#mac

Akamai's latest Ransomware Report 2025 reveals "quadruple extortion," new AI-driven tactics by groups like Black Basta, FunkSec, and TrickBot, and growing threats to non-profits. Learn about evolving cyber threats.

Cisco Talos is back at Black Hat with new research, threat detection overviews and opportunities to connect with our team. Whether you're interested in what we’re seeing in the threat landscape, detection engineering or real-world incident response, here's where and how to find us.

OpenShift confidential containers (CoCo) is now generally available for Microsoft Azure. You can extend the security capabilities of Red Hat OpenShift by using OpenShift confidential containers, which allows you to deploy and manage confidential workloads with enhanced data protection and integrity. This release marks a significant milestone, providing a robust solution for enterprises seeking to protect sensitive applications and data on Azure. It addresses critical security concerns by isolating workloads within a hardware-protected trusted execution environment, helping ensure that data re

Red Hat OpenShift sandboxed containers 1.10 has been released, bringing enhanced security and isolation capabilities to your Red Hat OpenShift environments. This marks the general availability of confidential containers on Microsoft Azure, and introduces the new Red Hat build of Trustee, which provides attestation services so your confidential workloads can run with integrity in the cloud. OpenShift sandboxed containers delivers a lightweight and powerful way to run workloads in isolation. Confidential containers add an additional layer for hardware-protected environments, leveraging Trusted E

A new report from Google's GTIG reveals how UNC3944 (0ktapus) uses social engineering to compromise Active Directory, then exploits VMware vSphere for data theft and direct ransomware deployment. Understand their tactics and learn vital mitigation steps.

macOS flaw dubbed Sploitlight allows attackers to access Apple Intelligence-cached data by abusing Spotlight plugins, bypassing privacy controls.

### Description The lookup function takes a user address for checking accounts as a feature, however, as per the ActivityPub spec (https://www.w3.org/TR/activitypub/#security-considerations), on the security considerations section at B.3, access to Localhost services should be prevented while running in production. The library does not prevent Localhost access (neither does it prevent LAN addresses such as 192.168.x.x) , thus is not safe for use in production by ActivityPub applications. The only check for localhost is done for selecting between HTTP and HTTPS protocols, and it is done by testing for a host that starts with the string “localhost” and ends with a port. Anything else (such as “127.0.0.1” or “localhost:1234/abc”) would not be considered localhost for this test. In addition, the way that the function determines the host, makes it possible to access any path in the host, not only “/.well-known/...” paths: ```javascript if (address.indexOf('://') > -1) { // other uri for...

The rise of agentic AI means the battle of the machines is just beginning. To win, we'll need our own agents — human and machine — working together.

## Summary An inconsistency in `MethodNode` can be exploited to access unexpected object fields through dot notation. This can be used to achieve **arbitrary code execution at load time**. While this issue may seem similar to https://github.com/skops-dev/skops/security/advisories/GHSA-m7f4-hrc6-fwg3, it is actually more severe, as it relies on fewer assumptions about trusted types. ## Details The `MethodNode` allows access to attributes of existing objects via dot notation. However, there are several critical shortcomings: * Although the `__class__` and `__module__` fields are checked via `get_untrusted_types` and during the `load` phase (as a concatenated string), **they are not actually used by `MethodNode`**. Instead, the `func` and `obj` entries in the `schema.json` are used to determine behavior. This means that even an apparently harmless `__module__.__class__` pair can lead to access of arbitrary attributes or methods of loaded objects, without any additional checks. * **...

## Summary An inconsistency in `OperatorFuncNode` can be exploited to hide the execution of untrusted `operator.xxx` methods. This can then be used in a code reuse attack to invoke seemingly safe functions and escalate to arbitrary code execution with minimal and misleading trusted types. **Note:** This report focuses on `operator.call` as it appears to be the most interesting target, but the same technique applies to other `operator` methods. Moreover, please do not focus too much on the specific example used to hide the `operator.call` invocation—it was a zero-effort choice meant solely to demonstrate the issue. The key point is the **inconsistency** that allows a user to approve a type as trusted, while in reality enabling the execution of `operator.xxx`. ## Details The `OperatorFuncNode` allows calling methods belonging to the `operator` module and included in a trusted list of methods. However, what is returned by `get_untrusted_types` and checked during the `load` call is no...