Tag
#nodejs
### Impact Npm users of PUC 1.17.3 or PUC latest were briefly affected by crypto-related malware detailed in the blog post below. This includes the extremely popular jsdelivr hosting of this file. ### Patches We unpublished the version on npm. ### Workarounds This has already been unpublished. See Prebid.js 9 release notes for suggestions on moving off the deprecated workflow of using the PUC or pointing to a dynamic version of it. PUC users pointing to latest should transition to 1.17.2 ASAP to avoid similar attacks in the future. ### References https://www.sonatype.com/blog/npm-chalk-and-debug-packages-hit-in-software-supply-chain-attack
### Impact NPM users of prebid 10.9.2. The malicious code attempts to redirect crypto transactions on the site to the attackers' wallet. ### Patches 10.10.0 is solved ### References https://www.sonatype.com/blog/npm-chalk-and-debug-packages-hit-in-software-supply-chain-attack
The npm package `interactive-git-checkout` is an interactive command-line tool that allows users to checkout a git branch while it prompts for the branch name on the command-line. It is available as an npm package and can be installed via `npm install -g interactive-git-checkout`. Resources: * Project's npm package: https://www.npmjs.com/package/interactive-git-checkout ## Command Injection Vulnerability The `interactive-git-checkout` tool is vulnerable to a command injection vulnerability because it passes the branch name to the `git checkout` command using the Node.js child process module's `exec()` function without proper input validation or sanitization. The following vulnerable code snippets demonstrates the issue: ```js const { exec: execCb } = require('child_process'); const { promisify } = require('util'); const exec = promisify(execCb); module.exports = async (targetBranch) => { const { stdout, stderr } = await exec(`git checkout ${targetBranch}`); process.st...
At startup, Claude Code executed a command templated in with `git config user.email`. A maliciously configured user email in git could be used to trigger arbitrary code execution before a user accepted the workspace trust dialog. Users on standard Claude Code auto-update will have received this fix automatically. Users performing manual updates are advised to update to the latest version. Thank you to the NVIDIA AI Red Team for reporting this issue!
Due to an error in command parsing, it was possible to bypass the Claude Code confirmation prompt to trigger execution of an untrusted command. Reliably exploiting this requires the ability to add untrusted content into a Claude Code context window. Users on standard Claude Code auto-update will have received this fix automatically. Users performing manual updates are advised to update to the latest version. Thank you to the NVIDIA AI Red Team for reporting this issue!
### Summary Files starting with the same name with the public directory were served bypassing the `server.fs` settings. ### Impact Only apps that match the following conditions are affected: - explicitly exposes the Vite dev server to the network (using --host or [`server.host` config option](https://vitejs.dev/config/server-options.html#server-host)) - uses [the public directory feature](https://vite.dev/guide/assets.html#the-public-directory) (enabled by default) - a symlink exists in the public directory ### Details The [servePublicMiddleware](https://github.com/vitejs/vite/blob/9719497adec4ad5ead21cafa19a324bb1d480194/packages/vite/src/node/server/middlewares/static.ts#L79) function is in charge of serving public files from the server. It returns the [viteServePublicMiddleware](https://github.com/vitejs/vite/blob/9719497adec4ad5ead21cafa19a324bb1d480194/packages/vite/src/node/server/middlewares/static.ts#L106) function which runs the needed tests and serves the page. The viteSer...
### Summary Any HTML files on the machine were served regardless of the `server.fs` settings. ### Impact Only apps that match the following conditions are affected: - explicitly exposes the Vite dev server to the network (using --host or [server.host config option](https://vitejs.dev/config/server-options.html#server-host)) - `appType: 'spa'` (default) or `appType: 'mpa'` is used This vulnerability also affects the preview server. The preview server allowed HTML files not under the output directory to be served. ### Details The [serveStaticMiddleware](https://github.com/vitejs/vite/blob/9719497adec4ad5ead21cafa19a324bb1d480194/packages/vite/src/node/server/middlewares/static.ts#L123) function is in charge of serving static files from the server. It returns the [viteServeStaticMiddleware](https://github.com/vitejs/vite/blob/9719497adec4ad5ead21cafa19a324bb1d480194/packages/vite/src/node/server/middlewares/static.ts#L136) function which runs the needed tests and serves the page. The...
Threat actors phished Qix's NPM account, then used their access to publish poisoned versions of 18 popular open source packages accounting for more than 2 billion weekly downloads.
The DuckDB distribution for [Node.js](http://node.js/) on [npm](https://www.npmjs.com/) was compromised with malware (along with [several other packages](https://www.aikido.dev/blog/npm-debug-and-chalk-packages-compromised)). An attacker published new versions of four of duckdb’s packages that included **malicious code to interfere with cryptocoin transactions**. The following packages and versions are affected: - `@duckdb/node-api@1.3.3` - `@duckdb/node-bindings@1.3.3` - `duckdb@1.3.3` - `@duckdb/duckdb-wasm@1.29.2` > Note: The current release version of DuckDB is 1.3.2, with 1.4.0 expected to be released on Sept 10th, 2025 (tomorrow as of this writing). We do not plan to ever release a “legit” DuckDB 1.3.3. Users should double-check that they are not accidentally updating to those affected versions. We have ourselves noticed this *within four hours* of it happening. Here’s our response: - As an immediate response, we have **deprecated** the specific versions. - We have reached...
Multiple npm packages have been compromised as part of a software supply chain attack after a maintainer's account was compromised in a phishing attack. The attack targeted Josh Junon (aka Qix), who received an email message that mimicked npm ("support@npmjs[.]help"), urging them to update their update their two-factor authentication (2FA) credentials before September 10, 2025, by clicking on