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### Impact ZITADEL offers developers the ability to manage user sessions using the [Session API](https://zitadel.com/docs/category/apis/resources/session_service_v2/session-service). This API enables the use of IdPs for authentication, known as idp intents. Following a successful idp intent, the client receives an id and token on a predefined URI. These id and token can then be used to authenticate the user or their session. However, it was possible to exploit this feature by repeatedly using intents. This allowed an attacker with access to the application’s URI to retrieve the id and token, enabling them to authenticate on behalf of the user. It’s important to note that the use of additional factors (MFA) prevents a complete authentication process and, consequently, access to the ZITADEL API. ### Patches 3.x versions are fixed on >=[3.0.0](https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel/releases/tag/v3.0.0) 2.71.x versions are fixed on >=[2.71.9](https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel/releases/t...

### Summary It seems that when running **goshs** without arguments it is possible for anyone to execute commands on the server. This was tested on version **1.0.4** of **goshs**. The command function was introduced in version **0.3.4**. ### Details It seems that the function ```dispatchReadPump``` does not checks the option cli ```-c```, thus allowing anyone to execute arbitrary command through the use of websockets. ### PoC Used **websocat** for the POC: ```bash echo -e '{"type": "command", "content": "id"}' |./websocat 'ws://192.168.1.11:8000/?ws' -t ``` ### Impact The vulnerability will only impacts goshs server on vulnerable versions.

The following functions in the `tanton_engine` crate are unsound due to lack of sufficient boundary checks in public API: - `Stack::offset()` - `ThreadStack::get()` - `RootMoveList::insert_score_depth()` - `RootMoveList::insert_score()` The tanton_engine crate is no longer maintained, so there are no plans to fix this issue.

### Summary Due to a validation error in `got.scpaping`, it is possible to use an HTTP redirect to avoid IP filtering. ### Details In `got.scpaping`, Summaly first makes a HTTP `HEAD` request to the page being summarized. It then preforms private IP address checks on the `HEAD` response, then makes an additional HTTP `GET` request to the page being summarized. Unfortunately, since private IP address checks aren't performed on the `GET` response, the `GET` response can issue a HTTP redirect to a private IP address, which will succeed, regardless of if private IP addresses are allowed by Summaly. ### PoC With a simple Caddy webserver, you can get Summaly to summarize a page hosted via a local IP address: ```caddy @summaly-bypass-head { method HEAD path /summaly-bypass } @summaly-bypass-get { method GET path /summaly-bypass } header @summaly-bypass-head Content-Type "text/html" respond @summaly-bypass-head 200 redir @summaly-bypass-get http://127.0.0.1:3080/ ``` ### Imp...

Disney was hit by two major 2024 cyberattacks, an ex-employee’s sabotage and a hacker’s AI trap, exposing internal…

### Impact Based on an analysis of the timing of post login API responses, it's possible to determine whether an account exists. ### Patches Patched in 10.8.10 and 13.8.1. ### Workarounds None available.

## Impact: A security issue has been found in `terraform-provider-windns` before version `1.0.5`. The `windns_record` resource did not santize the input variables. This can lead to authenticated command injection in the underlyding powershell command prompt. ## Patches: [`83ef736 (fix: better input validation)`](https://github.com/nrkno/terraform-provider-windns/commit/c76f69610c1b502f90aaed8c4f102194530b5bce) ## Fixed versions: - `v1.0.5`

### Affected Environments Note that this issue only affects the V0 engine, which has been off by default since v0.8.0. Further, the issue only applies to a deployment using tensor parallelism across multiple hosts, which we do not expect to be a common deployment pattern. Since V0 is has been off by default since v0.8.0 and the fix is fairly invasive, we have decided not to fix this issue. Instead we recommend that users ensure their environment is on a secure network in case this pattern is in use. The V1 engine is not affected by this issue. ### Impact In a multi-node vLLM deployment using the V0 engine, vLLM uses ZeroMQ for some multi-node communication purposes. The secondary vLLM hosts open a `SUB` ZeroMQ socket and connect to an `XPUB` socket on the primary vLLM host. https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/blob/c21b99b91241409c2fdf9f3f8c542e8748b317be/vllm/distributed/device_communicators/shm_broadcast.py#L295-L301 When data is received on this `SUB` socket, it is deserializ...

Threat actors have been observed actively exploiting security flaws in GeoVision end-of-life (EoL) Internet of Things (IoT) devices to corral them into a Mirai botnet for conducting distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks. The activity, first observed by the Akamai Security Intelligence and Response Team (SIRT) in early April 2025, involves the exploitation of two operating system command

About Remote Code Execution & Arbitrary File Reading – Apache HTTP Server (CVE-2024-38475) vulnerability. Improper escaping of output in mod_rewrite module leads to remote code execution or arbitrary file reading. Successful exploitation does not require authentication. 🔻 Apache HTTP Server 2.4.60, which includes a fix for this vulnerability, was released on July 1, 2024. Orange […]