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**Reporter:** Lumina Mescuwa **Product:** ImageMagick 7 (MagickCore) **Component:** `MagickCore/blob.c` (Blob I/O - BlobStream) **Tested:** 7.1.2-0 (source tag) and 7.1.2-1 (Homebrew), macOS arm64, clang-17, Q16-HDRI **Impact:** Heap out-of-bounds **WRITE** (attacker-controlled bytes at attacker-chosen offset) → memory corruption; potential code execution --- ## Executive Summary For memory-backed blobs (**BlobStream**), [`SeekBlob()`](https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/blob/3fcd081c0278427fc0e8ac40ef75c0a1537792f7/MagickCore/blob.c#L5106-L5134) permits advancing the stream **offset** beyond the current end without increasing capacity. The subsequent [`WriteBlob()`](https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/blob/3fcd081c0278427fc0e8ac40ef75c0a1537792f7/MagickCore/blob.c#L5915-L5938) then expands by **`quantum + length`** (amortized) instead of **`offset + length`**, and copies to `data + offset`. When `offset ≫ extent`, the copy targets memory beyond the allocatio...

### Summary A Use-After-Free (UAF) vulnerability has been discovered in the Sdf_PathNode module of the Pixar OpenUSD library. This issue occurs during the deletion of the Sdf_PrimPathNode object in multi-threaded environments, where freed memory is accessed. This results in segmentation faults or bus errors, allowing attackers to potentially exploit the vulnerability for remote code execution (RCE). By using a specially crafted .usd file, an attacker could gain control of the affected system. The vulnerability has been confirmed in multiple OpenUSD tools, including sdfdump, usdtree, usdcat, and sdffilter. ### Patches This is fixed with [commit 0d74f31](https://github.com/PixarAnimationStudios/OpenUSD/commit/0d74f31fe64310791e274e587c9926335e9db9db), with the fix available in OpenUSD 25.08 and onwards. ### Details The issue is a Use-After-Free vulnerability in the Sdf_PathNode destruction process, specifically in Sdf_PrimPathNode::~Sdf_PrimPathNode(). When multiple threads attempt to...

Cybersecurity researchers have lifted the lid on a previously undocumented threat cluster dubbed GhostRedirector that has managed to compromise at least 65 Windows servers primarily located in Brazil, Thailand, and Vietnam. The attacks, per Slovak cybersecurity company ESET, led to the deployment of a passive C++ backdoor called Rungan and a native Internet Information Services (IIS) module

The North Korea-linked threat actor known as the Lazarus Group has been attributed to a social engineering campaign that distributes three different pieces of cross-platform malware called PondRAT, ThemeForestRAT, and RemotePE. The attack, observed by NCC Group's Fox-IT in 2024, targeted an organization in the decentralized finance (DeFi) sector, ultimately leading to the compromise of an

Cybersecurity researchers have disclosed a stealthy new backdoor called MystRodX that comes with a variety of features to capture sensitive data from compromised systems. "MystRodX is a typical backdoor implemented in C++, supporting features like file management, port forwarding, reverse shell, and socket management," QiAnXin XLab said in a report published last week. "Compared to typical

Cybersecurity today is less about single attacks and more about chains of small weaknesses that connect into big risks. One overlooked update, one misused account, or one hidden tool in the wrong hands can be enough to open the door. The news this week shows how attackers are mixing methods—combining stolen access, unpatched software, and clever tricks to move from small entry points to large

### Impact A denial-of-service was found in Exiv2 version v0.28.5: a quadratic algorithm in the ICC profile parsing code in `jpegBase::readMetadata()` can cause Exiv2 to run for a long time. Exiv2 is a command-line utility and C++ library for reading, writing, deleting, and modifying the metadata of image files. The denial-of-service is triggered when Exiv2 is used to read the metadata of a crafted jpg image file. ### Patches The bug is fixed in version v0.28.6. ### References Issue: https://github.com/Exiv2/exiv2/issues/3333 Fixes: https://github.com/Exiv2/exiv2/pull/3335 (main branch), https://github.com/Exiv2/exiv2/pull/3345 (0.28.x branch) ### For more information Please see our [security policy](https://github.com/Exiv2/exiv2/security/policy) for information about Exiv2 security.

### Impact An out-of-bounds read was found in Exiv2 versions v0.28.5 and earlier. Exiv2 is a command-line utility and C++ library for reading, writing, deleting, and modifying the metadata of image files. The out-of-bounds read is triggered when Exiv2 is used to write metadata into a crafted image file. An attacker could potentially exploit the vulnerability to cause a denial of service by crashing Exiv2, if they can trick the victim into running Exiv2 on a crafted image file. Note that this bug is only triggered when writing the metadata, which is a less frequently used Exiv2 operation than reading the metadata. For example, to trigger the bug in the Exiv2 command-line application, you need to add an extra command-line argument such as delete. ### Patches The bug is fixed in version v0.28.6. ### Credit Thank you to @dragonArthurX for reporting this issue. ### Details (from original report by @dragonArthurX ) **Version:** Tested on v0.28.5 (latest official release) Commit: 907169fa...

Cisco Talos’ Vulnerability Discovery & Research team recently disclosed ten vulnerabilities in BioSig Libbiosig, nine in Tenda AC6 Router, eight in SAIL, two in PDF-XChange Editor, and one in a Foxit PDF Reader. The vulnerabilities mentioned in this blog post have been patched by their respective vendors, all in

## Summary Passing a geometry string containing only a colon (":") to montage -geometry leads GetGeometry() to set width/height to 0. Later, ThumbnailImage() divides by these zero dimensions, triggering a crash (SIGFPE/abort), resulting in a denial of service. ## Details **Root Cause** 1. `montage -geometry ":" ...` reaches `MagickCore/geometry.c:GetGeometry().` 2. `StringToDouble/InterpretLocaleValue` parses `":"` as `0.0;` then: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/blob/0ba1b587be17543b664f7ad538e9e51e0da59d17/MagickCore/geometry.c#L355 `WidthValue` (and/or `HeightValue)` is set with a zero dimension. 3. In MagickCore/resize.c:ThumbnailImage(), the code computes: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/blob/0ba1b587be17543b664f7ad538e9e51e0da59d17/MagickCore/resize.c#L4625-L4629 causing a division by zero and immediate crash. The issue is trivially triggerable without external input files (e.g., using `xc:white`). ### Reproduction Environment ``` Version: ImageMagick 7.1...