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#c++
** DISPUTED ** __btrfs_free_extent in fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c in the Linux kernel through 5.3.12 calls btrfs_print_leaf in a certain ENOENT case, which allows local users to obtain potentially sensitive information about register values via the dmesg program. NOTE: The BTRFS development team disputes this issues as not being a vulnerability because “1) The kernel provide facilities to restrict access to dmesg - dmesg_restrict=1 sysctl option. So it's really up to the system administrator to judge whether dmesg access shall be disallowed or not. 2) WARN/WARN_ON are widely used macros in the linux kernel. If this CVE is considered valid this would mean there are literally thousands CVE lurking in the kernel - something which clearly is not the case.”
On the x86-64 architecture, the GNU C Library (aka glibc) before 2.31 fails to ignore the LD_PREFER_MAP_32BIT_EXEC environment variable during program execution after a security transition, allowing local attackers to restrict the possible mapping addresses for loaded libraries and thus bypass ASLR for a setuid program.
This Saturday 9th of November, there will be a keynote from Microsoft engineers Ryan Levick and Sebastian Fernandez at RustFest Barcelona. They will be talking about why Microsoft is exploring Rust adoption, some of the challenges we’ve faced in this process, and the future of Rust adoption in Microsoft. If you want to talk with some of the people working on how Microsoft is evolving its code practices for better security, be sure to attend the keynote and talk to Ryan and Sebastian afterwards!
In two previous blog posts ( part 1 and part 2), we talked about using Semmle QL in C and C++ codebases to find vulnerabilities such as integer overflow, path traversal, and those leading to memory corruption. In this post, we will explore applying Semmle QL to web security by hunting for one of the most common type of client-side vulnerabilities: DOM-based cross-site scripting (XSS).
In two previous blog posts ( part 1 and part 2), we talked about using Semmle QL in C and C++ codebases to find vulnerabilities such as integer overflow, path traversal, and those leading to memory corruption. In this post, we will explore applying Semmle QL to web security by hunting for one of the most common type of client-side vulnerabilities: DOM-based cross-site scripting (XSS).
An issue was discovered in Xen through 4.12.x allowing ARM guest OS users to cause a denial of service via a XENMEM_add_to_physmap hypercall. p2m->max_mapped_gfn is used by the functions p2m_resolve_translation_fault() and p2m_get_entry() to sanity check guest physical frame. The rest of the code in the two functions will assume that there is a valid root table and check that with BUG_ON(). The function p2m_get_root_pointer() will ignore the unused top bits of a guest physical frame. This means that the function p2m_set_entry() will alias the frame. However, p2m->max_mapped_gfn will be updated using the original frame. It would be possible to set p2m->max_mapped_gfn high enough to cover a frame that would lead p2m_get_root_pointer() to return NULL in p2m_get_entry() and p2m_resolve_translation_fault(). Additionally, the sanity check on p2m->max_mapped_gfn is off-by-one allowing "highest mapped + 1" to be considered valid. However, p2m_get_root_pointer() will return NULL. The problem co...
In axohelp.c before 1.3 in axohelp in axodraw2 before 2.1.1b, as distributed in TeXLive and other collections, sprintf is mishandled.
Over the course of my internship at the Microsoft Security Response Center (MSRC), I worked on the safe systems programming languages (SSPL) team to promote safer languages for systems programming where runtime overhead is important, as outlined in this blog. My job was to port a security critical network processing agent into Rust to eliminate the memory safety bugs that had plagued it.
Directory Traversal in the function http_verify in nostromo nhttpd through 1.9.6 allows an attacker to achieve remote code execution via a crafted HTTP request.
Exiv2 0.27.2 allows attackers to trigger a crash in Exiv2::getULong in types.cpp when called from Exiv2::Internal::CiffDirectory::readDirectory in crwimage_int.cpp, because there is no validation of the relationship of the total size to the offset and size.