ghsa

In Eclipse Paho Go MQTT v3.1 library (paho.mqtt.golang) versions <=1.5.0 UTF-8 encoded strings, passed into the library, may be incorrectly encoded if their length exceeds 65535 bytes. This may lead to unexpected content in packets sent to the server (for example, part of an MQTT topic may leak into the message body in a PUBLISH packet). The issue arises because the length of the data passed in was converted from an int64/int32 (depending upon CPU) to an int16 without checks for overflows. The int16 length was then written, followed by the data (e.g. topic). This meant that when the data (e.g. topic) was over 65535 bytes then the amount of data written exceeds what the length field indicates. This could lead to a corrupt packet, or mean that the excess data leaks into another field (e.g. topic leaks into message body).

### Impact Multiple (unprefixed) classnames could be added in markdown source by using character references. This could make rendered user supplied markdown `code` elements appear like the rest of the page. The following markdown: ````markdown ```js&#x20;xss ``` ```` Would create `<pre><code class="language-js xss"></code></pre>` If your page then applied `.xss` classes (or listeners in JS), those apply to this element. For more info see <https://github.com/ChALkeR/notes/blob/master/Improper-markup-sanitization.md#unsanitized-class-attribute> ### Patches The bug was patched. When using regular semver, run `npm install`. For exact ranges, make sure to use `13.2.1`. ### Workarounds Update. ### References * bug introduced in https://github.com/syntax-tree/mdast-util-to-hast/commit/6fc783ae6abdeb798fd5a68e7f3f21411dde7403 * bug fixed in https://github.com/syntax-tree/mdast-util-to-hast/commit/ab3a79570a1afbfa7efef5d4a0cd9b5caafbc5d7

### Summary Having a simple form on site can reveal the whole Grav configuration details (including plugin configuration details) by using the correct POST payload. Sensitive information may be contained in the configuration details. ### PoC Create a simple form with two fields, 'registration-number' and 'hp'. Add a submit button and set the method to POST(screenshot attached below). Form name set to 'hero-form'. Send a POST request with the following payload and you will notice a response with a php array listing the whole Grav configuration details - including plugins(screenshot attached). registration-number:d643aaaa hp:vJyifp __form-name__:hero-form __unique_form_id__:{{var_dump(_context|slice(0,7))}}   ### Impact Server-Side Template (SS...

### Summary A Server-Side Template Injection (SSTI) vulnerability exists in Grav that allows authenticated attackers with editor permissions to execute arbitrary commands on the server and, under certain conditions, may also be exploited by unauthenticated attackers. This vulnerability stems from weak regex validation in the `cleanDangerousTwig` method. ### Important - First of all this vulnerability is due to weak sanitization in the method `clearDangerousTwig`, so any other class that calls it indirectly through for example `$twig->processString` to sanitize code is also vulnerable. - For this report, we will need the official Form and Admin plugin installed, also I will be chaining this with another vulnerability to allow an editor which is a user with only pages permissions to edit the process section of a form. - I made another report for the other vulnerability which is a Broken Access Control which allows a user with full permission for pages to change the process section by ...

## Summary A Stored Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability was identified in the `/admin/pages/[page]` endpoint of the _Grav_ application. This vulnerability allows attackers to inject malicious scripts into the `data[header][template]` parameter. The script is saved within the page's frontmatter and executed automatically whenever the affected content is rendered in the administrative interface or frontend view. --- ## Details **Vulnerable Endpoint:** `POST /admin/pages/[page]` **Parameter:** `data[header][template]` The application fails to properly sanitize user input in the `data[header][template]` field, which is stored in the YAML frontmatter of the page. An attacker can inject JavaScript code using this field, and the payload is rendered and executed when the page is accessed, especially within the Admin Panel interface. --- ## PoC **Payload:** `<script>alert('PoC-XXS73')</script>` ### Steps to Reproduce: 1. Log in to the _Grav_ Admin Panel and navigate to **Pages...

## Summary A Reflected Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability was identified in the `/admin/pages/[page]` endpoint of the _Grav_ application. This vulnerability allows attackers to inject malicious scripts into the `data[header][content][items]` parameter. --- ## Details **Vulnerable Endpoint:** `GET /admin/pages/[page]` **Parameter:** `data[header][content][items]` The application fails to properly validate and sanitize user input in the `data[header][content][items]` parameter. As a result, attackers can craft a malicious URL with an XSS payload. When this URL is accessed, the injected script is reflected back in the HTTP response and executed within the context of the victim's browser session. --- ## PoC **Payload:** `"><ImG sRc=x OnErRoR=alert('XSS-PoC3')>` 1. Log in to the _Grav_ Admin Panel and navigate to **Pages**. 2. Create a new page or edit an existing one. 3. In the **Advanced > Blog Config > Items** field (which maps to `data[header][content][items]...

### Summary A user with admin panel access and permissions to create or edit pages in Grav CMS can enable Twig processing in the page frontmatter. By injecting malicious Twig expressions, the user can escalate their privileges to admin or execute arbitrary system commands via the scheduler API. This results in both Privilege Escalation (PE) and Remote Code Execution (RCE) vulnerabilities. ### Details Grav CMS allows Twig to be executed in page templates if enabled in admin panel (process: twig: true). A user with publisher/editor privileges, that can create or edit pages and enable twig processing, can thereby inject arbitrary code that will execute in the context of the page render. This enables exploitation of Grav internal APIs such as: - `grav.user.update()` and `grav.user.save()` for escalating the current user to super admin or admin - `grav.scheduler.addCommand()`, `grav.scheduler.save()` and `grav.scheduler.run()` for code execution The Twig sandbox is not enforced in this c...

## Summary A Stored Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability was identified in the `/admin/config/site` endpoint of the _Grav_ application. This vulnerability allows attackers to inject malicious scripts into the `data[taxonomies]` parameter. The injected payload is stored on the server and automatically executed in the browser of any user who accesses the affected site configuration, resulting in a persistent attack vector. --- ## Details **Vulnerable Endpoint:** `POST /admin/config/site` **Parameter:** `data[taxonomies]` The application does not properly validate or sanitize input in the `data[taxonomies]` field. As a result, an attacker can inject JavaScript code, which is stored in the site configuration and later rendered in the administrative interface or site output, causing automatic execution in the user's browser. --- ## PoC **Payload:** `"><script>alert('XSS-PoC')</script>` ### Steps to Reproduce: 1. Log in to the _Grav_ Admin Panel with sufficient permissions t...

### Summary When a user with privilege of user creation creates a new user through the Admin UI and supplies a username containing path traversal sequences (for example ..\Nijat or ../Nijat), Grav writes the account YAML file to an unintended path outside user/accounts/. The written YAML can contain account fields such as email, fullname, twofa_secret, and hashed_password. In my tests, I was able to cause the Admin UI to write the following content into arbitrary .yaml files (including files like email.yaml, system.yaml, or other site YAML files like admin.yaml) — demonstrating arbitrary YAML write / overwrite via the Admin UI. Example observed content written by the Admin UI (test data): username: ..\Nijat state: enabled email: [EMAIL@gmail.com](mailto:EMAIL@gmail.com) fullname: 'Nijat Alizada' language: en content_editor: default twofa_enabled: false twofa_secret: RWVEIHC2AFVD6FCR6UHCO3DS4HWXKKDT avatar: { } hashed_password: $2y$10$wl9Ktv3vUmDKCt8o6u2oOuRZr1I04OE0YZf2sJ1QcAherbNnk1...

A flaw was found in Keycloak. The Keycloak guides recommend to not expose /admin path to the outside in case the installation is using a proxy. The issue occurs at least via ha-proxy, as it can be tricked to using relative/non-normalized paths to access the /admin application path relative to /realms which is expected to be exposed.