ghsa

### Impact A denial of service bug caused the vLLM server to crash if an invalid regex was provided while using structured output. This vulnerability is similar to [GHSA-6qc9-v4r8-22xg](https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/security/advisories/GHSA-6qc9-v4r8-22xg), but for regex instead of a JSON schema. Issue with more details: https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/issues/17313 ### Patches * https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/pull/17623

### Summary Hitting the /v1/completions API with a invalid json_schema as a Guided Param will kill the vllm server ### Details The following API call `(venv) [derekh@ip-172-31-15-108 ]$ curl -s http://localhost:8000/v1/completions -H "Content-Type: application/json" -d '{"model": "meta-llama/Llama-3.2-3B-Instruct","prompt": "Name two great reasons to visit Sligo ", "max_tokens": 10, "temperature": 0.5, "guided_json":"{\"properties\":{\"reason\":{\"type\": \"stsring\"}}}"}' ` will provoke a Uncaught exceptions from xgrammer in `./lib64/python3.11/site-packages/xgrammar/compiler.py ` Issue with more information: https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/issues/17248 ### PoC Make a call to vllm with invalid json_scema e.g. `{\"properties\":{\"reason\":{\"type\": \"stsring\"}}}` `curl -s http://localhost:8000/v1/completions -H "Content-Type: application/json" -d '{"model": "meta-llama/Llama-3.2-3B-Instruct","prompt": "Name two great reasons to visit Sligo ", "max_tokens": 10, "temper...

## Summary In the file `vllm/multimodal/hasher.py`, the `MultiModalHasher` class has a security and data integrity issue in its image hashing method. Currently, it serializes `PIL.Image.Image` objects using only `obj.tobytes()`, which returns only the raw pixel data, without including metadata such as the image’s shape (width, height, mode). As a result, two images of different sizes (e.g., 30x100 and 100x30) with the same pixel byte sequence could generate the same hash value. This may lead to hash collisions, incorrect cache hits, and even data leakage or security risks. ## Details - **Affected file:** `vllm/multimodal/hasher.py` - **Affected method:** `MultiModalHasher.serialize_item` https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/blob/9420a1fc30af1a632bbc2c66eb8668f3af41f026/vllm/multimodal/hasher.py#L34-L35 - **Current behavior:** For `Image.Image` instances, only `obj.tobytes()` is used for hashing. - **Problem description:** `obj.tobytes()` does not include the image’s width, height, o...

This issue arises from the prefix caching mechanism, which may expose the system to a timing side-channel attack. ## Description When a new prompt is processed, if the PageAttention mechanism finds a matching prefix chunk, the prefill process speeds up, which is reflected in the TTFT (Time to First Token). Our tests revealed that the timing differences caused by matching chunks are significant enough to be recognized and exploited. For instance, if the victim has submitted a sensitive prompt or if a valuable system prompt has been cached, an attacker sharing the same backend could attempt to guess the victim's input. By measuring the TTFT based on prefix matches, the attacker could verify if their guess is correct, leading to potential leakage of private information. Unlike token-by-token sharing mechanisms, vLLM’s chunk-based approach (PageAttention) processes tokens in larger units (chunks). In our tests, with chunk_size=2, the timing differences became noticeable enough to allow ...

### Summary A recent review identified several regular expressions in the vllm codebase that are susceptible to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) attacks. These patterns, if fed with crafted or malicious input, may cause severe performance degradation due to catastrophic backtracking. #### 1. vllm/lora/utils.py [Line 173](https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/blob/2858830c39da0ae153bc1328dbba7680f5fbebe1/vllm/lora/utils.py#L173) https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/blob/2858830c39da0ae153bc1328dbba7680f5fbebe1/vllm/lora/utils.py#L173 **Risk Description:** - The regex `r"\((.*?)\)\$?$"` matches content inside parentheses. If input such as `((((a|)+)+)+)` is passed in, it can cause catastrophic backtracking, leading to a ReDoS vulnerability. - Using `.*?` (non-greedy match) inside group parentheses can be highly sensitive to input length and nesting complexity. **Remediation Suggestions:** - Limit the input string length. - Use a non-recursive matching approach, or write a r...

## Summary A Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) vulnerability exists in the file [`vllm/entrypoints/openai/tool_parsers/pythonic_tool_parser.py`](https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/blob/main/vllm/entrypoints/openai/tool_parsers/pythonic_tool_parser.py) of the vLLM project. The root cause is the use of a highly complex and nested regular expression for tool call detection, which can be exploited by an attacker to cause severe performance degradation or make the service unavailable. ## Details The following regular expression is used to match tool/function call patterns: ``` r"\[([a-zA-Z]+\w*\(([a-zA-Z]+\w*=.*,\s*)*([a-zA-Z]+\w*=.*\s)?\),\s*)*([a-zA-Z]+\w*\(([a-zA-Z]+\w*=.*,\s*)*([a-zA-Z]+\w*=.*\s*)?\)\s*)+\]" ``` This pattern contains multiple nested quantifiers (`*`, `+`), optional groups, and inner repetitions which make it vulnerable to catastrophic backtracking. **Attack Example:** A malicious input such as ``` [A(A= )A(A=, )A(A=, )A(A=, )... (repeated dozens of...

### Summary This advisory addresses an Open Redirection vulnerability in Mautic's user unlocking endpoint. This vulnerability could be exploited by an attacker to redirect legitimate users to malicious websites, potentially leading to phishing attacks or the delivery of exploit kits. Open Redirection via `returnUrl` Parameter: An Open Redirection vulnerability exists in the `/s/action/unlock/user.user/0` endpoint. The `returnUrl` parameter, intended for post-action redirection, is not properly validated. This allows an attacker to craft a URL that, when clicked by a user, redirects them to an arbitrary external website controlled by the attacker. ### Mitigation Update Mautic to a version that properly validates or sanitizes the `returnUrl` parameter to ensure that redirects only occur to trusted, internal URLs or explicitly whitelisted domains.

### Summary This advisory addresses a security vulnerability in Mautic related to the segment cloning functionality. This vulnerability allows any authenticated user to clone segments without proper authorization checks. Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) / Missing Authorization: A missing authorization vulnerability exists in the `cloneAction` of the segment management. This allows an authenticated user to bypass intended permission restrictions and clone segments even if they lack the necessary permissions to create new ones. ### Mitigation Update Mautic to a version that implements proper authorization checks for the `cloneAction` within the `ListController.php`. Ensure that users attempting to clone segments possess the appropriate creation permissions. ### Workarounds None If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: Email us at security@mautic.org

### Summary This advisory addresses a security vulnerability in Mautic related to the "Forget your password" functionality. This vulnerability could be exploited by unauthenticated users to enumerate valid usernames. User Enumeration via Timing Attack: A user enumeration vulnerability exists in the "Forget your password" functionality. Differences in response times for existing and non-existing users, combined with a lack of request limiting, allow an attacker to determine the existence of usernames through a timing-based attack. ### Mitigation Please update to a version that addresses this timing vulnerability, where password reset responses are normalized to respond at the same time regardless of user existence. ### Workarounds None If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: Email us at security@mautic.org

### Summary This advisory addresses a security vulnerability in Mautic where sensitive `.env` configuration files may be directly accessible via a web browser. This exposure could lead to the disclosure of sensitive information, including database credentials, API keys, and other critical system configurations. Sensitive Information Disclosure via `.env` File Exposure: The `.env` file, which typically contains environment variables and sensitive application configurations, is directly accessible via a web browser due to missing web server configurations that restrict access to such files. This allows an unauthenticated attacker to view the contents of this file by simply navigating to its URL. ### Mitigation Update Mautic to the latest Mautic version. By default, Mautic does not use `.env` files for production data. **For Apache users:** Ensure your web server is configured to respect `.htaccess` files. **For Nginx users:** As Nginx does not inherently support `.htaccess` files, y...