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## Summary - **Target:** ImageMagick (commit `ecc9a5eb456747374bae8e07038ba10b3d8821b3`) - **Type:** Undefined Behavior (function-type-mismatch) in splay tree cloning callback - **Impact:** Deterministic abort under UBSan (DoS in sanitizer builds). No crash in a non-sanitized build; likely low security impact. - **Trigger:** Minimal **2-byte** input parsed via MagickWand, then coalescing. ## Environment OS: macOS (Apple Silicon/arm64) Homebrew clang version 20.1.8 Target: arm64-apple-darwin24.5.0 Thread model: posix InstalledDir: /opt/homebrew/Cellar/llvm/20.1.8/bin Configuration file: /opt/homebrew/etc/clang/arm64-apple-darwin24.cfg Homebrew ImageMagick: `magick -version` → `ImageMagick 7.1.2-0 Q16-HDRI aarch64` pkg-config: `MagickWand-7.Q16HDRI` version `7.1.2` Library configure flags (capsule build): ./configure --disable-shared --enable-static --without-modules --without-magick-plus-plus --disable-openmp --without-perl --without-x --with-png=yes --without-jpeg --without-tiff --with...

## **Vulnerability Details** The magnified size calculations in `ReadOneMNGIMage` (in `coders/png.c`) are unsafe and can overflow, leading to memory corruption. The source snippet below is heavily abbreviated due to the size of the function, but hopefully the important points are captured. ```c static Image *ReadOneMNGImage(MngReadInfo* mng_info, const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception) { // Lots of stuff, this is effectively a state machine for the MNG rendering commands, // skip to the point where we start processing the "MAGN" command. if (memcmp(type,mng_MAGN,4) == 0) { png_uint_16 magn_first, magn_last, magn_mb, magn_ml, magn_mr, magn_mt, magn_mx, magn_my, magn_methx, magn_methy; // Details unimportant, but each of the `magn_xxx` variables is read from the file. if (magn_first == ...

## **Vulnerability Details** When performing image magnification in `ReadOneMNGIMage` (in `coders/png.c`), there is an issue around the handling of images with separate alpha channels. When loading an image with a color type that implies a separate alpha channel (ie. `jng_color_type >= 12`), we will load the alpha pixels in this loop: ```c if (logging != MagickFalse) (void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(), " Reading alpha from alpha_blob."); jng_image=ReadImage(alpha_image_info,exception); if (jng_image != (Image *) NULL) for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++) { s=GetVirtualPixels(jng_image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception); q=GetAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception); // [0] if ((s == (const Quantum *) NULL) || (q == (Quantum *) NULL)) break; if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait) for (x=(ssize_t) image->columns; x != 0; x--) ...

### Summary While Processing a crafted TIFF file, imagemagick crashes. ### Details Following is the imagemagick version: ``` imagemagick_git/build_26jun23/bin/magick --version Version: ImageMagick 7.1.1-13 (Beta) Q16-HDRI x86_64 56f478940:20230625 https://imagemagick.org Copyright: (C) 1999 ImageMagick Studio LLC License: https://imagemagick.org/script/license.php Features: Cipher DPC HDRI Delegates (built-in): fontconfig freetype jbig jng jpeg lcms lzma pangocairo png tiff webp x xml zlib Compiler: gcc (4.2) ``` ### PoC issue can be replicated with following command with provided POC file(sent over email): ```bash magick poc.tiff /dev/null ``` ### Impact This can lead to application crash. ### Credits Please give credits to Hardik shah of Vehere (Dawn Treaders team)

## Summary In ImageMagick's `magick stream` command, specifying multiple consecutive `%d` format specifiers in a filename template causes a memory leak. ## Details - **Vulnerability Type:** Memory leak - **Affected Version:** ImageMagick 7.1.1-47 (as of commit 82572afc, June 2025) ## Reproduction ### Tested Environment - **Operating System:** Ubuntu 22.04 LTS - **Architecture:** x86_64 - **Compiler:** gcc with AddressSanitizer (gcc version: 11.4.0) ### Reproduction Steps ```bash # Clone source git clone --depth 1 --branch 7.1.1-47 https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick.git ImageMagick-7.1.1 cd ImageMagick-7.1.1 # Build with ASan CFLAGS="-g -O0 -fsanitize=address -fno-omit-frame-pointer" CXXFLAGS="$CFLAGS" LDFLAGS="-fsanitize=address" ./configure --enable-maintainer-mode --enable-shared && make -j$(nproc) && make install # Trigger crash ./utilities/magick stream %d%d a a ``` ### Output ``` $ magick stream %d%d a a stream: no decode delegate for this image format `' @ erro...

# Heap Buffer Overflow in InterpretImageFilename ## Summary A heap buffer overflow was identified in the `InterpretImageFilename` function of ImageMagick. The issue stems from an off-by-one error that causes out-of-bounds memory access when processing format strings containing consecutive percent signs (`%%`). ## Environment - **OS**: Arch Linux (Linux gmkhost 6.14.2-arch1-1 # 1 SMP PREEMPT_DYNAMIC Thu, 10 Apr 2025 18:43:59 +0000 x86_64 GNU/Linux (GNU libc) 2.41) - **Architecture**: x86_64 - **Compiler**: gcc (GCC) 15.1.1 20250425 ## Reproduction ### Build Instructions ```bash # Clone the repository git clone https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick.git cd ImageMagick git reset --hard 8fff9b4f44d2e8b5cae2bd6db70930a144d15f12 # Build with AddressSanitizer export CFLAGS="-fsanitize=address -g -O1" export CXXFLAGS="-fsanitize=address -g -O1" export LDFLAGS="-fsanitizer=address" ./configure make # Set library path and trigger the crash export LD_LIBRARY_PATH="$(pwd)/MagickWand/.lib...

## Summary In ImageMagick's `magick mogrify` command, specifying multiple consecutive `%d` format specifiers in a filename template causes internal pointer arithmetic to generate an address below the beginning of the stack buffer, resulting in a stack overflow through `vsnprintf()`. ## Details - **Vulnerability Type:** CWE-124: Buffer Underwrite - **Affected Component:** MagickCore/image.c - Format processing within InterpretImageFilename() - **Affected Version:** ImageMagick 7.1.1-47 (as of commit 82572afc, June 2025) - **CWE-124: Buffer Underwrite:** A vulnerability where writing occurs to memory addresses before the beginning of a buffer. This is caused by a design flaw in fixed offset correction, resulting in negative pointer arithmetic during consecutive format specifier processing. ## Reproduction ### Tested Environment - **Operating System:** Ubuntu 22.04 LTS - **Architecture:** x86_64 - **Compiler:** gcc with AddressSanitizer (gcc version: 11.4.0) ### Reproduction Steps ...

As of January 10, 2023, CISA will no longer be updating ICS security advisories for Siemens product vulnerabilities beyond the initial advisory. For the most up-to-date information on vulnerabilities in this advisory, please see Siemens' ProductCERT Security Advisories (CERT Services | Services | Siemens Global). View CSAF 1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY CVSS v3 9.1 ATTENTION: Exploitable remotely/low attack complexity Vendor: Siemens Equipment: Third-Party Components in SINEC OS Vulnerabilities: Improper Input Validation, Use After Free, Out-of-bounds Read, Incorrect Check of Function Return Value, Incorrect Comparison, Improper Control of Resource Identifiers ('Resource Injection'), Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource with Improper Synchronization ('Race Condition'), NULL Pointer Dereference, Excessive Platform Resource Consumption within a Loop, Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling, Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer, Buffer Copy with...

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Menlo Park, United States, 30th July 2025, CyberNewsWire