#nodejs

Cybersecurity researchers have disclosed details of yet another maximum-severity security flaw in n8n, a popular workflow automation platform, that allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to gain complete control over susceptible instances. The vulnerability, tracked as CVE-2026-21858 (CVSS score: 10.0), has been codenamed Ni8mare by Cyera Research Labs. Security researcher Dor Attias has been

A weakness has been identified in carboneio carbone up to fbcd349077ad0e8748be73eab2a82ea92b6f8a7e. This impacts an unknown function of the file lib/input.js of the component Formatter Handler. Executing a manipulation can lead to improperly controlled modification of object prototype attributes. The attack can be launched remotely. This attack is characterized by high complexity. The exploitability is said to be difficult. Upgrading to version 3.5.6 will fix this issue. This patch is called 04f9feb24bfca23567706392f9ad2c53bbe4134e. You should upgrade the affected component. A successful exploitation can "only occur if the parent NodeJS application has the same security issue".

Users of the "@adonisjs/bodyparser" npm package are being advised to update to the latest version following the disclosure of a critical security vulnerability that, if successfully exploited, could allow a remote attacker to write arbitrary files on the server. Tracked as CVE-2026-21440 (CVSS score: 9.2), the flaw has been described as a path traversal issue affecting the AdonisJS multipart

Anthropic's MCP TypeScript SDK versions up to and including 1.25.1 contain a regular expression denial of service (ReDoS) vulnerability in the UriTemplate class when processing RFC 6570 exploded array patterns. The dynamically generated regular expression used during URI matching contains nested quantifiers that can trigger catastrophic backtracking on specially crafted inputs, resulting in excessive CPU consumption. An attacker can exploit this by supplying a malicious URI that causes the Node.js process to become unresponsive, leading to a denial of service.

### Impact User control of the first argument of the loadFile method in the node.js build allows local file inclusion/path traversal. If given the possibility to pass unsanitized paths to the loadFile method, a user can retrieve file contents of arbitrary files in the local file system the node process is running in. The file contents are included verbatim in the generated PDFs. Other affected methods are: `addImage`, `html`, `addFont`. Only the node.js builds of the library are affected, namely the `dist/jspdf.node.js` and `dist/jspdf.node.min.js` files. Example attack vector: ```js import { jsPDF } from "./dist/jspdf.node.js"; const doc = new jsPDF(); doc.addImage("./secret.txt", "JPEG", 0, 0, 10, 10); doc.save("test.pdf"); // the generated PDF will contain the "secret.txt" file ``` ### Patches The vulnerability has been fixed in jsPDF@4.0.0. This version restricts file system access per default. This semver-major update does not introduce other breaking changes. ### Workaro...

The year opened without a reset. The same pressure carried over, and in some places it tightened. Systems people assume are boring or stable are showing up in the wrong places. Attacks moved quietly, reused familiar paths, and kept working longer than anyone wants to admit. This week’s stories share one pattern. Nothing flashy. No single moment. Just steady abuse of trust — updates, extensions,

### Summary **Description** A Path Traversal (CWE-22) vulnerability in AdonisJS multipart file handling may allow a remote attacker to write arbitrary files to arbitrary locations on the server filesystem. This impacts @adonisjs/bodyparser through version 10.1.1 and 11.x prerelease versions prior to 11.0.0-next.6. This issue has been patched in @adonisjs/bodyparser versions 10.1.2 and 11.0.0-next.6. ### Details AdonisJS parses `multipart/form-data` via `BodyParser` and exposes uploads as `MultipartFile`. The issue is in the `MultipartFile.move(location, options)` default options. If `options.name` isn't provided, it defaults to the unsanitized client filename and builds the destination with `path.join(location, name)`, allowing a traversal to escape the default or intended directory chosen by the developer. If `options.overwrite` isn't provided, it defaults to true, allowing file overwrites. The documentation previously demonstrated examples leading developers to this vulnerable code...

The SignalK appstore interface allows administrators to install npm packages through a REST API endpoint. While the endpoint validates that the package name exists in the npm registry as a known plugin or webapp, the version parameter accepts arbitrary npm version specifiers including URLs. npm supports installing packages from git repositories, GitHub shorthand syntax, and HTTP/HTTPS URLs pointing to tarballs. When npm installs a package, it can automatically execute any `postinstall` script defined in `package.json`, enabling arbitrary code execution. The vulnerability exists because npm's version specifier syntax is extremely flexible, and the SignalK code passes the version parameter directly to npm without sanitization. An attacker with admin access can install a package from an attacker-controlled source containing a malicious `postinstall` script. ### Affected Code **File**: `src/interfaces/appstore.js` (lines 46-76) ```javascript app.post( [ `${SERVERROUTESPREFIX}/app...

### Summary A Denial of Service (DoS) vulnerability allows an unauthenticated attacker to crash the SignalK Server by flooding the access request endpoint (`/signalk/v1/access/requests`). This causes a "JavaScript heap out of memory" error due to unbounded in-memory storage of request objects. ### Details The vulnerability is caused by a lack of rate limiting and improper memory management for incoming access requests. **Vulnerable Code Analysis:** 1. **In-Memory Storage**: In `src/requestResponse.js`, requests are stored in a simple JavaScript object: ```javascript const requests = {} ``` 2. **Unbounded Growth**: The `createRequest` function adds new requests to this object without checking the current size or count of existing requests. 3. **Infrequent Pruning**: The `pruneRequests` function, which removes old requests, runs only once every **15 minutes** (`pruneIntervalRate`). 4. **No Rate Limiting**: The endpoint `/signalk/v1/access/requests` accepts POST requests...

### Summary An unauthenticated attacker can pollute the internal state (`restoreFilePath`) of the server via the `/skServer/validateBackup` endpoint. This allows the attacker to hijack the administrator's "Restore" functionality to overwrite critical server configuration files (e.g., `security.json`, `package.json`), leading to account takeover and Remote Code Execution (RCE). ### Details The vulnerability is caused by the use of a module-level global variable `restoreFilePath` in `src/serverroutes.ts`, which is shared across all requests. **Vulnerable Code Analysis:** 1. **Global State**: `restoreFilePath` is defined at the top level of the module. ```typescript // src/serverroutes.ts let restoreFilePath: string ``` 2. **Unauthenticated State Pollution**: The `/skServer/validateBackup` endpoint updates this variable. Crucially, this endpoint **lacks authentication middleware**, allowing any user to access it. ```typescript app.post(`${SERVERROUTESPREFIX}/va...