#nodejs

A vulnerability was identified in `tarteaucitron.js`, where user-controlled inputs for element dimensions (`width` and `height`) were not properly validated. This allowed an attacker with direct access to the site's source code or a CMS plugin to set values like `100%;height:100%;position:fixed;`, potentially covering the entire viewport and facilitating clickjacking attacks. ## Impact An attacker with high privileges could exploit this vulnerability to: - Overlay malicious UI elements on top of legitimate content, - Trick users into interacting with hidden elements (clickjacking), - Disrupt the intended functionality and accessibility of the website. ## Fix https://github.com/AmauriC/tarteaucitron.js/commit/25fcf828aaa55306ddc09cfbac9a6f8f126e2d07 The issue was resolved by enforcing strict validation and sanitization of user-provided CSS values to prevent unintended UI manipulation.

The North Korean threat actors behind the ongoing Contagious Interview campaign are spreading their tentacles on the npm ecosystem by publishing more malicious packages that deliver the BeaverTail malware, as well as a new remote access trojan (RAT) loader. "These latest samples employ hexadecimal string encoding to evade automated detection systems and manual code audits, signaling a variation

### Summary The contents of arbitrary files can be returned to the browser. ### Impact Only apps explicitly exposing the Vite dev server to the network (using --host or [server.host config option](https://vitejs.dev/config/server-options.html#server-host)) are affected.. ### Details #### `.svg` Requests ending with `.svg` are loaded at this line. https://github.com/vitejs/vite/blob/037f801075ec35bb6e52145d659f71a23813c48f/packages/vite/src/node/plugins/asset.ts#L285-L290 By adding `?.svg` with `?.wasm?init` or with `sec-fetch-dest: script` header, the restriction was able to bypass. This bypass is only possible if the file is smaller than [`build.assetsInlineLimit`](https://vite.dev/config/build-options.html#build-assetsinlinelimit) (default: 4kB) and when using Vite 6.0+. #### relative paths The check was applied before the id normalization. This allowed requests to bypass with relative paths (e.g. `../../`). ### PoC ```bash npm create vite@latest cd vite-project/ npm insta...

### Summary `image-size` is vulnerable to a Denial of Service vulnerability when processing specially crafted images. The issue occurs because of an infine loop in `findBox` when processing certain images with a box with size `0`. ### Details If the first bytes of the input does not match any bytes in `firstBytes`, then the package tries to validate the image using other handlers: ```js // https://github.com/image-size/image-size/blob/v1.2.0/lib/detector.ts#L20-L31 export function detector(input: Uint8Array): imageType | undefined { const byte = input[0] if (byte in firstBytes) { const type = firstBytes[byte] if (type && typeHandlers[type].validate(input)) { return type } } const finder = (key: imageType) => typeHandlers[key].validate(input) //<-- return keys.find(finder) } ``` Some handlers that call `findBox` to validate or calculate the image size are `jxl`, `heif` and `jp2`. `JXL` handler calls `findBox` inside `validate`. To reach the `findBox` ...

### Impact We received a report about a vulnerability in Remix/React Router that affects all Remix 2 and React Router 7 consumers using the Express adapter. Basically, this vulnerability allows anyone to spoof the URL used in an incoming `Request` by putting a URL pathname in the port section of a URL that is part of a `Host` or `X-Forwarded-Host` header sent to a Remix/React Router request handler. ### Patches This issue has been patched and released in Remix 2.16.3 React Router 7.4.1. ### Credits - Rachid Allam (zhero;) - Yasser Allam (inzo_)

A vishing scam via Microsoft Teams led to attackers misusing TeamViewer to drop malware and stay hidden using simple but effective techniques.

### Summary The contents of arbitrary files can be returned to the browser. ### Impact Only apps explicitly exposing the Vite dev server to the network (using `--host` or [`server.host` config option](https://vitejs.dev/config/server-options.html#server-host)) are affected. ### Details - base64 encoded content of non-allowed files is exposed using `?inline&import` (originally reported as `?import&?inline=1.wasm?init`) - content of non-allowed files is exposed using `?raw?import` `/@fs/` isn't needed to reproduce the issue for files inside the project root. ### PoC Original report (check details above for simplified cases): The ?import&?inline=1.wasm?init ending allows attackers to read arbitrary files and returns the file content if it exists. Base64 decoding needs to be performed twice ``` $ npm create vite@latest $ cd vite-project/ $ npm install $ npm run dev ``` Example full URL `http://localhost:5173/@fs/C:/windows/win.ini?import&?inline=1.wasm?init`

### Summary There is a `ReDoS vulnerability risk` in the system, specifically when administrators create `notification` through the web service(`pushdeer` and `whapi`). If a string is provided that triggers catastrophic backtracking in the regular expression, it may lead to a ReDoS attack. ### Details The regular expression` \/*$\` is used to match zero or more slashes `/` at the end of a URL. When a malicious attack string appends a large number of slashes `/` and a non-slash character at the end of the URL, the regular expression enters a backtracking matching process. During this process, the regular expression engine starts checking each slash from the first one, continuing until it encounters the last non-slash character. Due to the greedy matching nature of the regular expression, this process repeats itself, with each backtrack checking the next slash until the last slash is checked. This backtracking process consumes significant CPU resources. ```js .replace(/\/*$/, "") ``` Fo...

Cybersecurity researchers have discovered several cryptocurrency packages on the npm registry that have been hijacked to siphon sensitive information such as environment variables from compromised systems. "Some of these packages have lived on npmjs.com for over 9 years, and provide legitimate functionality to blockchain developers," Sonatype researcher Ax Sharma said. "However, [...] the latest

### Summary The `search` query parameter allows users with access to a collection to filter items based on fields they do not have permission to view. This allows the enumeration of unknown field contents. ### Details The searchable columns (numbers & strings) are not checked against permissions when injecting the `where` clauses for applying the search query. This leads to the possibility of enumerating those un-permitted fields. ### PoC - Create a collection with a string / numeric field, configure the permissions for the public role to not include the field created - Create items with identifiable content in the not permitted field - Query the collection and include the field content in the `search` parameter - See that results are returned, even tho the public user does not have permission to view the field content ### Impact This vulnerability is a very high impact, as for example Directus instances which allow public read access to the user avatar are vulnerable to have th...