#vulnerability

Hive creates a credentials file to a temporary directory in the file system with permissions 644 by default when the file permissions are not set explicitly. Any unauthorized user having access to the directory can read the sensitive information written into this file. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 4.0.1, which fixes this issue.

The impetus for CrowdStrike's new professional services came from last year's Famous Chollima threat actors, which used fake IT workers to infiltrate organizations and steal data.

The now-fixed vulnerability involved a major travel services company that's integrated with dozens of airline websites worldwide.

Concerns include everything from ransomware, malware, and phishing attacks on the game's infrastructure to those targeting event sponsors and fans.

## Problem Description A vulnerability in the account linking logic of the extension allows a pre-hijacking attack leading to Account Takeover. The attack can only be exploited if the following requirements are met: - An attacker can anticipate the email address of the user. - An attacker can register a public frontend user account using that email address before the user's first OIDC login. - The IDP returns the field email containing the email address of the user ## Solution An updated versions 4.0.0 is available from the TYPO3 extension manager, packagist and at https://extensions.typo3.org/extension/download/oidc/4.0.0/zip Users of the extension are advised to update the extension as soon as possible.

An SQL injection vulnerability allows any authenticated user to execute arbitrary SQL commands on the server. This can lead to unauthorized access to sensitive data, data modification, or even complete control over the server. Details The vulnerability is found in the URL parameters of the following endpoint: `GET /admin/customermanagementframework/customers/list?add-new-customer=1&apply-segment-selection=Apply&filterDefinition[allowedRoleIds][]=1&filterDefinition[allowedUserIds][]=2&filterDefinition[id]=0&filterDefinition[name]=RDFYjolf&filterDefinition[readOnly]=on&filterDefinition[shortcutAvailable]=on&filter[active]=1&filter[email]=testing%40example.com&filter[firstname]=RDFYjolf&filter[id]=1&filter[lastname]=RDFYjolf&filter[operator-customer]=AND&filter[operator-segments]=%40%40dz1Uu&filter[search]=the&filter[segments][832][]=847&filter[segments][833][]=835&filter[segments][874][]=876&filter[showSegments][]=832 HTTP/1.1` The parameters filterDefinition and filter are vulnerable...

### Summary A Stored Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability in PIMCORE allows remote attackers to inject arbitrary web script or HTML via the PDF upload functionality. This can result in the execution of malicious scripts in the context of the user's browser when the PDF is viewed, leading to potential session hijacking, defacement of web pages, or unauthorized access to sensitive information. ### Details The vulnerability is present in the PDF upload functionality of the PIM Core Upload module. When a user uploads a PDF file, the application fails to properly sanitize the content, allowing embedded scripts to be executed when the PDF is viewed. The affected code is located in the file handling and rendering logic of the PDF upload feature. ### PoC 1. Log in as Administrator  2. Hover to Assets ...

A flaw was found in ArgoCD. The openshift.io/cluster-monitoring label is applied to all namespaces that deploy an ArgoCD CR instance, allowing the namespace to create a rogue PrometheusRule. This issue can have adverse effects on the platform monitoring stack, as the rule is rolled out cluster-wide when the label is applied.

A critical vulnerability was discovered in the `ismp-grandpa` crate, that allowed a malicious prover easily convince the verifier of the finality of arbitrary headers. ### Description The vulnerability manifests as a verifer that only accepts incorrect signatures of Grandpa precommits and was introduced in this [specific commit](https://github.com/polytope-labs/ismp-substrate/pull/64/commits/5ca3351a19151f1a439c30d5cbdbfdc72a11f1a8#diff-3835cc24fb2011b3e8246036059acd8c2c2a9a869eedf7a210d18edb6543318dL262). Perhaps due to unfamiliarity with core substrate APIs. The `if` statement should have included a negation check, similar to the previous code, but this was omitted. Causing the verifier to **only** accept invalid signatures. This vulnerability remained undetected even with [integration tests](https://github.com/polytope-labs/ismp-substrate/pull/64/commits/04d5be207b082eb61d586d52e1685e2e060347e6#diff-4aedbca82d26bebc03f274e23fd5697c3346ffff54405c87af9018f3aef708b2R1-R160), as the...

When logs are written to a widely-writable directory (the default), an unprivileged attacker may predict a privileged process's log file path and pre-create a symbolic link to a sensitive file in its place. When that privileged process runs, it will follow the planted symlink and overwrite that sensitive file. To fix that, glog now causes the program to exit (with status code 2) when it finds that the configured log file already exists.