#auth

Multiple npm packages have been compromised as part of a software supply chain attack after a maintainer's account was compromised in a phishing attack. The attack targeted Josh Junon (aka Qix), who received an email message that mimicked npm ("support@npmjs[.]help"), urging them to update their update their two-factor authentication (2FA) credentials before September 10, 2025, by clicking on

Geedge Networks, a company with ties to the founder of China’s mass censorship infrastructure, is selling its censorship and surveillance systems to at least four other countries in Asia and Africa.

At least 18 popular JavaScript code packages that are collectively downloaded more than two billion times each week were briefly compromised with malicious software today, after a developer involved in maintaining the projects was phished. The attack appears to have been quickly contained and was narrowly focused on stealing cryptocurrency. But experts warn that a similar attack with a slightly more nefarious payload could quickly lead to a disruptive malware outbreak that is far more difficult to detect and restrain.

# Summary pREST provides a simple way for users to expose access their database via a REST-full API. The project is implemented using the Go programming language and is designed to expose access to Postgres database tables. During an independent review of the project, Doyensec engineers found that SQL injection is a systemic problem in the current implementation (version `v2.0.0-rc2`). Even though there are several instances of attempts to sanitize user input and mitigate injection attempts, we have found that on most code-paths, the protection is faulty or non-existent. ## Core Endpoints The main functionality providing REST operations on the data stored in the Postgres database is exposed via the following endpoints: - `GET /{database}/{schema}/{table}` - `POST /{database}/{schema}/{table}` - `PUT|PATCH /{database}/{schema}/{table}` - `DELETE /{database}/{schema}/{table}` Handlers for the above endpoints execute very similar logic. At a high-level they: 1. Perform authenticati...

An XSS issue was reported in the MCP Inspector local development tool when connecting to an untrusted remote MCP server with a malicious redirect URI. This could be leveraged to interact directly with the inspector proxy to trigger arbitrary command execution. Users are advised to update to 0.16.6 to resolve this issue. Thank you to the following researchers for their reports and contributions: * Raymond (Veria Labs) * Gavin Zhong, [superboyzjc@gmail.com](mailto:superboyzjc@gmail.com) & Shuyang Wang, [swang@obsidiansecurity.com](mailto:swang@obsidiansecurity.com).

### Impact The blog application in XWiki allowed remote code execution for any user who has edit right on any page. Normally, these are all logged-in users as they can edit their own user profile. To exploit, it is sufficient to add an object of type `Blog.BlogPostClass` to any page and to add some script macro with the exploit code to the "Content" field of that object. ### Patches The vulnerability has been patched in the blog application version 9.14 by executing the content of blog posts with the rights of the appropriate author. ### Workarounds We're not aware of any workarounds. ### Resources * https://jira.xwiki.org/browse/BLOG-191 * https://github.com/xwiki-contrib/application-blog/commit/b98ab6f17da3029576f42d12b4442cd555c7e0b4

### Summary The OAuth client creation and update endpoints of the Fides Webserver API do not properly authorize scope assignment. This allows highly privileged users with `client:create` or `client:update` permissions to escalate their privileges to owner-level. ### Details When creating or updating OAuth clients, the API validates only that requested scopes exist in the system registry. It does not verify that the requester already possesses the scopes they are assigning, allowing these users to assign arbitrary scopes to OAuth clients. ### Impact This allows contributor-level users to escalate to owner-equivalent privileges, gaining access to user management, system configuration, and permission assignment capabilities they should not possess. ### Patches The vulnerability has been patched in Fides version `2.69.1`. Users are advised to upgrade to this version or later to secure their systems against this threat. ### Workarounds There are no workarounds. ### Risk Level This vuln...

### Summary The Fides Admin UI login endpoint relies on a general IP-based rate limit for all API traffic and lacks specific anti-automation controls designed to protect against brute-force attacks. This could allow attackers to conduct credential testing attacks, such as credential stuffing or password spraying, which poses a risk to accounts with weak or previously compromised passwords. ### Details Fides uses a configurable, system-wide rate limit to control traffic from any single IP address. Because this single limit must be set high enough to accommodate endpoints that receive a large volume of legitimate traffic, it offers only weak protection for the login endpoint. The system is not equipped with more advanced protections tailored specifically for authentication ### Impact Although password complexity requirements and the global rate limit make a traditional brute-force attack against a single account difficult, the lack of authentication-specific protections exposes Fid...

The breach kickstarted a massive supply chain attack that led to the compromise of hundreds of Salesforce instances through stolen OAuth tokens.

### Summary Admin UI user password changes in Fides do not invalidate active user sessions, creating a vulnerability chaining opportunity where attackers who have obtained session tokens through other attack vectors (such as XSS) can maintain access even after password reset. This issue is not directly exploitable on its own and requires a prerequisite vulnerability to obtain valid session tokens in the first place. ### Details Fides uses encrypted authentication tokens with extended expiration periods. When a password is changed via password reset endpoints, the system updates the password hash in the database but does not invalidate existing client sessions or tokens. The authentication system validates tokens based on their cryptographic integrity and expiration time, not against the current password state. The frontend application stores authentication state in browser local storage, which persists across browser sessions until explicit logout or natural token expiration. This...