#jira

Red Hat Security Advisory 2024-0298-03 - Red Hat Advanced Cluster Management for Kubernetes 2.9.2 General Availability release images, which provide security updates and fix bugs. Issues addressed include denial of service and traversal vulnerabilities.

Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor vulnerability in Apache Solr. The Solr Metrics API publishes all unprotected environment variables available to each Apache Solr instance. Users are able to specify which environment variables to hide, however, the default list is designed to work for known secret Java system properties. Environment variables cannot be strictly defined in Solr, like Java system properties can be, and may be set for the entire host, unlike Java system properties which are set per-Java-proccess. The Solr Metrics API is protected by the "metrics-read" permission. Therefore, Solr Clouds with Authorization setup will only be vulnerable via users with the "metrics-read" permission. This issue affects Apache Solr: from 9.0.0 before 9.3.0. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 9.3.0 or later, in which environment variables are not published via the Metrics API.

Red Hat Security Advisory 2024-0208-03 - An update for openssl is now available for Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8.6 Extended Update Support.

### Impact A user able to attach a file to a page can post a malformed TAR file by manipulating file modification times headers, which when parsed by Tika, could cause a denial of service issue via CPU consumption. ### Patches This vulnerability has been patched in XWiki 14.10.18, 15.5.3 and 15.8 RC1. ### Workarounds The workaround is to download [commons-compress 1.24](https://search.maven.org/remotecontent?filepath=org/apache/commons/commons-compress/1.24.0/commons-compress-1.24.0.jar) and replace the one located in XWiki `WEB-INF/lib/` folder. ### References https://jira.xwiki.org/browse/XCOMMONS-2796 ### For more information If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: * Open an issue in [Jira XWiki.org](https://jira.xwiki.org/) * Email us at [Security Mailing List](mailto:security@xwiki.org)

### Impact XWiki is vulnerable to a remote code execution (RCE) attack through its user registration feature. This issue allows an attacker to execute arbitrary code by crafting malicious payloads in the "first name" or "last name" fields during user registration. This impacts all installations that have user registration enabled for guests. To reproduce, register with any username and password and the following payload as "first name": `]]{{/html}}{{async}}{{groovy}}services.logging.getLogger("attacker").error("Attack succeeded){{/groovy}}{{/async}}`. In the following page that confirms the success of the registration, the full first name should be displayed, linking to the created user. If the formatting is broken and a log message with content "ERROR attacker - Attack succeeded!" is logged, the attack succeeded. ### Patches This vulnerability has been patched in XWiki 14.10.17, 15.5.3 and 15.8 RC1. ### Workarounds In the administration of your wiki, under "Users & Rights" > "Reg...

### Impact The rollback action is missing a right protection: it means that a user can rollback to a previous version of the page to gain rights they don't have anymore. This vulnerability impacts all version of XWiki since rollback action is available. ### Patches The problem has been patched in XWiki 14.10.16, 15.5.3 and 15.8-rc-1 by ensuring that the rights are checked before performing the rollback. ### Workarounds There's no workaround for this vulnerability, except paying attention to delete old versions of documents that could allow users to gain more rights. ### References * JIRA ticket: https://jira.xwiki.org/browse/XWIKI-21257 * Commit: [4de72875ca49602796165412741033bfdbf1e680](https://github.com/xwiki/xwiki-platform/commit/4de72875ca49602796165412741033bfdbf1e680) ### For more information If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: * Open an issue in [Jira XWiki.org](https://jira.xwiki.org/) * Email us at [Security Mailing List](mailto:security@x...

Apache OFBiz version 18.12.09 suffers from a pre-authentication remote code execution vulnerability.

### Impact It's possible to execute a Velocity script without script right through the document tree. To reproduce: * As a user without script right, create a document, e.g., named Nasty Title * Set the document's title to `$request.requestURI` * Click "Save & View" * Reload the page in the browser The navigation panel displays a document named with the current URL, showing that the Velocity code has been executed even though the user doesn't have script right. ### Patches This has been patched in XWiki 14.10.7 and 15.2RC1. ### Workarounds A possible workaround is to: * modify the page XWiki.DocumentTreeMacros * search for the code `#set ($discard = $translatedDocument.setTitle($translatedDocument.title))` * modify it into `#set ($discard = $translatedDocument.setcomment(''))` ### References * https://jira.xwiki.org/browse/XWIKI-20625 * https://github.com/xwiki/xwiki-platform/commit/41d7dca2d30084966ca6a7ee537f39ee8354a7e3 ### For more information If you have any questions ...

This improper authorization vulnerability allows an unauthenticated attacker to reset Confluence and create a Confluence instance administrator account. Using this account, an attacker can then perform all administrative actions that are available to the Confluence instance administrator. This Metasploit module uses the administrator account to install a malicious .jsp servlet plugin which the user can trigger to gain code execution on the target in the context of the of the user running the confluence server.

### Impact Anyone who can edit an arbitrary wiki page in an XWiki installation can gain programming right through several cases of missing escaping in the code for displaying sections in the administration interface. This impacts the confidentiality, integrity and availability of the whole XWiki installation. Normally, all users are allowed to edit their own user profile so this should be exploitable by all users of the XWiki instance. The easiest way to reproduce this is to edit any document with the object editor and add an object of type `XWiki.ConfigurableClass` ("Custom configurable sections"). Set "Display in section" and "Display in Category" to "other", set scope to "Wiki and all spaces" and "Heading" to `{{async}}{{groovy}}services.logging.getLogger("attacker").error("Attack from Heading succeeded!"); println("Hello from Groovy!"){{/groovy}}{{/async}}`. Click "Save". Open `<xwiki-host>/xwiki/bin/view/Main/?sheet=XWiki.AdminSheet&viewer=content&editor=globaladmin&section=othe...