ghsa

### Summary Due to a validation error in `got.scpaping`, it is possible to use an HTTP redirect to avoid IP filtering. ### Details In `got.scpaping`, Summaly first makes a HTTP `HEAD` request to the page being summarized. It then preforms private IP address checks on the `HEAD` response, then makes an additional HTTP `GET` request to the page being summarized. Unfortunately, since private IP address checks aren't performed on the `GET` response, the `GET` response can issue a HTTP redirect to a private IP address, which will succeed, regardless of if private IP addresses are allowed by Summaly. ### PoC With a simple Caddy webserver, you can get Summaly to summarize a page hosted via a local IP address: ```caddy @summaly-bypass-head { method HEAD path /summaly-bypass } @summaly-bypass-get { method GET path /summaly-bypass } header @summaly-bypass-head Content-Type "text/html" respond @summaly-bypass-head 200 redir @summaly-bypass-get http://127.0.0.1:3080/ ``` ### Imp...

### Impact Based on an analysis of the timing of post login API responses, it's possible to determine whether an account exists. ### Patches Patched in 10.8.10 and 13.8.1. ### Workarounds None available.

## Impact: A security issue has been found in `terraform-provider-windns` before version `1.0.5`. The `windns_record` resource did not santize the input variables. This can lead to authenticated command injection in the underlyding powershell command prompt. ## Patches: [`83ef736 (fix: better input validation)`](https://github.com/nrkno/terraform-provider-windns/commit/c76f69610c1b502f90aaed8c4f102194530b5bce) ## Fixed versions: - `v1.0.5`

### Affected Environments Note that this issue only affects the V0 engine, which has been off by default since v0.8.0. Further, the issue only applies to a deployment using tensor parallelism across multiple hosts, which we do not expect to be a common deployment pattern. Since V0 is has been off by default since v0.8.0 and the fix is fairly invasive, we have decided not to fix this issue. Instead we recommend that users ensure their environment is on a secure network in case this pattern is in use. The V1 engine is not affected by this issue. ### Impact In a multi-node vLLM deployment using the V0 engine, vLLM uses ZeroMQ for some multi-node communication purposes. The secondary vLLM hosts open a `SUB` ZeroMQ socket and connect to an `XPUB` socket on the primary vLLM host. https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/blob/c21b99b91241409c2fdf9f3f8c542e8748b317be/vllm/distributed/device_communicators/shm_broadcast.py#L295-L301 When data is received on this `SUB` socket, it is deserializ...

Schema parsing in the parquet-avro module of Apache Parquet 1.15.0 and previous versions allows bad actors to execute arbitrary code. While 1.15.1 introduced a fix to restrict untrusted packages, the default setting of trusted packages still allows malicious classes from these packages to be executed. The exploit is only applicable if the client code of parquet-avro uses the "specific" or the "reflect" models deliberately for reading Parquet files. ("generic" model is not impacted) Users are recommended to upgrade to 1.15.2 or set the system property "org.apache.parquet.avro.SERIALIZABLE_PACKAGES" to an empty string on 1.15.1. Both are sufficient to fix the issue.

Security policies like [`allowed-gadgets`](https://inspektor-gadget.io/docs/latest/reference/restricting-gadgets), [`disallow-pulling`](https://inspektor-gadget.io/docs/latest/reference/disallow-pulling), [`verify-image`](https://inspektor-gadget.io/docs/latest/reference/verify-assets#verify-image-based-gadgets) can be bypassed by a malicious client. ### Impact Users running `ig` in daemon mode or IG on Kubernetes that rely on any of the features mentioned above are vulnerable to this issue. In order to exploit this, the client needs access to the server, like the correct TLS certificates on the `ig daemon` case or access to the cluster in the Kubernetes case. ### Patches The issue has been fixed in v0.40.0 ### Workarounds There is not known workaround to fix it.

Incorrect access control in the /admin/** API of brcc v1.2.0 allows attackers to gain access to Admin rights via a crafted request.

Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability exists in Mezzanine CMS 6.0.0 in the "View Entries" feature within the Forms module.

### Summary A LLM application leveraging `XMLToolMessage` class may be exposed to untrusted XML input that could result in DoS and/or exposing local files with sensitive information. ### Details `XMLToolMessage` uses `lxml` without safeguards: https://github.com/langroid/langroid/blob/df6227e6c079ec22bb2768498423148d6685acff/langroid/agent/xml_tool_message.py#L51-L52 `lxml` is vulnerable to quadratic blowup attacks and processes external entity declarations for local files by default. Check here: https://pypi.org/project/defusedxml/#python-xml-libraries ### PoC A typical Quadratic blowup XML payload looks like this: ```xml <!DOCTYPE bomb [ <!ENTITY a "aaaaaaaaaa"> <!ENTITY b "&a;&a;&a;&a;&a;&a;&a;&a;&a;&a;"> <!ENTITY c "&b;&b;&b;&b;&b;&b;&b;&b;&b;&b;"> ]> <bomb>&c;</bomb> ``` Here, &a; expands to 10 characters, &b; expands to 100, and &c; expands to 1000, causing exponential memory usage and potentially crashing the application. ### Fix Langroid 0.53.4 initializes `XMLParser` with...

### Summary Cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in the [Attributes extension](https://commonmark.thephpleague.com/extensions/attributes/) of the league/commonmark library (versions 1.5.0 through 2.6.x) allows remote attackers to insert malicious JavaScript calls into HTML. ### Details The league/commonmark library provides configuration options such as `html_input: 'strip'` and `allow_unsafe_links: false` to mitigate cross-site scripting (XSS) attacks by stripping raw HTML and disallowing unsafe links. However, when the Attributes Extension is enabled, it introduces a way for users to inject arbitrary HTML attributes into elements via Markdown syntax using curly braces. As a result, even with the secure configuration shown above, an attacker can inject dangerous attributes into applications using this extension via a payload such as: ```md ![](){onerror=alert(1)} ``` Which results in the following HTML: ```html <p><img onerror="alert(1)" src="" alt="" /></p> ``` Which cause...