#ssh

### Impact When the built-in SSH server is enabled (`[server] START_SSH_SERVER = true`), unprivileged user accounts with at least one SSH key can execute arbitrary commands on the Gogs instance with the privileges of the user specified by `RUN_USER` in the configuration. It allows attackers to access and alter any users' code hosted on the same instance. ### Patches The `env` command sent to the internal SSH server has been changed to be a passthrough (https://github.com/gogs/gogs/pull/7868), i.e. the feature is effectively removed. Users should upgrade to 0.13.1 or the latest 0.14.0+dev. ### Workarounds [Disable the use of built-in SSH server](https://github.com/gogs/gogs/blob/7adac94f1e93cc5c3545ea31688662dcef9cd737/conf/app.ini#L76-L77) on operating systems other than Windows. ### References https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2024-39930

### Impact Unprivileged user accounts with at least one SSH key can read arbitrary files on the system. For instance, they could leak the configuration files that could contain database credentials (`[database] *`) and `[security] SECRET_KEY`. Attackers could also exfiltrate TLS certificates, other users' repositories, and the Gogs database when the SQLite driver is enabled. ### Patches Unintended Git options has been ignored for creating tags (https://github.com/gogs/gogs/pull/7872). Users should upgrade to 0.13.1 or the latest 0.14.0+dev. ### Workarounds No viable workaround available, please only grant access to trusted users to your Gogs instance on affected versions. ### References https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2024-39933

### Impact The malicious user is able to write a file to an arbitrary path on the server to gain SSH access to the server. ### Patches Writing files outside repository Git directory has been prohibited via the repository file update API (https://github.com/gogs/gogs/pull/7859). Users should upgrade to 0.13.1 or the latest 0.14.0+dev. ### Workarounds No viable workaround available, please only grant access to trusted users to your Gogs instance on affected versions. ### References n/a ### Proof of Concept 1. Generate a Personal Access Tokens 2. Edit any file on the server with this ```bash curl -v --path-as-is -X PUT --url "http://localhost:10880/api/v1/repos/Test/bbcc/contents/../../../../../../../../home/git/.ssh/authorized_keys" \ -H "Authorization: token eaac23cf58fc76bbaecd686ec52cd44d903db9bf" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ --data '{ "message": "an", "content": "<base64encoded: your ssh pub key>" }' ``` 3. ssh connect to...

### Impact The malicious user is able to commit and edit a crafted symlink file to a repository to gain SSH access to the server. ### Patches Editing symlink while changing the file name has been prohibited via the repository web editor (https://github.com/gogs/gogs/pull/7857). Users should upgrade to 0.13.1 or the latest 0.14.0+dev. ### Workarounds No viable workaround available, please only grant access to trusted users to your Gogs instance on affected versions. ### References n/a ### Proof of Concept 1. Create two repositories, upload something to the first repository, edit any file, and save it on the webpage. 2. In the second repository, create a symbolic link to the file you need to edit: ```bash $ ln -s /data/gogs/data/tmp/local-repo/1/.git/config test $ ls -la total 8 drwxr-xr-x   5 dd  staff  160 Oct 27 19:09 . drwxr-xr-x   4 dd  staff  128 Oct 27 19:06 .. drwxr-xr-x  12 dd  staff  384 Oct 27 19:09 .git -rw-r--r--   1 dd  staff   12 O...

### Summary An **Improper URL Handling Vulnerability** allows an attacker to access sensitive local files on the server by exploiting the `file:///` protocol. This vulnerability is triggered via the **"real-browser"** request type, which takes a screenshot of the URL provided by the attacker. By supplying local file paths, such as `file:///etc/passwd`, an attacker can read sensitive data from the server. ### Details The vulnerability arises because the system does not properly validate or sanitize the user input for the URL field. Specifically: 1. The URL input (`<input data-v-5f5c86d7="" id="url" type="url" class="form-control" pattern="https?://.+" required="">`) allows users to input arbitrary file paths, including those using the `file:///` protocol, without server-side validation. 2. The server then uses the user-provided URL to make a request, passing it to a browser instance that performs the "real-browser" request, which takes a screenshot of the content at the given URL....

A balance of rigorous supplier validation, purposeful data exposure, and meticulous preparation is key to managing and mitigating risk.

A free VPN app called Big Mama is selling access to people’s home internet networks. Kids are using it to cheat in a VR game while researchers warn of bigger security risks.

SUMMARY Datadog Security Labs’ cybersecurity researchers have discovered a new, malicious year-long campaign from a threat actor identified…

IntroductionIn a previous article, I demonstrated how to configure the Automatic Certificate Management Environment (ACME) feature included in the Identity Management (IdM) Dogtag Certificate Authority (CA). Specifically, I covered installation of IdM with random serial numbers, and how to enable the ACME service and expired certificate pruning. This article explains the management of ACME (currently a technology preview) with IdM and Red Hat Enterprise Linux (RHEL) clients.Currently, mod_md is the only ACME client implementation completely supported and provided by Red Hat. For this article,

Applications and libraries which misuse the ServerConfig.PublicKeyCallback callback may be susceptible to an authorization bypass. The documentation for ServerConfig.PublicKeyCallback says that "A call to this function does not guarantee that the key offered is in fact used to authenticate." Specifically, the SSH protocol allows clients to inquire about whether a public key is acceptable before proving control of the corresponding private key. PublicKeyCallback may be called with multiple keys, and the order in which the keys were provided cannot be used to infer which key the client successfully authenticated with, if any. Some applications, which store the key(s) passed to PublicKeyCallback (or derived information) and make security relevant determinations based on it once the connection is established, may make incorrect assumptions. For example, an attacker may send public keys A and B, and then authenticate with A. PublicKeyCallback would be called only twice, first with A and t...