#vulnerability

mitmproxy 12.1.1 and below embed python-hyper/h2 ≤ v4.2.0, which has a gap in its HTTP/2 header validation. This enables request smuggling attacks when mitmproxy is in a configuration where it translates HTTP/2 to HTTP/1. For example, this affects reverse proxies to `http://` backends. It does not affect mitmproxy's regular mode. All users are encouraged to upgrade to mitmproxy 12.1.2, which includes a fixed version of h2. More details about the vulnerability itself can be found at https://github.com/python-hyper/h2/security/advisories/GHSA-847f-9342-265h.

### Summary HTTP/2 request splitting vulnerability allows attackers to perform request smuggling attacks by injecting CRLF characters into headers. This occurs when servers downgrade HTTP/2 requests to HTTP/1.1 without properly validating header names/values, enabling attackers to manipulate request boundaries and bypass security controls.

### Summary This issue: http://github.com/mlc-ai/xgrammar/issues/250 should have it's own security advisory. Since several tools accept and pass user supplied grammars to xgrammar, and it is so easy to trigger it seems like a High.

You must have administrator access, and `ALLOW_ADMIN_CHANGES` must be enabled for this to work. https://craftcms.com/knowledge-base/securing-craft#set-allowAdminChanges-to-false-in-production Note: This is a follow-up to [GHSA-f3cw-hg6r-chfv](https://github.com/craftcms/cms/security/advisories/GHSA-f3cw-hg6r-chfv) Users should update to the patched versions (4.16.6 and 5.8.7) to mitigate the issue. References: https://github.com/craftcms/cms/pull/17612

Docker has released fixes to address a critical security flaw affecting the Docker Desktop app for Windows and macOS that could potentially allow an attacker to break out of the confines of a container. The vulnerability, tracked as CVE-2025-9074, carries a CVSS score of 9.3 out of 10.0. It has been addressed in version 4.44.3. "A malicious container running on Docker Desktop could access the

Prompt injection attacks could be coming to an AI browser near you. Read on to understand what these attacks do and how to stay safe.

## **Vulnerability Details** The magnified size calculations in `ReadOneMNGIMage` (in `coders/png.c`) are unsafe and can overflow, leading to memory corruption. The source snippet below is heavily abbreviated due to the size of the function, but hopefully the important points are captured. ```c static Image *ReadOneMNGImage(MngReadInfo* mng_info, const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception) { // Lots of stuff, this is effectively a state machine for the MNG rendering commands, // skip to the point where we start processing the "MAGN" command. if (memcmp(type,mng_MAGN,4) == 0) { png_uint_16 magn_first, magn_last, magn_mb, magn_ml, magn_mr, magn_mt, magn_mx, magn_my, magn_methx, magn_methy; // Details unimportant, but each of the `magn_xxx` variables is read from the file. if (magn_first == ...

This vulnerability was discovered by researchers at **Check Point**. We are sharing this report as part of a responsible disclosure process and are happy to assist in validation and remediation if needed. ### Summary A privilege escalation vulnerability exists in Langflow containers where an authenticated user with RCE access can invoke the internal CLI command **langflow superuser** to create a new administrative user. This results in full superuser access, even if the user initially registered through the UI as a regular (non-admin) account. ### Details Langflow's Docker image includes a CLI binary at /app/.venv/bin/langflow that exposes sensitive commands, including: `langflow superuser` This command allows creation of a new superuser without checking whether one already exists. When combined with code execution (e.g., via the authenticated **/api/v1/validate/code** endpoint), a low-privileged user can execute: `/app/.venv/bin/langflow superuser` inside the container, and el...

## **Vulnerability Details** When performing image magnification in `ReadOneMNGIMage` (in `coders/png.c`), there is an issue around the handling of images with separate alpha channels. When loading an image with a color type that implies a separate alpha channel (ie. `jng_color_type >= 12`), we will load the alpha pixels in this loop: ```c if (logging != MagickFalse) (void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(), " Reading alpha from alpha_blob."); jng_image=ReadImage(alpha_image_info,exception); if (jng_image != (Image *) NULL) for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++) { s=GetVirtualPixels(jng_image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception); q=GetAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception); // [0] if ((s == (const Quantum *) NULL) || (q == (Quantum *) NULL)) break; if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait) for (x=(ssize_t) image->columns; x != 0; x--) ...

## Summary In ImageMagick's `magick stream` command, specifying multiple consecutive `%d` format specifiers in a filename template causes a memory leak. ## Details - **Vulnerability Type:** Memory leak - **Affected Version:** ImageMagick 7.1.1-47 (as of commit 82572afc, June 2025) ## Reproduction ### Tested Environment - **Operating System:** Ubuntu 22.04 LTS - **Architecture:** x86_64 - **Compiler:** gcc with AddressSanitizer (gcc version: 11.4.0) ### Reproduction Steps ```bash # Clone source git clone --depth 1 --branch 7.1.1-47 https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick.git ImageMagick-7.1.1 cd ImageMagick-7.1.1 # Build with ASan CFLAGS="-g -O0 -fsanitize=address -fno-omit-frame-pointer" CXXFLAGS="$CFLAGS" LDFLAGS="-fsanitize=address" ./configure --enable-maintainer-mode --enable-shared && make -j$(nproc) && make install # Trigger crash ./utilities/magick stream %d%d a a ``` ### Output ``` $ magick stream %d%d a a stream: no decode delegate for this image format `' @ erro...