#java

# Summary The function `list_html` generates a file view of a folder without sanitizing the files or folders names, potentially leading to XSS in cases where a website allows access to public files using this feature, allowing anyone to upload a file. # Details The vulnerable snippet of code is the following: [**dir.rs**](https://github.com/salvo-rs/salvo/blob/16efeba312a274739606ce76366d921768628654/crates/serve-static/src/dir.rs#L581) ```rust // ... fn list_html(... let mut link = "".to_owned(); format!( r#"<a href="/">{}</a>{}"#, HOME_ICON, segments .map(|seg| { link = format!("{link}/{seg}"); format!("/<a href=\"{link}\">{seg}</a>") }) .collect::<Vec<_>>() .join("") ) // ... ``` # PoC https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/1e161e17-f033-4cc4-855b-43fd38ed1be4 Here is the example app we used: `mian.rs` ```rs ...

### Summary Since 2017, the default webpack plugins have passed the entire `process.env` to `EnvironmentPlugin`. This pattern exposed ALL build environment variables to client-side JavaScript bundles whenever application code (or any dependency) referenced `process.env.VARIABLE_NAME`. This is not a regression - the vulnerable code has existed since the original Webpacker implementation. No recent code change in Shakapacker triggered this issue. ### Impact Any environment variable in the build environment that is referenced in client-side code (including third-party dependencies) is embedded directly into the JavaScript bundle. This includes: - `DATABASE_URL` - Database credentials - `AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY` - AWS credentials - `RAILS_MASTER_KEY` - Rails encrypted credentials key - `STRIPE_SECRET_KEY`, `TWILIO_AUTH_TOKEN` - Third-party API keys - Any other secrets present in the build environment **Severity**: Critical - secrets are exposed in publicly accessible JavaScript files...

React Router (and Remix v1/v2) SPA open navigation redirects originating from loaders or actions in [Framework Mode](https://reactrouter.com/start/modes#framework), [Data Mode](https://reactrouter.com/start/modes#data), or the unstable RSC modes can result in unsafe URLs causing unintended javascript execution on the client. This is only an issue if developers are creating redirect paths from untrusted content or via an open redirect. > [!NOTE] > This does not impact applications that use [Declarative Mode](https://reactrouter.com/start/modes#declarative) (`<BrowserRouter>`).

A XSS vulnerability exists in in React Router's `<ScrollRestoration>` API in [Framework Mode](https://reactrouter.com/start/modes#framework) when using the `getKey`/`storageKey` props during Server-Side Rendering which could allow arbitrary JavaScript execution during SSR if untrusted content is used to generate the keys. > [!NOTE] > This does not impact applications if developers have [disabled server-side rendering](https://reactrouter.com/how-to/spa) in Framework Mode, or if they are using [Declarative Mode](https://reactrouter.com/start/modes#declarative) (`<BrowserRouter>`) or [Data Mode](https://reactrouter.com/start/modes#data) (`createBrowserRouter`/`<RouterProvider>`).

A XSS vulnerability exists in in React Router's `meta()`/`<Meta>` APIs in [Framework Mode](https://reactrouter.com/start/modes#framework) when generating `script:ld+json` tags which could allow arbitrary JavaScript execution during SSR if untrusted content is used to generate the tag. > [!NOTE] > This does not impact applications using [Declarative Mode](https://reactrouter.com/start/modes#declarative) (`<BrowserRouter>`) or [Data Mode](https://reactrouter.com/start/modes#data) (`createBrowserRouter`/`<RouterProvider>`).

### Summary An unsafe implementation in the `click` event listener used by `ui.sub_pages`, combined with attacker-controlled link rendering on the page, causes an XSS when the user actively clicks on the link. ### Details 1. On `click`, eventually `sub_pages_navigate` event is emitted. https://github.com/zauberzeug/nicegui/blob/59fa9424c470f1b12c5d368985fa36e21fda706b/nicegui/elements/sub_pages.js#L41-L63 2. SubPagesRouter (used by ui.sub_pages), lisnening on `sub_pages_navigate`, `_handle_navigate` runs. https://github.com/zauberzeug/nicegui/blob/59fa9424c470f1b12c5d368985fa36e21fda706b/nicegui/sub_pages_router.py#L18-L22 3. `_handle_navigate` runs `run_javascript` with f-string substituting `self.current_path` which is simply surrounded by double-quotes. The string context can be broken out easily. https://github.com/zauberzeug/nicegui/blob/59fa9424c470f1b12c5d368985fa36e21fda706b/nicegui/sub_pages_router.py#L73-L88 ### PoC The minimal PoC boils down to this: ```py from ni...

### Summary XSS risk exists in NiceGUI when developers pass attacker-controlled strings into `ui.navigate.history.push()` or `ui.navigate.history.replace()`. These helpers are documented as History API wrappers for updating the browser URL without page reload. However, if the URL argument is embedded into generated JavaScript without proper escaping, a crafted payload can break out of the intended string context and execute arbitrary JavaScript in the victim’s browser. **Applications that do not pass untrusted input into `ui.navigate.history.push/replace` are not affected.** ### Details NiceGUI provides `ui.navigate.history.push(url)` and `ui.navigate.history.replace(url)` to update the URL using the browser History API. If an application forwards user-controlled data (e.g., URL path segments, query parameters like `next=...`, form values, etc.) into these methods, an attacker can inject characters such as quotes and statement terminators to escape the JavaScript string context and e...

The internet never stays quiet. Every week, new hacks, scams, and security problems show up somewhere. This week’s stories show how fast attackers change their tricks, how small mistakes turn into big risks, and how the same old tools keep finding new ways to break in. Read on to catch up before the next wave hits. Honeypot Traps Hackers Hackers Fall for

Chainguard, the trusted source for open source, has a unique view into how modern organizations actually consume open source software and where they run into risk and operational burdens. Across a growing customer base and an extensive catalog of over 1800 container image projects, 148,000 versions, 290,000 images, and 100,000 language libraries, and almost half a billion builds, they can see

A flaw was found in Keycloak. The Keycloak Authorization header parser is overly permissive regarding the formatting of the "Bearer" authentication scheme. It accepts non-standard characters (such as tabs) as separators and tolerates case variations that deviate from RFC 6750 specifications.