Gitea does not properly validate repository ownership when linking attachments to releases. An attachment uploaded to a private repository could potentially be linked to a release in a different public repository, making it accessible to unauthorized users.

**Exploitability Metrics**

Attack Vector: This metric reflects the context by which vulnerability exploitation is possible. This metric value (and consequently the resulting severity) will be larger the more remote (logically, and physically) an attacker can be in order to exploit the vulnerable system. The assumption is that the number of potential attackers for a vulnerability that could be exploited from across a network is larger than the number of potential attackers that could exploit a vulnerability requiring physical access to a device, and therefore warrants a greater severity.

Attack Complexity: This metric captures measurable actions that must be taken by the attacker to actively evade or circumvent existing built-in security-enhancing conditions in order to obtain a working exploit. These are conditions whose primary purpose is to increase security and/or increase exploit engineering complexity. A vulnerability exploitable without a target-specific variable has a lower complexity than a vulnerability that would require non-trivial customization. This metric is meant to capture security mechanisms utilized by the vulnerable system.

Attack Requirements: This metric captures the prerequisite deployment and execution conditions or variables of the vulnerable system that enable the attack. These differ from security-enhancing techniques/technologies (ref Attack Complexity) as the primary purpose of these conditions is not to explicitly mitigate attacks, but rather, emerge naturally as a consequence of the deployment and execution of the vulnerable system.

Privileges Required: This metric describes the level of privileges an attacker must possess prior to successfully exploiting the vulnerability. The method by which the attacker obtains privileged credentials prior to the attack (e.g., free trial accounts), is outside the scope of this metric. Generally, self-service provisioned accounts do not constitute a privilege requirement if the attacker can grant themselves privileges as part of the attack.

User interaction: This metric captures the requirement for a human user, other than the attacker, to participate in the successful compromise of the vulnerable system. This metric determines whether the vulnerability can be exploited solely at the will of the attacker, or whether a separate user (or user-initiated process) must participate in some manner.

**Vulnerable System Impact Metrics**

Confidentiality: This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information managed by the VULNERABLE SYSTEM due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. Confidentiality refers to limiting information access and disclosure to only authorized users, as well as preventing access by, or disclosure to, unauthorized ones.

Integrity: This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information. Integrity of the VULNERABLE SYSTEM is impacted when an attacker makes unauthorized modification of system data. Integrity is also impacted when a system user can repudiate critical actions taken in the context of the system (e.g. due to insufficient logging).

Availability: This metric measures the impact to the availability of the VULNERABLE SYSTEM resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. While the Confidentiality and Integrity impact metrics apply to the loss of confidentiality or integrity of data (e.g., information, files) used by the system, this metric refers to the loss of availability of the impacted system itself, such as a networked service (e.g., web, database, email). Since availability refers to the accessibility of information resources, attacks that consume network bandwidth, processor cycles, or disk space all impact the availability of a system.

**Subsequent System Impact Metrics**

Confidentiality: This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information managed by the SUBSEQUENT SYSTEM due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. Confidentiality refers to limiting information access and disclosure to only authorized users, as well as preventing access by, or disclosure to, unauthorized ones.

Integrity: This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information. Integrity of the SUBSEQUENT SYSTEM is impacted when an attacker makes unauthorized modification of system data. Integrity is also impacted when a system user can repudiate critical actions taken in the context of the system (e.g. due to insufficient logging).

Availability: This metric measures the impact to the availability of the SUBSEQUENT SYSTEM resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. While the Confidentiality and Integrity impact metrics apply to the loss of confidentiality or integrity of data (e.g., information, files) used by the system, this metric refers to the loss of availability of the impacted system itself, such as a networked service (e.g., web, database, email). Since availability refers to the accessibility of information resources, attacks that consume network bandwidth, processor cycles, or disk space all impact the availability of a system.

GHSA-4xx9-vc8v-87hv: Gitea does not properly validate repository ownership when linking attachments to releases

Gitea does not properly validate ownership when toggling OpenID URI visibility. An authenticated user may be able to change the visibility settings of other users' OpenID identities.

GHSA-qqgv-v353-cv8p: Gitea does not properly validate ownership when toggling OpenID URI visibility

Gitea may send release notification emails for private repositories to users whose access has been revoked. When a repository is changed from public to private, users who previously watched the repository may continue to receive release notifications, potentially disclosing release titles, tags, and content.

GHSA-8fwc-qjw5-rvgp: Gitea may send release notification emails for private repositories to users whose access has been revoked

Gitea's stopwatch API does not re-validate repository access permissions. After a user's access to a private repository is revoked, they may still view issue titles and repository names through previously started stopwatches.

GHSA-j8xr-c56q-m8jj: Gitea improperly exposes issue titles and repository names through previously started stopwatches

Gitea's notification API does not re-validate repository access permissions when returning notification details. After a user's access to a private repository is revoked, they may still view issue and pull request titles through previously received notifications.

GHSA-2vgv-hgv4-22mh: Gitea improperly exposes issue and pull request titles

Gitea does not properly verify authorization when canceling scheduled auto-merges via the web interface. A user with read access to pull requests may be able to cancel auto-merges scheduled by other users.

GHSA-9cgq-wp42-4rpq: Gitea does not properly verify authorization when canceling scheduled auto-merges via the web interface

Gitea does not properly validate repository ownership when deleting Git LFS locks. A user with write access to one repository may be able to delete LFS locks belonging to other repositories.

GHSA-393c-qgvj-3xph: Gitea does not properly validate repository ownership when deleting Git LFS locks

Gitea does not properly validate project ownership in organization project operations. A user with project write access in one organization may be able to modify projects belonging to a different organization.

GHSA-rw22-5hhq-pfpf: Gitea does not properly validate project ownership in organization project operations

Gitea does not properly verify repository context when deleting attachments. A user who previously uploaded an attachment to a repository may be able to delete it after losing access to that repository by making the request through a different repository they can access.

GHSA-hgr3-x44x-33hx: Gitea has improper access control for uploaded attachments

In this week's newsletter, Bill hammers home the old adage, "Know your environment" — even throughout alert fatigue.

Thursday, January 22, 2026 14:00

Welcome to this week’s edition of the Threat Source newsletter. 

_“Upon us all a little rain must fall” — Led Zeppelin, via Henry Wadsworth Longfellow_  

I recently bumped into a colleague with whom I spent several years working in an MSSP environment. We had very different roles within the organization, so our viewpoints, both then and now, were very different. He asked me the question I hear almost every time I speak somewhere: “What do you think are the most essential things to protect your own network?” This always leads to my top answer — the one that no one ever wants to hear. 

“Know your environment.” 

It led me down a path of thinking about how cyclical things are in the world of cybersecurity and how we, the global “we”, have slipped back to a place where reconnaissance is too largely ignored in our day-to-day workflow. 

Look, I know that we all have alert fatigue. We’re managing too many devices, dealing with too many data points, generating too many logs, and facing too few resources to handle it all. So my “Let’s not ignore reconnaissance” mantra might not be regarded well at first.  

Here’s the thing: It’s always tempting to trim your alerts and reduce your ticketing workload. After all, attack signals seem more “impactful” by nature, right? But I've always believed it’s a mistake to dismiss reconnaissance events to clear the way for analysts to look for the “real” problems. I always go back to my first rule: “Know your environment.” The bad actors are only getting better at the recon portion, both on the wire and in social engineering. 

AI tooling has made a lot of the most challenging aspects of reconnaissance automagical. If you search the dark web for postings from initial access brokers (IABs), you’ll find that they excel in reconnaissance and understanding your ownenvironment. They’re quick to find every Windows 7 machine still on your network, not to mention your unpatched printers, smart fridges, and vulnerable thermostats. 

I get that we can’t get spun up about every half-open SYN, but spotting when these events form a pattern is exactly what we’re here for, and it’s as important as tracking down directory traversal attempts. 

_“Behind the clouds is the sun still shining;    
Thy fate is the common fate of all...” — Henry Wadsworth Longfellow_

**The one big thing **

Cisco Talos researchers recently discovered and disclosed vulnerabilities in Foxit PDF Editor, Epic Games Store, and MedDream PACS, all of which have since been patched by the vendors. These vulnerabilities include privilege escalation, use-after-free, and cross-site scripting issues that could allow attackers to execute malicious code or gain unauthorized access.

**Why do I care? **

 These vulnerabilities could have enabled attackers to escalate privileges, execute arbitrary code, or compromise sensitive systems, potentially leading to data breaches or system outages. Even though patches are available, unpatched systems remain at risk.

**So now what? **

Organizations should make sure all affected software is updated with the latest patches and review security monitoring for signs of exploitation attempts. Additionally, defenders should implement layered defenses and educate users on the risks of opening suspicious files or clicking unknown links to reduce the likelihood of successful attacks. 

**Top security headlines of the week **

**How a hacking campaign targeted high-profile Gmail and WhatsApp users across the Middle East**   
TechCrunch analyzed the source code of the phishing page, and believes the campaign aimed to steal Gmail and other online credentials, compromise WhatsApp accounts, and conduct surveillance by stealing location data, photos, and audio recordings. (TechCrunch) 

**LastPass warns of fake maintenance messages targeting users' master passwords**   
The campaign, which began on or around Jan. 19, 2026, involves sending phishing emails claiming upcoming maintenance and urging them to create a local backup of their password vaults in the next 24 hours. (The Hacker News) 

**Everest Ransomware claims McDonalds India breach involving customer data**    
The claim was published on the group’s official dark web leak site earlier today, January 20, 2026, stating that they exfiltrated a massive 861GB of customer data and internal company documents. (HackRead) 

**North Korea-linked hackers pose as human rights activists, report says**    
North Korea-linked hackers are using emails that impersonate human rights organizations and financial institutions to lure targets into opening malicious files. (UPI) 

**Hackers use LinkedIn messages to spread RAT malware through DLL sideloading**   
The attack involves approaching high-value individuals through messages sent on LinkedIn, establishing trust, and deceiving them into downloading a malicious WinRAR self-extracting archive (SFX). (The Hacker News) 

**Can’t get enough Talos? **

**Engaging Cisco Talos Incident Response is just the beginning**   
Sophisticated adversaries leave multiple persistence mechanisms. Miss one backdoor, one scheduled task, or one modified firewall rule, and they return weeks later, often selling access to other criminal groups. 

**Talos Takes: Cyber certifications and you**   
In the first episode of the year, Amy Ciminnisi, Talos’ Content Manager and new podcast host, steps up to the mic with Joe Marshall to explore certifications, one of cybersecurity’s overwhelming (and sometimes most controversial) topics. 

**Microsoft Patch Tuesday for January 2026**   
Microsoft has released its monthly security update for January 2026, which includes 112 vulnerabilities affecting a range of products, including 8 that Microsoft marked as “critical.”   

**Upcoming events where you can find Talos **

*   JSAC (Jan. 21 – 23) Tokyo, Japan 
*   DistrictCon (Jan. 24 – 25) Washington, DC 
*   S4x26 (Feb. 23 – 26) Miami, FL  

**Most prevalent malware files from Talos telemetry over the past week **

**SHA256: 9f1f11a708d393e0a4109ae189bc64f1f3e312653dcf317a2bd406f18ffcc507**    
MD5: 2915b3f8b703eb744fc54c81f4a9c67f    
Talos Rep: https://talosintelligence.com/talos\_file\_reputation?s=9f1f11a708d393e0a4109ae189bc64f1f3e312653dcf317a2bd406f18ffcc507   
Example Filename: 9f1f11a708d393e0a4109ae189bc64f1f3e312653dcf317a2bd406f18ffcc507.exe    
Detection Name: Win.Worm.Coinminer::1201 

**SHA256: 90b1456cdbe6bc2779ea0b4736ed9a998a71ae37390331b6ba87e389a49d3d59**   
MD5: c2efb2dcacba6d3ccc175b6ce1b7ed0a    
Talos Rep: https://talosintelligence.com/talos\_file\_reputation?s=90b1456cdbe6bc2779ea0b4736ed9a998a71ae37390331b6ba87e389a49d3d59    
Example Filename: APQCE0B.dll    
Detection Name: Auto.90B145.282358.in02 

**SHA256: a31f222fc283227f5e7988d1ad9c0aecd66d58bb7b4d8518ae23e110308dbf91**   
MD5: 7bdbd180c081fa63ca94f9c22c457376    
Talos Rep: https://talosintelligence.com/talos\_file\_reputation?s=a31f222fc283227f5e7988d1ad9c0aecd66d58bb7b4d8518ae23e110308dbf91    
Example Filename: e74d9994a37b2b4c693a76a580c3e8fe\_3\_Exe.exe    
Detection Name: Win.Dropper.Miner::95.sbx.tg 

**SHA256: 96fa6a7714670823c83099ea01d24d6d3ae8fef027f01a4ddac14f123b1c9974**    
MD5: aac3165ece2959f39ff98334618d10d9    
Talos Rep: https://talosintelligence.com/talos\_file\_reputation?s=96fa6a7714670823c83099ea01d24d6d3ae8fef027f01a4ddac14f123b1c9974    
Example Filename: 96fa6a7714670823c83099ea01d24d6d3ae8fef027f01a4ddac14f123b1c9974.exe    
Detection Name: W32.Injector:Gen.21ie.1201 

**SHA256: 47ecaab5cd6b26fe18d9759a9392bce81ba379817c53a3a468fe9060a076f8ca**    
MD5: 71fea034b422e4a17ebb06022532fdde    
Talos Rep: https://talosintelligence.com/talos\_file\_reputation?s=47ecaab5cd6b26fe18d9759a9392bce81ba379817c53a3a468fe9060a076f8ca    
Example Filename: VID001.exe    
Detection Name: Coinminer:MBT.26mw.in14.Talos

Tag

#web