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# Microsoft Security Advisory CVE-2025-55247 | .NET Denial of Service Vulnerability ## <a name="executive-summary"></a>Executive summary Microsoft is releasing this security advisory to provide information about a vulnerability in .NET 8.0.xxx, .NET 9.0.xxx and .NET 10.0.xxx. This advisory also provides guidance on what developers can do to update their environments to remove this vulnerability. A vulnerability exists in .NET where predictable paths for MSBuild's temporary directories on Linux let another user create the directories ahead of MSBuild, leading to DoS of builds. This only affects .NET on Linux operating systems. ## Announcement Announcement for this issue can be found at https://github.com/dotnet/announcements/issues/370 ### <a name="mitigation-factors"></a>Mitigation factors Projects which do not utilize the [DownloadFile](https://learn.microsoft.com/visualstudio/msbuild/downloadfile-task) build task are not susceptible to this vulnerability. ## <a name="affect...

### Impact An uncaught panic triggered by malformed input to `alloy_dyn_abi::TypedData` could lead to a denial-of-service (DoS) via `eip712_signing_hash()`. Software with high availability requirements such as network services may be particularly impacted. If in use, external auto-restarting mechanisms can partially mitigate the availability issues unless repeated attacks are possible. ### Patches The vulnerability was patched by adding a check to ensure the element is not empty before accessing its first element; an error is returned if it is empty. The fix is included in version [`v1.4.1`](https://crates.io/crates/alloy-dyn-abi/1.4.1) and backported to [`v0.8.26`](https://crates.io/crates/alloy-dyn-abi/0.8.26). ### Workarounds There is no known workaround that mitigates the vulnerability. Upgrading to a patched version is the recommended course of action. ### Reported by Christian Reitter & Zeke Mostov from [Turnkey](https://www.turnkey.com/)

### Summary An SMTP Command Injection (CRLF Injection) vulnerability in Netty's SMTP codec allows a remote attacker who can control SMTP command parameters (e.g., an email recipient) to forge arbitrary emails from the trusted server. This bypasses standard email authentication and can be used to impersonate executives and forge high-stakes corporate communications. ### Details The root cause is the lack of input validation for Carriage Return (\r) and Line Feed (\n) characters in user-supplied parameters. The vulnerable code is in io.netty.handler.codec.smtp.DefaultSmtpRequest, where parameters are directly concatenated into the SMTP command string. For example, when SmtpRequests.rcpt(recipient) is called, a malicious recipient string containing CRLF sequences can inject a new, separate SMTP command. Because the injected commands are sent from the server's trusted IP, any resulting emails will likely pass SPF and DKIM checks, making them appear legitimate to the victim's email clien...

This issue affects Apache Spark versions before 3.4.4, 3.5.2 and 4.0.0. Apache Spark versions before 4.0.0, 3.5.2 and 3.4.4 use an insecure default network encryption cipher for RPC communication between nodes. When spark.network.crypto.enabled is set to true (it is set to false by default), but spark.network.crypto.cipher is not explicitly configured, Spark defaults to AES in CTR mode (AES/CTR/NoPadding), which provides encryption without authentication. This vulnerability allows a man-in-the-middle attacker to modify encrypted RPC traffic undetected by flipping bits in ciphertext, potentially compromising heartbeat messages or application data and affecting the integrity of Spark workflows. To mitigate this issue, users should either configure spark.network.crypto.cipher to AES/GCM/NoPadding to enable authenticated encryption or enable SSL encryption by setting spark.ssl.enabled to true, which provides stronger transport security.

### Summary Prototype pollution capabilities on various APIs. ### Details Injection of malicious payload allows attacker to remotely execute arbitrary code. `Parse.Object` and internal APIs are affected, specifically: - `ParseObject.fromJSON` - `ParseObject.pin` - `ParseObject.registerSubclass` - `ObjectStateMutations` (internal) - `encode`/`decode` (internal) ### PoC Demonstrative tests added as part of the fix. ### References - https://github.com/parse-community/Parse-SDK-JS/security/advisories/GHSA-9f2h-7v79-mxw3 - Patch https://github.com/parse-community/Parse-SDK-JS/releases/tag/7.0.0-alpha.1

Flowise v3.0.1 < 3.0.8 and all versions after with 'ALLOW_BUILTIN_DEP' enabled contain an authenticated remote code execution vulnerability and node VM sandbox escape due to insecure use of integrated modules (Puppeteer and Playwright) within the nodevm execution environment. An authenticated attacker able to create or run a tool that leverages Puppeteer/Playwright can specify attacker-controlled browser binary paths and parameters. When the tool executes, the attacker-controlled executable/parameters are run on the host and circumvent the intended nodevm sandbox restrictions, resulting in execution of arbitrary code in the context of the host. **NOTE**: This vulnerability was incorrectly assigned as a duplicate CVE-2025-26319 and should be considered distinct from that identifier.

# Microsoft Security Advisory CVE-2025-55315: .NET Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability ## <a name="executive-summary"></a>Executive summary Microsoft is releasing this security advisory to provide information about a vulnerability in ASP.NET Core 10.0 , ASP.NET Core 9.0 , ASP.NET Core 8.0, and ASP.NET Core 2.3. This advisory also provides guidance on what developers can do to update their applications to address this vulnerability. Inconsistent interpretation of http requests ('http request/response smuggling') in ASP.NET Core allows an authorized attacker to bypass a security feature over a network. ## Discussion Discussion for this issue can be found at https://github.com/dotnet/announcements/issues/372 ### <a name="mitigation-factors"></a>Mitigation factors Microsoft has not identified any mitigating factors for this vulnerability. ## <a name="affected-software"></a>Affected software * Any ASP.NET Core 10.0 application running on ASP.NET Core 10.0.0-rc.1.25451.107 or earl...

Name: ASA-2025-003: Invalid BitArray handling can lead to network halt Criticality: High (Considerable Impact; Possible Likelihood per [ACMv1.2](https://github.com/interchainio/security/blob/main/resources/CLASSIFICATION_MATRIX.md)) Affected versions: `<= v0.38.18`, `<= v0.37.15`, and `main` development branches Affected users: Validators, Full nodes, Users ### Description A bug was discovered in CometBFT's handling of `BitArray`'s that have a mismatch between the `BitArray`'s expected number of `Elems` for the specified number of `Bits`. Additional validation was added to prevent processing `BitArray`'s in this invalid state, as well as guards to prevent panics on `BitArray` methods if one of these invalid states is processed. ### Impact `BitArray`'s are present in a number of messages received from peers. When handling these messages, insufficient validation was applied to prevent processing messages the aforementioned invalid state. In the worst case, nodes will gossip messages t...

### Summary An HTML injection vulnerability in plaintext emails generated by Mailgen has been discovered. Your project is affected if you use the `Mailgen.generatePlaintext(email)` method and pass in user-generated content. The issue was discovered and reported by Edoardo Ottavianelli (@edoardottt). ### Details The following function (inside index.js) is intended to strip all HTML content to produce a plaintext string. ```javascript // Plaintext text e-mail generator Mailgen.prototype.generatePlaintext = function (params) { // Plaintext theme not cached? if (!this.cachedPlaintextTheme) { throw new Error('An error was encountered while loading the plaintext theme.'); } // Parse email params and get back an object with data to inject var ejsParams = this.parseParams(params); // Render the plaintext theme with ejs, injecting the data accordingly var output = ejs.render(this.cachedPlaintextTheme, ejsParams); // Definition of the <br /> tag ...

### Summary An authenticated party can add a malicious name to the Energy entity, allowing for Cross-Site Scripting attacks against anyone who can see the Energy dashboard, when they hover over any information point (The blue bar in the picture below) <img width="955" height="568" alt="1_cens" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/ed855216-c306-4b50-affc-cda100e72b74" /> An alternative, and more impactful scenario, is that the entity gets a malicious name from the provider of the Entity (in this case the energy provider: Tibber), and gets exploited that way, through the default name. ### Details The incriminating entity in my scenario is from the Tibber integration, as shown in the screenshot below: <img width="822" height="309" alt="2_cens" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/d0d5a7aa-8d0c-4dcb-825b-e4cb8ea8885b" /> The exploit should be possible regardless of the Energy integration, as the user can name the entity themselves and as such pick a malicious na...