#git

Jenkins Curseforge Publisher Plugin 1.0 and earlier stores API Keys unencrypted in job `config.xml` files on the Jenkins controller as part of its configuration. These keys can be viewed by users with Item/Extended Read permission or access to the Jenkins controller file system. Additionally, the job configuration form does not mask these keys, increasing the potential for attackers to observe and capture them. As of publication of this advisory, there is no fix.

Jenkins MCP Server Plugin 0.84.v50ca_24ef83f2 and earlier does not perform permission checks in several MCP tools. This allows to do the following: - Attackers with Item/Read permission can obtain information about the configured SCM in a job despite lacking Item/Extended Read permission (`getJobScm`). - Attackers with Item/Read permission can trigger new builds of a job despite lacking Item/Build permission (`triggerBuild`). - Attackers without Overall/Read permission can retrieve the names of configured clouds (`getStatus`). MCP Server Plugin 0.86.v7d3355e6a_a_18 performs permission checks for the affected MCP tools.

Jenkins ByteGuard Build Actions Plugin 1.0 and earlier stores API tokens unencrypted in job `config.xml` files on the Jenkins controller as part of its configuration. These tokens can be viewed by users with Item/Extended Read permission or access to the Jenkins controller file system. Additionally, the job configuration form does not mask these credentials, increasing the potential for attackers to observe and capture them. As of publication of this advisory, there is no fix.

Jenkins Curseforge Publisher Plugin 1.0 and earlier stores API Keys unencrypted in job `config.xml` files on the Jenkins controller as part of its configuration. These keys can be viewed by users with Item/Extended Read permission or access to the Jenkins controller file system. Additionally, the job configuration form does not mask these keys, increasing the potential for attackers to observe and capture them. As of publication of this advisory, there is no fix.

Jenkins ByteGuard Build Actions Plugin 1.0 and earlier stores API tokens unencrypted in job `config.xml` files on the Jenkins controller as part of its configuration. These tokens can be viewed by users with Item/Extended Read permission or access to the Jenkins controller file system. Additionally, the job configuration form does not mask these credentials, increasing the potential for attackers to observe and capture them. As of publication of this advisory, there is no fix.

Jenkins JDepend Plugin 1.3.1 and earlier includes an outdated version of JDepend Maven Plugin that does not configure its XML parser to prevent XML external entity (XXE) attacks. This allows attackers able to configure input files for the "Report JDepend" step to have Jenkins parse a crafted file that uses external entities for extraction of secrets from the Jenkins controller or server-side request forgery. As of publication of this advisory, there is no fix.

Cybersecurity researchers have flagged a new security issue in agentic web browsers like OpenAI ChatGPT Atlas that exposes underlying artificial intelligence (AI) models to context poisoning attacks. In the attack devised by AI security company SPLX, a bad actor can set up websites that serve different content to browsers and AI crawlers run by ChatGPT and Perplexity. The technique has been

No, Gmail wasn’t hacked. But a flood of old stolen credentials on the dark web sparked headlines suggesting otherwise. Here’s what really happened.

BeyondTrust’s annual cybersecurity predictions point to a year where old defenses will fail quietly, and new attack vectors will surge. Introduction The next major breach won’t be a phished password. It will be the result of a massive, unmanaged identity debt. This debt takes many forms: it’s the “ghost” identity from a 2015 breach lurking in your IAM, the privilege sprawl from thousands of new

Organizations in Ukraine have been targeted by threat actors of Russian origin with an aim to siphon sensitive data and maintain persistent access to compromised networks. The activity, according to a new report from the Symantec and Carbon Black Threat Hunter Team, targeted a large business services organization for two months and a local government entity in the country for a week. The attacks