#maven

### Impact When an admin disables a user account, the user's profile is executed with the admin's rights. This allows a user to place malicious code in the user profile before getting an admin to disable the user account. To reproduce, as a user without script nor programming rights, edit the about section of your user profile and add `{{groovy}}services.logging.getLogger("attacker").error("Hello from Groovy!"){{/groovy}}`. As an admin, go to the user profile and click the "Disable this account" button. Then, reload the page. If the logs show `attacker - Hello from Groovy!` then the instance is vulnerable. ### Patches This has been patched in XWiki 14.10.21, 15.5.5, 15.10.6 and 16.0.0. ### Workarounds We're not aware of any workaround except upgrading. ### References * https://jira.xwiki.org/browse/XWIKI-21611 * https://github.com/xwiki/xwiki-platform/commit/f89c8f47fad6e5cc7e68c69a7e0acde07f5eed5a

A vulnerability was found in Undertow. URL-encoded request path information can be broken for concurrent requests on ajp-listener, causing the wrong path to be processed and resulting in a possible denial of service.

A vulnerability was found in Keycloak. The LDAP testing endpoint allows changing the Connection URL  independently without re-entering the currently configured LDAP bind credentials. This flaw allows an attacker with admin access (permission manage-realm) to change the LDAP host URL ("Connection URL") to a machine they control. The Keycloak server will connect to the attacker's host and try to authenticate with the configured credentials, thus leaking them to the attacker. As a consequence, an attacker who has compromised the admin console or compromised a user with sufficient privileges can leak domain credentials and attack the domain.

Keycloak allows the use of email as a username and doesn't check that an account with this email already exists. That could lead to the unability to reset/login with email for the user. This is caused by usernames being evaluated before emails.

Incorrect Authorization vulnerability in Apache Submarine Server Core. This issue affects Apache Submarine Server Core: from 0.8.0. As this project is retired, we do not plan to release a version that fixes this issue. Users are recommended to find an alternative or restrict access to the instance to trusted users. NOTE: This vulnerability only affects products that are no longer supported by the maintainer.

It was identified that if a cross-cluster API key https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/elasticsearch/reference/8.14/security-api-create-cross-cluster-api-key.html#security-api-create-cross-cluster-api-key-request-body restricts search for a given index using the query or the field_security parameter, and the same cross-cluster API key also grants replication for the same index, the search restrictions are not enforced during cross cluster search operations and search results may include documents and terms that should not be returned. This issue only affects the API key based security model for remote clusters https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/elasticsearch/reference/8.14/remote-clusters.html#remote-clusters-security-models that was previously a beta feature and is released as GA with 8.14.0

Users with low privileges (just plain users in the realm) are able to utilize administrative functionalities within Keycloak admin interface. This issue presents a significant security risk as it allows unauthorized users to perform actions reserved for administrators, potentially leading to data breaches or system compromise. **Acknowledgements:** Special thanks to Maurizio Agazzini for reporting this issue and helping us improve our project.

Azure Identity Libraries and Microsoft Authentication Library Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability

A flaw was found in Keycloak in the OAuth 2.0 Pushed Authorization Requests (PAR). Client provided parameters were found to be included in plain text in the KC_RESTART cookie returned by the authorization server's HTTP response to a request_uri authorization request. This could lead to an information disclosure vulnerability.

### Summary BoringSSLAEADContext keeps track of how many OHTTP responses have been sent and uses this sequence number to calculate the appropriate nonce to use with the encryption algorithm. Unfortunately, two separate errors combine which would allow an attacker to cause the sequence number to overflow and thus the nonce to repeat. ### Details 1. There is no overflow detection or enforcement of the maximum sequence value. (This is a missed requirement from the draft Chunked Oblivious OHTTP RFC and so should be inherited from the HPKE RFC 9180, Section 5.2). 2. The sequence number (seq) is stored as 32-bit int which is relatively easy to overflow. https://github.com/netty/netty-incubator-codec-ohttp/blob/1ddadb6473cd3be5491d114431ed4c1a9f316001/codec-ohttp-hpke-classes-boringssl/src/main/java/io/netty/incubator/codec/hpke/boringssl/BoringSSLAEADContext.java#L112-L114 ### Impact If the BoringSSLAEADContext is used to encrypt more than 2^32 messages then the AES-GCM nonce will repeat...