#git

The "create core" API of Apache Solr 8.6 through 9.10.0 lacks sufficient input validation on some API parameters, which can cause Solr to check the existence of and attempt to read file-system paths that should be disallowed by Solr's "allowPaths" security setting https://https://solr.apache.org/guide/solr/latest/configuration-guide/configuring-solr-xml.html#the-solr-element .  These read-only accesses can allow users to create cores using unexpected configsets if any are accessible via the filesystem.  On Windows systems configured to allow UNC paths this can additionally cause disclosure of NTLM "user" hashes.  Solr deployments are subject to this vulnerability if they meet the following criteria: * Solr is running in its "standalone" mode. * Solr's "allowPath" setting is being used to restrict file access to certain directories. * Solr's "create core" API is exposed and accessible to untrusted users.  This can happen if Solr's RuleBasedAuthorizationPlugin https://solr.ap...

A flaw was found in the Keycloak Admin REST API. This vulnerability allows the exposure of backend schema and rules, potentially leading to targeted attacks or privilege escalation via improper access control.

Boston, MA, USA, 21st January 2026, CyberNewsWire

Researchers showed how prompt injection hidden in a calendar invite can bypass privacy controls and turn an AI assistant into a data-leaking accomplice.

Every managed security provider is chasing the same problem in 2026 — too many alerts, too few analysts, and clients demanding “CISO-level protection” at SMB budgets. The truth? Most MSSPs are running harder, not smarter. And it’s breaking their margins. That’s where the quiet revolution is happening: AI isn’t just writing reports or surfacing risks — it’s rebuilding how security services are

A poorly secured wristband system used at a Carlsberg exhibition allowed access to visitor photos, videos, and full names. Attempts to report the issue were ignored for months.

A flaw was found in the keycloak-services component of Keycloak. This vulnerability allows the issuance of access and refresh tokens for disabled users, leading to unauthorized use of previously revoked privileges, via a business logic vulnerability in the Token Exchange implementation when a privileged client invokes the token exchange flow.

LastPass is alerting users to a new active phishing campaign that's impersonating the password management service, which aims to trick users into giving up their master passwords. The campaign, which began on or around January 19, 2026, involves sending phishing emails claiming upcoming maintenance and urging them to create a local backup of their password vaults in the next 24 hours. The

A flaw was found in the Keycloak server during refresh token processing, specifically in the TokenManager class responsible for enforcing refresh token reuse policies. When strict refresh token rotation is enabled, the validation and update of refresh token usage are not performed atomically. This allows concurrent refresh requests to bypass single-use enforcement and issue multiple access tokens from the same refresh token. As a result, Keycloak’s refresh token rotation hardening can be undermined.

## Summary NULL pointer dereference in MSL (Magick Scripting Language) parser when processing `<comment>` tag before any image is loaded. ## Version - ImageMagick 7.x (tested on current main branch) - Commit: HEAD ## Steps to Reproduce ### Method 1: Using ImageMagick directly ```bash magick MSL:poc.msl out.png ``` ### Method 2: Using OSS-Fuzz reproduce ```bash python3 infra/helper.py build_fuzzers imagemagick python3 infra/helper.py reproduce imagemagick msl_fuzzer poc.msl ``` Or run the fuzzer directly: ```bash ./msl_fuzzer poc.msl ``` ## Expected Behavior ImageMagick should handle the malformed MSL gracefully and return an error message. ## Actual Behavior ``` convert: MagickCore/property.c:297: MagickBooleanType DeleteImageProperty(Image *, const char *): Assertion `image != (Image *) NULL' failed. Aborted ``` ## Root Cause Analysis In `coders/msl.c:7091`, `MSLEndElement()` calls `DeleteImageProperty()` on `msl_info->image[n]` when handling the `</comment>` end tag wi...