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Symfony 2.0.11 carried a [similar] XXE security fix, however, on review of ZF2 I also noted a vulnerability to XML Entity Expansion (XEE) attacks whereby all extensions making use of libxml2 have no defense against XEE Quadratic Blowup Attacks. The vulnerability is a function of there being no current method of disabling custom entities in PHP (i.e. defined internal to the XML document without using external entities). In a QBA, a long entity can be defined and then referred to multiple times in document elements, creating a memory sink with which Denial Of Service attacks against a host's RAM can be mounted. The use of the LIBXML_NOENT or equivalent option in a dependent extension amplified the impact (it doesn't actually mean "No Entities"). In addition, libxml2's innate defense against the related Exponential or Billion Laugh's XEE attacks is active only so long as the LIBXML_PARSEHUGE is NOT set (it disables libxml2's hardcoded entity recursion limit). No instances of these two opt...

The XMLEncoder component of Symfony 2.0.x fails to disable external entities when parsing XML. In the Symfony2 framework the XML class may be used to deserialize objects or as part of a client/server API. By using external entities it is possible to include arbitrary files from the file system.

Symfony 2.0.6 has just been released. It addresses a security vulnerability in the EntityUserProvider as provided in the Doctrine bridge. If you let your users update their login/username from a form, and if you are using Doctrine as a user provider, then you are vulnerable and you should upgrade as soon as possible. The issue is that it is possible for a user to switch to another one. Here is how to reproduce it: The current user changes its username via a form to another existing username. When the form is submitted, he will have a validation error (as the username already exists) but the user object in the session will still be modified to the new username. This user from the session will be used for the next requests and so the user will be switched to this other user. The fix is to always refresh the user via the primary key (which cannot be updated via a form) instead of the username. If you cannot upgrade immediately, please apply the following patch: https://github.com/symf...

The XMLEncoder component of Symfony 2.0.x fails to disable external entities when parsing XML. In the Symfony2 framework the XML class may be used to deserialize objects or as part of a client/server API. By using external entities it is possible to include arbitrary files from the file system.

Symfony 2.0.11 carried a [similar] XXE security fix, however, on review of ZF2 I also noted a vulnerability to XML Entity Expansion (XEE) attacks whereby all extensions making use of libxml2 have no defense against XEE Quadratic Blowup Attacks. The vulnerability is a function of there being no current method of disabling custom entities in PHP (i.e. defined internal to the XML document without using external entities). In a QBA, a long entity can be defined and then referred to multiple times in document elements, creating a memory sink with which Denial Of Service attacks against a host's RAM can be mounted. The use of the LIBXML_NOENT or equivalent option in a dependent extension amplified the impact (it doesn't actually mean "No Entities"). In addition, libxml2's innate defense against the related Exponential or Billion Laugh's XEE attacks is active only so long as the LIBXML_PARSEHUGE is NOT set (it disables libxml2's hardcoded entity recursion limit). No instances of these two opt...

All 2.2.X, 2.3.X, 2.4.X, and 2.5.X versions of the Symfony HttpKernel component are affected by this security issue. Your application is vulnerable only if the ESI feature is enabled and there is a proxy in front of the web application. This issue has been fixed in Symfony 2.3.19, 2.4.9, and 2.5.4. Note that no fixes are provided for Symfony 2.2 as it is not maintained anymore. Description When you enable the ESI feature and when you are using a proxy like Varnish that you configured as a trusted proxy, the `FragmentHandler` considered requests to render fragments as coming from a trusted source, even if the client was requesting them directly. Symfony can not distinguish between ESI requests done on behalf of the client by Varnish and faked fragment requests coming directly from the client. To mitigate this issue, and for not-supported Symfony versions, you can use the following workaround in your Varnish configuration (`/_fragment` being the URL path prefix configured under the `f...

All 2.0.X, 2.1.X, 2.2.X, 2.3.X, 2.4.X, 2.5.X, and 2.6.X versions of the Symfony HttpFoundation component are affected by this security issue. This issue has been fixed in Symfony 2.3.27, 2.5.11, and 2.6.6. Note that no fixes are provided for Symfony 2.0, 2.1, 2.2, and 2.4 as they are not maintained anymore. ### Description The Symfony\Component\HttpFoundation\Request class provides a mechanism that ensures it does not trust HTTP header values coming from a "non-trusted" client. Unfortunately, it assumes that the remote address is always a trusted client if at least one trusted proxy is involved in the request; this allows a man-in-the-middle attack between the latest trusted proxy and the web server. The following methods are impacted: getPort(), isSecure(), and getHost(), and getClientIps(). ### Resolution All impacted methods now check that the remote address is trusted, which fixes the issue. The patch for this issue is available [here](https://github.com/symfony/symfony/pull/1...

All 2.0.X, 2.1.X, 2.2.X, 2.3.X, 2.4.X, and 2.5.X versions of the Symfony HttpFoundation component are affected by this security issue. This issue has been fixed in Symfony 2.3.19, 2.4.9, and 2.5.4. Note that no fixes are provided for Symfony 2.0, 2.1, and 2.2 as they are not maintained anymore. ### Description When an application uses an HTTP basic or digest authentication, Symfony does not parse the `Authorization` header properly, which could be exploited in some server setups (no exploits have been demonstrated though.) ### Resolution The parsing of the `Authorization` header has been fixed to comply to the HTTP specification. The patch for this issue is available here: https://github.com/symfony/symfony/pull/11829

All 2.0.X, 2.1.X, 2.2.X, 2.3.X, 2.4.X, and 2.5.X versions of the Symfony HttpFoundation component are affected by this security issue. This issue has been fixed in Symfony 2.3.19, 2.4.9, and 2.5.4. Note that no fixes are provided for Symfony 2.0, 2.1, and 2.2 as they are not maintained anymore. Description When an arbitrarily long hostname is sent by a client, its parsing in `Request::getHost()` can lead to a DoS attack, due to the way we validate the hostname via a regular expression. Resolution The regular expression used to parse and validate the hostname from the HTTP request has been modified to avoid too much sensitivity to the submitted value length. The patch for this issue is available here: https://github.com/symfony/symfony/pull/11828

An application is vulnerable if it uses the client IP address as returned by the Request::getClientIp() method for sensitive decisions like IP based access control. To fix this security issue, the following changes have been made to all versions of Symfony2: A new Request::setTrustedProxies() method has been introduced and should be used intead of Request::trustProxyData() to enable the trust proxy mode. It takes an array of trusted proxy IP addresses as its argument: ``` // before (probably in your front controller script) Request::trustProxyData(); // after Request::setTrustedProxies(array('1.1.1.1')); // 1.1.1.1 being the IP address of a trusted reverse proxy ``` The Request::trustProxyData() method has been deprecated (when used, it automatically trusts the latest proxy in the chain -- which is the current remote address): ``` Request::trustProxyData(); // is equivalent to Request::setTrustedProxies(array($request->server->get('REMOTE_ADDR'))); ``` We encourage all Symfony2 use...