ghsa

### Impact I can convince the UI to let me do things with an invalid Application. 1. Admin gives me `p, michael, applications, *, demo/*, allow`, where `demo` can just deploy to the `demo` namespace 2. Admin gives me AppProject `dev` which reconciles from ns `dev-apps` 3. Admin gives me `p, michael, applications, sync, dev/*, allow`, i.e. no updating via the UI allowed, gitops-only 4. I create an Application called `pwn` in `dev-apps` with project dev and sync the app with sources from git 5. I change the Application’s project to demo via kubectl or gitops (whichever mechanism my admins have given me, because it should be safe) 6. I use the UI to edit the resource which should only be mutable via gitops ### Patches A patch for this vulnerability has been released in the following Argo CD versions: v2.10.7 v2.9.12 v2.8.16 ### For more information If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: Open an issue in [the Argo CD issue tracker](https://github.com/argoproj/arg...

### Summary `gix-transport` does not check the username part of a URL for text that the external `ssh` program would interpret as an option. A specially crafted clone URL can smuggle options to SSH. The possibilities are syntactically limited, but if a malicious clone URL is used by an application whose current working directory contains a malicious file, arbitrary code execution occurs. ### Details This is related to the patched vulnerability https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-rrjw-j4m2-mf34, but appears less severe due to a greater attack complexity. Since https://github.com/Byron/gitoxide/pull/1032, `gix-transport` checks the host and path portions of a URL for text that has a `-` in a position that will cause `ssh` to interpret part of all of the URL as an option argument. But it does not check the non-mandatory username portion of the URL. As in Git, when an address is a URL of the form `ssh://username@hostname/path`, or when it takes the special form `username@hostname:dirs/r...

Amazon AWS Amplify CLI before 12.10.1 incorrectly configures the role trust policy of IAM roles associated with Amplify projects. When the Authentication component is removed from an Amplify project, a Condition property is removed but "Effect":"Allow" remains present, and consequently sts:AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity would be available to threat actors with no conditions. Thus, if Amplify CLI had been used to remove the Authentication component from a project built between August 2019 and January 2024, an "assume role" may have occurred, and may have been leveraged to obtain unauthorized access to an organization's AWS resources. NOTE: the problem could only occur if an authorized AWS user removed an Authentication component. (The vulnerability did not give a threat actor the ability to remove an Authentication component.) However, in realistic situations, an authorized AWS user may have removed an Authentication component, e.g., if the objective were to stop using built-in Cognito resou...

There is a potential vulnerability in Traefik managing HTTP/2 connections. More details in the [CVE-2023-45288](https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2023-45288). ## Patches - https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v2.11.2 - https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.0.0-rc5 ## Workarounds No workaround ## For more information If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, please [open an issue](https://github.com/traefik/traefik/issues).

### Impact Cilium allows outside actors (`world` entity) to directly access pods with their internal pod IP, even if they are not exposed explicitly (e.g. via `LoadBalancer`). A pod that does not authenticate clients and that does not exclude `world` traffic via network policy may leak sensitive data to an attacker _inside the cloud VPC_. ### Patches The issue has been patched in [v2.16.3](https://github.com/edgelesssys/constellation/releases/tag/v2.16.3). ### Workarounds This network policy excludes all `world` traffic. It mitigates the problem, but will also block all desired external traffic. If vulnerable pods are known, a policy can be crafted to only firewall those instead (see also https://docs.cilium.io/en/stable/security/policy/language/#access-to-from-outside-cluster). ```yaml apiVersion: "cilium.io/v2" kind: CiliumClusterwideNetworkPolicy metadata: name: "from-world-to-role-public" spec: endpointSelector: matchLabels: {} # role: public ingressDeny: -...

TCPDF before 6.7.4 mishandles calls that use HTML syntax.

## Impact `OpenTelemetry.Instrumentation.Http` writes the `url.full` attribute/tag on spans (`Activity`) when tracing is enabled for outgoing http requests and `OpenTelemetry.Instrumentation.AspNetCore` writes the `url.query` attribute/tag on spans (`Activity`) when tracing is enabled for incoming http requests. These attributes are defined by the [Semantic Conventions for HTTP Spans](https://github.com/open-telemetry/semantic-conventions/blob/main/docs/http/http-spans.md). Up until the `1.8.1` the values written by `OpenTelemetry.Instrumentation.Http` & `OpenTelemetry.Instrumentation.AspNetCore` will pass-through the raw query string as was sent or received (respectively). This may lead to sensitive information (e.g. EUII - End User Identifiable Information, credentials, etc.) being leaked into telemetry backends (depending on the application(s) being instrumented) which could cause privacy and/or security incidents. Note: Older versions of `OpenTelemetry.Instrumentation.Http` & `...

The Dusk plugin provides some special routes as part of its testing framework to allow a browser environment (such as headless Chrome) to act as a user in the Backend or User plugin without having to go through authentication. This route is `[[URL]]/_dusk/login/[[USER ID]]/[[MANAGER]]` - where `[[URL]]` is the base URL of the site, `[[USER ID]]` is the ID of the user account and `[[MANAGER]]` is the authentication manager (either `backend` for Backend, or `user` for the User plugin). If a configuration of a site using the Dusk plugin is set up in such a way that the Dusk plugin is available publicly and the test cases in Dusk are run with live data, this route may potentially be used to gain access to any user account in either the Backend or User plugin without authentication. As indicated in the [README](https://github.com/wintercms/wn-dusk-plugin/blob/main/README.md), this plugin should only be used in development and should *NOT* be used in a production instance. It is specifical...

### Impact Prior to the patched version, an authenticated user of Mautic could read system files and access the internal addresses of the application due to a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability. ### Patches Update to 4.4.12 or 5.0.4 ### Workarounds None ### References - https://owasp.org/Top10/A10_2021-Server-Side_Request_Forgery_%28SSRF%29/ If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: Email us at [security@mautic.org](mailto:security@mautic.org)

NiceGUI is an easy-to-use, Python-based UI framework. A local file inclusion is present in the NiceUI leaflet component when requesting resource files under the `/_nicegui/{__version__}/resources/{key}/{path:path}` route. As a result any file on the backend filesystem which the web server has access to can be read by an attacker with access to the NiceUI leaflet website. This vulnerability has been addressed in version 1.4.21. Users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this vulnerability.