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The ABB Cylon FLXeon BACnet controller uses a weak set of default administrative credentials that can be guessed in remote password attacks and gain full control of the system.

An authenticated attacker can access sensitive information via the system logs page of ABB Cylon FLXeon controllers. The logs expose critical data, including the OpenSSL password for stored certificates. This information can be leveraged for further attacks, such as decrypting encrypted communications, impersonation, or gaining deeper system access.

As of January 10, 2023, CISA will no longer be updating ICS security advisories for Siemens product vulnerabilities beyond the initial advisory. For the most up-to-date information on vulnerabilities in this advisory, please see Siemens' ProductCERT Security Advisories (CERT Services | Services | Siemens Global). View CSAF 1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY CVSS v3 9.8 ATTENTION: Exploitable remotely/low attack complexity Vendor: Siemens Equipment: SCALANCE W700 Vulnerabilities: Double Free, Improper Restriction of Communication Channel to Intended Endpoints, Improper Resource Shutdown or Release, Inadequate Encryption Strength, Race Condition, Integer Overflow or Wraparound, Out-of-bounds Write, NULL Pointer Dereference, Externally Controlled Reference to a Resource in Another Sphere, Use After Free, Type Confusion, Improper Certificate Validation, Missing Release of Memory after Effective Lifetime, Uncontrolled Resource Consumption, Out-of-bounds Read, Inefficient Regular Expression Complexity, In...

### Summary Private key can be extracted from ECDSA signature upon signing a malformed input (e.g. a string or a number), which could e.g. come from JSON network input Note that `elliptic` by design accepts hex strings as one of the possible input types ### Details In this code: https://github.com/indutny/elliptic/blob/3e46a48fdd2ef2f89593e5e058d85530578c9761/lib/elliptic/ec/index.js#L100-L107 `msg` is a BN instance after conversion, but `nonce` is an array, and different BN instances could generate equivalent arrays after conversion. Meaning that a same `nonce` could be generated for different messages used in signing process, leading to `k` reuse, leading to private key extraction from a pair of signatures Such a message can be constructed for any already known message/signature pair, meaning that the attack needs only a single malicious message being signed for a full key extraction While signing unverified attacker-controlled messages would be problematic itself (and exploi...

### Summary This report finds 2 availability issues due to the regex used in the `parse-duration` npm package: 1. An event loop delay due to the CPU-bound operation of resolving the provided string, from a 0.5ms and up to ~50ms per one operation, with a varying size from 0.01 MB and up to 4.3 MB respectively. 2. An out of memory that would crash a running Node.js application due to a string size of roughly 10 MB that utilizes unicode characters. ### PoC Refer to the following proof of concept code that provides a test case and makes use of the regular expression in the library as its test case to match against strings: ```js // Vulnerable regex to use from the library: import parse from './index.js' function generateStressTestString(length, decimalProbability) { let result = ""; for (let i = 0; i < length; i++) { if (Math.random() < decimalProbability) { result += "....".repeat(99); } result += Math.floor(Math.random() * 10); } return result; } function ...

A CSRF vulnerability has been identified in the ABB Cylon FLXeon series. However, exploitation is limited to specific conditions due to the server's CORS configuration (Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * without Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true). The vulnerability can only be exploited under the following scenarios: Same Domain: The attacker must host the malicious page on the same domain as the target server. Man-in-the-Middle (MitM): The attacker can intercept and modify traffic between the user and the server (e.g., on an unsecured network). Local Area Network (LAN) Access: The attacker must have access to the same network as the target server. Subdomains: The attacker can host the malicious page on a subdomain if the server allows it. Misconfigured CORS: The server’s CORS policy is misconfigured to allow certain origins or headers. Reflected XSS: The attacker can exploit a reflected XSS vulnerability to execute JavaScript in the context of the target origin.

**According to the CVSS metric, user interaction is required (UI:R) and privileges required is Low (PR:L). What does that mean for this vulnerability?** An authorized attacker with standard user privileges could place a malicious file on the machine running Visual Studio Code and then wait for the privileged victim to use certain JavaScript debugger functionality.

**Why is this HackerOne CVE included in the Security Update Guide?** The vulnerability assigned to this CVE is in Node.js software which is consumed by Microsoft Visual Studio. It is being documented in the Security Update Guide to announce that the latest builds of Visual Studio are no longer vulnerable. Please see Security Update Guide Supports CVEs Assigned by Industry Partners for more information.

The SAP Approuter Node.js package version v16.7.1 and before is vulnerable to Authentication bypass. When trading an authorization code, an attacker can steal the session of the victim by injecting malicious payload, causing High impact on confidentiality and integrity of the application.

### Summary esbuild allows any websites to send any request to the development server and read the response due to default CORS settings. ### Details esbuild sets `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *` header to all requests, including the SSE connection, which allows any websites to send any request to the development server and read the response. https://github.com/evanw/esbuild/blob/df815ac27b84f8b34374c9182a93c94718f8a630/pkg/api/serve_other.go#L121 https://github.com/evanw/esbuild/blob/df815ac27b84f8b34374c9182a93c94718f8a630/pkg/api/serve_other.go#L363 **Attack scenario**: 1. The attacker serves a malicious web page (`http://malicious.example.com`). 1. The user accesses the malicious web page. 1. The attacker sends a `fetch('http://127.0.0.1:8000/main.js')` request by JS in that malicious web page. This request is normally blocked by same-origin policy, but that's not the case for the reasons above. 1. The attacker gets the content of `http://127.0.0.1:8000/main.js`. In this sce...