commit/f372a68144a4d78c9f7f418168e4efe03336a432), released on January 24 of 2022. ### PoC 1. Create a git repo with the following content: `renovate.json5`: ```json5 { $schema: "https://docs.renovatebot.com/renovate-schema.json", customDatasou...