ghsa

## Summary A 32-bit integer overflow in the BMP encoder’s scanline-stride computation collapses `bytes_per_line` (stride) to a tiny value while the per-row writer still emits `3 × width` bytes for 24-bpp images. The row base pointer advances using the (overflowed) stride, so the first row immediately writes past its slot and into adjacent heap memory with attacker-controlled bytes. This is a classic, powerful primitive for heap corruption in common auto-convert pipelines. - **Impact:** Attacker-controlled heap out-of-bounds (OOB) write during conversion **to BMP**. - **Surface:** Typical upload → normalize/thumbnail → `magick ... out.bmp` workers. - **32-bit:** **Vulnerable** (reproduced with ASan). - **64-bit:** Safe from this specific integer overflow (IOF) by arithmetic, but still add product/size guards. - **Proposed severity:** **Critical 9.8** (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H). --- ## Scope & Affected Builds - **Project:** ImageMagick (B...

## Summary A format string bug vulnerability exists in `InterpretImageFilename` function where user input is directly passed to `FormatLocaleString` without proper sanitization. An attacker can overwrite arbitrary memory regions, enabling a wide range of attacks from heap overflow to remote code execution. <br> ## Details ### root cause ``` MagickExport size_t InterpretImageFilename(const ImageInfo *image_info, Image *image,const char *format,int value,char *filename, ExceptionInfo *exception) { ... while ((cursor=strchr(cursor,'%')) != (const char *) NULL) { const char *q = cursor; ssize_t offset = (ssize_t) (cursor-format); cursor++; /* move past '%' */ if (*cursor == '%') { /* Escaped %%. */ cursor++; continue; } /* Skip padding digits like %03d. */ if (isdigit((int) ((unsigned char) *cursor)) != 0) (void) strtol(cursor,(char **) &cursor,10); switch (*cursor) ...

## Summary Passing a geometry string containing only a colon (":") to montage -geometry leads GetGeometry() to set width/height to 0. Later, ThumbnailImage() divides by these zero dimensions, triggering a crash (SIGFPE/abort), resulting in a denial of service. ## Details **Root Cause** 1. `montage -geometry ":" ...` reaches `MagickCore/geometry.c:GetGeometry().` 2. `StringToDouble/InterpretLocaleValue` parses `":"` as `0.0;` then: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/blob/0ba1b587be17543b664f7ad538e9e51e0da59d17/MagickCore/geometry.c#L355 `WidthValue` (and/or `HeightValue)` is set with a zero dimension. 3. In MagickCore/resize.c:ThumbnailImage(), the code computes: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/blob/0ba1b587be17543b664f7ad538e9e51e0da59d17/MagickCore/resize.c#L4625-L4629 causing a division by zero and immediate crash. The issue is trivially triggerable without external input files (e.g., using `xc:white`). ### Reproduction Environment ``` Version: ImageMagick 7.1...

alextselegidis Easy!Appointments v1.5.1 was discovered to contain a SQL injection vulnerability via the order_by parameter.

A denial of service vulnerability exists in the JSONReader component of the run-llama/llama_index repository, specifically in version v0.12.37. The vulnerability is caused by uncontrolled recursion when parsing deeply nested JSON files, which can lead to Python hitting its maximum recursion depth limit. This results in high resource consumption and potential crashes of the Python process. The issue is resolved in version 0.12.38.

request-filtering-agent versions 1.x.x and earlier contain a vulnerability where HTTPS requests to 127.0.0.1 bypass IP address filtering, while HTTP requests are correctly blocked. **Impact:** Vulnerable patterns (requests that should be blocked but are allowed): - https://127.0.0.1:443/api - https://127.0.0.1:8443/admin - Any HTTPS request using direct IP address `https://127.0.0.1` This vulnerability primarily affects services using self-signed certificates on `127.0.0.1`. **Not affected (correctly blocked in all versions):** - http://127.0.0.1:80/api - HTTP requests are properly blocked - https://localhost:443/api - Domain-based requests trigger DNS lookup and are blocked - http://localhost:80/api - Domain-based HTTP requests are blocked - Requests to other private IPs like 192.168.x.x, 10.x.x.x, 172.16.x.x This allows attackers to potentially access internal HTTPS services running on localhost, bypassing the library's SSRF protection. The vulnerability is particularly dangerou...

mitmproxy 12.1.1 and below embed python-hyper/h2 ≤ v4.2.0, which has a gap in its HTTP/2 header validation. This enables request smuggling attacks when mitmproxy is in a configuration where it translates HTTP/2 to HTTP/1. For example, this affects reverse proxies to `http://` backends. It does not affect mitmproxy's regular mode. All users are encouraged to upgrade to mitmproxy 12.1.2, which includes a fixed version of h2. More details about the vulnerability itself can be found at https://github.com/python-hyper/h2/security/advisories/GHSA-847f-9342-265h.

### Summary HTTP/2 request splitting vulnerability allows attackers to perform request smuggling attacks by injecting CRLF characters into headers. This occurs when servers downgrade HTTP/2 requests to HTTP/1.1 without properly validating header names/values, enabling attackers to manipulate request boundaries and bypass security controls.

### Summary This issue: http://github.com/mlc-ai/xgrammar/issues/250 should have it's own security advisory. Since several tools accept and pass user supplied grammars to xgrammar, and it is so easy to trigger it seems like a High.

You must have administrator access, and `ALLOW_ADMIN_CHANGES` must be enabled for this to work. https://craftcms.com/knowledge-base/securing-craft#set-allowAdminChanges-to-false-in-production Note: This is a follow-up to [GHSA-f3cw-hg6r-chfv](https://github.com/craftcms/cms/security/advisories/GHSA-f3cw-hg6r-chfv) Users should update to the patched versions (4.16.6 and 5.8.7) to mitigate the issue. References: https://github.com/craftcms/cms/pull/17612