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### Impact Attackers can create long chains of CAs that would lead to OctoRPKI exceeding its max iterations parameter that would cause the program to crash and not finish the validation and thus a denial of service. ### Patches This issue is fixed in v1.4.4 ### Workarounds None.

Prior to version 0.4.2, `conduit-hyper` did not check any limit on a request's length before calling [`hyper::body::to_bytes`](https://docs.rs/hyper/latest/hyper/body/fn.to_bytes.html). An attacker could send a malicious request with an abnormally large `Content-Length`, which could lead to a panic if memory allocation failed for that request. In version 0.4.2, `conduit-hyper` sets an internal limit of 128 MiB per request, otherwise returning status 400 ("Bad Request"). This crate is part of the implementation of Rust's [crates.io](https://crates.io/), but that service is not affected due to its existing cloud infrastructure, which already drops such malicious requests. Even with the new limit in place, `conduit-hyper` is not recommended for production use, nor to directly serve the public Internet. The vulnerability was discovered by Ori Hollander from the JFrog Security Research team.

phpMyFAQ prior to version 3.1.8 is vulnerable to reflected cross-site scripting.

phpMyFAQ prior to version 3.1.8 is vulnerable to stored Cross-site Scripting.

phpMyFAQ prior to version 3.1.8 has Weak Password Requirements. Version 3.1.8 introduces an eight-character minimum password length.

### Impact The user controlled twig templates rendering in `Pimcore/Mail` & `ClassDefinition\Layout\Text` is vulnerable to server-side template Injection RCE. ### Patches Update to version 10.5.9 or apply this patch manually https://github.com/pimcore/pimcore/pull/13347.patch ### Workarounds Apply https://github.com/pimcore/pimcore/pull/13347.patch manually. ### References Credits: @nth347 from Viettel Cyber Security

### Impact This vulnerability creates a false sense of security for keylime users -- i.e. a user could query keylime and conclude that a parcitular node/agent is correctly attested, while attestations are not in fact taking place. **Short explanation**: the keylime verifier creates periodic reports on the state of each attested agent. The keylime verifier runs a set of python asynchronous processes to challenge attested nodes and create reports on the outcome. The vulnerability consists of the above named python asynchronous processes failing silently, i.e. quitting without leaving behind a database entry, raising an error or producing even a mention of an error in a log. The silent failure can be triggered by a small set of transient network failure conditions; recoverable device driver crashes being one such condition we saw in the wild. ### Patches The problem is fixed in keylime starting with tag 6.5.1 ### Workarounds This [patch](https://github.com/keylime/keylime/pull/112...

Users can read any files by log server, Apache DolphinScheduler users should upgrade to version 2.0.6 or higher.

Hashicorp Boundary is vulnerable to Clickjacking which allow for the interception of login credentials, re-direction of users to malicious sites, or causing users to perform malicious actions on the site.

### Impact The Snowboard framework in affected versions is vulnerable to prototype pollution in the main Snowboard class as well as its plugin loader. ### Patches This issue has been patched in https://github.com/wintercms/winter/commit/2a13faf99972e84c9661258f16c4750fa99d29a1 (for 1.2) and https://github.com/wintercms/winter/commit/bce4b59584abf961e9400af3d7a4fd7638e26c7f (for 1.1) and is available with Winter v1.1.10 and v1.2.1. ### Workarounds If you have not yet upgraded, or are using the 1.1 branch of Winter (1.1.8 or above), you can avoid this issue by following some common security practices for JavaScript, including implementing a [content security policy](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/CSP) and auditing your scripts. The 1.0 branch of Winter is not affected, as it does not contain the Snowboard framework. ### For more information If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: - Email us at [hello@wintercms.com](mailto:hello@wintercms.co...