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GHSA-356g-7x36-7m34: Moodle CSRF risks due to misuse of confirm_sesskey

Incorrect CSRF token checks resulted in multiple CSRF risks.

ghsa
#csrf#vulnerability#git
GHSA-p7r8-7w87-8g46: Dolibarr arbitrary file upload vulnerability

An arbitrary file upload vulnerability in the Upload Template function of Dolibarr ERP CRM up to v19.0.1 allows attackers to execute arbitrary code via uploading a crafted .SQL file.

GHSA-m93w-4fxv-r35v: PocketBase performs password auth and OAuth2 unverified email linking

**In order to be exploited you must have both OAuth2 and Password auth methods enabled.** A possible attack scenario could be: - a malicious actor register with the targeted user's email (it is unverified) - at some later point in time the targeted user stumble on your app and decides to sign-up with OAuth2 (_this step could be also initiated by the attacker by sending an invite email to the targeted user_) - on successful OAuth2 auth we search for an existing PocketBase user matching with the OAuth2 user's email and associate them - because we haven't changed the password of the existing PocketBase user during the linking, the malicious actor has access to the targeted user account and will be able to login with the initially created email/password To prevent this for happening we now reset the password for this specific case if the previously created user wasn't verified (an exception to this is if the linking is explicit/manual, aka. when you send `Authorization:TOKEN` with the OA...

GHSA-hpcg-xjq5-g666: Minder affected by denial of service from maliciously configured Git repository

Minder's Git provider is vulnerable to a denial of service from a maliciously configured GitHub repository. The Git provider clones users repositories using the `github.com/go-git/go-git/v5` library on these lines: https://github.com/stacklok/minder/blob/85985445c8ac3e51f03372e99c7b2f08a6d274aa/internal/providers/git/git.go#L55-L89 The Git provider does the following on these lines: First, it sets the `CloneOptions`, specifying the url, the depth etc: https://github.com/stacklok/minder/blob/85985445c8ac3e51f03372e99c7b2f08a6d274aa/internal/providers/git/git.go#L56-L62 It then validates the options: https://github.com/stacklok/minder/blob/85985445c8ac3e51f03372e99c7b2f08a6d274aa/internal/providers/git/git.go#L66-L68 It then sets up an in-memory filesystem, to which it clones: https://github.com/stacklok/minder/blob/85985445c8ac3e51f03372e99c7b2f08a6d274aa/internal/providers/git/git.go#L70-L71 Finally, it clones the repository: https://github.com/stacklok/minder/blob/85985445c...

GHSA-gmrm-8fx4-66x7: Keycloak: Leak of configured LDAP bind credentials

A vulnerability was found in Keycloak. The LDAP testing endpoint allows changing the Connection URL  independently without re-entering the currently configured LDAP bind credentials. This flaw allows an attacker with admin access (permission manage-realm) to change the LDAP host URL ("Connection URL") to a machine they control. The Keycloak server will connect to the attacker's host and try to authenticate with the configured credentials, thus leaking them to the attacker. As a consequence, an attacker who has compromised the admin console or compromised a user with sufficient privileges can leak domain credentials and attack the domain.

GHSA-q6c7-56cq-g2wm: Rancher's RKE1 Encryption Config kept in plain-text within cluster AppliedSpec

### Impact This issue is only relevant to clusters provisioned using RKE1 with secrets encryption configuration enabled. A vulnerability has been identified in which an RKE1 cluster keeps constantly reconciling when secrets encryption configuration is enabled (please see the [RKE documentation](https://rke.docs.rancher.com/config-options/secrets-encryption)). When reconciling, the Kube API secret values are written in plaintext on the AppliedSpec. Cluster owners, Cluster members, and Project members (for projects within the cluster), all have RBAC permissions to view the cluster object from the apiserver. This could lead to an unauthorized user gaining access to the entire secrets encryption config specific for the cluster, only on the applied spec. Since this affects only custom encryption configurations, users need to manually rotate the keys by editing the cluster. For more information, please refer to the [RKE secrets encryption documentation](https://rke.docs.rancher.com/config...

GHSA-64jq-m7rq-768h: Rancher's External RoleTemplates can lead to privilege escalation

### Impact A vulnerability has been identified whereby privilege escalation checks are not properly enforced for `RoleTemplate`objects when external=true, which in specific scenarios can lead to privilege escalation. The bug in the webhook rule resolver ignores rules from a `ClusterRole` for external `RoleTemplates` when its context is set to either `project` or is left empty. The fix introduces a new field to the `RoleTemplate` CRD named `ExternalRules`. The new field will be used to resolve rules directly from the `RoleTemplate`. Additionally, rules from the backing `ClusterRole` will be used if `ExternalRules` is not provided. The new field will always take precedence when it is set, and serve as the source of truth for rules used when creating Rancher resources on the local cluster. Please note that this is a breaking change for external `RoleTemplates`, when context is set to `project` or empty and the backing `ClusterRole` does not exist, as this was not previously required. *...

GHSA-6gr4-52w6-vmqx: rke's credentials are stored in the RKE1 Cluster state ConfigMap

### Impact When RKE provisions a cluster, it stores the cluster state in a configmap called `full-cluster-state` inside the `kube-system` namespace of the cluster itself. This cluster state object contains information used to set up the K8s cluster, which may include the following sensitive data: - RancherKubernetesEngineConfig - RKENodeConfig - SSH username - SSH private key - SSH private key path - RKEConfigServices - ETCDService - External client key - BackupConfig - S3BackupConfig - AWS access key - AWS secret key - KubeAPIService - SecretsEncryptionConfig - K8s encryption configuration (contains encryption keys) - PrivateRegistries - User - Password - ECRCredentialPlugin - AWS access key - AWS secret key - AWS session token - CloudProvider - AzureCloudProvider - ...

GHSA-9ghh-mmcq-8phc: Rancher does not automatically clean up a user deleted or disabled from the configured Authentication Provider

### Impact A vulnerability has been identified in which Rancher does not automatically clean up a user which has been deleted from the configured authentication provider (AP). This characteristic also applies to disabled or revoked users, Rancher will not reflect these modifications which may leave the user’s tokens still usable. An AP must be enabled to be affected by this, as the built-in User Management feature is not affected by this vulnerability. This issue may lead to an adversary gaining unauthorized access, as the user’s access privileges may still be active within Rancher even though they are no longer valid on the configured AP (please consult the [MITRE ATT&CK - Technique - Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/) for further information about the associated technique of attack). It’s important to note that all configurable APs are impacted, see [Rancher Docs - Configuring Authentication - External vs. Local Authentication](https://ranchermanager.docs....

GHSA-p36r-qxgx-jq2v: Lobe Chat API Key Leak

### Summary If an attacker can successfully authenticate through SSO/Access Code, they can obtain the real backend API Key by modifying the base URL to their own attack URL on the frontend and setting up a server-side request. ### Details The attack process is described above. ![image](https://github.com/lobehub/lobe-chat/assets/36695271/df5e0c3c-af28-45c3-959f-182cc9d06680) ### PoC Frontend: 1. Pass basic authentication (SSO/Access Code). 2. Set the Base URL to a private attack address. 3. Configure the request method to be a server-side request. 4. At the self-set attack address, retrieve the API Key information from the request headers. Backend: 1. The LobeChat version allows setting the Base URL. 2. There is no outbound traffic whitelist. ### Impact All community version LobeChat users using SSO/Access Code authentication, tested on version 0.162.13.