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### Impact The Markdown syntax is vulnerable to XSS through HTML. In particular, using Markdown syntax, it's possible for any user to embed Javascript code that will then be executed on the browser of any other user visiting either the document or the comment that contains it. In the instance that this code is executed by a user with admins or programming rights, this issue compromises the confidentiality, integrity and availability of the whole XWiki installation. To reproduce, on an instance where the CommonMark Markdown Syntax 1.2 extension is installed, log in as a user without script rights. Edit a document and set its syntax to Markdown. Then , add the content `<script>alert("XSS")</script>` and refresh the page. If an alert appears containing "XSS", then the instance is vulnerable. ### Patches This has been patched in version 8.9 of the CommonMark Markdown Syntax 1.2 extension. ### Workarounds We're not aware of any workaround except upgrading. ### References * https://jira....

### Impact A user who can access pages located in the XWiki space (by default, anyone) can access the page `XWiki.Authentication.Administration` and (unless an authenticator is set in `xwiki.cfg`) switch to another installed authenticator. Note that, by default, there is only one authenticator available (`Standard XWiki Authenticator`). So, if no authenticator extension was installed, it's not really possible to do anything for an attacker. Also, in most cases, if you have installed and are using an SSO authenticator (like OIDC or LDAP for example), the worst an attacker can do is break authentication by switching back to the standard authenticator (that's because it's impossible to login to a user which does not have a stored password, and that's usually what SSO authenticator produce). ### Patches This has been patched in XWiki 15.10.9 and XWiki 16.3.0RC1. ### Workarounds You can very easily fix this vulnerability in your instance through right configuration: * access the page...

### Impact Anyone can access the metadata of any attachment in the wiki using the wiki attachment REST endpoint. It's not filtering the result depending on current user rights, a not authenticated user could exploit this even in a totally private wiki. To reproduce: * remove view from guest on the whole wiki * logout * access http://127.0.0.1:8080/xwiki/rest/wikis/xwiki/attachments You get a list of attachments, while the expected result should be an empty list. ### Patches This vulnerability has been fixed in XWiki 14.10.22, 15.10.12, 16.7.0-rc-1 and 16.4.3. ### Workarounds We're not aware of any workaround except upgrading. ### For more information If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: * Open an issue in [Jira XWiki.org](https://jira.xwiki.org/) * Email us at [Security Mailing List](mailto:security@xwiki.org) ### Attribution Issue reported by Lukas Monert.

WordPress sites are under threat from a deceptive anti-malware plugin. Learn how this malware grants backdoor access, hides…

# Duplicate Advisory This advisory has been withdrawn because it is a duplicate of GHSA-5jfq-x6xp-7rw2. This link is maintained to preserve external references. # Original Description A flaw was found in Keycloak. The org.keycloak.authorization package may be vulnerable to circumventing required actions, allowing users to circumvent requirements such as setting up two-factor authentication.

### Summary A stored cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability was discovered in the application’s comments feature. This issue allows a malicious actor to inject JavaScript payloads that are stored and later executed in the browser of any user viewing the affected comment. The XSS occurs because the application fails to properly sanitize or encode user input submitted to the comments. Notably, the application sanitizes or does not allow execution of `<script>` tags, but does not account for payloads obfuscated using JavaScript block comments like `/* JavaScriptPayload */`. ### PoC Navigate to a site and page that allows comments and place this in the comments section and submit it: `/*<script>alert('pizzapower')</script>*/` Upon submitting to the page, it will run. And then upon every page visit, it will run. ### Impact An attacker can run arbitrary JS in the victim's browser (any user that visits the page with the comments). This can be chained to do many malicious actions, ...

### Summary Reflected XSS has been detected in the file upload form. Vulnerability can be exploited without authentication This Proof of Concept has been performed using the followings: - YesWiki v4.5.3 (doryphore-dev branch) - Docker environnment (docker/docker-compose.yml) ### Vulnerable code The vulnerability is located in the [file](https://github.com/YesWiki/yeswiki/blob/6894234bbde6ab168bf4253f9a581bd24bf53766/tools/attach/libs/attach.lib.php#L724-L735) ``` public function showUploadForm() { $this->file = $_GET['file']; echo '<h3>' . _t('ATTACH_UPLOAD_FORM_FOR_FILE') . ' ' . $this->file . "</h3>\n"; echo '<form enctype="multipart/form-data" name="frmUpload" method="POST" action="' . $this->wiki->href('upload', $this->wiki->GetPageTag()) . "\">\n" . ' <input type="hidden" name="wiki" value="' . $this->wiki->GetPageTag() . "/upload\" />\n" . ' <input type="hidden" name="MAX_FILE_SIZE" value="' . ...

### Impact The script API of the LESS compiler in XWiki is incorrectly checking for rights when calling the cache cleaning API, making it possible to clean the cache without having programming right. The only impact of this is a slowdown in XWiki execution as the caches are re-filled. As this vulnerability requires script right to exploit, and script right already allows unlimited execution of scripts, the additional impact due to this vulnerability is low. ### Patches This has been patched in XWiki 15.10.12, 16.4.3 and 16.8.0 RC1. ### Workarounds We're not aware of any workaround except for being careful whom to give script right, which is a general recommendation.

### Impact An open redirect vulnerability in the HTML conversion request filter allows attackers to construct URLs on an XWiki instance that redirect to any URL. To reproduce, open `<xwiki-host>/xwiki/bin/view/Main/?foo=bar&foo_syntax=invalid&RequiresHTMLConversion=foo&xerror=https://www.example.com/` where `<xwiki-host>` is the URL of your XWiki installation. ### Patches This bug has been fixed in XWiki 15.10.13, 16.4.4 and 16.8.0 by validating the domain of the redirect URL against the configured safe domains and the current request's domain. ### Workarounds A web application firewall could be configured to reject requests with the `xerror` parameter as from our analysis this parameter isn't used anymore. For requests with the `RequiresHTMLConversion` parameter set, the referrer URL should be checked if it points to the XWiki installation. Apart from that, we're not aware of any workarounds.

### Impact n8n workflows can store and serve binary files, which are accessible to authenticated users. However, there was no restriction on the MIME type of uploaded files, and the MIME type could be controlled via a GET parameter. This allowed the server to respond with any MIME type, potentially enabling malicious content to be interpreted and executed by the browser. An authenticated attacker with member-level permissions could exploit this by uploading a crafted HTML file containing malicious JavaScript. When another user visits the binary data endpoint with the MIME type set to text/html, the script executes in the context of the user’s session. This script could, for example, send a request to change the user’s email address in their account settings, effectively enabling account takeover. ### Patches - [n8n@1.90.0](https://github.com/n8n-io/n8n/releases/tag/n8n%401.90.0) ### Credit We would like to thank @Mahmoud0x00 for reporting this issue.